The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
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T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c h i n v o l v i n g a n i m a l s<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> relati<strong>on</strong>ship between moral status and morally relevant features<br />
3.27 Given that neither discussi<strong>on</strong> about the moral status <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> and humans nor<br />
reference to the facts <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> evoluti<strong>on</strong> appears to provide a straightforward answer to the<br />
questi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the permissibility <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> animal <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g>, it may seem unclear how the debate<br />
could be advanced. In the following paragraphs, we suggest that a promising approach<br />
may be to ask what features <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> humans and <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> could qualify them as a moral<br />
subjects (see Box 3.1), thus imposing c<strong>on</strong>straints or limits <strong>on</strong> how they may be treated.<br />
We do not start from the assumpti<strong>on</strong> that there is <strong>on</strong>e ‘master property’ or overriding<br />
criteri<strong>on</strong> which determines how beings may be treated. Similarly, for the purpose <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> this<br />
discussi<strong>on</strong>, we do not assume that there are some species that should never be used for<br />
any purpose, nor that the acceptability <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> using species depends <strong>on</strong> how closely related<br />
they are to humans in evoluti<strong>on</strong>ary terms. Rather, we explore the possibility that there<br />
are five features, at least <strong>on</strong>e or all <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> which may be applicable to specific <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>, albeit<br />
to differing degrees, and with subtly distinct moral c<strong>on</strong>sequences:<br />
■ sentience;<br />
■ higher cognitive capacities;<br />
■ the capacity to flourish;<br />
■ sociability; and<br />
■ the possessi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a life.<br />
We then turn to the sec<strong>on</strong>d, and perhaps more difficult step, which c<strong>on</strong>cerns the<br />
questi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> deciding how such characteristics should be taken into account in moral<br />
decisi<strong>on</strong> making (paragraphs 3.51-3.57).<br />
Sentience<br />
3.28 An emphasis <strong>on</strong> sentience is most comm<strong>on</strong>ly associated with the utilitarian philosophy<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> Jeremy Bentham (see Box 3.3). Sentience, for Bentham, was usually understood as the<br />
capacity to feel pleasure and pain. Although the ascripti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> such states is not always<br />
straightforward (see paragraph 4.2), it is now unc<strong>on</strong>tested that many <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> are<br />
capable <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> feeling pain. Equally, it is unc<strong>on</strong>tested that to cause pain is morally<br />
problematic and so needs to be taken into account in moral reas<strong>on</strong>ing. This is the case<br />
whether the pain is suffered by a human or by any other sentient being.<br />
CHAPTER 3 ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY ANIMAL RESEARCH<br />
3.29 However, some argue that the human experience <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> pain is in some relevant sense<br />
different from that <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>. It may be more intense because <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a greater facility <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
humans to anticipate pain, or because <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the disrupti<strong>on</strong> to social relati<strong>on</strong>ships that<br />
humans can suffer, for example if <strong>on</strong>e member <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a family suffers chr<strong>on</strong>ic pain. This is<br />
sometimes seen to lead to the c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> that it might be more justifiable to use <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
rather than n<strong>on</strong>-c<strong>on</strong>senting humans in harmful <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g>. An alternative argument might<br />
be that humans are far more able than <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> to cope with pain and suffering, especially<br />
when they understand the underlying reas<strong>on</strong>s or purposes. This could suggest that beings<br />
with less-developed rati<strong>on</strong>al capacities are not necessarily suffering less, but more, since<br />
they are not in a positi<strong>on</strong> to c<strong>on</strong>ceptualise pain or suffering as means to ends (see also<br />
paragraph 4.17).<br />
9 See also Ryder R (2001) Painism: A modern reality (L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>: Open Gate Press).<br />
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