The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
The ethics of research involving animals - Nuffield Council on ...
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T h e e t h i c s o f r e s e a r c h i n v o l v i n g a n i m a l s<br />
corresp<strong>on</strong>ds to a similar state <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> tiredness that we experience when we yawn in a<br />
comparable way. 4 Clearly, assessments made <strong>on</strong> this basis are more difficult if there are<br />
significant physiological and behavioural differences between the species being compared.<br />
Thus, it is not straightforward to claim that a primate, a cat or a snake that yawns feels<br />
tired in the same way that we might. While there is therefore some truth in the<br />
observati<strong>on</strong> that we will never be able to know what it is like to experience the world from<br />
the point <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> view <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a particular animal, such a requirement is mostly irrelevant with<br />
regard to assessing pain and suffering in laboratory <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> fact that we will never be<br />
able to obtain pro<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> our hypotheses by getting ‘inside the mind’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> an animal does not<br />
prevent us from making the best possible approximati<strong>on</strong>s. Nagel’s thought experiment<br />
therefore emphasises primarily the reality <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> subjectivity (i.e. it supports the view that it is<br />
plausible to assume that the way bats experience the world differs significantly from the<br />
ways beings that lack the capacity to perceive ultrasound experience it), rather than<br />
supporting the sceptical Cartesian view (see paragraph 4.4). By implicati<strong>on</strong>, it also enjoins<br />
us to compare animal welfare not exclusively to human dispositi<strong>on</strong>s, but to strive for<br />
alternative ways that may help to identify possible c<strong>on</strong>straints <strong>on</strong> animal welfare, for<br />
example by c<strong>on</strong>sidering their species-specific capacities and corresp<strong>on</strong>ding needs.<br />
■ Sec<strong>on</strong>dly, it is correct that humans will inevitably have to apply c<strong>on</strong>cepts such as pain,<br />
suffering and distress, which are used comm<strong>on</strong>ly and successfully in human-human<br />
interacti<strong>on</strong>s, when dealing with welfare assessments <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>. This means that care<br />
needs to be taken to avoid unwarranted anthropomorphism in using these terms. 5 Similar<br />
care in avoiding bias is required when making inferences based <strong>on</strong> familiarity, empathy<br />
and methodological observati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
4.7 In view <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> these observati<strong>on</strong>s, how are we to go about assessing welfare in other <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>?<br />
We acknowledge that all welfare assessments <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g> are imprecise and imperfect to a<br />
certain degree. However, we also take the view that meaningful assessments can be made.<br />
We therefore c<strong>on</strong>sider that the c<strong>on</strong>cept <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> critical anthropomorphism can be seen as a useful<br />
starting point. This approach involves the critical use <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> human experience to recognise and<br />
alleviate animal suffering by combining <strong>on</strong>e’s percepti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a particular animal’s situati<strong>on</strong><br />
with what can be determined by more objective, science-based observati<strong>on</strong>s. 6 We now<br />
examine in more detail whether such an approach can be successful.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> evoluti<strong>on</strong>ary c<strong>on</strong>tinuum<br />
4.8 According to the accepted basic paradigm <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> evoluti<strong>on</strong>ary biology, there is a c<strong>on</strong>tinuum<br />
from simple to more complex organisms. This ranges from primitive forms <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> life such as<br />
Amoeba and other single-celled and multicellular organisms to more complex forms, such as<br />
4 It could be assumed here that, philosophically, the assessment <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> mental states in other humans is always straightforward,<br />
and that <strong>on</strong>ly animal states pose problems. However, this is not the case and there is intense debate about questi<strong>on</strong>s such as<br />
whether it will ever be possible for a pers<strong>on</strong> to know what another pers<strong>on</strong>’s pain feels like, and whether they see the same<br />
hues <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> colours as we do. See, for example, Tye M (2003) Qualia, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/.<br />
Accessed <strong>on</strong>: 25 Apr 2005; Dennet D (1990) Quining Qualia, in Mind and Cogniti<strong>on</strong>, Lycan WC (Editor) (Oxford: Blackwell<br />
Publishers), pp519-48, available at: http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm. Accessed <strong>on</strong>: 25 Apr 2005. Thus,<br />
although we can generally make successful predicti<strong>on</strong>s about the mental states <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> other human beings it should not be<br />
forgotten that even such extrapolati<strong>on</strong>s may have their limitati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
5 In using terms such as pain or suffering, a wide spectrum <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> further c<strong>on</strong>notati<strong>on</strong>s is <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>ten implied. In comm<strong>on</strong>-sense use,<br />
syn<strong>on</strong>yms for suffering include afflicti<strong>on</strong>, distress, pain, ag<strong>on</strong>y, misery, torment, anguish, grief, sorrow, calamity, misfortune,<br />
trouble and adversity. When we say that some<strong>on</strong>e suffers we also think <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> syn<strong>on</strong>yms such as bear, abide, endure, lump,<br />
stand, stomach, swallow, take and tolerate. We use these terms primarily to describe states in ourselves and other humans.<br />
Care is required in applying them to <str<strong>on</strong>g>animals</str<strong>on</strong>g>, as it cannot be assumed that the terms always retain their meaning.<br />
6 See Mort<strong>on</strong> DB, Burghardt G and Smith JA (1990) Critical anthropomorphism, animal suffering and the ecological c<strong>on</strong>text<br />
Hastings Center Report <strong>on</strong> Animals, Science and Ethics 20: 13–9.<br />
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