11.04.2014 Views

Linear Algebra Exercises-n-Answers.pdf

Linear Algebra Exercises-n-Answers.pdf

Linear Algebra Exercises-n-Answers.pdf

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

72 <strong>Linear</strong> <strong>Algebra</strong>, by Hefferon<br />

-a<br />

T<br />

D<br />

a<br />

R<br />

a<br />

+<br />

b<br />

T<br />

D<br />

b<br />

R<br />

-b<br />

+<br />

c<br />

T<br />

D<br />

-c<br />

R<br />

c<br />

=<br />

-a+b+c<br />

3 (a) A two-voter election can have a majority cycle in two ways. First, the two voters could be<br />

opposites, resulting after cancellation in the trivial election (with the majority cycle of all zeroes).<br />

Second, the two voters could have the same spin but come from different rows, as here.<br />

−1 voter<br />

1 ·<br />

T<br />

D<br />

R<br />

1 voter<br />

1 voter<br />

1 voter<br />

+ 1 ·<br />

T<br />

D<br />

R<br />

1 voter<br />

−1 voter<br />

1 voter<br />

+ 0 ·<br />

T<br />

D<br />

R<br />

T<br />

−1 voter<br />

D<br />

R<br />

a+b-c<br />

1 voter<br />

a-b+c<br />

=<br />

0 voters<br />

T<br />

D<br />

R<br />

2 voters<br />

0 voters<br />

(b) There are two cases. An even number of voters can split half and half into opposites, e.g., half<br />

the voters are D > R > T and half are T > R > D. Then cancellation gives the trivial election. If<br />

the number of voters is greater than one and odd (of the form 2k + 1 with k > 0) then using the<br />

cycle diagram from the proof,<br />

-a<br />

T<br />

D<br />

a<br />

R<br />

a<br />

+<br />

b<br />

T<br />

D<br />

b<br />

R<br />

-b<br />

+<br />

c<br />

T<br />

D<br />

-c<br />

R<br />

c<br />

=<br />

-a+b+c<br />

T<br />

D<br />

R<br />

a+b-c<br />

a-b+c<br />

we can take a = k and b = k and c = 1. Because k > 0, this is a majority cycle.<br />

4 This is one example that yields a non-rational preference order for a single voter.<br />

character experience policies<br />

Democrat most middle least<br />

Republican middle least most<br />

Third least most middle<br />

The Democrat is preferred to the Republican for character and experience. The Republican is preferred<br />

to the Third for character and policies. And, the Third is preferred to the Democrat for experience<br />

and policies.<br />

5 First, compare the D > R > T decomposition that was done out in the Topic with the decomposition<br />

of the opposite T > R > D voter.<br />

⎛<br />

⎝ −1 ⎞ ⎛<br />

1 ⎠ = 1 3 · ⎝ 1 ⎞ ⎛<br />

1⎠ + 2 3 · ⎝ −1 ⎞ ⎛<br />

1 ⎠ + 2 3 · ⎝ −1 ⎞ ⎛<br />

0 ⎠ and ⎝ 1 ⎞ ⎛<br />

−1⎠ = d 1 · ⎝ 1 ⎞ ⎛<br />

1⎠ + d 2 · ⎝ −1 ⎞ ⎛<br />

1 ⎠ + d 3 · ⎝ −1 ⎞<br />

0 ⎠<br />

1 1 0<br />

1<br />

−1 1<br />

0<br />

1<br />

Obviously, the second is the negative of the first, and so d 1 = −1/3, d 2 = −2/3, and d 3 = −2/3. This<br />

principle holds for any pair of opposite voters, and so we need only do the computation for a voter<br />

from the second row, and a voter from the third row. For a positive spin voter in the second row,<br />

c 1 − c 2 − c 3 = 1<br />

c 1 + c 2 = 1<br />

c 1 + c 3 = −1<br />

−ρ 1+ρ 2 (−1/2)ρ 2+ρ 3<br />

−→<br />

−ρ 1+ρ 3<br />

−→ 2c 2 + c 3 = 0<br />

c 1 − c 2 − c 3 = 1<br />

(3/2)c 3 = −2<br />

gives c 3 = −4/3, c 2 = 2/3, and c 1 = 1/3. For a positive spin voter in the third row,<br />

c 1 − c 2 − c 3 = 1<br />

c 1 + c 2 = −1<br />

c 1 + c 3 = 1<br />

gives c 3 = 2/3, c 2 = −4/3, and c 1 = 1/3.<br />

−ρ 1 +ρ 2 (−1/2)ρ 2 +ρ 3<br />

−→<br />

−ρ 1+ρ 3<br />

−→ 2c 2 + c 3 = −2<br />

c 1 − c 2 − c 3 = 1<br />

(3/2)c 3 = 1<br />

6 It is nonempty because it contains the zero vector. To see that it is closed under linear combinations<br />

of two of its members, suppose that ⃗v 1 and ⃗v 2 are in U ⊥ and consider c 1 ⃗v 1 + c 2 ⃗v 2 . For any ⃗u ∈ U,<br />

and so c 1 ⃗v 1 + c 2 ⃗v 2 ∈ U ⊥ .<br />

(c 1 ⃗v 1 + c 2 ⃗v 2 ) ⃗u = c 1 (⃗v 1 ⃗u) + c 2 (⃗v 2 ⃗u) = c 1 · 0 + c 2 · 0 = 0<br />

Topic: Dimensional Analysis<br />

1 (a) This relationship<br />

(L 1 M 0 T 0 ) p 1<br />

(L 1 M 0 T 0 ) p 2<br />

(L 1 M 0 T −1 ) p 3<br />

(L 0 M 0 T 0 ) p 4<br />

(L 1 M 0 T −2 ) p 5<br />

(L 0 M 0 T 1 ) p 6<br />

= L 0 M 0 T 0

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!