quick reference chart and notes for determining immigration - ILRC
quick reference chart and notes for determining immigration - ILRC
quick reference chart and notes for determining immigration - ILRC
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Cali<strong>for</strong>nia Quick Reference Chart <strong>and</strong> Notes<br />
February 2010<br />
For the Defendant: Sections 12020(a) of the Cali<strong>for</strong>nia Penal Code is divisible <strong>for</strong> purposes of<br />
the firearms deportation ground because it includes offenses that do not relate to firearms, <strong>for</strong><br />
example possession of a blackjack in § 12020(a)(1) or carrying a concealed dirk or dagger under<br />
§ 12020(a)(4). Simple possession of a weapon is not a crime of violence or a crime involving<br />
moral turpitude.<br />
2. Assault with a firearm or other weapon, PC § 245(a)<br />
For purposes of the firearms deportation ground, PC § 245(a) is a divisible statute.<br />
There also is an argument that this offense is divisible <strong>for</strong> moral turpitude purposes. It has been<br />
held to be a crime of violence. See discussion <strong>and</strong> “To the Noncitizen Defendant” box on P.C. §<br />
245(a) at Part B.7, supra.<br />
E. Safer pleas <strong>for</strong> offenses relating to fraud, theft, receipt of stolen property, or<br />
burglary<br />
See also § N.11, “Burglary, Theft <strong>and</strong> Fraud”<br />
1. False personation, PC § 529(3)<br />
For the Defendant: Conviction under PC § 529(3) is not a categorical aggravated felony as<br />
<strong>for</strong>gery or a counterfeit offense even if a sentence of a year or more is imposed, <strong>and</strong> is not a<br />
categorical crime involving moral turpitude. The offense does not amount to fraud <strong>and</strong> need not<br />
have specific intent other than to take a false identity. In People v. Rathert (2000) 24 Cal.4 th<br />
200, the Cali<strong>for</strong>nia Supreme Court held that § 529(3) is violated without any requirement that the<br />
defendant have specific intent to cause any liability to the person impersonated, or to secure a<br />
benefit to any person. The statute “requires the existence of no state of mind or criminal intent<br />
beyond that plainly expressed on the face of the statute.” Id. at 202. “[T]he Legislature sought<br />
to deter <strong>and</strong> to punish all acts by an impersonator that might result in a liability or a benefit,<br />
whether or not such a consequence was intended or even <strong>for</strong>eseen.” Id. at 206. Moral turpitude<br />
generally requires an evil motive. Here the Court noted “One does not violate paragraph 3<br />
merely by happening to resemble another person. Rather, one must intentionally engage in a<br />
deception that may fairly be described as no innocent behavior, even if, in some instances, it<br />
might not stem from an evil motive.” Id. at 209.<br />
The authors believe that conviction under PC § 529(3) is not necessarily an aggravated<br />
felony as <strong>for</strong>gery or counterfeit offense, even if a sentence of a year or more is imposed. Neither<br />
is it categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. See discussion in Defendant box of People<br />
v. Rathert. This offense can be held to have the above consequences, however, if the record of<br />
Immigrant Legal Resource Center N-133