The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
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T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c h i n v o l v i n g a n i m a l s<br />
■ <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is something special about humans, and<br />
all humans possess some morally vital property<br />
that all <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> lack (the clear-line view).<br />
■ <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is a hierarchy <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> moral importance with<br />
humans at the apex, followed by primates<br />
and then other mammalian species such as<br />
pigs, dogs, rats and mice and other<br />
vertebrates such as zebrafish, with<br />
invertebrates (for example fruit flies) and<br />
single-celled creatures arranged towards the<br />
bottom (the moral sliding scale view).<br />
■ <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is no categorical distincti<strong>on</strong> between<br />
human and n<strong>on</strong>-human <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and that<br />
they are moral equals (the moral equality<br />
view).<br />
Box 2: Ethical questi<strong>on</strong>s raised by animal<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
■ Provided there are substantial benefits associated<br />
with <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>involving</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>, why should the<br />
use <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> require special justificati<strong>on</strong>?<br />
■ Can any use <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> by humans be justified?<br />
Which specific issues need to be c<strong>on</strong>sidered in the<br />
c<strong>on</strong>text <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g>?<br />
■ What role does the unavailability <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> alternatives<br />
play in the justificati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>involving</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>?<br />
■ How does the justificati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> animal <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> relate<br />
to the justificati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> other uses, such as food<br />
producti<strong>on</strong>?<br />
■ What is the appropriate role <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> regulati<strong>on</strong> for<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>involving</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>?<br />
We c<strong>on</strong>clude that neither c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the relative moral status nor reference to the evoluti<strong>on</strong>ary<br />
order or uses <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> in other c<strong>on</strong>texts (paragraphs 3.21-3.26), settles the questi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
permissibility <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> animal experimentati<strong>on</strong>, or <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> any other use <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> in a helpful manner.<br />
Exclusive focus <strong>on</strong> the c<strong>on</strong>cept <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> moral status may obscure more than it illuminates (paragraph 3.24).<br />
Morally relevant features<br />
We suggest instead that a promising approach is to ask what features <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> humans and <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> can<br />
qualify them as moral subjects, imposing c<strong>on</strong>straints or limits <strong>on</strong> how they may be treated. We do<br />
not start from the assumpti<strong>on</strong> that there is <strong>on</strong>e ‘master property’ or overriding criteri<strong>on</strong>. Nor, for<br />
the purpose <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the discussi<strong>on</strong> in Chapter 3, do we assume that there are some species that should<br />
never be used for any purpose, or that the acceptability <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> using species depends <strong>on</strong> how closely<br />
related they are to humans in evoluti<strong>on</strong>ary terms. We explore the possibility that there are no less<br />
than the following five morally relevant features. At least <strong>on</strong>e, or all <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> these, may be applicable<br />
to specific <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>, albeit to differing degrees, and with subtly distinct moral c<strong>on</strong>sequences:<br />
■ sentience (paragraphs 3.28–3.29);<br />
■ higher cognitive capacities (paragraphs 3.30–3.36);<br />
■ the capacity to flourish (paragraphs 3.37-3.43);<br />
■ sociability (paragraphs 3.44–3.46); and<br />
■ possessi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a life (paragraphs 3.47–3.49);<br />
Ways <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sidering morally relevant features in different normative frameworks<br />
We then turn to the questi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> deciding how, with regard to the possible or certain benefits <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g>, such characteristics should be taken into account in moral decisi<strong>on</strong> making: through<br />
weighing <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> factors (for example, the degree <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> suffering experienced by <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> versus the value<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> benefits <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g>) or through the generati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> absolute prohibiti<strong>on</strong>s (for example, that no<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>research</str<strong>on</strong>g> should be undertaken <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> that are capable <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> higher cognitive capacities, such<br />
as the chimpanzees, regardless <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the benefits; paragraphs 3.51 and 3.57). A c<strong>on</strong>sequentialist<br />
view weighs all costs against all benefits (paragraphs 3.52–3.55). A de<strong>on</strong>tological view lays down<br />
particular prohibiti<strong>on</strong>s (paragraphs 3.56–3.57). A hybrid view c<strong>on</strong>tains some prohibiti<strong>on</strong>s and<br />
some weighing (paragraphs 3.58–3.61). Hybrid views appear to prevail in practice, both in UK<br />
regulati<strong>on</strong>s and in public attitudes.<br />
XXII