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The grievant did not follow call off procedures, but she did not indicate that she would return at some uncertain date and visited the facility when she submitted a request for leave form. She provided the employer with “imperfect notice” regarding her sick leave status but she did not abandon her job. 444 (formerly Article 29.03 of 1986 contract) The Employer failed to support its job abandonment charge on the basis of the doctor’s verification requirement. The institutional practice regarding valid physicians’ verifications is confused, and it becomes quite difficult for any employee to comply with a shifting standard. 444 (formerly Article 29.03 of 1986 contract) The grievant knowingly violated call-off rules and sick leave policy, but those violations did not rise to the level of job abandonment. Once apprised of the Employer’s concerns, she responded immediately. 477 (formerly Article 29.03 of 1986 contract) The fact that the grievant submitted a request for leave form with a doctor’s verification did not excuse her from her call off responsibilities. The grievant also failed to call off on five dates in August, after being explicitly directed to do so. 488 (formerly Article 29.03 of 1986 contract) The grievant’s request for leave form covering the June dates she was absent could not have been submitted until some time after those dates, and the leave request was not approved because the grievant did not call off on those dates. The grievant’s argument that she was out on approved leave is not persuasive. 488 (formerly Article 29.03 of 1986 contract) Under Contract Article 29.04 II.D., inappropriate use of sick leave and appropriate disciplinary action is outlined. Sick leave is misused when a pattern of absences is developed over a period of time. Excessive absenteeism results when an employee uses more sick leave than is granted. The grievant in this case had a poor attendance record and sick leave was abused. Therefore, termination of her employment under 29.04 II.D. was justified. 555 (1994-97 contract) Contract Article 29.04 III.C. states that “when unauthorized use or abuse of sick leave is substantiated, the agency head or designee will effect corrective and progressive discipline, keeping in mind any extenuating or mitigating circumstances.” The Arbitrator held that Article 29.04 III.C. does not mandate that discipline be withheld due to mitigating or extenuating circumstances. Rather, it indicates that such circumstances are to be kept in mind in taking disciplinary action. 555 (1994-97 contract) The grievant was removed for excessive absenteeism. The arbitrator stated that the grievant’s absenteeism was extraordinary as was management’s failure to discipline the grievant concerning her repetitive absenteeism. The arbitrator found that the fact that the grievant used all of her paid leave and failed to apply for leave without pay, shielded management form the consequences of its laxness. It was determined that through Article 5, management has clear authority to remove the grievant for just cause even though her absenteeism was not due to misconduct if it was excessive. The arbitrator found that the grievant’s numerous absences coupled with the fact that she did not file for workers’ compensation until after termination, and never applied for unpaid leave, supported management’s decision to remove her. 791 The grievant was charged with engaging in his outside job, scalping baseball tickets, while on FMLA to care for sick parents. The arbitrator found that the employer failed to prove that the grievant did not provide assistance to his parents while on leave. However, it was clear that the grievant engaged in his supplemental employment while on leave. There was no evidence the parties agreed that FMLA was subject to the same contractual conditions as under Article 29.04 regarding unauthorized use of sick leave or abuse of sick leave. There are no provisions in FMLA restricting an employee’s use of the leave to medical treatment. Though the arbitrator found that the grievant was initially untruthful, his dishonesty did not warrant removal, based on his 16 years of service and satisfactory performance evaluations. The arbitrator noted that if ODOT had a policy regarding non-work which met the test of § 825.312(h) of the FMLA, the decision would have been different. 861 The grievant went on approved disability leave. She exhausted her available leave balances and was placed on Physician’s Verification. The grievant was sent a set of disability forms, but failed to submit the documents or contact the personnel office. The arbitrator found that the grievant’s actions, or inactions, aggravated rather than mitigated the situation. It is reasonable to expect an employee experiencing an extended absence to know that he/she must call his/her supervisor. The grievant made no attempt to contact her employer. The employer made several efforts to contact the grievant regarding her absence and the necessity to contact personnel. Nothing in the record indicates the employer did not have the grievant’s telephone number or correct address; nor was there any indication that the grievant had moved or changed her number. The arbitrator stated he had to assume the grievant blatantly disregarded the employer’s efforts. He found it ironic that had the grievant notified her employer, she could have filed her disability application in a timely manner. 873 The Grievant had a prescheduled medical appointment on the afternoon of July 24. Then the Grievant called off for her entire shift early in the morning of July 24. An Employee is under a duty to provide a statement from a physician who has examined the employee and who has signed the statement. The statement must be provided within three days after returning to work. The Grievant should have submitted a physician’s statement on the new request—the second request for an eight (8) hour leave. The Grievant, instead, submitted the physician’s statement that
