by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA

ARTICLE 32 – TRAVEL
32.02 – Personal Vehicle
Travel reimbursement is an entirely different issue than
travel time and appears to be covered by 32.02. 160
The arbitrator in interpreting Section 32.02 of the
Agreement found that if meat inspectors are to have a
personal vehicle available during the work day for their
employer’s convenience, they must have it with them and
cannot use public transportation, car pool, or any other
means to get to the plant. Thus meat inspectors that are
assigned to more than one plant during the day and need the
car to get from plant to plant can be said to use their
personal vehicles on the home-to-plant commute by
requirement of the agency. These employees would be
entitled to a minimum of 22 cents per mile from the time
they leave their homes in their personal vehicles. The
grievants in this case were stationary field employees
permanently assigned to a single facility. The grievants are
free to get to their plant assignment in any way they chose.
If they use their own vehicle they do so by choice rather
than an agency requirement. Having a personal vehicle is a
condition of employment not necessitating mileage
reimbursement, but using the vehicle at the behest of the
employer does require reimbursement. 355
Pursuant to Contract Article 32.02, the grievant was entitled
to mileage reimbursement for a 50 mile trip, within the
scope of her employment, taken in her personal vehicle after
reporting to work: 564 (1994- 97 contract)
ARTICLE 33
33.01
Throughout 2007 there was confusion about what
was required to be purchased and what was
optional for fire-resistant (FR) clothing. The
Traffic Engineer, the Grievants’ supervisor, relied
on information from the ODOT Central Office and
required the Grievants to wear the FR shirt and
pants beginning in October, 2007. The supervisor
rescinded the order in February, 2008 when she
received the following email: “All FR Safety
Apparel which has already been purchased can be
distributed to employees if they wish to wear it.
Since the apparel is only recommended, it will be
the employer’s responsibility to wash and maintain
the safety apparel.” The supervisor instructed the
Grievants to wear the pants and suit if they wished,
but cleaning and maintenance was their
responsibility. The contract between the parties
states that the arbitrator cannot impose an
obligation that is “not specifically required by the
expressed language of this Agreement.” OSHA
does not require FR clothing as personal protective
equipment for the Grievants in the text of Section
1910.335. The Arbitrator held that the Employer
was not obligated under Article 11.02 to provide
FR shirts and pants to the Grievants and,
consequently, did not have any obligation to clean
and maintain same. Because the traffic engineer
ordered the five Grievants to wear the FR shirt and
pants from October, 2007 to February, 2008, the
Employer was contractually responsible for the
cost of cleaning and maintaining the FR clothing
during these five months. Evidence was submitted
showing that Todd Braden had a per week expense
for care and maintenance of this clothing. The
make whole remedy was requested for this
Grievant only. 1018
ARTICLE 34 – SERVICE-CONNECTED INJURY
AND ILLNESS
The grievant was removed for excessive absenteeism. The
arbitrator stated that the grievant’s absenteeism was
extraordinary as was management’s failure to discipline the
grievant concerning her repetitive absenteeism. The
arbitrator found that the fact that the grievant used all of her
paid leave and failed to apply for leave without pay,
shielded management form the consequences of its laxness.
It was determined that through Article 5, management has
clear authority to remove the grievant for just cause even
though her absenteeism was not due to misconduct if it was
excessive. The arbitrator found that the grievant’s
numerous absences coupled with the fact that she did not
file for workers’ compensation until after termination, and
never applied for unpaid leave, supported management’s
decision to remove her. 791
34.04 – Occupational Injury Leave
The grievant was conducting union business at the
Warrensville Developmental Center when a client pushed
her and injured her back. Her Occupational Injury Leave
was denied because she was conducting union business. A
settlement was reached concerning a grievance filed over
the employer’s refusal to pay, in which the employer agreed
to withdraw its objection to her OIL application based on
the fact that she was performing union business. Her
application was then denied because her injury was an
aggravation of a pre-existing condition. The arbitrator found
the grievance arbitrable because the settlement was
mistakenly entered into. The grievant believed that her OIL
would be approved while the employer believed that it was
merely removing one basis for denial. The arbitrator
interpreted Appendix K to vest discretion in DAS to make
OIL application decisions. The employees’ attending
physician, however, was found to have authority to release
employees back to work. Additionally, Appendix K was
found not to limit OIL to new injuries only. The grievant’s
OIL claim was ordered to be paid. 420
34.07 Leave to Attend Industrial Commission Hearing
The Arbitrator found that the language of Article
34.07 is clear and unambiguous. The language