Protectionism's Quiet Return: GTA's Pre-G8 ... - Global Trade Alert

Protectionism's Quiet 

Return 

GTA's Pre-G8 Summit Report 

By Simon J. Evenett 

 

GLOB L 

TR DE 

LERT

Protectionism’s Quiet Return 

GTA’s Pre-G8 Summit Report

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 

Centre for Economic Policy Research 

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London 

EC1V 3PZ 

UK 

Tel: +44 (0) 20 7183 8801 

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Email: cepr@cepr.org 

Web: www.cepr.org 

© Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2013

Protectionism’s Quiet Return 

GTA’s Pre-G8 Summit Report 

By Simon J. Evenett 

a 

GLOB L 

TR DE 

LERT

About Global Trade Alert (GTA) 

Global Trade Alert provides information in real time on state measures taken during 

the current global economic downturn that are likely to discriminate against foreign 

commerce. Global Trade Alert is: 

Independent: GTA is a policy-oriented and research initiative of the Centre for Economic 

Policy Research (CEPR), an independent academic and policy research think-tank based 

in London, UK. Simon J. Evenett, the co-director of CEPR’s International Trade and 

Regional Economics Programme, is the coordinator of the GTA. 

Comprehensive: GTA complements and goes beyond the WTO, UNCTAD, and OECD’s 

monitoring initiatives by identifying those trading partners likely to be harmed by 

state measures. The GTA considers a broader range of policy instruments than other 

monitoring initiatives. 

Accessible: The GTA website allows policy-makers, exporters, the media, and analysts 

to search the posted government measures by implementing country, by trading 

partners harmed, and by sector. Third parties can report suspicious state measures and 

governments have the right to reply to any of their measures listed on the website. 

Transparent: The GTA website represents a major step forward in transparency of 

national policies, reporting not only the measures taken but identifies the implementing 

country, trading partners likely harmed, and product lines and sectors affected. 

Timely: The up-to-date information and informed commentary provided by Global 

Trade Alert will facilitates assessments of whether the G20 pledge not to “repeat the 

historic mistakes of protectionism of previous eras” is met, and the bite of multilateral 

trade rules. 

For further information, visit www.GlobalTradeAlert.org 

About the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 

The Centre for Economic Policy Research is a network of over 800 Research Fellows 

and Affiliates, based primarily in European universities. The Centre coordinates the 

research activities of its Fellows and Affiliates and communicates the results to the public 

and private sectors. CEPR is an entrepreneur, developing research initiatives with the 

producers, consumers and sponsors of research. Established in 1983, CEPR is a European 

economics research organization with uniquely wide-ranging scope and activities. 

The Centre is pluralist and non-partisan, bringing economic research to bear on the 

analysis of medium- and long-run policy questions. CEPR research may include views 

on policy, but the Executive Committee of the Centre does not give prior review to 

its publications, and the Centre takes no institutional policy positions. The opinions 

expressed in this report are those of the authors and not those of the Centre for Economic 

Policy Research. 

CEPR is a registered charity (No. 287287) and a company limited by guarantee and 

registered in England (No. 1727026). 

Chair of the Board Guillermo de la Dehesa 

President 

Richard Portes 

Chief Executive Officer Stephen Yeo 

Research Director Lucrezia Reichlin 

Policy Director 

Richard Baldwin

Contents 

Foreword 

vii 

1. Executive Summary 1 

2. Maps of the Countries Harmed by each G8 Member 13 

3. The Landscape of Crisis-Era Protectionism before the 2013 G8 Summit 23 

The G8 and Crisis-Era Protectionism: Country Tables 

Canada 45 

France 51 

Germany 59 

Italy 67 

Japan 76 

Russian Federation 84 

United Kingdom 92 

United States of America 100

Foreword 

Rather than being ‘the dog that didn’t bark in the night’, protectionism now 

appears to be ‘the thief in the night’. On the basis of the evidence presented in 

the 12th GTA report, traditional forms of protectionism during the last year, such 

as trade tariffs and defence measures, are imposed less often than more subtle 

forms of beggar-thy-neighbour policies that many governments now appear 

increasingly to favour, not least as a means of side-stepping the established WTO 

disciplines. 

Whilst this is a very worrying trend in itself, what is also alarming is that we 

are now beginning to witness – in full light of day – trade dispute confrontations 

such as the recent EU-China debacle over German solar panels and French wine. 

Such a confrontation could very easily escalate into a trade war that would 

undoubtedly have serious and dire economic and social consequences, not just 

for the regions involved, but for the global community too – such is the nature 

of international trade and political relations. 

The evidence base for this current report, compiled by the GTA network 

under the auspices of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), is not 

insubstantial; the GTA database now comprises 3,334 reports on government 

measures, with 904 new entries – protectionist as well as liberalising – having 

been added over the last few months. In summary, some of the principal findings 

of the report provide sufficient cause for concern: 

• Initial totals of protectionism imposed in Q4 2012 and Q1 2013 are 

the worst on record since GTA began its monitoring. 

• From June 2012 to May 2013, more than three times as many 

protectionist measures were imposed by governments around the 

world than liberalising measures. 

• G8 nations were collectively responsible for 30% of protectionist 

measures imposed during the last 12 months; if the G20 countries are 

included this percentage becomes 65%. 

• G8 nations are being hit frequently by beggar-thy-neighbour policies 

• China is being harmed by protectionist measures more frequently 

than any other jurisdiction. 

The GTA reports are generally timed to ‘catch the wave’ of the policy debate, 

and this 12th GTA report is no exception to that rule. The 2013 G8 summit will 

take place in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, on 17-18 June. As is pointed out 

by Professor Simon Evenett in the executive summary to this report, the UK 

Presidency has already made a commitment towards combating protectionism. It 

is our sincere wish that the members of that summit will now take on board the 

findings and recommendations of this report and join with the UK in agreeing 

and implementing that commitment. 

A report on this scale would not have been possible without the financial 

backing of concerned institutions and the dedicated work of the GTA team 

and individuals who are located around the world. In this respect, we would 

vii

viii Protectionism’s Quiet Return: GTA’s Pre-G8 Summit Report 

like to gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the UK Department for 

International Development (DFID), the International Development Research 

Centre (IDRC), and the University of St. Gallen. In addition, we extend our 

thanks and gratitude to all those who have been involved in the monitoring, data 

gathering and analytical work for the GTA reports, including IQOM Inteligencia 

Comercial (Mexico) and the African Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET). 

In particular, we acknowledge the dedicated and superb work of the following 

members of the St Gallen-based GTA team over the past 12 months: Martin 

Wermelinger, Frederic Bärtl, Lucas Bonadei, Morgan Böffard, Wesley van 

Drongelen, Irene Fensore, Johannes Fritz, Michael Füglister, Chintan Jadwani, 

Iva Mihaylova, and Bernard Morkunas. We also acknowledge the professionalism 

and efficiency of Anil Shamdasani in bringing the report through to publication 

and last, but certainly by no means least, the tireless and committed effort of the 

GTA co-ordinator, Simon Evenett. 

Viv Davies 

Chief Operating Officer, CEPR 

11 June 2013

1 Executive Summary 

Simon J. Evenett 

University of St. Gallen and CEPR 

As the recent public recriminations between China and the EU over solar panels 

demonstrated, favouring domestic firms at the expense of foreign rivals can be a 

transparent, noisy, and diplomatically painful matter. Such overt protectionism 

may have much in common with the 1930s, but it is not representative of current 

policy choice. 

Nowadays, governments are adept at tilting the playing field in a way that 

their trading partners, the media, and analysts find hard to track. Over the past 

year, beggar-thy-neighbour policies have made a quiet but significant resurgence. 

The first estimates of the amount of protectionism imposed in Q4 2012 and Q1 

2013 are the worst that the GTA team has compiled since November 2008, indeed 

much worse than in Q1 2009 when policymakers lost sleep over protectionism. 

Given that the current holder of this year’s G8 Presidency, the UK, has made 

combatting protectionism a priority 1 , this report has been compiled and released 

just before the G8 Summit in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, on 17-18 June 2013. 

Concerns about protectionism are not confined to the UK, however. In April 

2013, when introducing reduced forecasts for world trade growth, the Director- 

General of the WTO, Mr. Pascal Lamy, warned that the protectionist threat may 

be greater now than at any time since the onset of the global economic crisis. 2 On 

the basis of the evidence presented here, Mr Lamy’s concerns were well founded. 

Building on a massive update of Global Trade Alert that saw 904 new entries 

added to the GTA database which now comprises 3,334 reports on government 

measures 3 , this Report provides a comprehensive overview of the current state 

of protectionist and trade-liberalising dynamics. The principal findings of this 

report are: 

• Protectionism has made a quiet but aggressive return in Q4 2012 and 

Q1 2013. The initial totals of protectionism imposed in those quarters 

were 127 and 125, respectively. These first read outs, which will be 

1 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20880368 

2 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/10/us-trade-wto-idUSBRE9390AO20130410 

3 The GTA database contains information on announced or implemented state measures that alter 

the relative treatment of domestic commercial interests vis-à-vis the foreign rivals they compete 

with. As such, the GTA database contains information on measures that improve the treatment of 

foreign commercial interests (of which tariff reductions are an example) and that introduce or increase 

discrimination against foreign commercial interests (referred to typically as protectionism.) The “relative 

treatment” standard used by the GTA has the major advantage that it does not define protectionism 

in terms of specific trade policies (such as tariffs and quotas) and recognises that governments often 

innovate in the ways in which they discriminate against foreign commercial interests during economic 

crises. One lesson from economic history is that such innovation frequently occurs and, therefore, that 

a backward-looking definition of protectionism is likely to miss important policy developments. 

1

2 Protectionism’s Quiet Return: GTA’s Pre-G8 summit report 

revised upwards over time, exceed anything seen since monitoring 

began. 

• In the year June 2012 to May 2013, 431 new protectionist measures were 

imposed, substantially outnumbering the 141 commerce-liberalising 

measures implemented. A further 183 protectionist measures are in the 

pipeline. 

• Together, the G8 nations were responsible for 131 of the 431 

protectionist measures imposed during the past 12 months. When the 

rest of the G20 are included, the largest economies in the world are 

responsible for 65% of all protectionism imposed. 

• The G8 countries have much to lose from beggar-thy-neighbour acts. 

Their commercial interests have been hit often by others’ protectionism 

in the past year – ranging from 70 hits for Russia and Canada to 146 

incidences harming American interests. 

• The harm to G8 commercial interests has built up over time. Only 

Russia and Canada have seen their exporters, investors, and nationals 

working abroad harmed less than 500 times since November 2008. In 

contrast, American commercial interests have been harmed just under 

800 times. 

• The most frequently harmed nation is China, whose commercial 

interests have been hit by foreign protectionism just under 1,000 times 

since November 2008. 

• For the first time since our monitoring began, the number of dumping-, 

subsidy-, and safeguard-related duties imposed (484) exceeded the 

number of trade-distorting bailouts (476). Once export subsidies and 

incentives are added, state-provided financial incentives are still more 

common than import restrictions during the crisis era. 

• Traditional forms of protectionism – tariffs and trade defence measures 

– still represent less than 40% of all beggar-thy-neighbour measures. 

Since the crisis began, governments have become very creative in 

evading WTO disciplines. 

Protectionism’s quiet return 

Since so much crisis-era protectionism is not transparent, the GTA team has come 

to expect low initial counts of the number of beggar-thy-neighbour measures 

implemented in the most recent quarters. 4 The last quarter of 2012 (Q4 2012) 

and the first quarter of 2013 (Q1 2013) broke the mould, as shown in Figure 1.1. 

4 Experience had shown that initial estimates were revised up—often markedly—over time. Unless there 

has been a misclassification error, the total number of protectionist measures reported in a given quarter 

can only go up over time as more and more protectionist measures are uncovered by the GTA. The GTA 

team does not use statistical tools to forecast the number of protectionist measures implemented in a 

quarter. Instead, the team counts the number of government measures that can be documented.

Executive Summary 3 

Figure 1.1 

Number of beggar-thy-neighbour measures implemented 

180 

160 

140 

120 

100 

Protectionism’s return 

80 

60 

40 

20 

0 

Protectionism in Q4 2012 and Q1 2013 are on track to be the 

worst since the onset of the global economic crisis 

26 

94 

127 125 

Q2 2012 Q3 2012 Q4 2012 

Quarter 

Q1 2013 Worst quarter of 

the crisis to date 

(Q1 2009) 

Latest estimate First report 

77 

In our last report, published in June 2012, our first estimate of the number of 

protectionist measures imposed in Q2 2012 was just 26. 5 In this report, our first 

count for Q4 2012 and Q1 2013 are almost five times higher, at 127 and 125, 

respectively. These are the highest first counts of the number of protectionist 

measures for recently concluded quarters that the GTA has ever found. To see 

this, the worst quarter so far in the crisis era in terms of protectionism imposed 

was Q1 2009, when the first count was 77. Subsequently, another 100 or so 

protectionist steps were found to have been taken in that quarter. If Q4 2012 and 

Q1 2013 repeat this pattern, then the above estimates for recent protectionism 

could easily be revised up into the 200-250 range. 

With the exception of the occasional trade spat, this resurgence in protectionism 

has been accomplished quietly. Governments have become adept at tilting the 

playing field in favour of domestic firms without provoking the ire of trading 

partners. 

