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T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c h i n v o l v i n g a n i m a l s evidence so far is inconclusive (see paragraph 4.57). <strong>The</strong> GM approach may also lead to very considerable increases in fetal mortality, and high levels <strong>of</strong> ‘wastage’ <strong>of</strong> <strong>animals</strong> that fail to develop the desired mutations (paragraph 5.23). 3.43 Alternatively, opponents to the GM approach might agree that the technique does not differ fundamentally from some forms <strong>of</strong> selective breeding, but consider that it amplifies the problem <strong>of</strong> deliberately interfering with a species’ genotype in ways that can cause harm. If these observations are correct, the moral discussion then becomes focused on the extent to which genetic modification, and other forms <strong>of</strong> selective breeding, can be conducted without causing harm, as implied by the following response to the Consultation, which focuses on the consequences, 16 rather than the act, <strong>of</strong> modification: Sociability ‘We…consider that it is unlikely that it matters, from the animal’s point <strong>of</strong> view, whether any state <strong>of</strong> suffering was achieved by genetic manipulation or other means.’ AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals UK 3.44 Another philosophical tradition, influenced by philosophers such as Karl Marx, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger, sees sociability as creating a level <strong>of</strong> moral concern. According to this tradition, being a member <strong>of</strong> some form <strong>of</strong> complex community creates moral relations <strong>of</strong> rights and duties. <strong>The</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> such a community might be language or a substantial dependence on others for extensive social, economic or other reasons. But, if this tradition is not to be considered equivalent to the view <strong>of</strong> higher cognitive capacities discussed above, simply with the additional observation that these capacities develop through complex social interaction such as language use, then it must be sociability itself, rather than socially developed attributes, that generates moral concern. 3.45 This approach is plausible in that at least some rights and duties emerge in the context <strong>of</strong> social cooperation. But the argument can be developed in more than one way. One version has been highlighted in the following response to the Consultation: ‘<strong>The</strong>re are…<strong>animals</strong> which have established links with us and come to share our lives and our fate in historically complex ways – particularly dog, cat and horse. I think these links should be respected, even if the <strong>animals</strong> themselves have no knowledge <strong>of</strong> them or <strong>of</strong> their social and cultural significance. For, in disrespecting these links, we disrespect ourselves.’ Roger Scruton <strong>The</strong> view that humans have special responsibilities towards beings that form part <strong>of</strong> a community with them could also explain why some people have a special affinity for pets and working <strong>animals</strong>, and perhaps also why the A(SP)A requires special justification for the use <strong>of</strong> <strong>animals</strong> such as cats and dogs (see paragraph 13.5). 3.46 According to another version <strong>of</strong> the approach it could also be argued that not only the relationship to humans establishes certain responsibilities, but also relationships that <strong>animals</strong> have among themselves. This becomes perhaps most clear in considering <strong>animals</strong> such as primates. Since the species-specific capacities that these <strong>animals</strong> normally develop also include complex social interactions with other <strong>animals</strong>, many argue that expression <strong>of</strong> this behaviour is usually severely restricted in <strong>research</strong>. 17 Such infringements, it is feared, cannot be alleviated in the same way as physiological pain and suffering, the effects <strong>of</strong> which may 16 Other issues relating to the consequences <strong>of</strong> producing GM <strong>animals</strong> arise from the possibility that <strong>research</strong> <strong>animals</strong>, such as rodents, fish or insects, may escape and interbreed with wild <strong>animals</strong>, leading to potentially irreversible changes in the gene pool <strong>of</strong> the species. <strong>The</strong>se issues are outside the scope <strong>of</strong> this Report. 46
T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c h i n v o l v i n g a n i m a l s be mitigated by pain relieving medicines (for a discussion <strong>of</strong> issues arising in relation to assessing pain and suffering in <strong>animals</strong> see Chapter 4). Although proponents <strong>of</strong> the use <strong>of</strong> primates would point out that housing <strong>of</strong> <strong>animals</strong> in groups or in pairs can allow for acceptable levels <strong>of</strong> welfare, opponents are <strong>of</strong>ten not persuaded. <strong>The</strong>y argue that the cage sizes that can be provided in conventional laboratories will always be inadequate. <strong>The</strong>re are also concerns about how these social <strong>animals</strong> might potentially experience the death <strong>of</strong> other <strong>research</strong> <strong>animals</strong> with which they have established relationships. Similar arguments could be made with regard to other social <strong>animals</strong>, such as dogs. It seems plausible that sociability may interact with other features in that, if social dislocation causes distress or suffering or interferes with flourishing to a significant degree, then the overall effect on the animal could be potentially serious. Possession <strong>of</strong> a life 3.47 A perhaps more difficult morally relevant criterion is possession <strong>of</strong> a life. Is life itself <strong>of</strong> value? It may seem that if we think that killing is wrong, then we must be committed to the view that life itself is valuable. However, this need not be the case. Some philosophers have argued that life, as such, has no value, as distinct from the experiences that happen within life. Given this view, it is entirely reasonable to treat pain, suffering and other harms within a life with great moral seriousness without attributing a similar level <strong>of</strong> concern to death. For it can be the case that there are <strong>animals</strong> that have no sense <strong>of</strong> themselves as existing in time, although they may have highly developed capacities <strong>of</strong> sensory experience. In such cases it could be argued that to the <strong>animals</strong> concerned it matters less whether they exist but more how their moment-to-moment existence is characterised. 3.48 This line <strong>of</strong> thought raises the question <strong>of</strong> why we treat human life with special consideration and, in particular, why we experiment on <strong>animals</strong> precisely to find ways <strong>of</strong> prolonging the lives both <strong>of</strong> humans and <strong>animals</strong>. One possible answer, although not necessarily endorsed here, draws on two earlier points. First, most humans, and perhaps some other <strong>animals</strong>, exhibit self-consciousness and an ability to anticipate, reflect upon and fear their own death. Hence, the prospect <strong>of</strong> death usually has a significant secondary effect on the quality <strong>of</strong> lived experience. Secondly, humans, and perhaps some other <strong>animals</strong>, care about each other in the sense that the death <strong>of</strong> others is <strong>of</strong>ten considered a tragedy. Hence, death has special significance for highly social beings. It could therefore be argued that preserving the lives <strong>of</strong> humans and <strong>of</strong> relevant other <strong>animals</strong> should take precedence, with less regard being given to those <strong>animals</strong> that either lack self-consciousness or do not live in social groups. CHAPTER 3 ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY ANIMAL RESEARCH 3.49 A simpler response is to revert to an argument implied above according to which some higher cognitive capacity generates a right to life; most humans and those <strong>animals</strong> that closely share similar features in this respect have such a right, while other <strong>animals</strong> do not. Many attempts have been made to provide a philosophical foundation for this view, although none commands wide agreement (see paragraph 3.20 and Box 3.4). 17 See Smith JA and Boyd KM (Editors) (2002) <strong>The</strong> Boyd Group Papers on <strong>The</strong> use <strong>of</strong> Non-Human Primates in Research and Testing (Leicester: <strong>The</strong> British Psychological Society), available at: http://www.boydgroup.demon.co.uk/Prefaceandsummary.pdf. Accessed on: 18 Apr 2005. 47
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The ethics
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The ethics
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Foreword The issue
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Table of contents
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Stages 1-2: discovery and selection
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Conclusions and recommendations ...
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Terms of reference
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T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c
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Genetic screening: ethical issues P
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