Fourth Annual Chicago Forum on International ... - Mayer Brown

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<strong>Fourth</strong> <strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Chicago</strong> <strong>Forum</strong> on International Antitrust Issues Planning Committee Chair Roxane C. Busey Baker & McKenzie LLP <strong>Chicago</strong>, IL Members Thomas Campbell Baker & McKenzie LLP <strong>Chicago</strong>, IL Russell W. Damtoft Associate Director Office of International Affairs Federal Trade Commission Washington, D.C. Alice W. Detwiler Senior Attorney Microsoft Corporation Redmond, WA Anne Gron Vice President NERA Economic Consulting <strong>Chicago</strong>, IL Mark McLaughlin Mayer Brown LLP <strong>Chicago</strong>, IL Nick Koberstein Division Counsel, Corporate Transactions Abbott Laboratories Abbott Park, IL 1
Page 2 and 3: TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 4 and 5: Competition Committee Meeting, U.S.
Page 6 and 7: BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS ARISING IN
Page 8 and 9: 10:30-11:15 Venturing Outside the U
Page 12 and 13: SPEAKER BIOS
Page 14 and 15: Bill advises on EC and multi-jurisd
Page 16 and 17: associations. She has counseled com
Page 18 and 19: ALICE W. DETWILER is a senior attor
Page 20 and 21: property and antitrust. Dr. Gron ha
Page 22 and 23: the world. The study was published
Page 24 and 25: The acquisition of ADVO, Inc., by V
Page 26 and 27: BRITT M. MILLER is a partner in the
Page 28 and 29: • Ph.D., Economics, Rice Universi
Page 30 and 31: Columbia University (LL.M.) (1999)
Page 32 and 33: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON ANTI
Page 34 and 35: II. WORKPLAN 1. The U.S. and Indian
Page 36 and 37: United States of America Federal Tr
Page 38 and 39: I. Cooperation A. Benefits of Coope
Page 40 and 41: To mention a few of our ongoing coo
Page 42 and 43: C. China’s Recent Efforts in the
Page 44 and 45: programs, secondment of personnel t
Page 46 and 47: included recommended practices, cas
Page 48 and 49: policies, which are grounded in eco
Page 50 and 51: credibility of the competition agen
Page 52 and 53: discriminatory (RAND) terms. 11 The
Page 54 and 55: enforce, we potentially create two
Page 56 and 57: official decision for each of the r
Page 58 and 59: costs in these areas. It is also my
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The framework for cooperation betwe
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United States of America Federal Tr
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I. China and the Need for Cooperati
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egulate and comply with the laws on
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III. Where China Stands After Five
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decisions are encouraging, particul
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competition officials at all five a
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B. Creating Doctrinal Confusion As
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high value on intellectual property
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2013: What to expect on the Europea
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February 2013 following a reference
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Servier case, both in the Commissio
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they represent useful opportunities
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158 European Competition Law Review
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JOHN B. MEISEL BEN VAN ROMPUY Natio
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Editor Julian Maitland-Walker Solic
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171 CJEU AstraZeneca Judgment: Grop
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173 court found that the Italian An
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175 1 An uncertain balancing of int
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177 refuse disclosure, it has been
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179 violations of its laws” and t
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181 The UK Government published its
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183 Vertical price fixing in the Un
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185 First, “[t]he Albrecht decisi
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187 enforcement has promised that p
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189 UK calls for ban of parallel tr
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191 In applying these provisions to
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193 Supply quota system by a non-do
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195 Member States; withdrawing Lose
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197 Does the Pfleiderer judgment ma
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199 of the claim and the amount of
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201 Such oral statements will be re
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203 EU law seem difficult for the E
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205 The ECN has drafted a model len
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207 The European Commission’s Dec
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209 1. It needs to be shown that th
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211 divestment obligations. 33 It i
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213 restructuring aid donors does n
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215 of the decision prevented them
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217 However, it appears that later
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219 competition-enhancing regulator
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221 regulation in the United States
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223 Cunning as a Fox—Dutch Compet
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225 would be excessive. Regarding t
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National Reports N-49 National Repo
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SNCF/Haselsteiner Familien-Privatsi
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National Reports N-53 discovered du
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National Reports N-55 Denmark ANTI-
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National Reports N-57 obstacle for
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National Reports N-59 The SCPA will
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National Reports N-61 Roger Guenat
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National Reports N-63 judiciary as
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National Reports N-65 US ANTI-COMPE