Figure 1.2 shows that the larger trading nations – G8 members and the other 

members of the G20 – account for the lion’s share of the 431 protectionist 

measures implemented during the year from June 2012 to May 2013. 

5 The comparable first count for Q1 2012 was under 50, well below the first counts for Q4 2012 and Q1 

2013.


Figure 1.2 Decomposing the sources and form of protectionism over the past 12 

months, June 2012-May 2013 

450 

431 431 431 

400 

350 

300 

Rest of World, 

149 

Rest of World, 

149 

Other measures, 87 

Export restrictions, 17 

Investment 

restrictions, 23 

Migration 

restrictions, 35 

250 

Rest of G20, 93 

Tariff increases, 64 

200 

Rest of G20, 151 

150 

USA, 12 

EU27, 45 

Subsidies and 

bailouts, 95 

100 

50 

G8, 131 BRICS, 132 

Trade defence 

measures, 110 

0 

Implementing jurisdiction, first breakdown 

Implementing jurisdiction, second 

breakdown 

Types of beggar-thy-neighbour measures 

taken 

The eight Lough Eire summit attendees alone account for 30% of the protectionist 

measures implemented worldwide in the past year (see the first column of Figure 

1.2). All together, the G20 countries are responsible for 65% of all measures 

imposed in the past year that harm trading partners. The BRICS account for 

twice as much recent protectionism as the EU member states, the European 

Commission, and the US combined (see the second column of Figure 1.2). 

Although trade defence (anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and import surge) 

measures were the most commonly used protectionist measures in the past year, 

along with tariffs, another form of traditional protectionism, they accounted for 

174 of the 431 beggar-thy-neighbour policies implemented during June 2012 to 

May 2013. Governments still resort more to measures less well disciplined by 

WTO rules. Indeed, five years into the crisis governments are still awarding lots 

of trade-distorting subsidies. Migration restrictions saw a big increase in the past 

year, too (see the last column in Figure 1.2).


The G8’s substantial stake in an open trading system 

No doubt there are some in the G8 nations who believe that they don’t really 

need the existing body of multilateral trade rules because their economies’ size 

creates enough clout to deter foreign protectionism. Any such wishful thinking 

should be set aside, as the evidence presented in Figure 1.3 shows. Despite their 

size, six of the G8 members have seen their commercial interests hit over 500 

times since November 2008. The same six nations have seen their commercial 

interests harmed over 80 times in the past year. 

Figure 1.3 What’s at stake for the G8? The damage done to G8 commercial interests 

keeps piling up 

Russia 

59 

11 

Canada 

62 

8 

Japan 

73 

10 

France 

86 

12 

United Kingdom 

88 

16 

Italy 

82 

13 

Germany 

96 

11 

United States 

131 

15 

200 300 400 500 600 700 800 

Hits to commercial interests before June 2012 

Hits to commercial interests June 2012-May 2013 (red) 

Hits to commercial interests June 2012-May 2013 (amber) 

By now, Germany has seen its exporters, foreign investors, and citizens working 

abroad harmed by just under 700 foreign protectionist measures since November 

2008. The comparable figure for the US is just under 800. China is not a G8 

member, but the equivalent numbers for it are even worse. Since November 2008, 

Chinese commercial interests have been harmed nearly 1,000 times by foreign 

beggar-thy-neighbour moves. Such harm reduces export revenues, threatens 

firms’ cash flows and their survival in what are already difficult times, and poses 

a threat to jobs. There is little that the G8 – or any other country – should be 

complacent about. Each protectionist measure chips away at an open multilateral 

trading system. 

The G8 aren’t just victims of protectionism, its members have implemented 

a substantial proportion of the world’s protectionism since November 2008.


Data on the policies implemented by each G8 nation is presented in Figure 1.4. 

The GTA database colour codes each implemented measure green (if it is trade 

liberalising or makes national policy more transparent), red (if a measure almost 

certainly harms a foreign commercial interest) and amber (if a measure is likely 

to harm a foreign trading interest). In both charts in Figure 1.4, the G8 countries 

are sorted in descending order of the resort to implemented measures coded red 

or amber. 

Figure 1.4 

Leading by example? The G8’s mix of protectionism (amber and red) and 

liberalisation (green) 

Number of measures implemented 

since November 2008 

300 

250 

200 

150 

100 

50 

0 

Russia Germany Italy UK France US Japan Canada 

Green Amber Red 

1.0 

Proportion of measures implemented 

since November 2008 

0.9 

0.8 

0.7 

0.6 

0.5 

0.4 

0.3 

0.2 

0.1 

0.0 

Japan France United 

States 

Italy United 

Kingdom 

Germany Russia Canada 

Green Amber Red 

Russia tends to issue decrees for the smallest change in policy and this 

accounts for the fact that it stands out in terms of number of harmful measures 

imposed. When account is taken of the number of liberalising measures Russia 

implemented, then the proportion of measures that Moscow imposed that are 

protectionist falls to the second lowest in the G8. Other than Canada and Russia, 

90% of every other G8 country’s measures harm foreign commercial interests. 

Even so, Canada and Russia are not exactly paragons of free-trading virtue. 

The policy stance of every G8 nation is heavily skewed towards protectionism 

– at least 70% of each nation’s commerce-affecting measures beggared-itsneighbours. 

Publicly eschewing protectionism is easy, resisting temptation is 

much harder. Given its track record, any more fine words from the G8 about 

resisting protectionism should not be taken that seriously.


What types of beggar-thy-neighbour measures have been taken by the G8 in 

the past year? The GTA team is often asked to provide examples of consequential 

protectionist measures, perhaps to counter the impression that some give that 

crisis-era protectionist measures are commercially insignificant pinpricks. Table 

1.1 describes eight measures that have been implemented by the G8 in the past 

year. Only two of these measures – antidumping matters in the EU and the US – 

involve the use of traditional forms of protectionism. The others are representative 

of the more subtle, less transparent measures taken by governments in the crisis 

era. 

Table 1.1 only relates to steps taken by the G8 in the past year. There are other 

examples of far-reaching non-traditional forms of beggar-thy-neighbour measures 

taken by non-G8 countries. China, for example, operates what amounts to a 

surgical system of export management, altering certain tax rebates to exporters to 

adjust the incentive to ship goods on to world markets. Information on each type 

of beggar-thy-neighbour measure, traditional or otherwise, can be downloaded 

directly from globaltradealert.org 

The latest league tables of the most protectionist nations on Earth 

While the G8 summit inevitably puts the spotlight on its members’ behaviour, 

of course there are plenty of other countries in the world, many of whose 

governments resort to protectionism. No organisation has the resources to 

estimate case-by-case the value of either the trade affected by each protectionist 

measure or the actual harm done to trading partners. Still, four other metrics 

can be readily compiled with the information available and provide different 

ways to assess the scale of protectionism implemented by each government since 

November 2008. 

These metrics are the number of almost certainly discriminatory measures 

implemented by a jurisdiction (those measures coded red), the number of 

products affected by the (red) protectionist measures implemented by a 

jurisdiction, the number of economic sectors covered by (red) protectionist 

measures implemented by a jurisdiction, and the number of trading partners 

harmed by the (red) protectionist measures implemented by a jurisdiction. 

In Table 1.2, the ten worst economies are ranked on each metric. 6 Canada 

and Japan are the only G8 nations not to be represented in the top ten of these 

rankings. What is striking is the domination of these rankings by other larger 

trading nations – in particular, the G20 members. Moreover, taken together, 

EU members top three of the four rankings of most protectionist jurisdictions. 

Argentina, China, India, and Italy appear twice in the top five lists of most 

protectionist nations. 

6 Where relevant in these rankings, data on all of the measures taken by the EU member states and the 

European Commission are reported, denoted EU27. Since the European Union likes to be seen as a 

force in world trade, reporting its combined contribution as well as that of each member state seems 

appropriate.


Table 1.1 Examples of beggar-thy-neighbour measures implemented by G8 nations in the past 12 months 

Date 

6 June 2013 

1 April 2013 

6 March 

2013 

18 February 

2013 

Implementing 

jurisdiction, 

measure 

European Union, 

Dumping duties on 

solar panels from 

China 

United States, 

Extension of 

“Buy America” 

provisions to 

more bio-based 

products. 

Russian Federation, 

Promotion of 

foreign commerce 

by Russian firms 

Russian Federation, 

State guarantees to 

Russian exporters 

in return for local 

content 

Amount of trade 

potentially 

affected 

€21 billion China 

US$19.3 billion 

Belgium, Canada, 

China, France, 

Germany, 

Israel, Italy, 

Japan, Mexico, 

Netherlands, 

Poland, Republic 

of Korea, Spain, 

Switzerland, UK 

Details 

The European Commission imposed provisional duties on allegedly dumped 

imports of Chinese solar panels. Duties were levied initially at 11% but are 

scheduled to rise to 47% in August 2013 if a settlement is not concluded. For details 

see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-499_en.htm 

The US Department of Agriculture announced new rules that extend Federal public 

procurement rules that give preferences to US producers of wider range of biobased 

products. Fifteen trading partners (listed in the adjacent column) export the 

bio-based products covered by this new regulation to the United States and are 

likely to be harmed by this measure. For details see http://www.globaltradealert. 

org/measure/united-states-america-expanded-scope-biobased-products-receivingpreferential-treatment-fede 

The Russian government announced a package of measures titled “Development of 

the Foreign Economic Activity” for the years 2013-2018. These measures include 

enhanced state control over the foreign commerce of Russian firms. Russia plans 

on spending 422 billion roubles (approximately 14 billion US dollars) on this 

initiative, which targets 8 particular sectors of the Russian economy. For details see 

http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/russian-federation-state-support-programdevelopment-foreign-economic-activities-russian-fir 

The Russian government announced that exporters from six industrial sectors of 

its economy that source at least 30 per cent of their parts purchases locally would 

receive state guarantees on their export sales. Such sourcing requirements reduce 

the size of the market for parts, components, and commodities that foreign firms 

can supply to Russian buyers. For details see http://www.globaltradealert.org/ 

measure/russian-federation-state-guarantees-exporters-local-industrial-goods


Date 

25 

December 

2012 

19 

November 

2012 

25 June 2012 

Implementing 

jurisdiction, 

measure 

Japan, Expanded 

credit line for 

machinery exports 

to Russia and 5 

other CIS states 

Italy, Fund 

established to 

support “Made in 

Italy” 

United States, 

More restrictive 

antidumping rules 


potentially 

affected 

Exports of the 

supported sectors 

totalled just 

under US$111 

billion. 

Exports of the 

supported sectors 

totalled just 

under 111 billion 

USD dollars 

This measure 

covers all 

Chinese and 

Vietnamese 

imports into the 

USA. The total 

value of such 

imports in 2012 

was 465 billion 

US dollars. 

China, Viet Nam 

Details 

The Japan Bank for International Commerce created a half a billion dollar credit 

line to support purchases of machinery by customers in the Russian Federation, 

Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. These machines 

are made by firms in seven sectors of the Japanese economy. This export finance 

provides an edge for Japanese firms over foreign rivals trying to sell into these six 

trading partners. Credit lines can be rolled over several times a year, so that the 

amount of trade affected per annum can be multiples of the funds committed to 

this trade finance initiative. For details see http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/ 

japan-export-credit-line-purchase-japanese-machinery-russia-and-neighboringcountries 

A fund, whose planned size could reach 2 billion euros, was established by 

publicly-controlled Fondo Strategico Italiano to invest in and support the following 

sectors of the Italian economy: food and food distribution; fashion and luxury; 

furniture and design; tourism; lifestyle and leisure. Specific reference was made to 

the export contribution of these sectors. For details see http://www.fondostrategico. 

it/en/news/fsi-and-qatar-holding-sign-jv-to-invest-up-to-2-billion-in-made-in-italy. 

html 

The United States’ Department of Commerce announced changes in the manner 

in which it computes export prices from jurisdictions deemed to be Non -Market 

Economies, such as China and Viet Nam. These changes will increase both the 

probability that an exporter from these economies will be found to have been 

dumping and the size of the dumping duties imposed. For details see http:// 

www.globaltradealert.org/measure/united-states-america-changed-methodologyantidumping-investigations-non-market-economies


Date 

Implementing 

jurisdiction, 

measure 

25 July 2012, 

24 October 

2012 

France, Measures 

to benefit the local 

car industry 


potentially 

affected 

In 2012 over 30 

billion US dollars 

worth of cars 

were imported 

into France. Just 

under 1.9 million 

cars were sold in 

France in 2012. 

42 trading 

partners that 

export cars to 

France 

Details 

In July 2012 the French Ministry for Productive Recovery expanded financial 

incentives to buy classes of cars where French car makers have large domestic 

market shares. Certain other car segments where foreign firms, including 

German firms, had large market shares were subject to higher taxes, purportedly 

on environmental grounds. In October 2012, in a separate matter, the French 

government offered a state guarantee of 1.2 billion euros to Banque PSA Finance, 

a 100 per cent owned subsidiary of car manufacturers Peugeot and Citroen. 

The financial terms offered to car buyers are an important source of commercial 

advantage. The European Commission approved this state assistance even though 

it concluded that the measure would affect trade flows. For details see http://www. 

globaltradealert.org/measure/france-rescue-plan-automobile-industry and http:// 

www.globaltradealert.org/measure/france-state-guarantee-psa-group


Table 1.2 Which countries have inflicted the most harm since November 2008? 

