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92nd ARMORED FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION<br />

PART VI<br />

Cont<strong>in</strong>ued from the March–April Issue of<br />

The Graybeards, Vol 23, No. 2<br />

Beg<strong>in</strong>: Excerpt from Military History<br />

Book, Chapter entitled “The last offensive.”<br />

See: Web Page http://www.army.<br />

mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/truce/fm.htm for<br />

the full document<br />

The Last Offensive<br />

The resumption of armistice negotiations<br />

at Panmunjom on to July and the<br />

apparent pacification of Syngman Rhee<br />

dur<strong>in</strong>g early July provided an <strong>in</strong>centive for<br />

the last Communist offensive. With the<br />

end of hostilities at long last <strong>in</strong> sight, the<br />

enemy was faced with its f<strong>in</strong>al opportunity<br />

to give the world a conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g display<br />

of Communist military might; to teach the<br />

upstart ROK forces another lesson; and to<br />

improve defensive terra<strong>in</strong> positions <strong>in</strong> the<br />

barga<strong>in</strong>. The June offensive had accomplished<br />

these aims to some degree, but<br />

much of the Kumsong salient still<br />

rema<strong>in</strong>ed. Furthermore, the ROKA units<br />

had bent but not broken under the<br />

Communist assault; perhaps this time the<br />

Ch<strong>in</strong>ese might really give them a trounc<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

By even<strong>in</strong>g of 13 July the Communists<br />

had moved elements of five Ch<strong>in</strong>ese<br />

armies <strong>in</strong>to attack and support positions<br />

along the central sector that encompassed<br />

the Kumsong salient. Fac<strong>in</strong>g them from<br />

west to east lay the ROK 9th and Capital<br />

Divisions of the U.S. IX Corps and the<br />

ROK 6th, 8th, 3d, and 5th Divisions of the<br />

ROK II Corps.<br />

The <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the tempo of artillery<br />

and mortar fire on 13 July corroborated<br />

earlier <strong>in</strong>telligence reports from prisoners,<br />

deserters, agents, and reconnaissance that<br />

the Communists were about to launch a<br />

major drive aimed primarily at ROK units<br />

on the central front.<br />

After darkness descended, the Ch<strong>in</strong>ese<br />

forces moved forward en masse. A re<strong>in</strong>forced<br />

regiment from the 72d Division of<br />

the CCF 24th Army struck the ROK 9th<br />

Division’s right flank while the 203d<br />

Division of the CCF 68th Army smashed<br />

<strong>in</strong>to the ROK Capital Division guard<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the left shoulder of the Kumsong bulge.<br />

Friendly outposts were overrun as wave<br />

after wave of Ch<strong>in</strong>ese jo<strong>in</strong>ed the assault.<br />

By midnight, enemy units had penetrated<br />

the ma<strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e of resistance up to 1,000<br />

meters <strong>in</strong> some places. In the Sniper Ridge<br />

sector—long a bone of contention—<br />

friendly forces had to pull back to avoid<br />

be<strong>in</strong>g cut off. Throughout the night the<br />

pressure cont<strong>in</strong>ued, with huge expenditures<br />

of artillery and mortar fire from both<br />

sides.<br />

In the ROK 6th Division area adjacent<br />

to the Capital Division, four battalions<br />

from the 204th Division of the CCF 68th<br />

Army hit a company-sized outpost of the<br />

ROK 19th Regiment. By the morn<strong>in</strong>g of<br />

14 July, they had penetrated the ma<strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e<br />

positions of the regiment and surrounded<br />

one friendly battalion. Elements of the<br />

204th Division moved through the ROK<br />

6th Division sector and then swung to the<br />

west and jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the attack upon the<br />

Capital Division.<br />

To the east the Ch<strong>in</strong>ese on 13 July sent<br />

four companies to surround an outpost <strong>in</strong><br />

the ROK 8th Division l<strong>in</strong>es and a battalion<br />

aga<strong>in</strong>st a company outpost <strong>in</strong> the ROK 3d<br />

Division area on the right shoulder of the<br />

Kumsong salient. They also attacked the<br />

ROK 5th and 7th Divisions to keep them<br />

occupied while the ma<strong>in</strong> assault was <strong>in</strong><br />

progress.<br />

By the morn<strong>in</strong>g of 14 July the pattern<br />

of the Communist offensive attack had<br />

developed as the enemy <strong>in</strong>creased the<br />

weight of his pressure upon the ROK 3d<br />

Division. Battalion and two-battalion<br />

attacks accompanied by heavy artillery<br />

and mortar support broke through the<br />

ROK 3d outpost system and drove <strong>in</strong>to the<br />

ma<strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e positions. The 22d and 23d<br />

Regiments received assault after assault,<br />

but with the aid of the 18th Regiment <strong>in</strong><br />

block<strong>in</strong>g positions managed to hold on.<br />

Then four enemy companies filtered <strong>in</strong><br />

through the adjacent ROK 5th Division<br />

sector and swung <strong>in</strong> beh<strong>in</strong>d the 23d<br />

Regiment. When the <strong>in</strong>dication of a double<br />

envelopment became apparent, the<br />

ROK 3d began to pull back.<br />

As the Ch<strong>in</strong>ese pierced the ROK l<strong>in</strong>es<br />

along the central front and cut off units<br />

from their parent organizations, the situation<br />

became confused. Soldiers from the<br />

6th, 8th, and Capital Divisions found<br />

themselves defend<strong>in</strong>g strongpo<strong>in</strong>ts together.<br />

Lateral and front-to-rear l<strong>in</strong>es of communications<br />

were soon out of commission<br />

and radio and foot messengers became the<br />

chief means of send<strong>in</strong>g and receiv<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>in</strong>structions and <strong>in</strong>formation. Sister regiments<br />

were often out of contact and<br />

unaware of what the other was do<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Reports trickl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> from the front were<br />

often delayed and usually <strong>in</strong>complete as<br />

the ROKA commanders displayed their<br />

customary unwill<strong>in</strong>gness to forward unfavorable<br />

news that would cause them to<br />

lose face.<br />

Despite the lack of details, it was<br />

apparent after the first day of the Ch<strong>in</strong>ese<br />

assault that the enemy’s use of major elements<br />

of six divisions had made serious<br />

<strong>in</strong>roads <strong>in</strong> the ROK Capital and 3d<br />

Divisions’ sectors. S<strong>in</strong>ce these guarded<br />

the shoulders of the salient, the ROK 6th<br />

and 8th Divisions were <strong>in</strong> danger of hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />

their flanks exposed to a double envelopment.<br />

General Taylor, therefore, on 14<br />

July ordered the ROK Capital, 6th, 8th,<br />

3d, and 5th Divisions to fall back south of<br />

the Kumsong River l<strong>in</strong>e at the base of the<br />

bulge. This would straighten out the<br />

defensive l<strong>in</strong>e and shorten the front to be<br />

covered. In the process of comply<strong>in</strong>g with<br />

Taylor’s <strong>in</strong>structions, however, the ROK<br />

commanders lost contact with and control<br />

of some of their units, with the result that<br />

many of them did not stop at the Kumsong<br />

68<br />

May – June 2009<br />

The Graybeards

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