Fourth Annual Chicago Forum on International ... - Mayer Brown

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property and antitrust. Dr. Gron has worked on competition-related matters involving companies in insurance distribution, automobile insurance, and financial institutions. She has also worked on matters involving companies in a number of markets and industries including life insurance, annuities, reinsurance, mortgage financing, retail deposits, marketing databases, artificial joints, computer peripherals, beverage distribution, airlines, automotive repair, mutual funds, and discount retailing. Dr. Gron’s work has been published in a number of the top economic journals including the Rand Journal of Economics, the Journal of Industrial Economics, the Journal of Law and Economics, the Review of Economics and Statistics, and the American Economic Review. Prior to joining NERA, Dr. Gron taught Competitive Strategy, Microeconomics and Risk Management and Insurance to MBA students at Kellogg School of Management and at the Graduate School of Business (now Booth) at the University of <strong>Chicago</strong>. Dr. Gron received her PhD in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, with concentrations in industrial organization and regulation, and public finance. She received her BA, magna cum laude, in economics and computer science from Williams College. JOHN HARKRIDER is co-chair of Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider’s antitrust practice. His practice concentrates on mergers, counseling and litigation. In the merger context, he advised Google in connection with its acquisitions of Motorola Mobility and hA Software. He represented Cingular in its $41 billion acquisition by BellSouth and BellSouth in its $86 billion acquisition by AT&T and is currently representing Thermo Fisher in its $13 billion acquisition of Life. In litigation, he has represented Tyson Foods in litigation against the DOJ, and represented United Technologies Corporation in Walker Process and Sham Litigation Section 2 claims. He also represented the U.S. Department of Justice in its investigation and suit to enjoin WorldCom’s attempted acquisition of Sprint, which was the largest merger ever challenged by the DOJ. Recently, he represented Google and Motorola Mobility in connection with the FTC’s standard-essential patent investigation. He also represents Red Hat on patent/antitrust issues. H. STEPHEN HARRIS, JR. is a partner in Baker & McKenzie’s Global Antitrust & Competition Group. Mr. Harris is widely published and globally recognized as a leading antitrust lawyer and commercial litigator by publications including Chambers USA (2004-2011), International Who's Who of Competition Lawyers (2000-2011), and PLC Which Lawyer? (2001-2011). Mr. Harris practices antitrust law, including class actions and cartel and merger investigations, before US and international courts and agencies. He also represents financial institutions in complex regulatory and commercial litigation. 8
Mr. Harris handles civil and criminal antitrust litigation and cartel investigations in a broad range of industries, including financial institutions, pharmaceuticals, information technology, electronics, health care, consumer products, retail, and software. He also has represented major money-center banks in numerous cases against US financial regulatory agencies Mr. Harris attended Columbia Law School (J.D. Honors, Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar) (1982) and Cornell University (A.B. magna cum laude, College Scholar) (1977). NEVILLE (NED) HEDLEY is the Director of Internal Investigations at Abbott Laboratories. Prior to that Mr. Hedley was a Trial Attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Midwest Field Office from 2009 – 2012 where he worked primarily on nationwide bid-rigging and market manipulation investigation and related prosecutions concerning the municipal finance and municipal derivatives market. Mr. Hedley was also Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Enforcement Division, <strong>Chicago</strong> Office from 2007 – 2009 and Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California, San Diego, CA, Criminal Division from 2004 – 2007 and Associate, Mayer Brown, Tax Controversy Group, <strong>Chicago</strong> Office from 1997 – 2004. He received his B.A. from Wake Forest University, his J.D. from New England School of Law, his LL.M. from New York University School of Law and his M.B.A. Northwestern University Graduate School of Business. ROY HOFFINGER is Vice President, Legal Counsel, for Qualcomm, Inc, a position he has held since October 2006. At Qualcomm, Mr. Hoffinger is responsible for antitrust and competition law matters. Prior to joining Qualcomm, Mr. Hoffinger was a member of Perkins, Coie LLP and Holme, Roberts & Owen in Denver, Colorado, where he practiced antitrust and regulatory law. Prior to returning to private practice, Mr. Hoffinger spent 14 years as in-house counsel for Qwest and AT&T, as Vice President, Chief Counsel for Federal and State Regulation, and Chief Counsel, Antitrust & Federal Regulation, respectively. Mr. Hoffinger currently serves on the Advisory Board of the Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program sponsored by the University of Colorado. He received his J.D. from the University of <strong>Chicago</strong> Law School in 1982. NATHALIE JALABERT DOURY is the head of Mayer Brown’s Antitrust and Competition in the Paris office. Nathalie has developed an extensive practice in all aspects of competition law at both a national and European level, including: cartels, concerted practices and abuse of dominance, mergers, horizontal and vertical agreements as well as State aids. She regularly advises companies on compliance issues and has recently coordinated with Theodore Banks (Compliance and Competition Consultants) an international survey on competition law compliance programs covering 17 antitrust regimes around 9
Page 2 and 3: TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 4 and 5: Competition Committee Meeting, U.S.