Rank 

Ranked by 

number of 

protectionist 

measures 

imposed 

Ranked by the 

number of tariff 

lines (product 

categories) 

affected by 

protectionist 

measures 

Ranked by 

the number of 

sectors affected 

by protectionist 

measures 

Ranked by the 

number of trading 

partners affected 


measures 

1 EU27 (372) Viet Nam (943) EU27 (78) EU27 (201) 

2 

Russian 

Federation (231) 

Venezuela (787) Italy (78) Italy (194) 

3 Argentina (185) Kazakhstan (738) Argentina (73) China (193) 

4 India (113) China (705) Germany (66) Indonesia (170) 

5 Belarus (101) EU27 (676) Algeria (58) India (164) 

6 Germany (99) Nigeria (603) 

7 


(98) 

Russian 


Indonesia (558) China (52) 

Netherlands 

(164) 


(164) 

8 Italy (94) India (514) Kazakhstan (50) Germany (160) 

9 France (91) Argentina (499) USA (47) France (159) 

10 Brazil (80) Algeria (485) Nigeria (45) Poland (159) 

Note: These rankings were compiled using data on the measures classified “almost certainly discriminated” 

and colour coded red in the Global Trade Alert database. 

As to the scale of protectionism, eight of the top ten countries have taken measures 

that distort trade of more than 40% of product categories. 7 When jurisdictions 

are ranked by the number of economic sectors affected by own protectionism, 

every one of the top ten worst jurisdictions’ actions have affected over half of the 

sectors in their economies. 8 

When ranked in terms of the number of trading partners harmed, of which 

there are a maximum of 232, every one of the ten worst jurisdictions harmed 

at least 159 trading partners. In the most protectionist nations, attempts to 

diminish the scale of beggar-thy-neighbour policies should be dismissed. That so 

many of the most protectionist nations on Earth are its largest economies is a real 

concern, especially as so much crisis-era protectionism remains to be unwound. 

7 Here the United Nation’s 4-digit level of product classification was used. At that level of disaggregation 

there are 1204 product categories. 

8 Here the UN’s 2-digit CPC classification of economic sectors was used. In this classification there are 79 

such sectors.


Summary and recommended actions 

The past 12 months have seen a quiet, wide-ranging assault on the commercial 

level playing field. Governments have found ways to routinely favour domestic 

interests without provoking the ire of trading partners. Artful governments found 

no need to openly flout WTO rules either; instead, they used the wiggle room in 

existing rules and, if that wasn’t enough, employed policies not well disciplined 

by multilateral trade rules. Little of this showed up in traditional monitoring that 

was designed – like WTO rules – to tackle the protectionism of yesteryear. Less 

than half of recent protectionism involves measures on which data was collected 

systematically before the crisis. 

This report fills in the informational vacuum and, in doing so, reveals that 

the first readings of protectionism imposed in Q4 2012 and Q1 2013 far exceed 

anything seen since the onset of the global financial crisis. When protectionist 

dynamics were viewed as a compelling threat to the world economy in early 

2009, defenders of an open trading system took up arms. They would be wise 

to do so again before international commerce fragments further along national 

lines. 

The G8 should take a stand at its forthcoming summit. Business as usual should 

be rejected. The G8 should go beyond making soothing comments about the 

need to resist protectionism and launch an initiative to unwind it. One place to 

start would be to remove the 37 measures implemented by G8 governments that 

harm the commercial interests of the least developed countries, thereby reversing 

protectionism and promoting economic development in one fell swoop. 

Organisation of the remainder of this report 

In the next chapter, maps are reproduced showing the geographical distribution 

of the harm done by each G8 nation’s policies across the globe. These maps 

will help trading partners of each G8 member to assess the latter’s resort to 

beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The third chapter provides a detailed summary 

of the landscape of protectionism, paying particular attention to developments 

between June 2012 and May 2013. Detailed tables of the resort to protectionism 

by each G8 country and the incidence of foreign protectionism affecting each G8 

nation then follow.

2 Maps of the Countries Harmed 

by each G8 Member

Map 2.1 Canada: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G8 member’s protectionist measures 

Maps of the Countries Harmed by each G8 Member 15


Map 2.2 France: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G8 member’s protectionist measures

Map 2.3 Germany: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G8 member’s protectionist measures 



Map 2.4 Italy: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G8 member’s protectionist measures

Map 2.5 Japan: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G8 member’s protectionist measures 



Map 2.6 Russian Federation: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G8 member’s protectionist measures

Map 2.7 United Kingdom: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G8 member’s protectionist measures 



Map 2.8 United States: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G8 member’s protectionist measures

3 The Landscape of Crisis-Era 

Protectionism before the 2013 

G8 Summit 

Simon J. Evenett 

University of St. Gallen and CEPR 

In the 11th report of Global Trade Alert, the motivation for and approach to 

monitoring crisis-era protectionism were described. The GTA team has not departed 

from that approach in the preparation of this, the 12th report. Consequently, 

the focus of this chapter is on what is new, namely, a substantial update of the 

GTA database completed at the end of May 2013 and the implications for our 

understanding of the key features (or “landscape”) of crisis-era protectionism. 

3.1. The latest update of the GTA database 

The reality that 21st century international commerce takes many forms – not 

just exporting and importing – accounts for the treatment-based definition of 

discrimination employed by the GTA team. That is, the team seeks to include 

public measures in the GTA database that might alter the relative treatment 

of domestic commercial interests vis-à-vis their direct foreign rivals. This 

formulation allows for the inclusion of “liberalising” as well as “discriminatory” 

public measures of any type. 

Soon after the 11th report was completed, a number of key members of the 

GTA team took on other assignments and a new team had to be trained. This 

transition created an opportunity to revisit the information sources used by 

the GTA team, the information that should ideally be presented in reports on 

government measures on the GTA website, and the procedure for reviewing draft 

reports for publication on the GTA website. 

A more systematic approach was taken in each of these areas and this may 

well have contributed to the volume and quality of the measures subsequently 

published on the website. In the case of information collection, for example, lists 

of ministry websites were compiled to allow for regular checking and internet 

search technologies were employed to spot new postings containing certain 

key words. Greater efforts were made to check leads arising from the reports of 

international organisations and global consulting and advisory services. 

Specific additional research projects were also undertaken to identify potentially 

overlooked government measures. For example, following the nationalisation 

23


and expropriation of Spanish-owned YPF by the government of Argentina, one 

colleague devoted plenty of time to looking for other instances of expropriations 

and the like. Similarly, for migration measures. 

In the future, similar projects will be undertaken on public procurement 

matters and local content requirements. Indications from the private sector 

suggest that the latter are of growing importance. Moreover, preliminary research 

has shown that governments sometimes refer to the local content requirements 

as “local preferences.” Consequently, the GTA team’s approach to searching for 

information on local content measures will be adapted. This example highlights 

the cat-and-mouse game at work between monitors of crisis-era policy choice and 

artful policymakers. 

In June 2012, at the time the 11th report was published, the GTA database 

comprised 2,430 reports of state measures. At the end of May 2013, the database 

included 3,334 measures, an increase of 904 measures in 12 months. In addition 

to updating many existing measures in the database, the additional measures 

represented an increase in the rate of published reports per month (to just over 

75 per month.) 

Of the 904 new reports, 755 referred to measures implemented during the 12 

months from June 2012 to May 2013. The balance includes expanded coverage 

of state measures taken before June 2012 plus measures announced but not 

implemented since June 2012. Such considerations should be borne in mind when 

interpreting the tables that follow. For example, in Table 3.1 the total number of 

implemented, almost discriminatory measures (coded red) in the database has 

increased by 575 since June 2012. A total of 431 of those protectionist measures 

were implemented between June 2012 and May 2013, implying that 134 almost 

discriminatory measures included in the GTA database in the past 12 months 

actually refer to steps taken by governments before June 2012. This accounts for, 

amongst others, the increases in some of the quarterly totals of protectionism 

imposed before June 2012 (see Figure 3.5). 

Where possible, the format of the tables and figures presented in this chapter 

are the same as in the 11th report, so as to facilitate comparisons over time. 

Having said this, in a number of tables and figures information on the G8 group 

of nations has been included, which seems appropriate given that this report has 

been released just before their 2013 summit. Inclusion of data on the G8 as well 

as the G20 reveals the contributions of different types of large economy to the 

liberalisation and distortion of global commercial flows. 

Information is also contained in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.5 on the number of 

protectionist measures that had been implemented and then were subsequently 

removed (“unwound” in the parlance of policymaking.) 

3.2. Principal features of the landscape of crisis-era 

protectionism. 

1. Of the 3,334 state measures taken since November 2008 that are included in 

the GTA database, 1,915 almost certainly worsened the treatment of some

The Landscape of Crisis-Era Protectionism before the 2013 G8 Summit 25 

foreign commercial interest. To this must be added the 226 implemented 

state measures that likely harmed foreign commercial interests. The 

number of liberalising or transparency-improving measures proposed since 

November 2008 was 678. See Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 

2. The number of discriminatory measures implemented (2,141) exceeded the 

number of liberalising and transparency improving measures implemented 

(630) by more than three-to-one. Restricting consideration to state measures 

other than trade defence reduces this ratio to below three-to-one. 

3. The total number of almost discriminatory and likely discriminatory 

measures that are no longer is force (320) exceeds the number of unwound 

liberalising and transparency-improving measures (88), again by more than 

three-to-one. See Table 3.1. 

4. The total number of almost certainly discriminatory measures in the GTA 

database has expanded more than 40% since the last report was issued in June 

2012. A total of 575 such measures have been found, a number that falls to 

406 once trade defence instruments are excluded. The latter highlights the 

large number (110) of new trade defence measures implemented between 

June 2012 (the publication month of the 11th report) and May 2013. See 

Table 3.1. 

5. The update of the GTA database for this report has added more than 

four times as many almost certainly discriminatory measures (575) than 

liberalising and transparency-improving measures (125). 

6. Using the advanced search function of the GTA website reveals that, since 

the last report was published in June 2012, a total of 431 discriminatory 

measures have been implemented by governments worldwide, of which 394 

are almost certainly discriminatory. 

7. Together, the G20 countries have implemented 1,254 almost certainly 

discriminatory measures and 142 likely discriminatory measures since 

November 2008. Of the total (1,396), 404 were trade defence measures. 

This implies that 72% of all protectionist measures implemented by the 

G20 during the crisis era were not antidumping, countervailing duties, or 

safeguards actions. See Table 3.3. 

8. Since November 2003, the G20 countries have not just implemented 

discriminatory measures. Together these countries are responsible for 

405 liberalising and transparency-improving measures. Still, for the G20 

countries, the number of discriminatory measures outnumbers the latter 

measures by more than three-to-one. See Table 3.3.


9. Taken together, similar to the last report, the G20 countries are responsible 

for 65% of all protectionist measures imposed since the first crisis-era G20 

Summit in November 2008. Of the protectionist measures still in force, the 

G20 countries are responsible for 68% of the worldwide total. Computed 

from Tables 3.1-3.3. 

10. Calculated year-by-year, the share of protectionist measures implemented by 

the G20 countries increased through to 2012, but fell according to the yearto-date 

data for 2013. See Figure 3.2a. 

11. The proportion of protectionist measures implemented by the G8 nations 

since November 2008 exceeded those for the G20 and the worldwide total. 

See Figure 3.1. 

12. The G8’s share of worldwide protectionism rose sharply from 2012 to 2013, 

from 27% to 35%. Caution is needed in interpreting the findings for 2013, 

though, as reporting lags will no doubt result in increases in the number of 

protectionist measures imposed by the G8 nations and by the rest of the 

world. See Figure 3.2b. 

13. There is a wide variation across G20 countries in the number of state measures 

taken since November 2008. The total number of measures implemented 

by the 27 member states of the EU plus those measures undertaken by the 

European Commission exceeds 250, as it does for the Russian Federation. 

In terms of the number of protectionist measures undertaken, the totals 

for the EU27 together, Russia, and Argentina are far larger than the rest of 

the G20. Furthermore, Russia, India, China, Brazil, and South Africa have 

implemented relatively more liberalising and transparency-improving 

measures than other members of the G20. See Figures 3.3a and 3.3b, which 

break out the data for the G8 nations. 

14. Countries may differ in the rate at which they announce state measures, 

so a simple count of the total amount of measures may be misleading. One 

alternative is to compute for each G20 country the proportion of the total 

number of measures that are almost certainly discriminatory (red), likely 

to be discriminatory (amber), and liberalising or transparency-improving 

(green) measures. Having sorted the G20 countries in descending order of 

the number of discriminatory measures (red plus amber), the results are 

summarised in Figure 3.4a. On this measure, Japan, France, the US, and 

Saudi Arabia move up the ranking of offending G20 nations. Argentina and 

the EU27 remain highly ranked. Interestingly, Brazil has implemented so 

many liberalising measures that its proportion of protectionist measures is 

now the lowest of the G20. Figure 3.4a gives one way to compare the resort 

to protectionism across the G20 countries.


15. Comparable data on the proportion of protectionist measures implemented 

by the G8 nations is found in Figure 3.4b. Canada has implemented the 

lowest number of protectionist measures in the G8 and the lowest proportion 

of protectionist measures. See Figures 3.4a and 3.4b. 

