The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
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T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c h i n v o l v i n g a n i m a l s<br />
ii) <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>involving</str<strong>on</strong>g> primates with no, or minor, welfare implicati<strong>on</strong>s;<br />
iii) <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>involving</str<strong>on</strong>g> mice with substantial welfare implicati<strong>on</strong>s; and<br />
iv) <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>involving</str<strong>on</strong>g> primates with substantial welfare implicati<strong>on</strong>s?<br />
According to the sliding-scale view, the order <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> acceptability ought to be i, iii, ii, iv. However,<br />
for many people, the order i, ii, iii, iv, as presented above, would seem more plausible,<br />
suggesting that an unmodified versi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> this view is less attractive than initially assumed.<br />
3.23 With regard to the moral-equality view, it needs to be remembered that even if humans and<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> are c<strong>on</strong>sidered to be moral equals, it does not necessarily follow that harming<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> in <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> should not be carried out. Moral equality is simply the doctrine that<br />
humans and <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> are moral equals. In principle, this view could allow for the c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong><br />
that harmful experiments should be c<strong>on</strong>ducted both <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> and humans. 8 Alternatively,<br />
the use <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> might be justified for practical reas<strong>on</strong>s. For example, the reproducti<strong>on</strong><br />
rate <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> humans can be too slow for some experiments, or obtaining the quantity <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a test<br />
chemical to dose humans could be impossible. Under these circumstances, it might be more<br />
appropriate to experiment <strong>on</strong> mice and rabbits, even if they are perceived as moral equals.<br />
Finally, it could be argued that where <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> has a negative effect <strong>on</strong> welfare and <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
are less affected than humans, it is preferable to use <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> to minimise the overall harm.<br />
3.24 In c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>, c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the relative moral status does not settle the questi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
permissibility <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> animal <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g>, or <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> any other use <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>, in a helpful manner.<br />
Although it is attractive to think that the questi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> justificati<strong>on</strong> is merely a matter <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
deciding whether the clear-line view, the sliding-scale view or the moral-equality view is the<br />
most adequate, this strategy may obscure more than it illuminates. Some people agree with<br />
this c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> and refer instead to evoluti<strong>on</strong>ary theory as a justificati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a relatively<br />
unrestricted right to use <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Drawing <strong>on</strong> what can be termed the competitive<br />
argument, they may point out that different species must always compete for survival and<br />
that it is natural for any species to put itself first.<br />
3.25 This argument is not compelling. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> fact that humans have survived by dominating other<br />
species does not in itself show that we are morally justified in c<strong>on</strong>tinuing to act in the same<br />
way. Humans have evolved a capacity to reflect up<strong>on</strong> their own behaviour. Much <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> this<br />
reflecti<strong>on</strong> has taken place by means <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> civilisati<strong>on</strong> and especially educati<strong>on</strong>, which have<br />
channelled and changed ‘natural’ behaviour. Attitudes towards many forms <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> behaviour<br />
that were <strong>on</strong>ce justified as natural, as, for example, the dominance <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> men over women, or<br />
even the keeping <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> slaves, have changed substantially in a great number <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> societies (see<br />
also Box 3.4). Moreover, as we have said, if humans do indeed have a higher nature, this<br />
could entail duties <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> protecti<strong>on</strong> and stewardship for lesser beings, rather than the right <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
domini<strong>on</strong> (see paragraph 3.21).<br />
3.26 Hence, it is clear that the competitive argument, which is based <strong>on</strong> the evoluti<strong>on</strong>ary order<br />
or the naturalness <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> certain behaviours, is unpersuasive in justifying ethically why it should<br />
be permissible for humans to use <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> for <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g>. It is crucial to distinguish between<br />
moral and scientific questi<strong>on</strong>s. Although, in particular cases, science may support particular<br />
moral c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>s, it can never be sufficient in itself to settle a moral questi<strong>on</strong>. Any<br />
argument for a moral c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> needs to be based <strong>on</strong> moral premises or assumpti<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
although it may also draw <strong>on</strong> facts, including scientific <strong>on</strong>es. Understanding the relati<strong>on</strong>ship<br />
between the moral and the scientific questi<strong>on</strong>s is vital to achieving clarity in this discussi<strong>on</strong><br />
(see paragraph 3.6).<br />
8 Of course, humans do participate in medical <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> (see paragraphs 8.25–8.28 and box 11.1) but generally it is not harmful<br />
and takes place with prior, voluntarily given c<strong>on</strong>sent.<br />
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