Page 6 and 7: BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS ARISING IN
Page 8 and 9: 10:30-11:15 Venturing Outside the U
Page 10 and 11: With thanks to our sponsors
Page 12 and 13: SPEAKER BIOS
Page 14 and 15: Bill advises on EC and multi-jurisd
Page 16 and 17: associations. She has counseled com
Page 18 and 19: ALICE W. DETWILER is a senior attor
Page 22 and 23: the world. The study was published
Page 24 and 25: The acquisition of ADVO, Inc., by V
Page 26 and 27: BRITT M. MILLER is a partner in the
Page 28 and 29: • Ph.D., Economics, Rice Universi
Page 30 and 31: Columbia University (LL.M.) (1999)
Page 32 and 33: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON ANTI
Page 34 and 35: II. WORKPLAN 1. The U.S. and Indian
Page 36 and 37: United States of America Federal Tr
Page 38 and 39: I. Cooperation A. Benefits of Coope
Page 40 and 41: To mention a few of our ongoing coo
Page 42 and 43: C. China’s Recent Efforts in the
Page 44 and 45: programs, secondment of personnel t
Page 46 and 47: included recommended practices, cas
Page 48 and 49: policies, which are grounded in eco
Page 50 and 51: credibility of the competition agen
Page 52 and 53: discriminatory (RAND) terms. 11 The
Page 54 and 55: enforce, we potentially create two
Page 56 and 57: official decision for each of the r
Page 58 and 59: costs in these areas. It is also my
Page 60 and 61: The framework for cooperation betwe
Page 62 and 63: United States of America Federal Tr
Page 64 and 65: I. China and the Need for Cooperati
Page 66 and 67: egulate and comply with the laws on
Page 68 and 69: III. Where China Stands After Five
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decisions are encouraging, particul
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competition officials at all five a
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B. Creating Doctrinal Confusion As
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high value on intellectual property
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2013: What to expect on the Europea
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February 2013 following a reference
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Servier case, both in the Commissio
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they represent useful opportunities
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158 European Competition Law Review
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JOHN B. MEISEL BEN VAN ROMPUY Natio
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Editor Julian Maitland-Walker Solic
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171 CJEU AstraZeneca Judgment: Grop
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173 court found that the Italian An
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175 1 An uncertain balancing of int
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177 refuse disclosure, it has been
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179 violations of its laws” and t
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181 The UK Government published its
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183 Vertical price fixing in the Un
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185 First, “[t]he Albrecht decisi
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187 enforcement has promised that p
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189 UK calls for ban of parallel tr
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191 In applying these provisions to
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193 Supply quota system by a non-do
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195 Member States; withdrawing Lose
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197 Does the Pfleiderer judgment ma
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199 of the claim and the amount of
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201 Such oral statements will be re
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203 EU law seem difficult for the E
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205 The ECN has drafted a model len
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207 The European Commission’s Dec
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209 1. It needs to be shown that th
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211 divestment obligations. 33 It i
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213 restructuring aid donors does n
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215 of the decision prevented them
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217 However, it appears that later
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219 competition-enhancing regulator
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221 regulation in the United States
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223 Cunning as a Fox—Dutch Compet
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225 would be excessive. Regarding t
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National Reports N-49 National Repo
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SNCF/Haselsteiner Familien-Privatsi
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National Reports N-53 discovered du
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National Reports N-55 Denmark ANTI-
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National Reports N-57 obstacle for
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National Reports N-59 The SCPA will
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National Reports N-61 Roger Guenat
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National Reports N-63 judiciary as
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National Reports N-65 US ANTI-COMPE
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National Reports N-67 SEPs is that
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free to view Your essential online
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208 : THE A NTITRUST B ULLETIN: Vol
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Competition Policy in Brazil Franci
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Part 1 - Merger Control in Brazil -
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Substantive Changes What is a “Me
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Practical Considerations - Pre-merg
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Overview of the Legislation - “An
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Largest Brazilian Fines Defendant (
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Expected Developments - Scenario: (
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VENTURING OUTSIDE THE US— ANTITRU
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EN C 11/2 Official Journal of the E
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EN 14.1.2011 Official Journal of th
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EN C 11/10 Official Journal of the
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EN EN EN
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COMMISSION NOTICE Guidelines on Ver
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I. INTRODUCTION 1. Purpose of the G
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(9) Subject to the conditions set o
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- does not take responsibility for
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estrictions of competition, which a
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purchase, sale and resale, such as
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estrictions concerning the assignme
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provides goods and/or services, in
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favoured-customer clause. The same
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outing of customers to the manufact
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dealer's outlet is mobile ("shop on
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Exemption Regulation), thereby prev
