The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
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T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c h i n v o l v i n g a n i m a l s<br />
hypothetically, humans had never begun to experiment <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>, had had a far more<br />
restrictive policy in place or had found different ways to gain scientific knowledge.<br />
14.30 It could be argued that the ‘moral dilemma’ view differs insignificantly from the ’<strong>on</strong><br />
balance justificati<strong>on</strong>’ view: it is simply a str<strong>on</strong>ger recogniti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the fact that it is morally<br />
problematic to use other species. While this may be true for some positi<strong>on</strong>s within the<br />
c<strong>on</strong>cept, it may not be for other positi<strong>on</strong>s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se differ with regard to the way in which the<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>ship between humans and <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> is understood; the way in which they may be<br />
used; views about the value <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g>; and the role <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> alternatives.<br />
14.31 Prop<strong>on</strong>ents <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ‘moral dilemma’ view are less certain than those holding the ’<strong>on</strong> balance<br />
justificati<strong>on</strong>’ view about the supremacy <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> humans over <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re can be various<br />
reas<strong>on</strong>s for this difference. Usually, interpretati<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> religious approaches or evoluti<strong>on</strong>ary<br />
theory which suggest a clear primacy <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> humans over <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> are rejected as they could<br />
equally be used to argue for stewardship and compassi<strong>on</strong> (see also paragraphs 3.21, 3.24 and<br />
3.27–3.50). Rather, prop<strong>on</strong>ents may draw <strong>on</strong> religious arguments that recognise human<br />
stewardship over <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>, 8 or they assert that it is reas<strong>on</strong>able to assume that <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> become<br />
members <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the moral community ins<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>ar as they possess <strong>on</strong>e or more <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the morally<br />
relevant capacities discussed in Chapter 3 (paragraphs 3.27–3.50). Whereas within the ’<strong>on</strong><br />
balance justificati<strong>on</strong>’ view there is usually acceptance <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a hierarchy <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> species based <strong>on</strong> the<br />
aggregate number <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> morally relevant capacities within the ‘moral dilemma’ view a more<br />
comm<strong>on</strong>ly found positi<strong>on</strong> is that there is no such hierarchy.<br />
14.32 Similarly, whereas those holding the ’<strong>on</strong> balance justificati<strong>on</strong>’ view perceive forced<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sequentialist sacrifice as practised under the A(SP)A as acceptable because they take the<br />
view that it matters less to the <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> themselves whether or not they are used in <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
some prop<strong>on</strong>ents <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ‘moral dilemma’ view disagree. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> reas<strong>on</strong> for scepticism can be called<br />
epistemic modesty: most prop<strong>on</strong>ents <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ’<strong>on</strong> balance justificati<strong>on</strong>’ view assert that it is<br />
usually possible to assess levels <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> pain, suffering and distress in scientifically reliable ways.<br />
Some <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> those holding the ‘moral dilemma’ view are more cautious. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y refer to philosophical<br />
problems resulting from the ‘problem <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> other minds’, which casts doubt over the possibility<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> determining the exact state <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sciousness <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> other beings (paragraphs 4.5 and 4.22).<br />
Since skilful observati<strong>on</strong>, free from inappropriate anthropomorphisms, str<strong>on</strong>gly suggests that<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> do possess a range <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> different welfare states, <strong>on</strong>e should, where possible, err <strong>on</strong> the<br />
safe side and refrain from any harmful use. Similarly, <strong>on</strong>e should not assume that just because<br />
an animal such as a mouse is not in possessi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> higher mental capacities it is therefore more<br />
acceptable to subject it to pain: as may also be acknowledged under the ’<strong>on</strong> balance<br />
justificati<strong>on</strong>’ view, the quality <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the pain and suffering may have a far greater intensity,<br />
despite, or rather because <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the lack <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> higher capacities (paragraphs 3.29 and 4.17).<br />
14.33 In c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>, from the ‘moral dilemma’ view, the primary motivati<strong>on</strong> for granting <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
intrinsic moral status is their possessi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> any <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the morally relevant features. Expanding the<br />
discussi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the morally relevant criteri<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> sociability, prop<strong>on</strong>ents emphasise the<br />
importance <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> what can be termed relati<strong>on</strong>ship morality: humans can build meaningful<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>ships not <strong>on</strong>ly with other humans, but also with <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> way specific areas <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> wellbeing<br />
are influenced by human acti<strong>on</strong> matters equally in both cases, since both are subjects <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
life (see Box 3.4) who have interests in maximising their welfare. Disrespecting the prima facie<br />
entitlement <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> to lead a life free from negative interference by humans can therefore<br />
create an existential dilemma for prop<strong>on</strong>ents <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> this positi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
8 However, see footnote 3.<br />
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