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National Reports N-67 SEPs is that
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free to view Your essential online
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208 : THE A NTITRUST B ULLETIN: Vol
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Competition Policy in Brazil Franci
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Part 1 - Merger Control in Brazil -
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Substantive Changes What is a “Me
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Practical Considerations - Pre-merg
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Overview of the Legislation - “An
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Largest Brazilian Fines Defendant (
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Expected Developments - Scenario: (
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VENTURING OUTSIDE THE US— ANTITRU
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EN C 11/2 Official Journal of the E
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EN 14.1.2011 Official Journal of th
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EN C 11/10 Official Journal of the
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EN EN EN
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COMMISSION NOTICE Guidelines on Ver
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I. INTRODUCTION 1. Purpose of the G
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(9) Subject to the conditions set o
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- does not take responsibility for
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estrictions of competition, which a
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purchase, sale and resale, such as
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estrictions concerning the assignme
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provides goods and/or services, in
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favoured-customer clause. The same
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outing of customers to the manufact
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dealer's outlet is mobile ("shop on
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Exemption Regulation), thereby prev
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agreements enforced by competing su
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Exemption Regulation becomes applic
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provider of a business method. For
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1.1. Negative effects of vertical r
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(2) To "open up or enter new market
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instance, economies of scale in dis
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especially where they establish exc
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efficiency gains must fully off-set
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anti-competitive effects can be exp
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(147) Where the supplier provides t
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and/or softening of competition. If
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market, and pre-sale service to ret
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facilitate collusion, both at the s
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distribution or do not require the
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elevant in a market with growing de
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concerning the products being distr
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supply obligation. The higher the t
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cover the expense of those payments
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this increases the possible foreclo
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manufacturer with market power to f
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Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborat
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AGREEMENTS AMONG COMPETITORS.......
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ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORAT
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collaborations. These Guidelines us
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The competitive effects from compet
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collaboration and any individual ag
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An agreement may be “reasonably n
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already in operation, 28 then, abse
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The following sections illustrate c
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An exercise of market power may inj
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that is, the technologies or goods
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Where the nature of the agreement a
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scope of R&D efforts and investment
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In the context of research and deve
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assess the likelihood and magnitude
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specialized assets or characteristi
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participants also agree to fix the
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ut automobile manufacturers would f
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eported simultaneously to both part
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it could not adequately assess the
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Global Guide to Competition Litigat
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England and Wales Keith Jones, Rich
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against the infringement finding by
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Attheraces v BHB 14 confirmed this
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disclosure in relation to competiti
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Most claims for damages resulting f
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that, to avoid discouraging risk ta
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Contact Information Keith Jones Pho
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Arbitrating Competition Law Dispute
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION DG Competition
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forwarded to DG Competition for pub
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II. QUANTIFYING THE OVERCHARGE.....