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agreements enforced by competing su
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Exemption Regulation becomes applic
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provider of a business method. For
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1.1. Negative effects of vertical r
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(2) To "open up or enter new market
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instance, economies of scale in dis
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especially where they establish exc
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efficiency gains must fully off-set
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anti-competitive effects can be exp
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(147) Where the supplier provides t
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and/or softening of competition. If
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market, and pre-sale service to ret
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facilitate collusion, both at the s
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distribution or do not require the
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elevant in a market with growing de
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concerning the products being distr
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supply obligation. The higher the t
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cover the expense of those payments
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this increases the possible foreclo
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manufacturer with market power to f
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Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborat
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AGREEMENTS AMONG COMPETITORS.......
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ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORAT
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collaborations. These Guidelines us
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The competitive effects from compet
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collaboration and any individual ag
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An agreement may be “reasonably n
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already in operation, 28 then, abse
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The following sections illustrate c
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An exercise of market power may inj
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that is, the technologies or goods
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Where the nature of the agreement a
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scope of R&D efforts and investment
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In the context of research and deve
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assess the likelihood and magnitude
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specialized assets or characteristi
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participants also agree to fix the
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ut automobile manufacturers would f
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eported simultaneously to both part
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it could not adequately assess the
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Global Guide to Competition Litigat
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England and Wales Keith Jones, Rich
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against the infringement finding by
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Attheraces v BHB 14 confirmed this
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disclosure in relation to competiti
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Most claims for damages resulting f
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that, to avoid discouraging risk ta
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Contact Information Keith Jones Pho
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Arbitrating Competition Law Dispute
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION DG Competition
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forwarded to DG Competition for pub
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II. QUANTIFYING THE OVERCHARGE.....
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• the heads of damages to be comp
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injured party to be compared with t
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Raised prices mean that the custome
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27. Section IV below sets out consi
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period with the price paid by custo
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Pre-infringement data could also be
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(3) Comparison with data from other
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ules regarding causality, whether a
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Price 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 I
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. Examples and illustrations 66. A
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they sold to bakeries during the ca
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e.g. through applying specific stat
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84. Courts in the EU sometimes also
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model appropriately reflects the co
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97. It may occur that the observed
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cases be more appropriate than othe
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The following figure represents in
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these studies are set out below in
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(2) The initial overcharge paid by
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133. Also, the timing of the cartel
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141. A further possibility to estim
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overcharge (for example, where they
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158. In particular, the comparator-
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etween the actual profits generated
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assessing lost profits does not mak
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lost by the harmed competitor could
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180 160 Refusal to supply starts 14
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182. The general approach to quanti
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have continued producing goods or p
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to show that, in the absence of the
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Juzgado Mercantil numero 2 de Barce
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In case you want to verify which pe
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International Standards for Experts
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Snapshots of International Experien
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Quantification of damages - Most ju
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM COMPLIANCE TO
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will continue to make these decisio
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Compliance matters What companies c
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Foreword by Joaquín Almunia Vice-P
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Contents Foreword..................
