The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...

T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c h i n v o l v i n g a n i m a l s
Ethical issues raised by animal <strong>research</strong>
Introduction
3.1 As we have said, the debate about <strong>research</strong> <strong>involving</strong> <strong>animals</strong> ranges broadly over two
distinct questions. <strong>The</strong> first asks whether animal <strong>research</strong> yields useful knowledge that could
not be gained from other sources. <strong>The</strong> second concerns whether it is morally acceptable for
humans to use <strong>animals</strong> in ways that can cause them harm. <strong>The</strong>se two questions are clearly
related: if it were the case that we learn nothing useful and distinctive from <strong>research</strong> that
may harm <strong>animals</strong>, it would be difficult to see how, on any reasonable view, it could be
morally justified. <strong>The</strong> question <strong>of</strong> scientific justification is therefore fundamental to the
question <strong>of</strong> moral justification and we explore it in detail in Chapters 5–10.
3.2 However, a positive answer to the scientific question does not settle the moral question, for
it may be the case that an experiment that yields useful and relevant information is not
ethically acceptable. We need therefore to consider from first principles the arguments in
support <strong>of</strong>, and against, <strong>research</strong> <strong>involving</strong> <strong>animals</strong>. For the purpose <strong>of</strong> our discussion, we
take the principal ethical questions to be the following:
■ Provided there are substantial benefits associated with animal <strong>research</strong>, why should the
use <strong>of</strong> <strong>animals</strong> require special justification?
■ Can any use <strong>of</strong> <strong>animals</strong> by humans be justified? Which specific issues need to be
considered in the case <strong>of</strong> <strong>research</strong>?
■ What role does the unavailability <strong>of</strong> alternatives play in the justification <strong>of</strong> <strong>research</strong>
<strong>involving</strong> <strong>animals</strong>?
■ How does the justification <strong>of</strong> such <strong>research</strong> relate to the justification <strong>of</strong> other uses, such
as food production?
■ What is the appropriate role <strong>of</strong> regulation for <strong>research</strong> <strong>involving</strong> <strong>animals</strong>?
3.3 For each <strong>of</strong> these questions, we consider commonly encountered arguments to bring clarity
to the debate; to identify agreement where it exists; and to understand what lies behind
remaining disagreement. We hope that this approach will be useful in enabling readers to
make informed judgements about whether or not specific types <strong>of</strong> <strong>research</strong>, as described in
Chapters 5–9, can be justified. We would also like to encourage them to reflect upon the
assumptions behind their own positions and those <strong>of</strong> others.
CHAPTER 3 ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY ANIMAL RESEARCH
Facts, values and the reflective equilibrium
3.4 Historically, a number <strong>of</strong> apparently rigid and irreconcilable implicit and explicit ethical
positions on animal <strong>research</strong> have arisen. Often, holders <strong>of</strong> these views think that their
ethical judgement is irrefutably right, while that <strong>of</strong> others is simply wrong. Consequently,
they consider truths about animal <strong>research</strong> to be self-evident, and suspect those who do not
share these views <strong>of</strong> some sort <strong>of</strong> ‘moral astigmatism’ or intentional malevolence.
3.5 This state <strong>of</strong> affairs raises complex philosophical issues that are usually debated under the
title <strong>of</strong> moral epistemology. <strong>The</strong> term refers to the study <strong>of</strong>, among other things, whether
and how we can come to know moral truths; what we mean when we make moral
judgements; and under what conditions we can change the moral judgements <strong>of</strong> others. 1
Although this Report is not suited to a detailed exploration <strong>of</strong> the many subtleties that
1 See Campbell R (2003) Stanford Encyclopaedia <strong>of</strong> Philosophy: Moral epistemology, available at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-epistemology. Accessed on: 11 Apr 2005.
33