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• the heads of damages to be comp
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injured party to be compared with t
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Raised prices mean that the custome
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27. Section IV below sets out consi
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period with the price paid by custo
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Pre-infringement data could also be
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(3) Comparison with data from other
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ules regarding causality, whether a
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Price 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 I
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. Examples and illustrations 66. A
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they sold to bakeries during the ca
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e.g. through applying specific stat
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84. Courts in the EU sometimes also
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model appropriately reflects the co
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97. It may occur that the observed
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cases be more appropriate than othe
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The following figure represents in
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these studies are set out below in
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(2) The initial overcharge paid by
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133. Also, the timing of the cartel
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141. A further possibility to estim
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overcharge (for example, where they
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158. In particular, the comparator-
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etween the actual profits generated
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assessing lost profits does not mak
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lost by the harmed competitor could
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180 160 Refusal to supply starts 14
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182. The general approach to quanti
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have continued producing goods or p
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to show that, in the absence of the
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Juzgado Mercantil numero 2 de Barce
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In case you want to verify which pe
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International Standards for Experts
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Snapshots of International Experien
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Quantification of damages - Most ju
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM COMPLIANCE TO
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will continue to make these decisio
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Compliance matters What companies c
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Foreword by Joaquín Almunia Vice-P
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Contents Foreword..................
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9 1 Complying with competition rule
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11 The risk of engaging in anti-com
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13 3 Compliance with EU competition
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15 What about Small & Medium Enterp
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17 In addition, guidance in particu
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19 cific needs of the undertaking,
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21 advise on or approve individual
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23 summaries/competition/firms/l261
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978-92-79-22094-4 KD-32-11-985-EN-C
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these instruments are essentially p
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corporate officers, managers, super
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2) the commitment to appoint one or
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in itself when making an individual
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@ Tendances Theodore Banks (dir.) t
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11. In view of the increasing penal
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notably to be stressed that even if
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14. There is also an indicative lis
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43. An abuse of dominance case was
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71. There have been approximately 1
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98. In 2012, the NMa imposed fines
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D. Complaint for Criminal Sanctions
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of the more onerous rules on discov
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g Are competition authorities/agenc
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the outlined guidelines is availabl
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202. At present, there is no develo
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7. Consequences of non compliance f
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240. In cases where the management
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g The organization shall take reaso
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In addition to enhance the good cor
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299. There would however be scope i
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327. Originally, the parent company
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341. As explained above, the sancti
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359. For example, the Federal Court
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that even a genuine and bona fide c
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418. A compliance programme simply
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eal-estate agents, publishers and s
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France 465. Adopting a compliance p
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Best practices for compliance progr
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France 515. Adopting a compliance p
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Pakistan 546. No such information i
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Japan 570. In the event that the co
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597. Like the IAA - the ISA publish
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Tab.: Guidance and incentives propo
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CPI Antitrust Chronicle February
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Today’s Topics Translating theor
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Maximizing Impact with Limited Reso
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Making It Real In English (or Japa
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Questions? Thank you for your atten
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Update on Antitrust Enforcement in
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Ashok Chawla Chairperson H. C. Gupt
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Inquiry Process - Non-merger Invest
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Remedial Powers • Anticompetitive
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Competition Commission of India Mer
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Competition Commission of India Mer
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Competition Commission of India Non
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Competition Commission of India Bre
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Competition Commission of India Ant
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Competition Commission of India Ant
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Competition Commission of India Abu
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Competition Commission of India Abu
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Highlights of the Proposed Amendmen
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Highlights of the Amendments to the
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Some Observations • CCI burdened
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Some Observations • No “nationa
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Antitrust, Innovation, and Standard
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THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF STANDARDS
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MEANING OF F/RAND Emerging consensu
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THE “HOLD UP” PROBLEM: MORE HYP
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VIEWS FROM THE INDUSTRY “Any unif
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VIEWS FROM THE AGENCIES “[I]f a p
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WHITHER STANDARD-SETTING? System of
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Antitrust Issues in Doing Business
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The Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) - Effec
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Enforcement of the AML - 1 Policy A
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IP in the AML - AML Art. 55 • “
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IP in the AML - AML Art. 13(5) •
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Competition in the Patent Law - Pat
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SAIC Draft Intellectual Property Gu
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SAIC Draft IP Guidelines - Article
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SAIC Draft IP Guidelines • Refuse
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SAIC Draft IP Guidelines - Art. 21
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SAIC Draft IP Guidelines - Art. 22
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Proposed Regulation on Standards fo
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Proposed Regulation for Simple Case
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Proposed Regulation for Simple Case
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Draft Rules on Merger Remedies - Ty
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Draft Rules on Merger Remedies - Ar
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Recent MOFCOM Merger Decisions © 2
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Marubeni Acquisition of Gavilon Hol
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Glencore Acquisition of Xstrata - A
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Glencore Acquisition of Xstrata •
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Huawei v. Interdigital - Huawei sue
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Thank you! Contact information: ste
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Assessing the Quality of Competitio
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BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS ARISING IN
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Page 2 of 15 Journal of Competition
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Page 10 of 15 Journal of Competitio
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C O V E R S T O R I E S Antitrust,
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C O V E R S T O R I E S proposed tr
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C O V E R S T O R I E S 1 U.S. Dep
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1 Introduction Empirical competitiv
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metric Cournot model, our framework
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must pay an (explicit or implicit)
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o¤ers a two-step estimation proced
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and All of these are K 0 1 f(pjN =
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accounts for the fact that N t is k
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Let l (p; A; ) denote the joint den
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We now turn to the step 2 results.
