Linear Algebra Exercises-n-Answers.pdf
Linear Algebra Exercises-n-Answers.pdf
Linear Algebra Exercises-n-Answers.pdf
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72 <strong>Linear</strong> <strong>Algebra</strong>, by Hefferon<br />
-a<br />
T<br />
D<br />
a<br />
R<br />
a<br />
+<br />
b<br />
T<br />
D<br />
b<br />
R<br />
-b<br />
+<br />
c<br />
T<br />
D<br />
-c<br />
R<br />
c<br />
=<br />
-a+b+c<br />
3 (a) A two-voter election can have a majority cycle in two ways. First, the two voters could be<br />
opposites, resulting after cancellation in the trivial election (with the majority cycle of all zeroes).<br />
Second, the two voters could have the same spin but come from different rows, as here.<br />
−1 voter<br />
1 ·<br />
T<br />
D<br />
R<br />
1 voter<br />
1 voter<br />
1 voter<br />
+ 1 ·<br />
T<br />
D<br />
R<br />
1 voter<br />
−1 voter<br />
1 voter<br />
+ 0 ·<br />
T<br />
D<br />
R<br />
T<br />
−1 voter<br />
D<br />
R<br />
a+b-c<br />
1 voter<br />
a-b+c<br />
=<br />
0 voters<br />
T<br />
D<br />
R<br />
2 voters<br />
0 voters<br />
(b) There are two cases. An even number of voters can split half and half into opposites, e.g., half<br />
the voters are D > R > T and half are T > R > D. Then cancellation gives the trivial election. If<br />
the number of voters is greater than one and odd (of the form 2k + 1 with k > 0) then using the<br />
cycle diagram from the proof,<br />
-a<br />
T<br />
D<br />
a<br />
R<br />
a<br />
+<br />
b<br />
T<br />
D<br />
b<br />
R<br />
-b<br />
+<br />
c<br />
T<br />
D<br />
-c<br />
R<br />
c<br />
=<br />
-a+b+c<br />
T<br />
D<br />
R<br />
a+b-c<br />
a-b+c<br />
we can take a = k and b = k and c = 1. Because k > 0, this is a majority cycle.<br />
4 This is one example that yields a non-rational preference order for a single voter.<br />
character experience policies<br />
Democrat most middle least<br />
Republican middle least most<br />
Third least most middle<br />
The Democrat is preferred to the Republican for character and experience. The Republican is preferred<br />
to the Third for character and policies. And, the Third is preferred to the Democrat for experience<br />
and policies.<br />
5 First, compare the D > R > T decomposition that was done out in the Topic with the decomposition<br />
of the opposite T > R > D voter.<br />
⎛<br />
⎝ −1 ⎞ ⎛<br />
1 ⎠ = 1 3 · ⎝ 1 ⎞ ⎛<br />
1⎠ + 2 3 · ⎝ −1 ⎞ ⎛<br />
1 ⎠ + 2 3 · ⎝ −1 ⎞ ⎛<br />
0 ⎠ and ⎝ 1 ⎞ ⎛<br />
−1⎠ = d 1 · ⎝ 1 ⎞ ⎛<br />
1⎠ + d 2 · ⎝ −1 ⎞ ⎛<br />
1 ⎠ + d 3 · ⎝ −1 ⎞<br />
0 ⎠<br />
1 1 0<br />
1<br />
−1 1<br />
0<br />
1<br />
Obviously, the second is the negative of the first, and so d 1 = −1/3, d 2 = −2/3, and d 3 = −2/3. This<br />
principle holds for any pair of opposite voters, and so we need only do the computation for a voter<br />
from the second row, and a voter from the third row. For a positive spin voter in the second row,<br />
c 1 − c 2 − c 3 = 1<br />
c 1 + c 2 = 1<br />
c 1 + c 3 = −1<br />
−ρ 1+ρ 2 (−1/2)ρ 2+ρ 3<br />
−→<br />
−ρ 1+ρ 3<br />
−→ 2c 2 + c 3 = 0<br />
c 1 − c 2 − c 3 = 1<br />
(3/2)c 3 = −2<br />
gives c 3 = −4/3, c 2 = 2/3, and c 1 = 1/3. For a positive spin voter in the third row,<br />
c 1 − c 2 − c 3 = 1<br />
c 1 + c 2 = −1<br />
c 1 + c 3 = 1<br />
gives c 3 = 2/3, c 2 = −4/3, and c 1 = 1/3.<br />
−ρ 1 +ρ 2 (−1/2)ρ 2 +ρ 3<br />
−→<br />
−ρ 1+ρ 3<br />
−→ 2c 2 + c 3 = −2<br />
c 1 − c 2 − c 3 = 1<br />
(3/2)c 3 = 1<br />
6 It is nonempty because it contains the zero vector. To see that it is closed under linear combinations<br />
of two of its members, suppose that ⃗v 1 and ⃗v 2 are in U ⊥ and consider c 1 ⃗v 1 + c 2 ⃗v 2 . For any ⃗u ∈ U,<br />
and so c 1 ⃗v 1 + c 2 ⃗v 2 ∈ U ⊥ .<br />
(c 1 ⃗v 1 + c 2 ⃗v 2 ) ⃗u = c 1 (⃗v 1 ⃗u) + c 2 (⃗v 2 ⃗u) = c 1 · 0 + c 2 · 0 = 0<br />
Topic: Dimensional Analysis<br />
1 (a) This relationship<br />
(L 1 M 0 T 0 ) p 1<br />
(L 1 M 0 T 0 ) p 2<br />
(L 1 M 0 T −1 ) p 3<br />
(L 0 M 0 T 0 ) p 4<br />
(L 1 M 0 T −2 ) p 5<br />
(L 0 M 0 T 1 ) p 6<br />
= L 0 M 0 T 0