16. Figure 3.5 sheds light on the quarterly rate at which protectionist measures 

were imposed since the November 2008 G20 summit. By comparing the 

data for this report with the last one, there is a substantial upward revision 

in the quarterly totals from Q3 2011. This reinforces the point that evidence 

on protectionism takes time to assemble and that instant assessments 

underestimate the amount of protectionism imposed. Another implication 

is that previously reported fall off in the total number of protectionist 

measures per quarter in 2011 and 2012 was more apparent than real. 

17. A sharp jump up in the number of protectionist measures was seen in Q1 

2009, with over 170 measures imposed in that quarter alone. After that, the 

next five quarters saw between 120 and 140 measures implemented in each. 

Rates of protectionism imposed dipped in Q3 2010 and Q4 2011, suggesting 

there has been interesting intra-crisis variation in the resort to beggar-thyneighbour 

policies. See Figure 3.5. 

18. Figure 3.5 also contains some good news. Quite a few – certainly not a 

majority – of protectionist measures implemented from Q1 2009 to Q1 

2010 are no longer in force. Still, approximately 100 protectionist measures 

implemented in each of those quarters remain in force. For reference, this 

total is more than double the number of protectionist measures implemented 

in Q4 2008 that are still in force. 

19. Figure 3.5 shows the substantial uptick in recorded protectionism in Q4 

2012 and Q1 2013, which was discussed in the Executive Summary. 

20. China and the EU27 taken together stand out in terms of the number of 

times that their commercial interests have been harmed by protectionism 

since November 2008. Foreign protectionism has harmed China’s 

commercial interests 877 times, implying that 41% of all protectionist 

measures implemented since November 2008 have included China as one of 

the harmed trading parties. Once account is taken of foreign measures likely 

to have harmed Chinese interests, then the total number of hits to Chinese 

commercial interests since November 2008 rises to 991. See Table 3.5. 

21. The latest update of the GTA database has increased the number of times that 

commercial interests of China, the EU 27, and the USA have been harmed by 

others’ protectionism by over 200 times each. See Table 3.5.


22. Even when account is taken of the protectionist measures have lapsed, 

approximately 75-80% of the protectionist measures harming the major 

trading nations remain in force. See Table 3.5. 

23. GTA does not calculate the amount of commerce affected by each state 

measure, nor the associated welfare impact. To do so for 3334 state measures 

would be exceptionally resource-intensive. Instead, four intermediate metrics 

of harm done by a jurisdiction are reported: the number of almost certainly 

(red) discriminatory measures, the number of tariff lines affected by almost 

certainly discriminatory measures, the number of sectors affected by almost 

certainly discriminatory measures, and the number of trading partners 

harmed by a jurisdiction’s almost certainly discriminatory measures. All the 

trading jurisdictions in the GTA database are ranked in descending order on 

these four metrics and the top ten offenders on each category are reported 

in Table 3.6. Looking across the top ten lists, it is striking how often G8 and 

other G20 members are mentioned. 

24. In terms of discriminatory measures imposed, number of economic sectors 

affected, and number of trading partners harmed, the EU27 is the worst 

offender. In terms of tariff lines affected, Vietnam is ranked worst due to 

repeated, transparent competitive currency devaluations. See Table 3.6. 

25. Argentina, Germany, India, and Italy are listed in three of the four top ten 

lists of worst offenders. See Table 2.6. 

26. With respect to the policy instruments that discriminate against foreign 

commercial interests, an important change is that, in terms of the total 

number of measures implemented, trade defence measures now outnumber 

trade-distorting bailouts. Given that antidumping and countervailing duty 

actions target specific trading partners, the number of jurisdictions harmed 

by the effects of discriminatory bailouts is still double that of trade defence 

instruments. As a first approximation, bailouts remain where a lot of the 

action is in crisis-era protectionism. See Table 3.7. 

27. The traditional forms of protectionism – tariff increases and trade defence 

instruments – still account for approximately 37% of the worldwide total 

of almost certainly discriminatory (red) measures implemented since 

November 2008. In terms of measures still in force, the respective percentage 

is 38.6%. In short, non-traditional forms of protection still dominate crisisera 

protectionism. See Table 2.7 and Figure 3.6. 

28. The fact that so many of the top ten most used protectionist instruments are 

subject to weak or no WTO rules confirms an earlier GTA finding – namely, 

that governments under pressure during the crisis era have circumvented 

the tougher, binding multilateral trade rules.


29. The increased resort in the past year to trade defence instruments – a feature 

common to previous business cycle downturns in many countries – merits a 

closer look. Table 3.8 was assembled with this in mind. A total of 442 trade 

defence measures restricting imports are currently in force, an increase of 

157 on our previous report. Another 257 investigations are under way. 

30. As shown in Figure 3.7, on-going trade defence investigations account for 

52% of the policy measures that have been announced or initiated but 

where, to date, no discrimination against foreign commercial interests has 

been implemented. 

31. Sustaining a finding from the last report, agriculture – a developmentsensitive 

sector – has been the economic sector most hit by almost certainly 

(red) discriminatory measures since November 2008. In terms of measures 

still in force, the sector most hit is basic chemicals. See Table 3.8. 

32. While discriminatory bailouts in the financial sector have received a lot of 

attention during the crisis, only 7% of the total number of implemented 

protectionist measures in the GTA database affected this sector. Moreover, less 

than a quarter of the total number of discriminatory bailouts and subsidies 

recorded in the GTA database relate to the financial sector. Both findings 

suggest that the GTA findings are not unduly skewed by the inclusion of 

the financial sector in the database. This data was extracted using the GTA 

website’s advanced search function.


Table 3.1 

Statistic 

Total number of 

measures in GTA 

database 


measures coded 

green 

of which currently 

in force 

of which no longer 

in force 



amber 


in force 


in force 


measures coded red 


in force 


in force 

Total number of state measures reported in the GTA database 

This report (June 2013) 

Total 

Total except unfair 

trade and safeguard 

measures 

Increase from previous report 

(June 2012) 

Total 



measures 

3334 2494 904 701 

678 671 125 222 

542 535 192 202 

88 88 1 3 

741 392 203 73 

207 200 46 41 

19 19 -22 -20 

1915 1431 575 406 

1614 1172 532 375 

301 259 43 31


How does the GTA colour code measures? 

Colour code 

Red 

Amber 

Green 

Criteria 

The measure has been implemented since November 2008 and almost 

certainly discriminates against foreign commercial interests. 

(i) The measure has been implemented since November 2008 and 

likely involves discrimination against foreign commercial interests; OR 

(ii) The measure has been announced or is under consideration and 

would (if implemented) almost certainly involve discrimination against 

foreign commercial interests. 

(i) The measure has been announced and involves liberalization on a 

non-discriminatory (i.e., most favoured nation) basis; OR 

(ii) The measure has been implemented since November 2008 and is 

found not to be discriminatory: OR 

(iii) The measure has been implemented since November 2008, 

involves no further discrimination, and improves the transparency of a 

jurisdiction’s trade-related policies. 

Notes: 

1. A measure that is red and still implemented as of 1 June 2013 is referred to in this report as “still in 

force.” 

2. A red measure that was implemented and has been repealed, withdrawn, or has lapsed is treated as “no 

longer in force.” Likewise for amber measures that had previously been implemented.


Table 3.2 

Statistic 



database 



green 



amber 



Total Number 

of 4-digit tariff 

lines affected by 

almost certainly 

discriminatory 

measures 

Total Number of 

2-digit sectors 

affected by 



measures 


trading partners 

affected by 



measures 

Measures implemented since the first crisis related G20 summit in 

November 2008, totals for all jurisdictions and change since last report in 

June 2012 


Total 



measures 


(June 2012) 


Total trade and safeguard 

measures 

2767 2270 789 630 

630 623 193 205 

226 219 24 21 

1911 1428 571 403 

1213 1212 2 1 

79 79 5 5 

220 218 11 7


Table 3.3 

Statistic 



database 



green 



amber 



Total Number 

of 4-digit tariff 

lines affected by 



measures 

Total Number of 

2-digit sectors 

affected by 



measures 


trading partners 

affected by 



measures 

Measures implemented by G20 countries since the first crisis related G20 

summit in November 2008, totals for all G20 jurisdictions and change 

since last report in June 2012 


Total 



measures 


(June 2012) 


Total trade and safeguard 

measures 

1801 1391 485 362 

405 399 102 111 

142 136 6 4 

1254 856 166 247 

1111 1103 23 21 

79 79 6 6 

217 216 3 6


Table 3.4 

Statistic 

Total number 

of measures in 

GTA database 

Total number 

of measures 

coded green 

Total number 

of measures 

coded amber 

Total number 

of measures 

coded red 

Measures implemented worldwide, by the G20, and by the G8 since the 

first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008 that are still in force 

Total 

Worldwide G20 G8 

Total except 

unfair 

trade and 

safeguard 

measures 

Total 

Total except 

unfair trade 

and safeguard 

measures 

Total 

Total except 

unfair trade 

and safeguard 

measures 

2342 1886 1571 1186 612 505 

540 533 332 326 109 108 

206 199 130 124 49 48 

1596 1154 1109 736 454 349 

Table 3.5 Top 10 biggest targets of protectionist measures taken since November 2008 

Number of 


(red) measures 

imposed on target 

since November 

2008 

This 

report 

(June 

2013) 

Increase 

from 

previous 

report 

(June 

2012) 

Number of 


measures on target 

and still in force 

This 

report 

(June 

2013) 

Increase 

from 

previous 

report 

(June 

2012) 

Number of trading 

partners imposing 


measures 

This 

report 

(June 

2013) 

Increase 

from 

previous 

report 

(June 

2012) 

Number 

of pending 

measures, which 

if implemented 

would harm target 

too 

This 

report 

(June 

2013) 

Increase 

from 

previous 

report 

(June 

2012) 

1 China 877 257 757 232 88 5 253 96 

2 EU27 814 233 663 197 99 5 160 55 

3 US 683 201 564 170 85 6 101 38 

4 Germany 578 145 468 119 71 5 99 29 

5 Italy 506 121 401 90 68 5 87 22 

6 France 504 117 412 99 70 3 83 23 

7 UK 492 137 401 113 73 -7 80 24 

8 Japan 454 110 376 94 75 3 90 36 

9 

Republic 

of Korea 

454 na 373 na 69 na 106 na 

10 Spain 438 108 346 85 63 4 65 18


Table 3.6 Which countries have inflicted the most harm since November 2008? 

Rank 

Ranked by 

number of 

protectionist 

measures 

imposed 

Ranked by the 

number of tariff 

lines (product 

categories) 

affected by 

protectionist 

measures 

Ranked by 

the number of 

sectors affected 


measures 

Ranked by the 

number of trading 

partners affected 


measures 

1 EU27 (372) Viet Nam (943) EU27 (78) EU27 (201) 

2 

Russian 


Venezuela (787) Italy (78) Italy (194) 

3 Argentina (185) Kazakhstan (738) Argentina (73) China (193) 

4 India (113) China (705) Germany (66) Indonesia (170) 

5 Belarus (101) EU27 (676) Algeria (58) India (164) 

6 Germany (99) Nigeria (603) 

7 


(98) 

Russian 


Indonesia (558) China (52) 

Netherlands 

(164) 


(164) 

8 Italy (94) India (514) Kazakhstan (50) Germany (160) 

9 France (91) Argentina (499) USA (47) France (159) 

10 Brazil (80) Algeria (485) Nigeria (45) Poland (159) 

Note: These rankings were compiled using data on the measures classified “almost certainly discriminated” 

and colour coded red in the Global Trade Alert database.


Table 3.7 

Ten most used state measures to discriminate against foreign commercial 

interest since the first G20 crisis meeting. 

Number of 




imposed since 

November 2008 

This 

report 

(June 

2013) 

Increase 

from 

previous 

report 

(June 

2012) 

Number of 



imposed and still 

in force 

This 

report 

(June 

2013) 

Increase 

from 

previous 

report 

(June 

2012) 

Number of 

jurisdictions that 

imposed these 


measures since 

November 2008 

This 

report 

(June 

2013) 

Increase 

from 

previous 

report 

(June 

2012) 

Number of 

jurisdictions 

harmed by these 


measures since 

November 2008 

This 

report 

(June 

2013) 

Increase 

from 

previous 

report 

(June 

2012) 

1 

Trade 

defence 484 169 442 157 63 1 90 4 

measure (AD) 

2 

Bail out / 

state aid 476 115 339 105 53 5 194 5 

measure 

3 Tariff 

measure 

232 54 182 50 74 4 167 14 

Non tariff 

4 

barrier (not 

otherwise 

164 47 154 47 69 41 167 19 

specified) 

5 

Export taxes 

or restriction 

113 23 78 20 63 6 183 5 

6 Investment 

measure 

98 49 96 47 41 12 106 25 

7 Migration 

measure 

85 36 78 34 34 9 145 39 

8 Export 

subsidy 

53 12 48 8 48 6 198 0 

9 Import ban 47 15 42 13 29 5 100 2 

10 Public 

procurement 

46 5 45 9 21 0 137 2 

Table 3.8 Resort to trade defence measures since November 2008 

Status of trade defence measure 

Number 

That have been initiated and currently under investigation 257 

Where a provisional or final duty has been imposed and is in 

force 

442 

Where a provisional or final duty has been imposed but is no 

longer in force 

41 

For which the investigation has ended without the 

implementation of any duties 

85


Table 3.9 

CPC code, Affected Sector 

Top 20 sectors most affected by discriminatory measures since November 

2008. 

