The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...

T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c h i n v o l v i n g a n i m a l s
<strong>The</strong> relationship between moral status and morally relevant features
3.27 Given that neither discussion about the moral status <strong>of</strong> <strong>animals</strong> and humans nor
reference to the facts <strong>of</strong> evolution appears to provide a straightforward answer to the
question <strong>of</strong> the permissibility <strong>of</strong> animal <strong>research</strong>, it may seem unclear how the debate
could be advanced. In the following paragraphs, we suggest that a promising approach
may be to ask what features <strong>of</strong> humans and <strong>animals</strong> could qualify them as a moral
subjects (see Box 3.1), thus imposing constraints or limits on how they may be treated.
We do not start from the assumption that there is one ‘master property’ or overriding
criterion which determines how beings may be treated. Similarly, for the purpose <strong>of</strong> this
discussion, we do not assume that there are some species that should never be used for
any purpose, nor that the acceptability <strong>of</strong> using species depends on how closely related
they are to humans in evolutionary terms. Rather, we explore the possibility that there
are five features, at least one or all <strong>of</strong> which may be applicable to specific <strong>animals</strong>, albeit
to differing degrees, and with subtly distinct moral consequences:
■ sentience;
■ higher cognitive capacities;
■ the capacity to flourish;
■ sociability; and
■ the possession <strong>of</strong> a life.
We then turn to the second, and perhaps more difficult step, which concerns the
question <strong>of</strong> deciding how such characteristics should be taken into account in moral
decision making (paragraphs 3.51-3.57).
Sentience
3.28 An emphasis on sentience is most commonly associated with the utilitarian philosophy
<strong>of</strong> Jeremy Bentham (see Box 3.3). Sentience, for Bentham, was usually understood as the
capacity to feel pleasure and pain. Although the ascription <strong>of</strong> such states is not always
straightforward (see paragraph 4.2), it is now uncontested that many <strong>animals</strong> are
capable <strong>of</strong> feeling pain. Equally, it is uncontested that to cause pain is morally
problematic and so needs to be taken into account in moral reasoning. This is the case
whether the pain is suffered by a human or by any other sentient being.
CHAPTER 3 ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY ANIMAL RESEARCH
3.29 However, some argue that the human experience <strong>of</strong> pain is in some relevant sense
different from that <strong>of</strong> <strong>animals</strong>. It may be more intense because <strong>of</strong> a greater facility <strong>of</strong>
humans to anticipate pain, or because <strong>of</strong> the disruption to social relationships that
humans can suffer, for example if one member <strong>of</strong> a family suffers chronic pain. This is
sometimes seen to lead to the conclusion that it might be more justifiable to use <strong>animals</strong>
rather than non-consenting humans in harmful <strong>research</strong>. An alternative argument might
be that humans are far more able than <strong>animals</strong> to cope with pain and suffering, especially
when they understand the underlying reasons or purposes. This could suggest that beings
with less-developed rational capacities are not necessarily suffering less, but more, since
they are not in a position to conceptualise pain or suffering as means to ends (see also
paragraph 4.17).
9 See also Ryder R (2001) Painism: A modern reality (London: Open Gate Press).
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