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9 1 Complying with competition rule
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11 The risk of engaging in anti-com
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13 3 Compliance with EU competition
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15 What about Small & Medium Enterp
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17 In addition, guidance in particu
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19 cific needs of the undertaking,
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21 advise on or approve individual
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23 summaries/competition/firms/l261
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978-92-79-22094-4 KD-32-11-985-EN-C
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these instruments are essentially p
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corporate officers, managers, super
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2) the commitment to appoint one or
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in itself when making an individual
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@ Tendances Theodore Banks (dir.) t
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11. In view of the increasing penal
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notably to be stressed that even if
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14. There is also an indicative lis
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43. An abuse of dominance case was
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71. There have been approximately 1
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98. In 2012, the NMa imposed fines
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D. Complaint for Criminal Sanctions
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of the more onerous rules on discov
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g Are competition authorities/agenc
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the outlined guidelines is availabl
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202. At present, there is no develo
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7. Consequences of non compliance f
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240. In cases where the management
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g The organization shall take reaso
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In addition to enhance the good cor
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299. There would however be scope i
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327. Originally, the parent company
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341. As explained above, the sancti
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359. For example, the Federal Court
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that even a genuine and bona fide c
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418. A compliance programme simply
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eal-estate agents, publishers and s
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France 465. Adopting a compliance p
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Best practices for compliance progr
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France 515. Adopting a compliance p
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Pakistan 546. No such information i
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Japan 570. In the event that the co
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597. Like the IAA - the ISA publish
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Tab.: Guidance and incentives propo
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CPI Antitrust Chronicle February
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Today’s Topics Translating theor
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Maximizing Impact with Limited Reso
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Making It Real In English (or Japa
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Questions? Thank you for your atten
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Update on Antitrust Enforcement in
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Ashok Chawla Chairperson H. C. Gupt
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Inquiry Process - Non-merger Invest
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Remedial Powers • Anticompetitive
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Competition Commission of India Mer
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Competition Commission of India Mer
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Competition Commission of India Non
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Competition Commission of India Bre
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Competition Commission of India Ant
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Competition Commission of India Ant
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Competition Commission of India Abu
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Competition Commission of India Abu
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Highlights of the Proposed Amendmen
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Highlights of the Amendments to the
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Some Observations • CCI burdened
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Some Observations • No “nationa
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Antitrust, Innovation, and Standard
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THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF STANDARDS
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MEANING OF F/RAND Emerging consensu
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THE “HOLD UP” PROBLEM: MORE HYP
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VIEWS FROM THE INDUSTRY “Any unif
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VIEWS FROM THE AGENCIES “[I]f a p
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WHITHER STANDARD-SETTING? System of
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Antitrust Issues in Doing Business
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The Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) - Effec
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Enforcement of the AML - 1 Policy A
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IP in the AML - AML Art. 55 • “
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IP in the AML - AML Art. 13(5) •
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Competition in the Patent Law - Pat
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SAIC Draft Intellectual Property Gu
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SAIC Draft IP Guidelines - Article
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SAIC Draft IP Guidelines • Refuse
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SAIC Draft IP Guidelines - Art. 21
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SAIC Draft IP Guidelines - Art. 22
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Proposed Regulation on Standards fo
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Proposed Regulation for Simple Case
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Proposed Regulation for Simple Case
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Draft Rules on Merger Remedies - Ty
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Draft Rules on Merger Remedies - Ar
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Recent MOFCOM Merger Decisions © 2
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Marubeni Acquisition of Gavilon Hol
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Glencore Acquisition of Xstrata - A
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Glencore Acquisition of Xstrata •
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Huawei v. Interdigital - Huawei sue
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Thank you! Contact information: ste
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Assessing the Quality of Competitio
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BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS ARISING IN
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Page 2 of 15 Journal of Competition
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Page 10 of 15 Journal of Competitio
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C O V E R S T O R I E S Antitrust,
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C O V E R S T O R I E S proposed tr
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C O V E R S T O R I E S 1 U.S. Dep
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1 Introduction Empirical competitiv
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metric Cournot model, our framework
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must pay an (explicit or implicit)
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o¤ers a two-step estimation proced
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and All of these are K 0 1 f(pjN =
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accounts for the fact that N t is k
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Let l (p; A; ) denote the joint den
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We now turn to the step 2 results.