Number of 



affecting 

commercial 

interests in this 

sector 

Number of 


(red) 

implemented 

measures 

affecting 

specified sector 

and still in force 

Number of 

jurisdictions 

implementing 

measures 

affecting 

specified sector 

and classified 

as red 

Number 

of pending 

measures 

affecting 

specified 

sector 

01 ( Products of agriculture, 

horticulture and market 

207 160 78 100 

gardening) 

34 ( Basic chemicals) 202 173 64 119 

49 ( Transport equipment) 172 147 71 71 

41 ( Basic metals) 166 147 65 112 

44 ( Special purpose machinery) 154 130 64 61 

21 ( Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, 

oils and fats) 

137 109 69 73 

81 ( Financial intermediation 

services and auxiliary services 136 96 40 48 

therefor) 

42 ( Fabricated metal products, 

except machinery and 

127 116 54 60 

equipment) 

02 ( Live animals and animal 

products) 

120 92 61 50 

43 ( General purpose machinery) 115 101 34 52 

23 ( Grain mill products, starches 

and starch products; other food 110 83 61 65 

products) 

26 ( Yarn and thread; woven and 

tufted textile fabrics) 

105 95 57 46 

35 ( Other chemical products; 

man-made fibres) 

105 90 59 50 

37 ( Glass and glass products 

and other non-metallic products 98 87 64 53 

n.e.c.) 

36 ( Rubber and plastics 

products) 

96 90 55 43 

46 ( Electrical machinery and 

apparatus) 

91 81 32 48 

38 ( Furniture; other transportable 

goods n.e.c.) 

90 78 58 36 

27 ( Textile articles other than 

apparel) 

87 78 65 41 

28 ( Knitted or crocheted fabrics; 

wearing apparel) 

86 77 60 30 

22 ( Dairy products) 75 56 53 42


Figure 3.1 

The share of beggar-thy-neighbour policies implemented by the G8 

countries is higher than that of the G20 countries and that worldwide 

Implemented by G8 

445 

Implemented Worldwide 

1596 

Implemented by the G20 

1099 

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 

Number of measures coded red 

Number of measures coded amber 

Number of measures coded green 

Figure 3.2a The share of worldwide protectionist measures implemented by the G20 

peaked in 2011 and 2012 and on current data has fallen so far in 2013 

2009 2010 2011 2012 

2013 

YTD 

Implemented by Rest of World 227 165 119 119 72 

Implemented by the G20 332 310 308 296 106 

100% 

90% 

80% 

70% 

60% 

50% 

40% 

30% 

20% 

10% 

0% 

Figure 3.2b The share of worldwide protectionist measures implemented by G8 

countries has picked up in the year to date, 2013 

2009 2010 2011 2012 

2013 

YTD 

Implemented by Rest of World 375 359 319 310 115 

Implemented by the G8 184 116 108 105 63 

100% 

90% 

80% 

70% 

60% 

50% 

40% 

30% 

20% 

10% 

0%


Figure 3.3a Total number of state measures implemented by each G20 country since 

November 2008, by type and ranked in descending order of number of 

protectionist state measures taken 

300 

250 

200 

150 

100 

50 

0 

EU27 

Russia 

Argentina 

India 

China 

Germany 

Italy 


France 

Brazil 

Red Amber Green 

Indonesia 

United States 

Turkey 

South Africa 

Australia 

Japan 

Canada 

Mexico 

South Korea 

Saudi Arabia 

Figure 3.3b Total number of state measures implemented by each G8 country since 

November 2008, by type and ranked in descending order of number of 

protectionist state measures taken 

300 

250 

200 

150 

100 

50 

0 

Russia 

Germany 

Italy 


France 

United States 

Japan 

Canada 

Red Amber Green


Figure 3.4a The composition of state measures taken by each G20 country since 

November 2008, ranked by descending order in the proportion of 

protectionist measures implemented 

1.000 

0.900 

0.800 

0.700 

0.600 

0.500 

0.400 

0.300 

0.200 

0.100 

0.000 

Argentina 

EU27 

Japan 

France 

United States 

Italy 

Indonesia 


Germany 

Saudi Arabia 

Turkey 

Australia 

Red Amber Green 

Russia 

China 

India 

Canada 

South Korea 

Mexico 

South Africa 

Brazil 

Figure 3.4b The composition of state measures taken by each G8 country since 

November 2008, ranked by descending order in the proportion of 

protectionist measures implemented 

1.000 

0.900 

0.800 

0.700 

0.600 

0.500 

0.400 

0.300 

0.200 

0.100 

0.000 

Japan France United 

States 

Italy 

United 

Kingdom 

Germany Russia Canada 

Red Amber Green


Figure 3.5 

180 

After the Q1 2009 peak, the total number of measures implemented in 

2009, 2010 and 2011 converged to an average of 120-100 per quarter. 

While there was a dip in Q4 2011, the number of protectionist measures 

implemented per quarter recovered in 2012 and accelerated in Q4 2012 

and Q1 2013 

160 

140 

120 

100 

80 

60 

40 

20 

0 

Q4 2008 

Q1 2009 

Q2 2009 

Q3 2009 

Q4 2009 

Q1 2010 

Q2 2010 

Q3 2010 

Q4 2010 

Q1 2011 

Q2 2011 

Q3 2011 

Q4 2011 

Q1 2012 

Q2 2012 

Q3 2012 

Q4 2012 

Q1 2013 

Q2 2013 

Prior report (June 2012) - Protectionist and in force 

Latest report (June 2013) - Protectionist and in force 

Prior report (June 2012) - Protectionist and no longer in force 

Latest report (June 2013) - Protectionist and no longer in force 

Figure 3.6 

Top ten protectionist measures implemented since the first G20 crisis 

meeting in November 2008 

Other; 225; 11% 

Trade defence measure 

(AD, CVD, safeguard); 484; 

24% 

Public procurement; 46; 2% 

Import ban; 47; 2% 

Export subsidy; 53; 3% 

Migration measure; 85; 4% 

Investment measure; 98; 

5% 

Bail out / state aid measure; 

476; 24% 

Export taxes or restriction; 

113; 6% 

Non tariff barrier (not 

Tariff measure; 232; 11% 

otherwise specified); 164; 

8% 

Note: This pie chart was compiled using data on the measures classified “almost certainly discriminated” 

and colour coded red in the Global Trade Alert database.


Figure 3.7. Distribution of pending measures that, if implemented, would almost 

certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests 

Other; 62; 13% 

Import ban; 11; 2% 

Migration measure; 12; 2% 

Non tariff barrier (not 

otherwise specified); 12; 2% 

Trade defence measure 

(AD, CVD, safeguard); 257; 

52% 

Other service sector 

measure; 16; 3% 

Local content requirement; 

20; 4% 

Bail out / state aid measure; 

23; 5% 

Investment measure; 24; 

5% 

Public procurement; 24; 5% 

Tariff measure; 36; 7%

The G8 and Crisis-Era Protectionism: 

Country Tables 

Table notes: 

[1] These measures are classified “green” in the Global Trade Alert database. 

[2] These measures are classified “amber” in the Global Trade Alert database. 

[3] These measures are classified “red” in the Global Trade Alert database.

The G8 and Crisis-Era Protectionism: Country Tables 45 

Canada 

Table 4.1 Foreign state measures affecting Canada’s commercial interests 

Summary statistic of foreign state measures 

affecting Canada’s commercial interests 

All 

measures 

All measures 

except antidumping, 

anti-subsidy, 

and safeguard 

actions 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of measures affecting Canada’s 

commercial interests 

Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no 

change in the treatment of Canada’s commercial interests [1] 

Total number of foreign measures that 

(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Canada’s 

commercial interests or 

(ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which 

almost certainly discriminate against Canada’s interests [2] 

Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and 

which almost certainly discriminate against Canada’s interests [3] 

MEASURES STILL IN FORCE 

Total number of implemented measures affecting Canada’s 


Total number of implemented measures that are likely to harm or 

almost certainly harm Canada’s commercial interests 

Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harm 

Canada’s commercial interests 

PENDING MEASURES 

Total number of pending measures affecting Canada’s commercial 

interests 

Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely 

to harm Canada’s commercial interests 

MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE 

Total number of implemented measures that affected Canada’s 

commercial interests but are no longer in force 

Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures 

that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Canada’s 



that were harmful to Canada’s commercial interests 

TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE 

Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that 

are currently in force and that harm Canada’s commercial interests 

663 639 

187 186 

130 118 

346 335 

486 475 

341 341 

286 276 

72 60 

59 47 

105 104 

65 64 

59 58 

72 72 

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the 

numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting 

“Canada” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”. 

CANADA


Table 4.2 

Canada’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial 

interests. 


affecting Canada’s commercial interests 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of Canada’s measures affecting other 

jurisdictions’ commercial interests 

Total number of Canada’s measures found to benefit 

or involve no change in the treatment of other 

jurisdictions’ commercial interests [1] 

Total number of Canada’s measures that 

(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm 

foreign commercial interests or 

(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 

and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign 

interests [2] 

Total number of Canada’s measures that have been 

implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 

against foreign commercial interests [3] 


Total number of Canada’s measures found to benefit 



Total number of Canada’s measures that have 

been implemented and are likely to harm foreign 


Total number of Canada’s measures that have been 


against foreign commercial interests 

COMMERCE AFFECTED 

Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures 

implemented by Canada that harm foreign commercial 

interests 

Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures 


interests 

Total number of trading partners affected by measures 


interests 

All measures 

All measures except 

anti-dumping, 

anti-subsidy, and 

safe-guard actions 

87 66 

24 24 

30 21 

33 21 

15 15 

8 8 

27 18 

30 13 

17 10 

47 47 

CANADA 



“Canada” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”.


Table 4.3 

Frequency with which trading partners’ state measures have almost 

certainly harmed* Canadian commercial interests 

Jurisdiction 

Number of measures 


Argentina 31 

Belarus 25 

India 20 

Indonesia 19 

Kazakhstan 18 

Brazil 17 

France 13 

China 12 

Germany 12 

Italy 11 

Spain 10 

Poland 9 

Belgium 8 

Netherlands 8 

Portugal 8 

Sweden 8 

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 8 

United States of America 8 

Viet Nam 8 

Ireland 7 

Singapore 7 

Austria 6 

Bulgaria 6 

Cyprus 6 

Czech Republic 6 

Denmark 6 

Estonia 6 

Finland 6 

Greece 6 

Hungary 6 

Japan 6 

Latvia 6 

Lithuania 6 

Luxembourg 6 

Malta 6 

Romania 6 

Slovakia 6 

Slovenia 6 

South Africa 6 

Australia 5 

European Communities 5 

Ghana 3 

Malaysia 3 

CANADA


Jurisdiction 


Republic of Korea 3 

Saudi Arabia 3 

Turkey 3 

Ukraine 3 

Venezuela 3 

Algeria 2 

Bolivia 2 

Ecuador 2 

Nigeria 2 

Paraguay 2 

Uruguay 2 

Belize 1 

Colombia 1 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 1 

Egypt 1 

Ethiopia 1 

Hong Kong 1 

Iran 1 

Israel 1 

Mexico 1 

Peru 1 

Puerto Rico 1 

Sri Lanka 1 

Switzerland 1 

Thailand 1 

Togo 1 

Uzbekistan 1 

Zimbabwe 1 

*These measures are classified “red” in the Global Trade Alert database. 

CANADA 

Table 4.4 

Jurisdictions affected 

Frequency with which Canada’s state measures have almost certainly 

harmed* foreign commercial interests. 


China 20 


France 13 

Mexico 11 



India 9 

Philippines 9 

Colombia 8 

Iran 8 

Morocco 8 

Pakistan 8 

Romania 8




Sri Lanka 8 

United Arab Emirates 8 

Germany 6 

Japan 5 

Spain 4 

Indonesia 3 

Italy 3 

Netherlands 3 

Sweden 3 

Australia 2 

Brazil 2 


Finland 2 

Hungary 2 


Argentina 1 

Austria 1 

Azerbaijan 1 

Chile 1 

Croatia 1 

Denmark 1 

Hong Kong 1 

Israel 1 

Lebanon 1 

New Zealand 1 

Norway 1 

Peru 1 

Poland 1 

Portugal 1 

Singapore 1 

Switzerland 1 

Thailand 1 

Ukraine 1 


CANADA


Table 4.5 Implemented measures that harm* Canada’s commercial interests, by type 

Type of measure 

Number of 

measures 

As percentage of 

measures 

Tariff measure 85 20,29% 

Bail out / state aid measure 73 17,42% 

Non tariff barrier not otherwise specified) 45 10,74% 

Export subsidy 32 7,64% 

Export taxes or restriction 32 7,64% 

Migration measure 20 4,77% 

Public procurement 18 4,30% 

Local content requirement 17 4,06% 

Investment measure 16 3,82% 

Import ban 12 2,86% 

Trade defence measure AD, CVD, safeguard) 10 2,39% 

Trade finance 10 2,39% 

Quota including tariff rate quotas) 9 2,15% 

State-controlled company 7 1,67% 

Competitive devaluation 5 1,19% 

Consumption subsidy 5 1,19% 

Technical Barrier to Trade 5 1,19% 

Import subsidy 4 0,95% 

Intellectual property protection 3 0,72% 

Other service sector measure 3 0,72% 

Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure 3 0,72% 

State trading enterprise 3 0,72% 

Sub-national government measure 2 0,48% 

Total 419 100,00% 


CANADA 

Table 4.6 


Canada’s implemented measures that harm* foreign commercial interests, 

by type. 

