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prohibitions against abuse and use of excessive<br />
force. 955<br />
When the Grievant organized, planned, and<br />
promoted a work stoppage she violated Rule<br />
30B. The Arbitrator believed she developed the<br />
plan and solicited the participation of other<br />
employees. When the grievant organized a work<br />
stoppage in the face of an approaching winter<br />
storm, she engaged in “action that could harm or<br />
potentially harm . . . a member of the general<br />
public” and violated Rule 26. Grievant violated<br />
Rule 4 <strong>by</strong> interfering with the investigation of<br />
the work stoppage. Testimony from other<br />
witnesses showed that the grievant was not<br />
truthful in her accounts of the events. The<br />
Arbitrator believed the state conducted a full and<br />
fair investigation. The Arbitrator did not believe<br />
the grievant was the object of disparate<br />
treatment. Leaders of work actions are identified<br />
and discharged, while employees playing a lesser<br />
role receive less severe penalties. The Arbitrator<br />
did not believe the state failed to use progressive<br />
discipline. In the case of very serious<br />
misconduct an employer is not required to follow<br />
the usual sequence of increasingly severe<br />
discipline. Mitigating factors of long service,<br />
good evaluations, and behaving in a professional<br />
manner in her work as a union steward did not<br />
offset the seriousness of the Grievant’s<br />
misconduct. The Arbitrator concluded that when<br />
the Grievant organized a work stoppage in the<br />
face of major winter storm she provided the state<br />
with just cause for her discharge. 956<br />
The grievance was granted in part and denied in<br />
part. The grievant must enroll in and<br />
successfully complete an EAP program<br />
associated with anger management. The grievant<br />
was required to enroll in the program no later<br />
than thirty days from the date of the award.<br />
Failure to enroll would be grounds for removal.<br />
The grievant was reinstated with all applicable<br />
seniority rights within thirty days of the award.<br />
The discipline was reduced to a two-day fine.<br />
The grievant received no back pay. The grievant<br />
was a Correction Officer charged with<br />
threatening an inmate. The arbitrator found that<br />
the grievant’s conduct warranted discipline;<br />
however, the Union demonstrated that a coworker<br />
who previously committed a similar<br />
offense was treated differently. The employer<br />
offered no explanation for the disparate<br />
treatment. The removal was ruled excessive and<br />
the grievant was reinstated. 957<br />
The grievant was a TPW working third shift at a<br />
group home. When he arrived at work he was<br />
told that a resident was found with knives and<br />
Tylenol. He was instructed to position himself<br />
so he could visually monitor the resident. Coworkers<br />
testified that they saw the grievant<br />
sleeping while on duty. They also testified that<br />
the grievant was not in a physical position to see<br />
the resident if he were on the stairs. During his<br />
shift the grievant placed three telephone calls to<br />
the supervising nurse at home. He was allegedly<br />
rude and disrespectful each time he called. The<br />
arbitrator found that the grievant’s removal was<br />
just. In addition to his rude behavior the grievant<br />
had previously been given a verbal warning and<br />
two (2) five-day working suspensions for similar<br />
offenses within his four years of employment.<br />
958<br />
The central question was whether the Grievant<br />
lost control of security keys to an inmate through<br />
no fault of his own. The Arbitrator felt that the<br />
Grievant used poor judgment in holding the keys<br />
in front of an inmate and letting him take them<br />
without protest. The Grievant’s actions<br />
afterward suggested he knew he had made a<br />
mistake and was trying to cover it up. These<br />
were not actions in-and-of-themselves<br />
warranting termination; however, a proven act of<br />
misconduct must be viewed in context. This was<br />
the Grievant’s sixth performance related<br />
misconduct in his less than two years service and<br />
he was on a Last Chance Agreement strictly<br />
limiting an arbitrator’s authority to that of<br />
reviewing whether he violated the Last Chance<br />
Agreement and/or the rule. When he violated the<br />
rule he broke the Last Chance Agreement and<br />
the Employer had the right to terminate his<br />
employment. The grievance was denied in its<br />
entirety. 961<br />
The grievance was sustained in part and denied<br />
in part. The discharge was to be converted to a<br />
thirty (30) day suspension without pay. The<br />
Grievant was to be restored to employment with<br />
all back pay and benefits, less the thirty day<br />
suspension. The restoration to employment was<br />
to be regarded as a “last chance.” Further<br />
instances of discipline, if not overturned or<br />
modified in the grievance procedure of the<br />
parties, would result in her discharge. Neither<br />
the Employer nor the Union were entirely right<br />
or wrong in the case. The Grievant’s discipline<br />
did not stand in isolation. She had 29+ years of<br />
service with the state with a satisfactory record<br />
until 2004. In addition, she had been diagnosed