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quick reference chart and annotations for determining immigration ...

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Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Florence Immigrant <strong>and</strong> Refugee Rights Project,<br />

Maricopa County Public Defender August 2012<br />

Crime Involving Moral Turpitude (CMT): Yes, but with some possible exceptions. There is<br />

an argument that A2 is not a CIMT under Carr v. INS, 86 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 1996), but most unpublished<br />

BIA decisions have held to the contrary. Simple assault knowing that the person was a police officer<br />

under A8 should not be a CMT, particularly when the plea involved mere offensive touching or the<br />

possibility of it under §13-1203(A)(3). The same might be true <strong>for</strong> other occupations listed in A8.<br />

Aggravated Felony: Crime of Violence. An intentional aggravated assault with a sentence<br />

imposed of one year or more will be considered a crime of violence. However, an aggravated assault with<br />

a mens rea of recklessness (as under § 13-1203(A)(1)) or the use of de minimus <strong>for</strong>ce (under (A)(3)) may<br />

not be a crime of violence, even with a sentence of one year or more. See Fern<strong>and</strong>ez-Ruiz v. Gonzales,<br />

466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2006).<br />

Immigration law uses the federal definition of a “crime of violence” found at 18 U.S.C. § 16.<br />

Section 16(a) of 18 U.S.C. requires the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical <strong>for</strong>ce,” while<br />

section 16(b) requires that the offense be a felony <strong>and</strong> involve a “substantial risk” that physical <strong>for</strong>ce may<br />

be used. In Fern<strong>and</strong>ez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit<br />

found that a conviction <strong>for</strong> misdemeanor assault under § 13-1203 did not categorically constitute a crime<br />

of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) since recklessness under (A)(1) would not involve the “use,<br />

attempted use, or threatened use of physical <strong>for</strong>ce.” However, the court did not reach the issue of whether<br />

a felony assault under § 13-1204 committed with a mens rea of recklessness would meet the definition of<br />

a crime of violence under section 16(b) by presenting a “substantial risk” that physical <strong>for</strong>ce may be used.<br />

But the Ninth Circuit has recently suggested that a Cali<strong>for</strong>nia “general intent” crime that employs a mens<br />

rea of recklessness would not be a “crime of violence” under section 16(b). See Flores-Lopez v. Holder,<br />

685 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2012).<br />

Defense counsel should conservatively assume that a conviction <strong>for</strong> aggravated assault with a<br />

sentence of one year or more will be held to be an aggravated felony. However, if a sentence of 364 days<br />

or less is not possible, counsel should attempt to specify a subsection that is more likely to involve a mens<br />

rea of recklessness, such as A1, A2, A6, A7, or A8. Since A3, A4, A5, A9, A10 are more likely by<br />

nature to involve the intentional use of <strong>for</strong>ce, these subsections should be avoided. Furthermore, a plea to<br />

the underlying definition of assault at § 13-1203(A)(1) or (A)(3), <strong>and</strong> use of the specific word<br />

“recklessness” in the plea agreement, will aid <strong>immigration</strong> counsel in arguing that the offense is not a<br />

crime of violence.<br />

Note that a plea to attempted assault will always involve an intentional mens rea <strong>and</strong> thus<br />

preclude the benefits of a plea to recklessness. United States v. Gomez-Hern<strong>and</strong>ez, 680 F.3d 1171, 1176<br />

(9th Cir. 2012) (“it is well-settled that attempted aggravated assault under Arizona law covers only<br />

intentional conduct”) (citing State v. Kiles, 175 Ariz. 358, 857 P.2d 1212, 1224 (1993) (“[A]ttempt is a<br />

specific intent crime <strong>and</strong> by definition involves intentional conduct.”). There<strong>for</strong>e, in order to avoid a<br />

crime of violence or a crime of domestic violence, counsel would be better off pleading to a straight<br />

assault than an attempt in order to leave open the possibility of a reckless mens rea.<br />

Other Grounds: Domestic Violence. See discussion of §13-1203.<br />

Other Grounds: Child Abuse: A6 (person is eighteen years of age or older <strong>and</strong> commits the<br />

assault on a child who is fifteen years of age or under) will likely be charged as a crime of child abuse<br />

under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). See Matter of Soram, 25 I&N Dec. 378 (BIA 2010) (unreasonably<br />

placing a child in a situation that poses a threat of injury to the child’s life or health is categorically a<br />

Arizona Criminal Chart with Explanatory Endnote – August 2012<br />

26

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