by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA
by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA
by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA
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the FR clothing during these five<br />
months. Evidence was submitted<br />
showing that Todd Braden had a per<br />
week expense for care and maintenance<br />
of this clothing. The make whole<br />
remedy was requested for this Grievant<br />
only. 1018<br />
11.02 – Personal Protective Clothing and<br />
Equipment<br />
The employer is not required to provide work<br />
shoes or safety shoes for employees, nor<br />
compensate them for the purchase of such items.<br />
The employer did not require safety shoes, but<br />
prohibited tennis shoes and sandals. The<br />
department’s regulation only recommends safety<br />
or heavy work shoes. No one has been<br />
disciplined for the shoes they wore except when<br />
they work tennis shoes or had been also guilty of<br />
insubordination because they had refused to<br />
change shoes after being ordered to do so. The<br />
employer’s department’s policies about shoe<br />
have been in place for several years. Failure to<br />
grieve earlier constituted acquiescence in the<br />
employer’s interpretation of the contract. Finally,<br />
33.01 and 33.02 reference specific requirements<br />
regarding the furnishing of uniforms and tools. If<br />
the union wanted the employer to supply shoes,<br />
it should have negotiated for the requirement.<br />
For the arbitrator to impose such a requirement<br />
would be to add to the contract in violation of<br />
25.03 which prohibits the arbitrator form doing<br />
so. 259<br />
Throughout 2007 there was confusion<br />
about what was required to be<br />
purchased and what was optional for<br />
fire-resistant (FR) clothing. The Traffic<br />
Engineer, the Grievants’ supervisor,<br />
relied on information from the ODOT<br />
Central Office and required the<br />
Grievants to wear the FR shirt and pants<br />
beginning in October, 2007. The<br />
supervisor rescinded the order in<br />
February, 2008 when she received the<br />
following email: “All FR Safety<br />
Apparel which has already been<br />
purchased can be distributed to<br />
employees if they wish to wear it.<br />
Since the apparel is only recommended,<br />
it will be the employer’s responsibility<br />
to wash and maintain the safety<br />
apparel.” The supervisor instructed the<br />
Grievants to wear the pants and suit if<br />
they wished, but cleaning and<br />
maintenance was their responsibility.<br />
The contract between the parties states<br />
that the arbitrator cannot impose an<br />
obligation that is “not specifically<br />
required <strong>by</strong> the expressed language of<br />
this Agreement.” OSHA does not<br />
require FR clothing as personal<br />
protective equipment for the Grievants<br />
in the text of Section 1910.335. The<br />
Arbitrator held that the Employer was<br />
not obligated under Article 11.02 to<br />
provide FR shirts and pants to the<br />
Grievants and, consequently, did not<br />
have any obligation to clean and<br />
maintain same. Because the traffic<br />
engineer ordered the five Grievants to<br />
wear the FR shirt and pants from<br />
October, 2007 to February, 2008, the<br />
Employer was contractually responsible<br />
for the cost of cleaning and maintaining<br />
the FR clothing during these five<br />
months. Evidence was submitted<br />
showing that Todd Braden had a per<br />
week expense for care and maintenance<br />
of this clothing. The make whole<br />
remedy was requested for this Grievant<br />
only. 1018<br />
11.03 – Unsafe Conditions<br />
Grievant did not follow the general principle –<br />
“obey now, grieve later.” The section 11.03 right<br />
to refuse unsafe orders applies only where there<br />
are unsafe conditions abnormal to the work<br />
place. While such conditions may have been<br />
present, the grievant’s refusal to vacate her<br />
supervisor’s office rose to a level of<br />
insubordination that was not justified <strong>by</strong> the<br />
unsafe working conditions. She could have<br />
merely declined to work at her regular station.<br />
123<br />
When the grievant, a flagger who was in charge<br />
of directing traffic during construction, left her<br />
post during a storm it was deemed to be Neglect<br />
of Duty and insubordination. The grievant’s<br />
explanation of her leaving her post as a refusal to<br />
work in a dangerous or unsafe work area<br />
(Section 11.03) was not believed. The grievant<br />
was trained in her responsibilities as a flagger,<br />
she knew the storm was approaching and there<br />
were several reasonable alternatives to her action<br />
of abandoning her post. A responsibility<br />
employee faced with similar circumstances<br />
would have attempted a number of reasonable<br />
alternatives rather than place the lives of co-