The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
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T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c h i n v o l v i n g a n i m a l s<br />
be mitigated by pain relieving medicines (for a discussi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> issues arising in relati<strong>on</strong> to<br />
assessing pain and suffering in <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> see Chapter 4). Although prop<strong>on</strong>ents <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the use <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
primates would point out that housing <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> in groups or in pairs can allow for<br />
acceptable levels <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> welfare, opp<strong>on</strong>ents are <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>ten not persuaded. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y argue that the cage<br />
sizes that can be provided in c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al laboratories will always be inadequate. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are<br />
also c<strong>on</strong>cerns about how these social <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> might potentially experience the death <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
other <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> with which they have established relati<strong>on</strong>ships. Similar arguments<br />
could be made with regard to other social <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>, such as dogs. It seems plausible that<br />
sociability may interact with other features in that, if social dislocati<strong>on</strong> causes distress or<br />
suffering or interferes with flourishing to a significant degree, then the overall effect <strong>on</strong> the<br />
animal could be potentially serious.<br />
Possessi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a life<br />
3.47 A perhaps more difficult morally relevant criteri<strong>on</strong> is possessi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a life. Is life itself <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
value? It may seem that if we think that killing is wr<strong>on</strong>g, then we must be committed to<br />
the view that life itself is valuable. However, this need not be the case. Some philosophers<br />
have argued that life, as such, has no value, as distinct from the experiences that happen<br />
within life. Given this view, it is entirely reas<strong>on</strong>able to treat pain, suffering and other<br />
harms within a life with great moral seriousness without attributing a similar level <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
c<strong>on</strong>cern to death. For it can be the case that there are <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> that have no sense <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
themselves as existing in time, although they may have highly developed capacities <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
sensory experience. In such cases it could be argued that to the <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>cerned it<br />
matters less whether they exist but more how their moment-to-moment existence is<br />
characterised.<br />
3.48 This line <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> thought raises the questi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> why we treat human life with special<br />
c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> and, in particular, why we experiment <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> precisely to find ways <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
prol<strong>on</strong>ging the lives both <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> humans and <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>. One possible answer, although not<br />
necessarily endorsed here, draws <strong>on</strong> two earlier points. First, most humans, and perhaps<br />
some other <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>, exhibit self-c<strong>on</strong>sciousness and an ability to anticipate, reflect up<strong>on</strong> and<br />
fear their own death. Hence, the prospect <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> death usually has a significant sec<strong>on</strong>dary effect<br />
<strong>on</strong> the quality <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> lived experience. Sec<strong>on</strong>dly, humans, and perhaps some other <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>, care<br />
about each other in the sense that the death <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> others is <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>ten c<strong>on</strong>sidered a tragedy. Hence,<br />
death has special significance for highly social beings. It could therefore be argued that<br />
preserving the lives <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> humans and <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> relevant other <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> should take precedence, with<br />
less regard being given to those <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> that either lack self-c<strong>on</strong>sciousness or do not live in<br />
social groups.<br />
CHAPTER 3 ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY ANIMAL RESEARCH<br />
3.49 A simpler resp<strong>on</strong>se is to revert to an argument implied above according to which some<br />
higher cognitive capacity generates a right to life; most humans and those <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> that<br />
closely share similar features in this respect have such a right, while other <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> do not.<br />
Many attempts have been made to provide a philosophical foundati<strong>on</strong> for this view,<br />
although n<strong>on</strong>e commands wide agreement (see paragraph 3.20 and Box 3.4).<br />
17 See Smith JA and Boyd KM (Editors) (2002) <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Boyd Group Papers <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> use <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> N<strong>on</strong>-Human Primates in Research and<br />
Testing (Leicester: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> British Psychological Society), available at: http://www.boydgroup.dem<strong>on</strong>.co.uk/Prefaceandsummary.pdf.<br />
Accessed <strong>on</strong>: 18 Apr 2005.<br />
47