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by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA

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the FR clothing during these five<br />

months. Evidence was submitted<br />

showing that Todd Braden had a per<br />

week expense for care and maintenance<br />

of this clothing. The make whole<br />

remedy was requested for this Grievant<br />

only. 1018<br />

11.02 – Personal Protective Clothing and<br />

Equipment<br />

The employer is not required to provide work<br />

shoes or safety shoes for employees, nor<br />

compensate them for the purchase of such items.<br />

The employer did not require safety shoes, but<br />

prohibited tennis shoes and sandals. The<br />

department’s regulation only recommends safety<br />

or heavy work shoes. No one has been<br />

disciplined for the shoes they wore except when<br />

they work tennis shoes or had been also guilty of<br />

insubordination because they had refused to<br />

change shoes after being ordered to do so. The<br />

employer’s department’s policies about shoe<br />

have been in place for several years. Failure to<br />

grieve earlier constituted acquiescence in the<br />

employer’s interpretation of the contract. Finally,<br />

33.01 and 33.02 reference specific requirements<br />

regarding the furnishing of uniforms and tools. If<br />

the union wanted the employer to supply shoes,<br />

it should have negotiated for the requirement.<br />

For the arbitrator to impose such a requirement<br />

would be to add to the contract in violation of<br />

25.03 which prohibits the arbitrator form doing<br />

so. 259<br />

Throughout 2007 there was confusion<br />

about what was required to be<br />

purchased and what was optional for<br />

fire-resistant (FR) clothing. The Traffic<br />

Engineer, the Grievants’ supervisor,<br />

relied on information from the ODOT<br />

Central Office and required the<br />

Grievants to wear the FR shirt and pants<br />

beginning in October, 2007. The<br />

supervisor rescinded the order in<br />

February, 2008 when she received the<br />

following email: “All FR Safety<br />

Apparel which has already been<br />

purchased can be distributed to<br />

employees if they wish to wear it.<br />

Since the apparel is only recommended,<br />

it will be the employer’s responsibility<br />

to wash and maintain the safety<br />

apparel.” The supervisor instructed the<br />

Grievants to wear the pants and suit if<br />

they wished, but cleaning and<br />

maintenance was their responsibility.<br />

The contract between the parties states<br />

that the arbitrator cannot impose an<br />

obligation that is “not specifically<br />

required <strong>by</strong> the expressed language of<br />

this Agreement.” OSHA does not<br />

require FR clothing as personal<br />

protective equipment for the Grievants<br />

in the text of Section 1910.335. The<br />

Arbitrator held that the Employer was<br />

not obligated under Article 11.02 to<br />

provide FR shirts and pants to the<br />

Grievants and, consequently, did not<br />

have any obligation to clean and<br />

maintain same. Because the traffic<br />

engineer ordered the five Grievants to<br />

wear the FR shirt and pants from<br />

October, 2007 to February, 2008, the<br />

Employer was contractually responsible<br />

for the cost of cleaning and maintaining<br />

the FR clothing during these five<br />

months. Evidence was submitted<br />

showing that Todd Braden had a per<br />

week expense for care and maintenance<br />

of this clothing. The make whole<br />

remedy was requested for this Grievant<br />

only. 1018<br />

11.03 – Unsafe Conditions<br />

Grievant did not follow the general principle –<br />

“obey now, grieve later.” The section 11.03 right<br />

to refuse unsafe orders applies only where there<br />

are unsafe conditions abnormal to the work<br />

place. While such conditions may have been<br />

present, the grievant’s refusal to vacate her<br />

supervisor’s office rose to a level of<br />

insubordination that was not justified <strong>by</strong> the<br />

unsafe working conditions. She could have<br />

merely declined to work at her regular station.<br />

123<br />

When the grievant, a flagger who was in charge<br />

of directing traffic during construction, left her<br />

post during a storm it was deemed to be Neglect<br />

of Duty and insubordination. The grievant’s<br />

explanation of her leaving her post as a refusal to<br />

work in a dangerous or unsafe work area<br />

(Section 11.03) was not believed. The grievant<br />

was trained in her responsibilities as a flagger,<br />

she knew the storm was approaching and there<br />

were several reasonable alternatives to her action<br />

of abandoning her post. A responsibility<br />

employee faced with similar circumstances<br />

would have attempted a number of reasonable<br />

alternatives rather than place the lives of co-

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