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anges of 30 to 50 percent for “id
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In summary, the estimates in Table
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esources attempting to resolve unce
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References [1] An, Yonghong, Yingya
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[18] Narasimhan, Chakravarthi (1988
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Substituting for in equation (15)
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For each simulated period, t, we ra
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates and Bo
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Table 4: Percentage Change in Post-
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ECONOMIC OVERVIEW Hypotheticals and
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ECONOMIC OVERVIEW ‘But for’ pri
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Horizontal Merger Guidelines U.S.
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9. Entry...........................
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The unifying theme of these Guideli
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disrupt market conditions with a ne
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merger. However, rival firms may pr
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Defining a market broadly to includ
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satisfying the test, guided by the
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legal or regulatory requirements; a
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Example 12: The merging parties bot
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significant sunk costs, are also co
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5.3 Market Concentration Market con
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6. Unilateral Effects The eliminati
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A merger is unlikely to generate su
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complementary capabilities that can
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A market typically is more vulnerab
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As part of their full assessment of
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coordinated effects context, increm
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11. Failure and Exiting Assets Notw
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influence can lessen competition be
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The Chicago <stron
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First Principles - Tying As to tyin
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First Principles - Evolving Applica
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Tying Put simply, it is a Seller’
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Tying - Elements Considered Based o
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Tying - Element Two That the tying
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Tying - Element Three Seller must h
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Tying When those elements are prese
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Tying - Kodak Kodak - another key t
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Tying - Kodak (cont.) Ninth Circuit
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Tying - After Kodak Predicted flood
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Tying - After Kodak Legacy of Kodak
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Tying - More Recent Development - I
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Bundling 27
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Bundling - Legal Standard Antitrust
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Bundling - Legal Standard (cont.) T
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Bundling - “Competitive Products
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Bundling - After PeaceHealth Pacifi
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Bundling - Conclusions Bundling wil
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Exclusive Dealing - Background A re
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Exclusive Dealing - The Dentsply Ca
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Exclusive Dealing - The Dentsply Ca
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Exclusive Dealing - The Intel Case
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Loyalty Discounts 51
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Loyalty Discounts - Brunswick (cont
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Loyalty Discounts - Brunswick, Sect
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Loyalty Discounts - Market Share Di
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IDENTIFYING AND RESOLVING CONFLICTS
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Global Conflicts - Introduction •
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Rule 1.7(a)(1) - Direct Adversity t
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Rule 1.7(a)(2) - Material Limitatio
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Corporate Family Issue - When Can a
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Waivers • Under Rule 1.7(b), a la
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Rule 1.9 - Duties to Former Clients
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Rule 1.18 - Duties to Prospective C
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Conflicts Outside the United States
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Conflicts in Cross-Border Matters
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Rule 8.5(b) - Choice Of Law • Rul
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Cross-Border Issues • 1. Where Pa
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