Emerging biotechnologies: full report - Nuffield Council on Bioethics
Emerging biotechnologies: full report - Nuffield Council on Bioethics
Emerging biotechnologies: full report - Nuffield Council on Bioethics
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E m e r g i n g b i o t e c h n o l o g i e s<br />
behind this: firstly, a frame is always necessary to give phenomena significance; sec<strong>on</strong>dly, there<br />
is no ‘universal’ or ‘absolute’ frame that would synthesise every possible meaning or value.<br />
From this it follows that all frames are incomplete, that alternative framings are always possible,<br />
and that it is rarely self-evident that any <strong>on</strong>e frame should be privileged over alternatives.<br />
3.30 Nevertheless, in relati<strong>on</strong> to many familiar social phenomena, specific aspects of frames may be<br />
well-established and widely shared. For example, in a society with comm<strong>on</strong> cultural and<br />
religious traditi<strong>on</strong>s, and commitments to human rights, comm<strong>on</strong> value frameworks c<strong>on</strong>tribute to<br />
making the everyday behaviour of individuals relatively c<strong>on</strong>sistent and predictable, within certain<br />
limits. If it were not for the way that frames are embedded in public discourse, a pernicious<br />
relativism might be inescapable. C<strong>on</strong>sistent moral frames also allow a given individual to make<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sistent choices over time and – importantly – to assimilate novel phenomena. 240 However,<br />
frames are also dynamic; whatever their innate c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of possibility, they are subject to<br />
rec<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong> and learning in resp<strong>on</strong>se to novel challenges.<br />
C H A P T E R 3<br />
3.31 The importance of c<strong>on</strong>sidering alternative frames in the governance of emerging biotechnology<br />
is heightened by the fact that so many social processes operate in the real world effectively to<br />
‘close down’ the plurality of frames that may be applied. These processes are often typical of<br />
routine decisi<strong>on</strong> making processes where instituti<strong>on</strong>al bias or ‘groupthink’ are found. 241 This<br />
does not imply that alternative frames may not coexist with the dominant frame, or <strong>on</strong>ly that they<br />
are not ‘granted’ equal status to influence outcomes. 242 Governance processes that do not<br />
effectively mitigate such pressures may foreclose the range of frames through which emerging<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>biotechnologies</str<strong>on</strong>g> are understood and evaluated. Evidence-based policy making, often c<strong>on</strong>cerned<br />
with formalised assessment of impact and risk, is a comm<strong>on</strong> mitigati<strong>on</strong> but, as we argued in<br />
Chapter 1, 243 with emerging <str<strong>on</strong>g>biotechnologies</str<strong>on</strong>g> there are significant difficulties in applying<br />
evidence, a c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> that has led to our more sceptical and reflective approach. In the next<br />
two secti<strong>on</strong>s, we describe the role of frames in suppressing the uncertainty and ambiguity<br />
associated with emerging <str<strong>on</strong>g>biotechnologies</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Uncertainty reduced to risk<br />
3.32 As we have argued above, <strong>on</strong>e c<strong>on</strong>venient simplificati<strong>on</strong> effected by framing is to bring<br />
phenomena subject to uncertainty and ambiguity within a c<strong>on</strong>text that supposes the possibility<br />
of a rati<strong>on</strong>al preference. As a c<strong>on</strong>sequence, decisi<strong>on</strong>s may be guided by a misplaced<br />
c<strong>on</strong>fidence in the relevance of an evidence base, risk management methodology and<br />
quantificati<strong>on</strong>. Likewise, the significance of ambiguity may be repressed through social<br />
processes of aggregati<strong>on</strong> and c<strong>on</strong>sensus.<br />
3.33 However, even at the limit of <str<strong>on</strong>g>full</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>fidence in the identificati<strong>on</strong> of outcomes and the<br />
assignment of likelihoods of each, it has been shown that decisi<strong>on</strong> making is not immune from<br />
the effects of presentati<strong>on</strong>, manipulati<strong>on</strong> of language, individual psychology and group<br />
dynamics.<br />
3.34 The findings of psychological research have shown that human subjects, when c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>ted with<br />
risk, make choices that are not c<strong>on</strong>sistent with calculative rati<strong>on</strong>ality, 244 that the framing of<br />
choices tends to affect this in certain ways and, in some cases, that the ‘framing effect’ can be<br />
240 See: Plous S (1993) The psychology of judgment and decisi<strong>on</strong> making (New York: McGraw-Hill).<br />
241 For example, the methods by which the Royal Air Force prosecuted its bombing campaign during the Sec<strong>on</strong>d World War, or<br />
the interpretati<strong>on</strong> of intelligence relating to weap<strong>on</strong>s of mass destructi<strong>on</strong> during the lead up to US-led invasi<strong>on</strong> of Iraq in<br />
2003. See: Edgert<strong>on</strong> D (2008) The shock of the old (L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>: Profile), p13-4 and US Select Committee <strong>on</strong> Intelligence (2004)<br />
Report of the Select Committee <strong>on</strong> Intelligence <strong>on</strong> the U.S. intelligence community's prewar intelligence assessments <strong>on</strong><br />
Iraq, together with additi<strong>on</strong>al views, available at: http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/108301.pdf, p18.<br />
242 This does not imply any deliberate intenti<strong>on</strong> to dominate or mislead. It may come about, for example, by means of individual<br />
prejudice, selective resourcing, expedient design, organisati<strong>on</strong>al incentives, ec<strong>on</strong>omic interests, and associated patterns of<br />
advancement, preferment and patr<strong>on</strong>age.<br />
243 See Box 1.2.<br />
244 See the work of Tversky and Kahneman, discussed in paragraphs 2.41, 3.3 and 4.13.<br />
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