comported entirely with her initial request for a leave on July 13 for three (3) hours. The record does not show that the reason for the prescheduled appointment was for the same condition that led her to call of her shift. The letter from the doctor made it clear that they could not provide an excuse for the entire shift absence requested by the Grievant. There was no testimony from the Grievant about why she called off her entire shift. The record does not support the finding that the Employer “demanded” a second physician’s verification. The physician’s verification submitted by the Grievant supported only a leave for three (3) hours, and the record is sufficient to show that the Employer did note this inadequacy to the Grievant on August 7. Based on the record, the Arbitrator found that the Grievant failed to provide physician’s verification when required—an offense under Rule 3F of the Absenteeism Track set forth in the disciplinary grid. This constituted a breach by the Grievant of her Last Chance Agreement. Proof of this violation required that “termination be imposed.” Furthermore, the Arbitrator did not have any authority to modify this discipline. 993 ARTICLE 30 – ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE WITH PAY 30.02 – Military Leave The employer neither violated Section 31.01 of the Collective bargaining Agreement nor relevant sections of the Ohio Revised Code when it failed to allow the accrual of vacation and personal leave while the Grievant was on a leave of absence and on active duty in the military. Vacation leave accruals as specified in Section 28.01 required active pay status which the grievant did not possess. Similarly, personal leave accruals only arise when as employee is on a paid leave of absence, and Section 31.01(E) defines military leave as unpaid leave with a proviso. The Revised Code also fails to articulate the type of benefit sought by the Union. A reading of R.C. 5923.05 surfaces the Legislature’s intent to ensure that an employee on military leave not suffer a loss of pay; however, leave accruals are never specified in this statute. 889 30.03 – Bereavement Leave The fundamental question in deciding whether the grievants would be allowed bereavement leave for the death of their step fathers is whether the step parent “stands in the place of a parent.” One grievant indicated that her real father had died when she was three or four years old and she had no father until 1976 when her mother married again. It is clear that the grievant viewed her step-father as a surrogate father. The fact that her real father had died and her mother had married her step-father certainly allowed the conclusion that her step-father stood in the place of a parent and, in fact, acted as a parent. This grievant was awarded bereavement leave. One grievant lived with her step-father and had more contact with him than her real father but her real father was still living. The grievant’s mother had married her stepfather and then divorced him and although the step-father and mother were not living together they did not remarry. The grievant’s claim for bereavement leave is not appropriate given that her step-father was not married to her mother and that her real father is still living. The step-father in this instance, under the Agreement, did not stand in the place of a parent. The grievant requested bereavement leave upon the death of the son of the grievant’s former “significant other.” There is nothing in the Agreement that covers a deceased who “stands in the place of son or daughter” without being a legal step-child. Section 30.03 must be interpreted literally and precisely. It is impossible to base bereavement leave considerations on the quality of a particular personal relationship. These decisions must rest primarily on legal and narrow definitions of the relationship between the employee and the deceased. 322 30.03 – Bereavement Leave The arbitrator noted that this matter was in many ways identical to arbitration no. 11-05(89-11-22)0052-01-09, Arbitrator John Drotning in which a grievant’s stepfather acted as a parent for the grievant. In this matter, the grievant’s husband’s biological mother was deceased. His aunt performed all aspects of motherhood for him, becoming his defacto mother. When the grievant married her husband, his aunt became her defacto mother-in-law. The deceased aunt fulfilled tests established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement: 1) she was the grievant’s mother-in-law and 2) she stood in the place of a parent. 764 30.05 - Witness Duty There is no doubt that the parties reached an agreement that the Ohio Administrative Code would be applied to witness leave situations, and when the parties bargained again in 1989, they continued in the Agreement the existing language. 473 (1992-94 contract) Section 30.05 of the Agreement is to be interpreted as reflecting the operation of Ohio Administrative Code § 123:34-03, “Court Leave”. 473 (1992-94 contract) Employees subpoenaed to appear before any court commission, board or other legally constituted body authorized by law to compel the attendance of a witness shall be granted leave with pay at the regular rate of that employee EXCEPT that if that employee is a party to the dispute, he or she may be granted use of vacation time, personal leave, compensatory time or leave of absence without pay. 473 (1992-94 contract) A party to an action shall be considered to be an employee who is either the plaintiff, petitioner or defendant in a judicial or administrative proceeding. This should be considered to include those proceedings which may involve juveniles. A grievant under the Agreement would not be considered a part for purposes of Section 30.05. 473 (1992- 94 contract) ARTICLE 31 - LEAVES OF ABSENCE
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INDEX BY CONTRACT SECTION ARTICLE 1
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this case, one cannot conclude that
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Muskingum Counties that were consol
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in Article 24.04 as a meeting. The
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Article 2.01 requires that neither
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The Arbitrator found that when the
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hardship when an employee was on Un
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determined that through Article 5,
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The grievant had a thirty-day time
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Management established a list of in
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the FR clothing during these five m
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11.11 - Concern for Pregnancy Hazar
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of the contract occurred. Based upo
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“In paragraph 3…the word “win
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overtime. The arbitrator found that
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an educated guess, the grievance mu
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2. The Agreement also designates th
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which this particular agreement did
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In this case the Union grieved that
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Arbitrator held that the Grievant f
