The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
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T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c h i n v o l v i n g a n i m a l s<br />
3.35 It is plausible to associate the ability to exercise higher cognitive capacities with neurological<br />
complexity. This is not to say that ‘more-developed’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> are more important than ‘lessdeveloped’<br />
<strong>on</strong>es, but that there are more morally questi<strong>on</strong>able ways <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> mistreating the<br />
more-developed <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
3.36 Some object to a view in which moral status is based solely <strong>on</strong> higher cognitive capacities.<br />
This is because it appears that such views fail to <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fer grounds for refraining from causing<br />
unlimited pain or suffering to those beings that lack such capacities. But, as we have said,<br />
it cannot be taken for granted that any <strong>on</strong>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the morally relevant features that we<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sider here can be taken to be a master property. Rather, there are several reas<strong>on</strong>s for<br />
showing moral c<strong>on</strong>cern, <strong>on</strong>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> which is capacity to feel pain, which applies to many<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> that do not exhibit higher cognitive capacities.<br />
Capacity to flourish<br />
3.37 A further basis <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> moral c<strong>on</strong>cern, associated with Aristotle, is the idea <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> having a<br />
telos, a good, or alternatively having interests or species-specific needs. If the <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> are<br />
able to satisfy these needs, <strong>on</strong>e might say that they flourish. This c<strong>on</strong>cept enables us to say<br />
that things may go well or badly for an animal depending <strong>on</strong> how specific envir<strong>on</strong>mental<br />
c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s relate to its usual species-specific development (see paragraphs 4.23–4.26 and<br />
4.41). 14 If this view is not simply to be c<strong>on</strong>sidered equivalent to those already c<strong>on</strong>sidered<br />
(sentience and higher cognitive capacities), there must be a sense in which <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> can<br />
flourish or wither independently <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> these features.<br />
3.38 One way in which the c<strong>on</strong>cept might theoretically be extended is to focus not <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong><br />
avoiding pain and suffering (which may require primarily c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> sentience and<br />
higher cognitive capacities), but to c<strong>on</strong>sider also what envir<strong>on</strong>mental enrichments can be<br />
provided to attend to the species-specific needs. Animals may fail to flourish in laboratory<br />
c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s whether or not they experience pain, suffering or premature death.<br />
3.39 While it may sometimes be difficult to determine when life is best for an animal, the c<strong>on</strong>cept<br />
seems to have clear force in relati<strong>on</strong> to identifying circumstances that fundamentally violate<br />
the expressi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> significant biologically determined features <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a species. For example, if<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> such as dogs, which are a roaming species, are kept in very small and c<strong>on</strong>fined pens<br />
for prol<strong>on</strong>ged periods <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> time, they would usually display stereotypic behaviours, which<br />
indicate that the animal is stressed. But keeping <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> in unnatural envir<strong>on</strong>ments need not<br />
always lead to welfare infringements. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> relevant questi<strong>on</strong> to ask is not whether the<br />
envir<strong>on</strong>ment is natural or not (in nature too, <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> can encounter a number <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> adverse<br />
c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s) but whether it is appropriate with regard to its species-specific capacities and<br />
needs. Thus, if <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> have been bred in captivity and are provided with a sufficiently<br />
complex envir<strong>on</strong>ment, they may in principle be able to develop their potential in similar<br />
ways to <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> living in the wild (see paragraph 4.26). In any case, the c<strong>on</strong>cept <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
flourishing can be seen as important as it establishes a more comprehensive idea <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> animal<br />
well-being than just freedom from pain and suffering.<br />
3.40 Another extensi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the c<strong>on</strong>cept <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> flourishing relates to c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>s about the moral<br />
value <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a species. This may be especially relevant to issues raised by selective breeding and<br />
the genetic modificati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se processes usually aim at altering an aspect <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
genotype <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a species in a targeted and <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>ten unprecedented way. In the c<strong>on</strong>text <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> basic<br />
14 By species-specific development we mean behaviours and dispositi<strong>on</strong>s that the animal has developed during evoluti<strong>on</strong> in<br />
order to be able to resp<strong>on</strong>d to the range <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> situati<strong>on</strong>s typically encountered in its natural habitat.<br />
44