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anges of 30 to 50 percent for “id
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In summary, the estimates in Table
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esources attempting to resolve unce
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References [1] An, Yonghong, Yingya
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[18] Narasimhan, Chakravarthi (1988
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Substituting for in equation (15)
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For each simulated period, t, we ra
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates and Bo
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Table 4: Percentage Change in Post-
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ECONOMIC OVERVIEW Hypotheticals and
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ECONOMIC OVERVIEW ‘But for’ pri
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Horizontal Merger Guidelines U.S.
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9. Entry...........................
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The unifying theme of these Guideli
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disrupt market conditions with a ne
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merger. However, rival firms may pr
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Defining a market broadly to includ
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satisfying the test, guided by the
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legal or regulatory requirements; a
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Example 12: The merging parties bot
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significant sunk costs, are also co
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5.3 Market Concentration Market con
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6. Unilateral Effects The eliminati
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A merger is unlikely to generate su
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complementary capabilities that can
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A market typically is more vulnerab
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As part of their full assessment of
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coordinated effects context, increm
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11. Failure and Exiting Assets Notw
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influence can lessen competition be
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The Chicago <stron
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First Principles - Tying As to tyin
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First Principles - Evolving Applica
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Tying Put simply, it is a Seller’
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Tying - Elements Considered Based o
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Tying - Element Two That the tying
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Tying - Element Three Seller must h
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Tying When those elements are prese
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Tying - Kodak Kodak - another key t
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Tying - Kodak (cont.) Ninth Circuit
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Tying - After Kodak Predicted flood
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Tying - After Kodak Legacy of Kodak
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Tying - More Recent Development - I
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Bundling 27
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Bundling - Legal Standard Antitrust
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Bundling - Legal Standard (cont.) T
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Bundling - “Competitive Products
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Bundling - After PeaceHealth Pacifi
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Bundling - Conclusions Bundling wil
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Exclusive Dealing - Background A re
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Exclusive Dealing - The Dentsply Ca
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Exclusive Dealing - The Dentsply Ca
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Exclusive Dealing - The Intel Case
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Loyalty Discounts 51
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Loyalty Discounts - Brunswick (cont
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Loyalty Discounts - Brunswick, Sect
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Page 953 and 954:
Loyalty Discounts - Market Share Di
Page 955 and 956:
IDENTIFYING AND RESOLVING CONFLICTS
Page 957 and 958:
Global Conflicts - Introduction •
Page 959 and 960:
Rule 1.7(a)(1) - Direct Adversity t
Page 961 and 962:
Rule 1.7(a)(2) - Material Limitatio
Page 963 and 964:
Corporate Family Issue - When Can a
Page 965 and 966:
Waivers • Under Rule 1.7(b), a la
Page 967 and 968:
Rule 1.9 - Duties to Former Clients
Page 969 and 970:
Rule 1.18 - Duties to Prospective C
Page 971 and 972:
Conflicts Outside the United States
Page 973 and 974:
Conflicts in Cross-Border Matters
Page 975 and 976:
Rule 8.5(b) - Choice Of Law • Rul
Page 977 and 978:
Cross-Border Issues • 1. Where Pa
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Fourth Annual Chicago Forum on International ... - Mayer Brown

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