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when he was placed back into his fo
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selected because she was within ten
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she was in Section 17.04 applicant
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for a new DCS Assessment. The union
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won is not sufficient to prove incr
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Ohio Revised Code 145.298 requires
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18.04 (formerly Article 18.03 of 19
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establishes that the just cause sta
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suspension would be excessive and u
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employee cannot be on “notice”
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grievant was a nine-year employee w
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not lead to the conclusion that the
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grievant’s allegation that the si
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etween the grievant and his supervi
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her car on state property and she p
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The Employer had just cause to remo
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The employer had just cause to remo
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a period of about 10-15 minutes whe
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commodities was completely lacking
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answer questions, even after the De
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offenders. The incident was recorde
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judgment and his less than credible
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employees and the Union are aware t
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once the Youth was on the ground. C
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enroll in an EAP program within fiv
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The parties did not intend that pre
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progressive and commensurate discip
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Bureau of Employment Services, had
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jurisdiction to resolve differences
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language toward a number of inmates
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a motor vehicle with an inoperative
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The grievant was removed for allege
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her work. The arbitrator stated tha
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meeting. The evidence also suggeste
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egarding IME’s within ODNR. The a
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individual under the supervision of
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arbitrator noted that if the behavi
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particularly in light of layoffs, b
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“extraordinarily patient with the
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and he had remained in contact with
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credible. Evidence presented indica
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oad, commonsensical guidelines abou
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aware of the grievant’s poor work
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procedural error. He found that whe
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youth at his facility. The evidence
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COs were aiding in investigations a
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The grievant was involved in a resp
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with sleep apnea and begun treatmen
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that he would have accrued during t
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years of state service. The arbitra
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workers who were aware of the condu
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criminal Assault and Falsification.
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held that removal was unreasonable,
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was knowledgeable of the corrective
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24.04 - Pre-Discipline supervisor.
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equire support before one can estab
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Page 155 and 156: The grievant was an investigator wi
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Page 159 and 160: The grievant was a Corrections Offi
Page 161 and 162: considered the grievant’s guilty
Page 163 and 164: 24.05. The Arbitrator agreed with t
Page 165 and 166: The grievant was reinstated to her
Page 167 and 168: consider that the co-worker may hav
Page 169 and 170: grievant’s removal was upheld, an
Page 171 and 172: once the Youth was on the ground. C
Page 173 and 174: undermines the purpose of the EAP p
Page 175 and 176: exercised its discretion in an arbi
Page 177 and 178: the possible violation was not brou
Page 179 and 180: irrelevant for the purpose of calcu
Page 181 and 182: grievance was held arbitrable, (the
Page 183 and 184: prohibited from using the grievance
Page 185 and 186: employee in her right to bring a gr
Page 187 and 188: 26, 1994. The language of Contract
Page 189 and 190: y the grievant, would be compensabl
Page 191 and 192: committed other acts of neglect of
Page 193 and 194: filed a grievance arguing that assi
Page 195 and 196: guarantee that a document has suffi
Page 197 and 198: 25.08 because the union made excess
Page 199 and 200: 26.03 Work on Holidays No dispute e
Page 201 and 202: ARTICLE 28 - VACATIONS 28.01 - Rate
Page 203: contains various interventions and
Page 207 and 208: ARTICLE 32 - TRAVEL 32.02 - Persona
Page 209 and 210: ARTICLE 36 - WAGES 36.02 - General
Page 211 and 212: 37.04 - In-Service Training Under 3
Page 213 and 214: arbitrator found the grievance arbi
Page 215 and 216: 43.03 - Mid-Term Contractual Change
Page 217 and 218: permanent part-time employees earn
Page 219 and 220: she was evaluated below average in
Page 221 and 222: “similar or related series” as
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