The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
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T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c h i n v o l v i n g a n i m a l s<br />
characterise this subject, we think it important to draw attenti<strong>on</strong> to two fundamental issues<br />
relevant to our discussi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
3.6 First, the relati<strong>on</strong>ship between facts and values is not straightforward. A reas<strong>on</strong>able<br />
discussi<strong>on</strong> between people <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> differing opini<strong>on</strong>s requires clarity about whether the exact<br />
area <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> disagreement c<strong>on</strong>cerns:<br />
■ knowledge <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> facts (disagreement about whether or not a particular animal suffers from<br />
being used in a particular kind <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g>, or about the actual c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
envir<strong>on</strong>ment);<br />
■ the interpretati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> values associated with facts (agreement that <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> involved in a<br />
particular experiment experience pain, but disagreement about whether or not causing<br />
this pain is morally wr<strong>on</strong>g); and<br />
■ the way that values are derived from facts (disagreement about whether or not <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
are capable <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> being members <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ‘moral community’, and if they are, how we might<br />
know, see Box 3.1).<br />
3.7 Sec<strong>on</strong>dly, even if the source <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> disagreement is identified, the questi<strong>on</strong> arises <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> what to do if<br />
<strong>on</strong>e’s own moral judgement is in c<strong>on</strong>flict with new facts, evidence or arguments presented by<br />
others. On <strong>on</strong>e view, such disagreement is unavoidable and, in principle, irrec<strong>on</strong>cilable. Since<br />
facts are usually interpreted differently within frameworks <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> different ethical theories or<br />
belief systems, it is not surprising that prop<strong>on</strong>ents with different viewpoints will differ in their<br />
judgements. However, this is <strong>on</strong>ly true if ethical frameworks are c<strong>on</strong>strued as being<br />
unchangeable in principle. On a different view, new circumstances may enjoin us to test and,<br />
where necessary, revise our frameworks. This can apply to both prop<strong>on</strong>ents <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> particular<br />
ethical theories, as well as to people who have not c<strong>on</strong>sidered ethical issues raised by animal<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> in a systematic way, but who nevertheless hold str<strong>on</strong>g views. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se processes <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
revisi<strong>on</strong> are sometimes described as striving to achieve a ‘reflective equilibrium’ which c<strong>on</strong>sists:<br />
‘… in working back and forth am<strong>on</strong>g our c<strong>on</strong>sidered judgments (some say our ‘intuiti<strong>on</strong>s’)<br />
about particular instances or cases [the relati<strong>on</strong>ship to judgments about similar cases], the<br />
principles or rules that we believe govern them, and the theoretical c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>s that<br />
we believe bear <strong>on</strong> accepting these c<strong>on</strong>sidered judgments, principles, or rules, revising<br />
any <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> these elements wherever necessary in order to achieve an acceptable coherence<br />
am<strong>on</strong>g them. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> method succeeds and we achieve reflective equilibrium when we arrive<br />
at an acceptable coherence am<strong>on</strong>g these beliefs. An acceptable coherence requires that<br />
our beliefs not <strong>on</strong>ly be c<strong>on</strong>sistent with each other (a weak requirement), but that some<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> these beliefs provide support or provide a best explanati<strong>on</strong> for others.’ 2<br />
Thus, c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the many ways in which <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> are used in <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> may require us<br />
not <strong>on</strong>ly to simply apply our system <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> beliefs to this specific matter but, in doing so, to<br />
accept the possibility that some parts <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> our belief system may require revisi<strong>on</strong>. Openness<br />
towards such a process would lead to more refined ethical theories and belief systems and<br />
it could also help identify possible policy reforms to generate practices that are acceptable<br />
to those holding a range <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> moral views. 3<br />
3.8 In this chapter, we generally do not take a view as to whether or not, and if so <strong>on</strong> what basis,<br />
particular arguments in favour or against the use <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> in <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> are justified. Rather,<br />
we comment <strong>on</strong> possible weaknesses <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> specific arguments and return to a more detailed<br />
outline <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> specific positi<strong>on</strong>s in Chapters 14 and 15.<br />
2 Daniels N (2003) Stanford Encyclopedia <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> Philosophy: Reflective equilibrium, available at:<br />
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/#1. Accessed <strong>on</strong>: 11 Apr 2005.<br />
3 See also Thagard P (2000) Coherence in Thought and Acti<strong>on</strong> (MIT-Press).<br />
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