Number of 

measures 


measures 


Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard) 9 24,32% 




Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 2 5,41% 





Total 37 100,00% 

*These measures are classified “red” in the Global Trade Alert database.


France 

Table 4.7 Foreign state measures affecting France’s commercial interests 


affecting France’s commercial interests 

All 

measures 

All measures 


anti-subsidy, 

and safeguard 

actions 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of measures affecting France’s 



change in the treatment of France’s commercial interests [1] 


(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm France’s 



almost certainly discriminate against France’s interests [2] 


which almost certainly discriminate against France’s interests [3] 


Total number of implemented measures affecting France’s 



almost certainly harm France’s commercial interests 


France’s commercial interests 


Total number of pending measures affecting France’s commercial 

interests 


to harm France’s commercial interests 


Total number of implemented measures that affected France’s 



that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to France’s 



that were harmful to France’s commercial interests 



are currently in force and that harm France’s commercial interests 

922 834 

253 252 

165 130 

504 452 

688 638 

490 441 

418 369 

97 62 

83 48 

137 134 

95 92 

85 82 

66 66 



“France” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”. 

FRANCE


Table 4.8 France’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests. 


affecting France’s commercial interests 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of France’s measures affecting other 


Total number of France’s measures found to benefit 



Total number of France’s measures that 





interests [2] 

Total number of France’s measures that have been 




Total number of France’s measures found to benefit 



Total number of France’s measures that have 



Total number of France’s measures that have been 





implemented by France that harm foreign commercial 

interests 



interests 



interests 

All measures 


anti-dumping, 



151 66 

15 14 

45 13 

91 39 

10 9 

7 7 

78 31 

197 147 

38 35 

155 155 

FRANCE 



“France” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”.


Table 4.9 

Frequency with which trading partners’ state measures have almost 

certainly harmed* French commercial interests 

Jurisdiction 



Argentina 49 

Belarus 35 

Kazakhstan 30 

China 29 

India 29 

Brazil 21 

Indonesia 19 

Canada 13 

Italy 13 

Turkey 11 

Germany 9 

Nigeria 9 


Viet Nam 8 

Singapore 7 


Australia 6 

Japan 6 

Ukraine 6 

Algeria 5 

Egypt 4 

Poland 4 

Spain 4 

Sri Lanka 4 

Switzerland 4 


Paraguay 3 


Venezuela 3 


Ecuador 2 

Ghana 2 

Greece 2 

Iran 2 

Israel 2 

Latvia 2 

Malaysia 2 

Netherlands 2 

Portugal 2 

Slovakia 2 

Sweden 2 


Uruguay 2 

FRANCE


Jurisdiction 


Austria 1 

Belgium 1 

Bolivia 1 

Cameroon 1 

Colombia 1 

Côte d'Ivoire 1 

Ethiopia 1 

France 1 

Gambia 1 

Hungary 1 

Kenya 1 

Mauritania 1 

Mexico 1 

Morocco 1 

Norway 1 

Pakistan 1 

Puerto Rico 1 

Romania 1 

Thailand 1 

Togo 1 

Trinidad and Tobago 1 

Zambia 1 


Table 4.10 Frequency with which France’s state measures have almost certainly 


FRANCE 



China 48 

Thailand 16 


Canada 13 

India 13 


Turkey 13 

Argentina 12 

Brazil 11 

Switzerland 11 

Colombia 10 

Indonesia 10 

Israel 10 

Malaysia 10 

Mexico 10 



Japan 9 

New Zealand 9




Peru 9 

Tunisia 9 

Australia 8 

Belgium 8 

Chile 8 

Croatia 8 

Italy 8 

Philippines 8 

Romania 8 

Serbia 8 


Belarus 7 

Bosnia and Herzegovina 7 

Denmark 7 

Germany 7 

Greece 7 

Iran 7 

Morocco 7 

Norway 7 

Pakistan 7 

Poland 7 

Portugal 7 

Singapore 7 

Spain 7 


Algeria 6 

Bulgaria 6 

Costa Rica 6 


Egypt 6 

Ireland 6 

Kenya 6 

Netherlands 6 

Nicaragua 6 

Senegal 6 

Sri Lanka 6 

Sweden 6 

Ukraine 6 

Viet Nam 6 

Albania 5 

Armenia 5 

Chinese Taipei 5 

Dominican Republic 5 

Ghana 5 

Lebanon 5 

Lithuania 5 

Madagascar 5 

FRANCE


FRANCE 



Austria 4 


Honduras 4 

Iceland 4 

Jamaica 4 

Luxembourg 4 

Namibia 4 

Paraguay 4 

Slovakia 4 

Togo 4 

Uruguay 4 

Zambia 4 

Bangladesh 3 

Benin 3 

Bolivia 3 

Cameroon 3 

Cuba 3 

Cyprus 3 

Ecuador 3 

El Salvador 3 

Estonia 3 

Finland 3 

Guatemala 3 

Jordan 3 

Kyrgyzstan 3 

Macedonia 3 

Mauritius 3 

Mozambique 3 

Nigeria 3 

Oman 3 

Panama 3 

Republic of Moldova 3 

Slovenia 3 

Suriname 3 


Venezuela 3 

Zimbabwe 3 

Belize 2 

Burkina Faso 2 

Faeroe Islands 2 

Hong Kong 2 

Hungary 2 

Kazakhstan 2 

Mali 2 

Malta 2 

Netherlands Antilles 2 

New Caledonia 2




Qatar 2 


Sudan 2 

Swaziland 2 

Uganda 2 

Uzbekistan 2 

Yemen 2 

Afghanistan 1 

Andorra 1 

Angola 1 

Bahamas 1 

Bahrain 1 

Barbados 1 

Botswana 1 

Cambodia 1 

Comoros 1 

Congo 1 


Dominica 1 

Equatorial Guinea 1 

Ethiopia 1 

Fiji 1 

France 1 

Gabon 1 

Georgia 1 

Greenland 1 

Guinea 1 

Guyana 1 

Kuwait 1 

Latvia 1 

Malawi 1 

Maldives 1 

Mauritania 1 

Mayotte 1 

Montenegro 1 

Palestinian 1 

Saint Lucia 1 

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1 

Sierra Leone 1 

Syrian Arab Republic 1 

Tajikistan 1 

United Republic of Tanzania 1 


FRANCE


Table 4.11 Implemented measures that harm* France’s commercial interests, by type 


Number of 

measures 


measures 











Quota (including tariff rate quotas) 11 1,95% 













Total 563 100,00% 


FRANCE 

Table 4.12 


France’s implemented measures that harm* foreign commercial interests, 

by type. 

Number of 

measures 


measures 












Total 88 100,00% 



Germany 

Table 4.13 

Foreign state measures affecting Germany’s commercial interests 


affecting Germany’s commercial interests 

All 

measures 

All measures 


anti-subsidy, 

and safeguard 

actions 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of measures affecting Germany’s 



change in the treatment of Germany’s commercial interests [1] 


(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Germany’s 



almost certainly discriminate against Germany’s interests [2] 


which almost certainly discriminate against Germany’s interests [3] 


Total number of implemented measures affecting Germany’s 



almost certainly harm Germany’s commercial interests 


Germany’s commercial interests 


Total number of pending measures affecting Germany’s 



to harm Germany’s commercial interests 


Total number of implemented measures that affected Germany’s 



that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Germany’s 



that were harmful to Germany’s commercial interests 


Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 

that are currently in force and that harm Germany’s commercial 

interests 

1082 959 

305 304 

199 148 

578 507 

806 745 

562 502 

472 412 

113 61 

99 48 

163 153 

113 103 

103 93 

66 66 



“Germany” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”. 

GERMNAY


Table 4.14 

Germany’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial 

interests. 

GERMANY 


affecting Germany’s commercial interests 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of Germany’s measures affecting other 


Total number of Germany’s measures found to 

benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other 


Total number of Germany’s measures that 





interests [2] 

Total number of Germany’s measures that have been 




Total number of Germany’s measures found to 



Total number of Germany’s measures that have 



Total number of Germany’s measures that have been 




Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by 

measures implemented by Germany that harm foreign 



implemented by Germany that harm foreign 



implemented by Germany that harm foreign 


All measures 


anti-dumping, 



158 73 

18 17 

41 9 

99 47 

14 13 

4 4 

87 40 

141 89 

66 66 

155 155 



“Germany” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”.


Table 4.15 Frequency with which trading partners’ state measures have almost 

certainly harmed* German commercial interests 

Jurisdiction 



Argentina 56 

Belarus 50 

Kazakhstan 40 

India 35 

China 32 

Brazil 26 

Indonesia 23 


Viet Nam 13 

Italy 12 

Turkey 10 

Australia 9 

Nigeria 8 

Ukraine 8 

France 7 


Canada 6 

Japan 6 

Algeria 5 

Poland 5 


Austria 4 


Spain 4 

Switzerland 4 

Ghana 3 

Israel 3 

Malaysia 3 

Paraguay 3 

Sri Lanka 3 

Sweden 3 

Uzbekistan 3 

Colombia 2 


Denmark 2 

Ecuador 2 

Egypt 2 

Greece 2 

Latvia 2 

Netherlands 2 

Pakistan 2 

Portugal 2 

Singapore 2 

GERMANY


Jurisdiction 


Slovakia 2 


Uruguay 2 

Zimbabwe 2 

Belgium 1 

Bolivia 1 

Cameroon 1 

Ethiopia 1 

Gambia 1 

Hungary 1 

Iran 1 

Kenya 1 

Mexico 1 

Norway 1 

Philippines 1 

Puerto Rico 1 


Romania 1 

Sudan 1 

Thailand 1 

Togo 1 

Venezuela 1 


Table 4.16 Frequency with which Germany’s state measures have almost certainly 


GERMANY 



China 51 




Thailand 13 

Turkey 13 

Canada 12 

Japan 12 

India 11 


Belgium 9 

Croatia 9 

France 9 

Indonesia 9 

Italy 9 

Netherlands 9 

Poland 9 

Romania 9 

Serbia 9




Spain 9 

Denmark 8 

Malaysia 8 

Norway 8 

Sweden 8 


Argentina 7 

Austria 7 

Brazil 7 


Colombia 7 


Finland 7 

Australia 6 

Belarus 6 

New Zealand 6 


Ukraine 6 


Viet Nam 6 

Algeria 5 

Bangladesh 5 


Chile 5 

Egypt 5 

Hungary 5 

Israel 5 

Lebanon 5 

Mexico 5 

Pakistan 5 

Peru 5 

Philippines 5 


Singapore 5 

Costa Rica 4 

Greece 4 

Iceland 4 

Iran 4 

Latvia 4 

Macedonia 4 

Oman 4 

Slovakia 4 

Tunisia 4 

Uruguay 4 

Zambia 4 

Albania 3 

Armenia 3 

GERMANY


GERMANY 



Bulgaria 3 

Cyprus 3 

El Salvador 3 

Ghana 3 

Guatemala 3 

Hong Kong 3 

Ireland 3 

Jamaica 3 

Jordan 3 

Kazakhstan 3 

Kyrgyzstan 3 

Lithuania 3 

Morocco 3 

Nicaragua 3 

Nigeria 3 

Panama 3 

Paraguay 3 

Slovenia 3 

Sri Lanka 3 

Sudan 3 

Uzbekistan 3 

Zimbabwe 3 

Antigua and Barbuda 2 

Bahrain 2 

Belize 2 

Benin 2 

Bermuda 2 

Bolivia 2 


Honduras 2 

Kenya 2 

Liechtenstein 2 

Luxembourg 2 

Malta 2 

Marshall Islands 2 

Mauritius 2 

Mozambique 2 

Namibia 2 


Portugal 2 

Qatar 2 


Senegal 2 

Swaziland 2 

Tajikistan 2 

Togo 2 

Trinidad and Tobago 2




Uganda 2 

Venezuela 2 

Yemen 2 

Afghanistan 1 

Andorra 1 

Angola 1 

Azerbaijan 1 

Barbados 1 

Cambodia 1 

Cameroon 1 

Cayman Islands 1 

Comoros 1 

Congo 1 

Cuba 1 



Dominica 1 

Ecuador 1 


Ethiopia 1 


Fiji 1 

Gabon 1 

Guinea 1 

Guyana 1 

Kuwait 1 

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 1 

Madagascar 1 

Malawi 1 

Mali 1 

Mayotte 1 

Mongolia 1 

Montenegro 1 

New Caledonia 1 

Palestinian 1 

Saint Lucia 1 



Suriname 1 


Turkmenistan 1 



GERMANY


Table 4.17 Implemented measures that harm* Germany’s commercial interests, by 

type 


Number of 

measures 


measures 
























Total 645 100,00% 


GERMANY 

Table 4.18 


Germany’s implemented measures that harm* foreign commercial 

interests, by type. 

Number of 

measures 


measures 









Total 92 100,00% 



Italy 

Table 4.19 

Foreign state measures affecting Italy’s commercial interests 


affecting Italy’s commercial interests 

All 

measures 

All measures 


anti-subsidy, 

and safeguard 

actions 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of measures affecting Italy’s 



change in the treatment of Italy’s commercial interests [1] 


(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Italy’s 



almost certainly discriminate against Italy’s interests [2] 


which almost certainly discriminate against Italy’s interests [3] 


Total number of implemented measures affecting Italy’s 



almost certainly harm Italy’s commercial interests 


Italy’s commercial interests 


Total number of pending measures affecting Italy’s commercial 

interests 


to harm Italy’s commercial interests 


Total number of implemented measures that affected Italy’s 



that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Italy’s commercial 

interests 


that were harmful to Italy’s commercial interests 



are currently in force and that harm Italy’s commercial interests 

939 837 

257 256 

176 133 

506 448 

687 638 

487 439 

407 359 

101 58 

87 44 

151 141 

107 97 

98 88 

60 60 



“Italy” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”. 

