The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c h i n v o l v i n g a n i m a l s<br />
need to be taken to reduce existing disagreement as far as possible. At the very least, if a<br />
public policy is adopted which many believe to be morally wr<strong>on</strong>g, instability, protest and,<br />
in extreme cases civil unrest may ensue. In thinking through the next stage in the argument<br />
we are partially influenced by the c<strong>on</strong>cept <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ‘overlapping c<strong>on</strong>sensus’, developed by the<br />
American philosopher John Rawls, who c<strong>on</strong>sidered how to achieve fair agreements<br />
between reas<strong>on</strong>able moral agents <strong>on</strong> policies and procedures in societies that faced the<br />
‘fact <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> pluralism’. 12 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>cept relies <strong>on</strong> the possibility that each party to a c<strong>on</strong>sensus<br />
supports it for its own sake, or <strong>on</strong> its own merits, based <strong>on</strong> its individual moral or other<br />
normative framework. 13<br />
14.54 In trying to achieve an overlapping c<strong>on</strong>sensus it is necessary to produce a procedure or<br />
positi<strong>on</strong> that could be adopted from all reas<strong>on</strong>able perspectives. Could it be the case that<br />
the c<strong>on</strong>cept <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Three Rs, and the type <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> hybrid moral positi<strong>on</strong> (some absolute<br />
c<strong>on</strong>straints, some balancing), which can be said to underlie the A(SP)A, could be accepted,<br />
at least in broad outlines, by all positi<strong>on</strong>s? This is clearly so for the cluster <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> moral positi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
that support the ’<strong>on</strong> balance justificati<strong>on</strong>’ view, which directly endorses such a regime. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
‘moral dilemma’ approach suggests that there are no decisive moral c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>s, and so<br />
may, for practical purposes, be prepared to fall in line with the ’<strong>on</strong> balance justificati<strong>on</strong>’<br />
view, as l<strong>on</strong>g as the <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> is genuinely necessary, and no alternatives exist. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ‘weakness<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> morality’ view as a sub-category <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ‘aboliti<strong>on</strong>ist’ view cannot accept that there is a<br />
moral justificati<strong>on</strong> for present practices, but at the same time does not see morality as<br />
having influence <strong>on</strong> behaviour in any relevant sense. Its prop<strong>on</strong>ents, too, can accept<br />
something akin to the current regulati<strong>on</strong>s as a practical soluti<strong>on</strong>. Hence between these<br />
three views a form <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> overlapping c<strong>on</strong>sensus can be achieved.<br />
14.55 However, whereas the ’anything goes’ view can accept the permissi<strong>on</strong>s included in the<br />
current regulati<strong>on</strong>s, it cannot accept the restricti<strong>on</strong>s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> positi<strong>on</strong> for the aboliti<strong>on</strong>ists is the<br />
c<strong>on</strong>verse: they can accept the restricti<strong>on</strong>s but not the permissi<strong>on</strong>s. As these moral positi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
appear to fall outside this overlapping c<strong>on</strong>sensus they require special discussi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
14.56 Although it is, as we have said, unlikely that any serious thinker holds the view that human<br />
beings may do whatever they like to <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> without any moral justificati<strong>on</strong>, nevertheless<br />
there are groups who view some current restricti<strong>on</strong>s as unjustified. Could anything be d<strong>on</strong>e<br />
to bring such groups into the overlapping c<strong>on</strong>sensus? <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> place in which their<br />
disagreement is greatest c<strong>on</strong>cerns cases such as the policy <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the de facto ban <strong>on</strong> using the<br />
great apes. Prop<strong>on</strong>ents <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ’anything goes’ view argue that when there is a very good<br />
chance <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> providing positive results, <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> potential value to human health and life, then some<br />
forms <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> great apes should be permitted. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> circumstances in which this would<br />
be permissible, and the forms <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> permissible treatment <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> such <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>, would be very<br />
tightly c<strong>on</strong>trolled, to a point where, in practice, it may be very rare indeed that the<br />
c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s are met. As observed above, the current ‘ban’ merely has the status <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> policy,<br />
and is not enshrined directly in the A(SP)A (paragraphs 13.6 and 13.30). Thus, in principle,<br />
some <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the prop<strong>on</strong>ents <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ’anything goes’ view might join the overlapping c<strong>on</strong>sensus,<br />
as l<strong>on</strong>g as the prohibiti<strong>on</strong> is not a matter <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> law.<br />
14.57 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> aboliti<strong>on</strong>ists, by c<strong>on</strong>trast, would prefer the policy decisi<strong>on</strong> to be a matter <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> law, rather<br />
than policy. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y welcome the restricti<strong>on</strong>s in current regulati<strong>on</strong>s, yet view the permissi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
as unacceptable. Widening the permissi<strong>on</strong>s would make matters worse for them. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
12 Rawls J (1987) <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Idea <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> an Overlapping C<strong>on</strong>sensus Oxford Journal for Legal Studies 7: 1-25.<br />
13 Rawls J (1989) <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Domain <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Political and Overlapping C<strong>on</strong>sensus New York University Law Review 64: 233–55.<br />
256