by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA
by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA
by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
comported entirely with her initial request for a leave on<br />
July 13 for three (3) hours. The record does not show that<br />
the reason for the prescheduled appointment was for the<br />
same condition that led her to call of her shift. The letter<br />
from the doctor made it clear that they could not provide an<br />
excuse for the entire shift absence requested <strong>by</strong> the<br />
Grievant. There was no testimony from the Grievant about<br />
why she called off her entire shift. The record does not<br />
support the finding that the Employer “demanded” a second<br />
physician’s verification. The physician’s verification<br />
submitted <strong>by</strong> the Grievant supported only a leave for three<br />
(3) hours, and the record is sufficient to show that the<br />
Employer did note this inadequacy to the Grievant on<br />
August 7. Based on the record, the Arbitrator found that the<br />
Grievant failed to provide physician’s verification when<br />
required—an offense under Rule 3F of the Absenteeism<br />
Track set forth in the disciplinary grid. This constituted a<br />
breach <strong>by</strong> the Grievant of her Last Chance Agreement.<br />
Proof of this violation required that “termination be<br />
imposed.” Furthermore, the Arbitrator did not have any<br />
authority to modify this discipline. 993<br />
ARTICLE 30 – ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE WITH<br />
PAY<br />
30.02 – Military Leave<br />
The employer neither violated Section 31.01 of the<br />
Collective bargaining Agreement nor relevant sections of<br />
the Ohio Revised Code when it failed to allow the accrual of<br />
vacation and personal leave while the Grievant was on a<br />
leave of absence and on active duty in the military.<br />
Vacation leave accruals as specified in Section 28.01<br />
required active pay status which the grievant did not<br />
possess. Similarly, personal leave accruals only arise when<br />
as employee is on a paid leave of absence, and Section<br />
31.01(E) defines military leave as unpaid leave with a<br />
proviso. The Revised Code also fails to articulate the type<br />
of benefit sought <strong>by</strong> the Union. A reading of R.C. 5923.05<br />
surfaces the Legislature’s intent to ensure that an employee<br />
on military leave not suffer a loss of pay; however, leave<br />
accruals are never specified in this statute. 889<br />
30.03 – Bereavement Leave<br />
The fundamental question in deciding whether the grievants<br />
would be allowed bereavement leave for the death of their<br />
step fathers is whether the step parent “stands in the place of<br />
a parent.” One grievant indicated that her real father had<br />
died when she was three or four years old and she had no<br />
father until 1976 when her mother married again. It is clear<br />
that the grievant viewed her step-father as a surrogate father.<br />
The fact that her real father had died and her mother had<br />
married her step-father certainly allowed the conclusion that<br />
her step-father stood in the place of a parent and, in fact,<br />
acted as a parent. This grievant was awarded bereavement<br />
leave. One grievant lived with her step-father and had more<br />
contact with him than her real father but her real father was<br />
still living. The grievant’s mother had married her stepfather<br />
and then divorced him and although the step-father<br />
and mother were not living together they did not remarry.<br />
The grievant’s claim for bereavement leave is not<br />
appropriate given that her step-father was not married to her<br />
mother and that her real father is still living. The step-father<br />
in this instance, under the Agreement, did not stand in the<br />
place of a parent. The grievant requested bereavement leave<br />
upon the death of the son of the grievant’s former<br />
“significant other.” There is nothing in the Agreement that<br />
covers a deceased who “stands in the place of son or<br />
daughter” without being a legal step-child. Section 30.03<br />
must be interpreted literally and precisely. It is impossible to<br />
base bereavement leave considerations on the quality of a<br />
particular personal relationship. These decisions must rest<br />
primarily on legal and narrow definitions of the relationship<br />
between the employee and the deceased. 322<br />
30.03 – Bereavement Leave<br />
The arbitrator noted that this matter was in many ways<br />
identical to arbitration no. 11-05(89-11-22)0052-01-09,<br />
Arbitrator John Drotning in which a grievant’s stepfather<br />
acted as a parent for the grievant. In this matter, the<br />
grievant’s husband’s biological mother was deceased. His<br />
aunt performed all aspects of motherhood for him,<br />
becoming his defacto mother. When the grievant married<br />
her husband, his aunt became her defacto mother-in-law.<br />
The deceased aunt fulfilled tests established in the<br />
Collective Bargaining Agreement: 1) she was the grievant’s<br />
mother-in-law and 2) she stood in the place of a parent. 764<br />
30.05 - Witness Duty<br />
There is no doubt that the parties reached an agreement that<br />
the Ohio Administrative Code would be applied to witness<br />
leave situations, and when the parties bargained again in<br />
1989, they continued in the Agreement the existing<br />
language. 473 (1992-94 contract)<br />
Section 30.05 of the Agreement is to be interpreted as<br />
reflecting the operation of Ohio Administrative Code §<br />
123:34-03, “Court Leave”. 473 (1992-94 contract)<br />
Employees subpoenaed to appear before any court<br />
commission, board or other legally constituted body<br />
authorized <strong>by</strong> law to compel the attendance of a witness<br />
shall be granted leave with pay at the regular rate of that<br />
employee EXCEPT that if that employee is a party to the<br />
dispute, he or she may be granted use of vacation time,<br />
personal leave, compensatory time or leave of absence<br />
without pay. 473 (1992-94 contract)<br />
A party to an action shall be considered to be an employee<br />
who is either the plaintiff, petitioner or defendant in a<br />
judicial or administrative proceeding. This should be<br />
considered to include those proceedings which may involve<br />
juveniles. A grievant under the Agreement would not be<br />
considered a part for purposes of Section 30.05. 473 (1992-<br />
94 contract)<br />
ARTICLE 31 - LEAVES OF ABSENCE