ITALY


Table 4.20 Italy’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests 


affecting Italy’s commercial interests 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of Italy’s measures affecting other 


Total number of Italy’s measures found to benefit 



Total number of Italy’s measures that 





interests [2] 

Total number of Italy’s measures that have been 




Total number of Italy’s measures found to benefit 




implemented and are likely to harm foreign 







implemented by Italy that harm foreign commercial 

interests 



interests 



interests 

All measures 


anti-dumping, 



150 65 

15 14 

41 9 

94 42 

12 11 

5 5 

81 34 

152 102 

78 78 

194 194 



“Italy” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”. 

ITALY



certainly harmed* Italian commercial interests. 

Jurisdiction 



Argentina 58 

Belarus 36 

India 36 

Kazakhstan 32 

China 28 

Brazil 24 

Indonesia 19 

Turkey 11 

Viet Nam 10 

Germany 9 

France 8 

Egypt 7 

Nigeria 7 


Ukraine 7 

Japan 6 


Algeria 5 

Poland 5 

Venezuela 5 

Australia 4 

Switzerland 4 


Austria 3 

Canada 3 

Paraguay 3 


Spain 3 

Uruguay 3 

Ecuador 2 

Greece 2 

Hungary 2 

Iran 2 

Israel 2 

Latvia 2 

Malaysia 2 

Mexico 2 

Netherlands 2 

Portugal 2 

Slovakia 2 

Sri Lanka 2 

Sweden 2 


ITALY


Jurisdiction 


Armenia 1 

Belgium 1 

Bolivia 1 

Cameroon 1 

Colombia 1 


Ethiopia 1 

Ghana 1 

Kenya 1 

Norway 1 

Pakistan 1 


Romania 1 

Sudan 1 

Thailand 1 



Table 4.22 Frequency with which Italy’s state measures have almost certainly 


ITALY 



China 47 



Thailand 14 

France 13 

Germany 12 

Japan 12 


Turkey 12 

Canada 11 

Croatia 11 

India 11 

Indonesia 11 

Malaysia 11 


Austria 10 

Brazil 10 

Belgium 9 

Israel 9 

Netherlands 9 


Spain 9 

Tunisia 9 

Argentina 8 

Mexico 8




Norway 8 

Romania 8 

Slovenia 8 


Sweden 8 


Albania 7 

Australia 7 

Bulgaria 7 

Denmark 7 

Egypt 7 

Greece 7 

New Zealand 7 

Philippines 7 

Slovakia 7 

Ukraine 7 

Algeria 6 

Belarus 6 


Chile 6 

Colombia 6 

Costa Rica 6 


Finland 6 

Hong Kong 6 

Hungary 6 

Serbia 6 

Singapore 6 

Viet Nam 6 


Ghana 5 

Ireland 5 

Lebanon 5 

Pakistan 5 

Peru 5 

Uruguay 5 

Zambia 5 

Armenia 4 

Cyprus 4 

El Salvador 4 

Estonia 4 

Guatemala 4 

Iran 4 

Jamaica 4 

Jordan 4 

Latvia 4 

Lithuania 4 

ITALY


ITALY 



Malta 4 

Morocco 4 

Nicaragua 4 

Oman 4 

Paraguay 4 

Poland 4 

Portugal 4 


Sri Lanka 4 

Sudan 4 

Zimbabwe 4 

Bangladesh 3 

Belize 3 

Benin 3 

Bolivia 3 


Honduras 3 

Iceland 3 

Kazakhstan 3 

Kenya 3 

Kyrgyzstan 3 

Luxembourg 3 

Macao 3 

Macedonia 3 

Mauritius 3 

Mozambique 3 

Namibia 3 


Nigeria 3 

Panama 3 


Senegal 3 

Swaziland 3 

Togo 3 


Uganda 3 

Uzbekistan 3 

Yemen 3 

Afghanistan 2 

Andorra 2 

Angola 2 

Bahrain 2 

Barbados 2 

Cambodia 2 

Cameroon 2 

Comoros 2 

Congo 2




Cuba 2 



Dominica 2 

Ecuador 2 



Fiji 2 

Gabon 2 

Guinea 2 

Guyana 2 

Kuwait 2 

Madagascar 2 

Malawi 2 

Mali 2 

Mayotte 2 

Montenegro 2 


Qatar 2 

Saint Lucia 2 



Suriname 2 


Tajikistan 2 


Anguilla 1 

Antigua and Barbuda 1 

Aruba 1 

Azerbaijan 1 

Bahamas 1 

Bermuda 1 

Bhutan 1 

Botswana 1 

British Virgin Islands 1 

Brunei Darussalam 1 


Burundi 1 

Cape Verde 1 

Cayman Islands 1 

Central African Republic 1 

Chad 1 

Democratic People's Republic of Korea 1 

Djibouti 1 

Eritrea 1 

Ethiopia 1 

French Polynesia 1 

ITALY




Gambia 1 

Georgia 1 

Grenada 1 

Guam 1 

Guinea-Bissau 1 

Haiti 1 

Holy See 1 

Iraq 1 

Lao People's Democratic Republic 1 

Liberia 1 


Maldives 1 


Mauritania 1 

Mongolia 1 

Myanmar 1 

Nepal 1 

Niger 1 

Palestinian 1 

Papua New Guinea 1 

Rwanda 1 

Samoa 1 

Sao Tome and Principe 1 

Seychelles 1 

Somalia 1 


Turks and Caicos Islands 1 

Venezuela 1 


ITALY 

Table 4.23 Implemented measures that harm* Italy’s commercial interests, by type 


Number of 

measures 


measures 














State-controlled company 6 1,09%



Number of 

measures 


measures 










Total 549 100,00% 


Table 4.24 


Italy’s implemented measures that harm* foreign commercial interests, by 

type. 

Number of 

measures 


measures 











Total 88 100,00% 


ITALY


Japan 

Table 4.25 Foreign state measures affecting Japan’s commercial interests 


affecting Japan’s commercial interests 

All 

measures 

All measures 


anti-subsidy, 

and safeguard 

actions 

JAPAN 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of measures affecting Japan’s 



change in the treatment of Japan’s commercial interests [1] 


(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Japan’s 



almost certainly discriminate against Japan’s interests [2] 


which almost certainly discriminate against Japan’s interests [3] 


Total number of implemented measures affecting Japan’s 



almost certainly harm Japan’s commercial interests 


Japan’s commercial interests 


Total number of pending measures affecting Japan’s commercial 

interests 


to harm Japan’s commercial interests 


Total number of implemented measures that affected Japan’s 



that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Japan’s 



that were harmful to Japan’s commercial interests 



are currently in force and that harm Japan’s commercial interests 

901 801 

268 267 

179 132 

454 402 

671 619 

461 410 

380 329 

108 61 

90 43 

122 121 

81 80 

73 72 

74 74 



“Japan” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”.


Table 4.26 Japan’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests 


affecting Japan’s commercial interests 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of Japan’s measures affecting other 


Total number of Japan’s measures found to benefit 



Total number of Japan’s measures that 





interests [2] 

Total number of Japan’s measures that have been 




Total number of Japan’s measures found to benefit 











implemented by Japan that harm foreign commercial 

interests 



interests 



interests 

All measures 


anti-dumping, 



58 50 

7 7 

9 8 

42 35 

3 3 

4 4 

36 33 

191 187 

30 30 

135 135 



“Japan” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”. 

JAPAN



certainly harmed* Japanese commercial interests. 

JAPAN 

Jurisdiction 



Argentina 46 

India 39 

China 32 

Indonesia 32 

Belarus 23 

Kazakhstan 21 

Brazil 19 

Viet Nam 18 

Germany 12 

Italy 12 

France 9 

Singapore 9 

Australia 8 

Poland 7 



Portugal 6 


Spain 6 

Sweden 6 

Ukraine 6 

Belgium 5 

Canada 5 

Hungary 5 

Netherlands 5 

Nigeria 5 

Romania 5 

Slovakia 5 


Austria 4 

Bulgaria 4 

Cyprus 4 


Denmark 4 

Estonia 4 


Finland 4 

Greece 4 

Ireland 4 

Latvia 4 

Lithuania 4 

Luxembourg 4 

Malta 4


Jurisdiction 


Slovenia 4 

Colombia 3 

Philippines 3 

Sri Lanka 3 

Turkey 3 

Algeria 2 

Ecuador 2 

Malaysia 2 

Pakistan 2 

Paraguay 2 


Thailand 2 

Uruguay 2 

Venezuela 2 

Zimbabwe 2 

Bangladesh 1 

Bolivia 1 


Egypt 1 

Ethiopia 1 

Gambia 1 

Ghana 1 

Iran 1 

Israel 1 

Mauritania 1 

Mexico 1 

Puerto Rico 1 

Sudan 1 

Togo 1 

Uganda 1 


Table 4.28 Frequency with which Japan’s state measures have almost certainly 





China 8 

Austria 6 

Belgium 6 

Canada 6 

France 6 

Germany 6 

Italy 6 


Brazil 5 


JAPAN


JAPAN 



Indonesia 5 

Malaysia 5 

Netherlands 5 

Norway 5 

Philippines 5 

Spain 5 

Sweden 5 

Switzerland 5 

Thailand 5 


Viet Nam 5 

Australia 4 

Denmark 4 

India 4 

Poland 4 

Turkey 4 

Costa Rica 3 

Croatia 3 

Egypt 3 

Finland 3 

Hong Kong 3 

Hungary 3 

Iran 3 

Ireland 3 

Israel 3 

Mexico 3 

Morocco 3 

New Zealand 3 

Pakistan 3 

Portugal 3 

Romania 3 


Singapore 3 

Slovenia 3 

Sri Lanka 3 

Tunisia 3 


Bangladesh 2 

Bolivia 2 

Bulgaria 2 

Chile 2 

Colombia 2 

Ecuador 2 

Estonia 2 

Guatemala 2 

Honduras 2 

Kazakhstan 2





Latvia 2 

Lithuania 2 

Macedonia 2 

Maldives 2 

Malta 2 

Mauritius 2 

Mozambique 2 

Myanmar 2 

Nepal 2 

Nicaragua 2 

Nigeria 2 

Oman 2 

Papua New Guinea 2 

Peru 2 

Slovakia 2 


Ukraine 2 

Algeria 1 

Bahrain 1 

Belarus 1 

Belize 1 

Botswana 1 


Cambodia 1 

Cameroon 1 

Cook Islands 1 

Cuba 1 

Cyprus 1 



Djibouti 1 


Ethiopia 1 

Fiji 1 

Ghana 1 

Greece 1 

Guam 1 

Haiti 1 

Iceland 1 

Jordan 1 

Kenya 1 

Kiribati 1 

Kuwait 1 


Luxembourg 1 

Macao 1 

JAPAN




Madagascar 1 

Malawi 1 


Mongolia 1 

Namibia 1 



Palau 1 

Panama 1 

Paraguay 1 

Qatar 1 


Saint Helena 1 


Senegal 1 

Serbia 1 

Seychelles 1 

Solomon Islands 1 

Sudan 1 

Swaziland 1 


Tonga 1 


Uganda 1 



Uruguay 1 

Uzbekistan 1 

Vanuatu 1 

Venezuela 1 


JAPAN


Table 4.29 Implemented measures that harm* Japan’s commercial interests, by type 


Number of 

measures 


measures 
























Total 525 100,00% 


Table 4.30 


Japan’s implemented measures that harm* foreign commercial interests, 

by type. 

Number of 

measures 


measures 











Total 43 100,00% 


JAPAN


Russian Federation 

Table 4.31 Foreign state measures affecting Russian Federation’s commercial interests 


affecting Russian Federation’s commercial interests 

All 

measures 

All measures 


anti-subsidy, 

and safeguard 

actions 

RUSSIAN FEDERATION 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of measures affecting Russian Fed.’s 



change in the treatment of Russian Fed.’s commercial interests [1] 


(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Russian Fed.’s 



almost certainly discriminate against Russian Fed.’s interests [2] 


which almost certainly discriminate against Russian Fed.’s interests 

[3] 


Total number of implemented measures affecting Russian Fed.’s 



almost certainly harm Russian Fed.’s commercial interests 


Russian Fed.’s commercial interests 


Total number of pending measures affecting Russian Fed.’s 


Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to 

harm Russian Fed.’s commercial interests 


Total number of implemented measures that affected Russian Fed.’s 



that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to Russian Fed.’s 


Total number of implemented, but no longer enforced measures that 

were harmful to Russian Fed.’s commercial interests 


Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are 

currently in force and that harm Russian Fed.’s commercial interests. 

507 453 

127 127 

119 84 

261 242 

364 345 

268 249 

215 197 

69 35 

60 26 

74 73 

52 51 

46 45 

59 59 



“Russian Federation” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”.


