Emerging biotechnologies: full report - Nuffield Council on Bioethics
Emerging biotechnologies: full report - Nuffield Council on Bioethics
Emerging biotechnologies: full report - Nuffield Council on Bioethics
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E m e r g i n g b i o t e c h n o l o g i e s<br />
4.24 According to the can<strong>on</strong>ical definiti<strong>on</strong> of ‘utility’ proposed by JS Mill “acti<strong>on</strong>s are right in<br />
proporti<strong>on</strong> as they tend to promote happiness, wr<strong>on</strong>g as they tend to produce the reverse of<br />
happiness.” 276 The difficulty in applying this evaluati<strong>on</strong> to emerging <str<strong>on</strong>g>biotechnologies</str<strong>on</strong>g> is that their<br />
‘tendency’ to produce <strong>on</strong>e thing or the other comes up hard against a paucity of evidence, either<br />
of their producti<strong>on</strong> of these effects, or of relevant experiences from which such effects can be<br />
inferred reliably. In fact we know it is plausible that most prospective <str<strong>on</strong>g>biotechnologies</str<strong>on</strong>g> will<br />
actually not provide benefits, for the reas<strong>on</strong> that they encounter hard c<strong>on</strong>straints and fail during<br />
development, for example, or because they are crowded out by more dominant technologies. 277<br />
Some technologies, we know, actually produce harms, although these may not be easily<br />
foreseen. 278<br />
C H A P T E R 4<br />
4.25 A sec<strong>on</strong>d c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> that tempers this prima facie ethical argument for biotechnology is the<br />
possible existence of opportunity costs, in the form of foreg<strong>on</strong>e opportunities to develop<br />
alternatives approaches. If there is a real possibility of alternatives that would be preferable (at<br />
least from some perspectives) being crowded out by c<strong>on</strong>tingent c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s that facilitate the<br />
development of those that are developed, this might result in foregoing some utility that would<br />
otherwise be available.<br />
4.26 If we acknowledge uncertainty as an irreducible characteristic of emerging <str<strong>on</strong>g>biotechnologies</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the<br />
claims that any particular biotechnology will produce particular outcomes or ‘impacts’ must be<br />
treated with circumspecti<strong>on</strong>. This does not mean that the pursuit of particular outcomes is<br />
unethical; indeed, it is indispensible. The point of this scepticism is to draw attenti<strong>on</strong> to the error<br />
of committing prematurely to two sorts of potential frame: firstly, c<strong>on</strong>struing social ‘challenges’<br />
as hypothecated to technological soluti<strong>on</strong>s (in general or particular) and therefore curtailing the<br />
explorati<strong>on</strong> of other kinds of possible resp<strong>on</strong>se; sec<strong>on</strong>dly, focusing the development of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>biotechnologies</str<strong>on</strong>g> too tightly <strong>on</strong> soluti<strong>on</strong>s to particular challenges and therefore failing to be<br />
sensitive to the range of possible benefits they might bring, perhaps in radically different<br />
c<strong>on</strong>texts.<br />
4.27 In any case, what counts as a benefit or harm, or of whose happiness or unhappiness is<br />
relevant, may well be c<strong>on</strong>tested in the case of <str<strong>on</strong>g>biotechnologies</str<strong>on</strong>g>. 279 Such c<strong>on</strong>tested questi<strong>on</strong>s are<br />
clearly difficult to resolve, but that is what makes them the proper matter of bioethics.<br />
Public values<br />
4.28 In posing questi<strong>on</strong>s of public ethics, we wish to set out three underlying values that we believe<br />
should guide biotechnology assessment. Their point of applicati<strong>on</strong> is the expectati<strong>on</strong>s and<br />
imaginaries that animate attitudes towards <str<strong>on</strong>g>biotechnologies</str<strong>on</strong>g> and orientate decisi<strong>on</strong>s relating to<br />
them. Their aim is to broaden out reflecti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> these orientati<strong>on</strong>s to take account of potential<br />
transformative effects – including effects <strong>on</strong> the structure of society – and opportunity costs. We<br />
do not claim these values are necessarily and eternally valid: they are simply those that, in<br />
relati<strong>on</strong> to the emergence of <str<strong>on</strong>g>biotechnologies</str<strong>on</strong>g> in the present historical c<strong>on</strong>text, appear to us to be<br />
most important, taking into account the public interest in <str<strong>on</strong>g>biotechnologies</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and the broader<br />
c<strong>on</strong>text that prompts the ‘biotechnology wager’.<br />
276 Mill JS (1863) Utilitarianism (L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>: Phoenix, 1993), p6.<br />
277 See paragraphs 1.26, 1.31 and 2.41.<br />
278 Such as CFCs or asbestos, as discussed in Box 1.1.<br />
279 As the authors of an ethical framework for stem cell research in the EU observe: “This questi<strong>on</strong> has proved resistant to<br />
resoluti<strong>on</strong> through philosophical analysis or by scientific definiti<strong>on</strong>s. The moral status, or degrees of protecti<strong>on</strong> to be<br />
accorded to the embryo is c<strong>on</strong>stituted linguistically, culturally, scientifically, politically and through religious and secular<br />
beliefs.” Eurostem (2005) An ethical framework for stem cell research, available at:<br />
http://www.eirma.org/sites/www.eirma.org/files/doc/pubs/briefs/0410stemcell-ethframe.pdf/noproxy, p2.<br />
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