Table 4.32 Russian Federation’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions’ 



affecting Russian Federation’s commercial interests 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of Russian Fed.’s measures affecting other 


Total number of Russian Fed.’s measures found to 



Total number of Russian Fed.’s measures that 





interests [2] 

Total number of Russian Fed.’s measures that have been 




Total number of Russian Fed.’s measures found to 



Total number of Russian Fed.’s measures that have 



Total number of Russian Fed.’s measures that have been 





implemented by Russian Fed. that harm foreign 








All measures 


anti-dumping, 



358 322 

89 89 

38 29 

231 204 

65 65 

20 20 

192 167 

483 473 

54 54 

137 137 



“Russian Federation” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”. 

RUSSIAN FEDERATION



certainly harmed* Russian Federation’s commercial interests. 


Jurisdiction 


Belarus 31 

India 21 

China 19 


Ukraine 13 

Indonesia 13 

France 13 

Kazakhstan 12 

Germany 10 

Spain 9 

Poland 9 

Italy 9 

Slovakia 8 

Netherlands 8 

Latvia 8 

Greece 8 


Romania 7 

Portugal 7 

Ireland 7 

Estonia 7 


Viet Nam 6 

Sweden 6 

Slovenia 6 

Malta 6 

Luxembourg 6 

Lithuania 6 

Hungary 6 

Finland 6 

Denmark 6 

Cyprus 6 

Bulgaria 6 

Belgium 6 

Austria 6 

Uzbekistan 5 

Turkey 5 


Nigeria 4 


Japan 3 

Egypt 3 

Brazil 3 

Venezuela 2


Jurisdiction 



Thailand 2 

Israel 2 

Iran 2 

Australia 2 

Sri Lanka 1 





Malaysia 1 

Ethiopia 1 

Cameroon 1 

Armenia 1 

Algeria 1 


Table 4.34 Frequency with which Russian Federation’s state measures have almost 

certainly harmed* foreign commercial interests. 



China 91 

Germany 87 

Ukraine 83 


France 78 

Poland 77 

Italy 75 

Finland 69 


Netherlands 63 

Spain 60 


Turkey 58 

Belgium 57 

Sweden 57 

Japan 56 


Austria 53 

Canada 53 

Lithuania 52 

Hungary 46 

Denmark 44 

Slovakia 39 


India 37 

Latvia 37 

RUSSIAN FEDERATION





Thailand 37 

Mexico 35 

Estonia 30 

Romania 30 


Portugal 29 

Uzbekistan 29 

Brazil 28 

Iran 28 

Slovenia 28 

Norway 27 

Australia 24 

Serbia 24 

Malaysia 22 


Singapore 20 

Ireland 19 

Bulgaria 18 

Israel 18 

Azerbaijan 17 

Kazakhstan 17 

Greece 16 

Indonesia 16 

Hong Kong 15 

Kyrgyzstan 14 

Viet Nam 14 


Egypt 11 

New Zealand 10 

Armenia 9 

Croatia 9 


Uruguay 9 

Georgia 8 

Iceland 8 

Luxembourg 8 

Philippines 8 

Algeria 6 

Chile 6 

Colombia 6 

Cyprus 6 

Mongolia 6 



Pakistan 5 

Peru 5 

Tajikistan 5




Venezuela 5 

Cuba 4 

Macao 4 

Morocco 4 


Sri Lanka 4 

Tunisia 4 

Albania 3 

British Virgin Islands 3 

Costa Rica 3 

Guatemala 3 

Malta 3 

Mauritius 3 

Panama 3 

Afghanistan 2 

Belarus 2 

Bolivia 2 





Ecuador 2 

El Salvador 2 

Kenya 2 

Lebanon 2 

Paraguay 2 

Uganda 2 

Bahamas 1 

Bangladesh 1 

Barbados 1 

Cambodia 1 



Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 1 

Ghana 1 

Guinea 1 

Honduras 1 

Jamaica 1 

Jordan 1 

Liberia 1 

Macedonia 1 

Malawi 1 

Mauritania 1 

Montenegro 1 

Mozambique 1 

Namibia 1 


RUSSIAN FEDERATION




Nicaragua 1 

Niger 1 

Nigeria 1 

Oman 1 

Qatar 1 


Rwanda 1 


Samoa 1 

San Marino 1 

Sudan 1 


Togo 1 


Yemen 1 

Zambia 1 

Zimbabwe 1 



Table 4.35 Implemented measures that harm* Russian Federation’s commercial 

interests, by type 


Number of 

measures 


measures 




















Total 301 100,00% 



Table 4.36 


Russian Federation’s implemented measures that harm* foreign 

commercial interests, by type. 

Number of 

measures 


measures 




















Total 251 100,00% 


RUSSIAN FEDERATION



Table 4.37 Foreign state measures affecting United Kingdom’s commercial interests 


affecting UK’s commercial interests 

All 

measures 

All measures 


anti-subsidy, 

and safeguard 

actions 

UNITED KINGDOM 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of measures affecting UK’s 

commercial interests. 


change in the treatment of UK’s commercial interests [1] 


(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm UK’s commercial 

interests or 


almost certainly discriminate against UK’s interests [2] 


which almost certainly discriminate against UK’s interests [3] 


Total number of implemented measures affecting UK’s commercial 

interests 


almost certainly harm UK’s commercial interests 


UK’s commercial interests 


Total number of pending measures affecting UK’s commercial 

interests 


to harm UK’s commercial interests 


Total number of implemented measures that affected UK’s 



that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to UK’s commercial 

interests 


that were harmful to UK’s commercial interests 



are currently in force and that harm UK’s commercial interests 

934 861 

266 265 

176 149 

492 447 

700 657 

491 449 

405 363 

97 70 

80 53 

137 134 

96 93 

86 83 

69 69 



“United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking 

the button “Get Stats”.


Table 4.38 

United Kingdom’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial 

interests 


affecting UK’s commercial interests 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of UK’s measures affecting other 


Total number of UK’s measures found to benefit 



Total number of UK’s measures that 





interests [2] 

Total number of UK’s measures that have been 




Total number of UK’s measures found to benefit 











implemented by UK that harm foreign commercial 

interests 



interests 



interests 

All measures 


anti-dumping, 



157 72 

16 15 

43 11 

98 46 

13 12 

6 6 

81 34 

236 194 

43 43 

146 146 



“United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking 

the button “Get Stats”. 

UNITED KINGDOM



certainly harmed* United Kingdom’s commercial interests. 


Jurisdiction 




India 33 

Belarus 32 

Kazakhstan 28 

China 27 

Indonesia 20 

Brazil 17 

Australia 14 

Canada 11 

Italy 11 


Viet Nam 10 

Germany 8 


France 7 

Nigeria 7 

Singapore 7 

Turkey 6 

Ukraine 6 

Algeria 5 

Japan 5 

Poland 5 

Sri Lanka 4 


Kenya 3 

Malaysia 3 


Spain 3 

Switzerland 3 

Ecuador 2 

Egypt 2 

Iran 2 

Israel 2 

Latvia 2 

Netherlands 2 

Norway 2 

Pakistan 2 

Paraguay 2 

Portugal 2 

Sweden 2 

Uganda 2 

Uruguay 2 

Zimbabwe 2


Jurisdiction 


Austria 1 

Belgium 1 

Bolivia 1 

Colombia 1 



Denmark 1 

Ethiopia 1 

Gambia 1 

Ghana 1 

Greece 1 

Hong Kong 1 

Hungary 1 

Mexico 1 

Puerto Rico 1 


Romania 1 


Slovakia 1 

Sudan 1 

Thailand 1 

Togo 1 


Venezuela 1 

Zambia 1 


Table 4.40 Frequency with which United Kingdom’s state measures have almost 

certainly harmed* foreign commercial interests. 



China 51 


India 16 

New Zealand 14 


Philippines 13 

Thailand 13 

Australia 12 

Pakistan 12 

Canada 8 

Malaysia 8 


Indonesia 7 

Japan 7 


Turkey 7 

UNITED KINGDOM





Algeria 6 



Colombia 6 

Croatia 6 

Serbia 6 


Brazil 5 

Chile 5 

Israel 5 

Lebanon 5 

Mexico 5 

Switzerland 5 


Zambia 5 

Bangladesh 4 

Belarus 4 

Costa Rica 4 

Egypt 4 

Ghana 4 

Iran 4 

Jamaica 4 

Morocco 4 

Peru 4 


Singapore 4 

Sri Lanka 4 

Tunisia 4 

Ukraine 4 

Viet Nam 4 

Zimbabwe 4 

Albania 3 

Armenia 3 

Bulgaria 3 

El Salvador 3 

Hong Kong 3 

Jordan 3 

Kenya 3 

Macedonia 3 

Mauritius 3 

Nicaragua 3 

Nigeria 3 

Norway 3 

Oman 3 

Paraguay 3 

Romania 3 

Sudan 3




Sweden 3 


Uganda 3 

Uruguay 3 

Yemen 3 

Afghanistan 2 

Angola 2 

Austria 2 

Barbados 2 

Belize 2 

Benin 2 

Bolivia 2 


Dominica 2 


France 2 

Germany 2 

Guatemala 2 

Guyana 2 

Honduras 2 

Iceland 2 

Ireland 2 

Italy 2 

Kazakhstan 2 

Kuwait 2 

Kyrgyzstan 2 

Malawi 2 

Mozambique 2 

Namibia 2 


Panama 2 


Saint Lucia 2 


Senegal 2 


Spain 2 

Swaziland 2 

Togo 2 

Uzbekistan 2 

Andorra 1 

Bahrain 1 

Belgium 1 

Cambodia 1 

Cameroon 1 

Comoros 1 

Congo 1 

UNITED KINGDOM





Cuba 1 

Cyprus 1 



Denmark 1 

Ecuador 1 


Eritrea 1 

Ethiopia 1 


Fiji 1 

Finland 1 

Gabon 1 

Grenada 1 

Guinea 1 

Iraq 1 


Madagascar 1 

Mali 1 

Mayotte 1 

Montenegro 1 

Montserrat 1 

Myanmar 1 

Nepal 1 

Netherlands 1 


Palestinian 1 

Poland 1 

Portugal 1 

Qatar 1 

Saint Kitts and Nevis 1 

Somalia 1 

Suriname 1 


Tajikistan 1 




Table 4.41 Implemented measures that harm* United Kingdom’s commercial 

interests, by type 


Number of 

measures 


measures 
























Total 565 100,00% 


Table 4.42 


United Kingdom’s implemented measures that harm* foreign commercial 

interests, by type. 

Number of 

measures 


measures 









Total 89 100,00% 


UNITED KINGDOM


United States of America 

Table 4.43 Foreign state measures affecting United States of America’s commercial 

interests 


affecting The US’s commercial interests 

All 

measures 

All measures 


anti-subsidy, 

and safeguard 

actions 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of measures affecting the US’s 



change in the treatment of the US’s commercial interests [1] 


(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm the US’s 



almost certainly discriminate against the US’s interests [2] 


which almost certainly discriminate against the US’s interests [3] 


Total number of implemented measures affecting the US’s 



almost certainly harm US’s commercial interests 


US’s commercial interests 


Total number of pending measures affecting the US’s commercial 

interests 


to harm the US’s commercial interests 


Total number of implemented measures that affected the US’s 



that were harmful or almost certainly harmful to the US’s 



that were harmful to the US’s commercial interests 



are currently in force and that harm the US’s commercial interests. 

1246 1086 

355 352 

208 141 

683 593 

945 861 

667 586 

569 489 

119 53 

101 35 

182 172 

121 111 

112 102 

82 82 



“United States of America” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”.


Table 4.44 United States of America’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions’ 



affecting The US’s commercial interests 

ALL MEASURES 

Total number of The US’s measures affecting other 


Total number of The US’s measures found to benefit 



Total number of The US’s measures that 





interests [2] 

Total number of The US’s measures that have been 




Total number of The US’s measures found to benefit 



Total number of The US’s measures that have 



Total number of The US’s measures that have been 





implemented by The US that harm foreign commercial 

interests 



interests 



interests 

All measures 


anti-dumping, 



171 119 

24 24 

104 73 

43 22 

6 6 

7 6 

40 19 

174 145 

47 44 

109 109 



“United States of America” in the “Affecting Trading Partner” and clicking the button “Get Stats”. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



certainly harmed* the US’s commercial interests. 


Jurisdiction 



The European Union 70 

China 42 

India 38 

Belarus 34 

Indonesia 32 

Brazil 31 

Kazakhstan 30 


Italy 18 


Canada 16 

Germany 16 

Australia 15 

Viet Nam 15 

France 14 

Turkey 12 

Japan 11 

Mexico 11 

Poland 11 

Spain 11 

Netherlands 10 

Belgium 9 

Greece 9 

Portugal 9 

Sweden 9 

Venezuela 9 

Austria 8 

Hungary 8 

Ireland 8 

Latvia 8 

Nigeria 8 

Romania 8 


Slovakia 8 

Bulgaria 7 

Cyprus 7 


Denmark 7 

Estonia 7 

Finland 7 

Lithuania 7 

Luxembourg 7 

Malta 7


Jurisdiction 


Singapore 7 

Slovenia 7 

Colombia 6 



Sri Lanka 5 

Egypt 4 

Malaysia 4 

Paraguay 4 

Algeria 3 

Ghana 3 

Pakistan 3 

Ukraine 3 

Uruguay 3 


Ecuador 2 

Ethiopia 2 

Morocco 2 

Philippines 2 

Thailand 2 

Uzbekistan 2 

Bolivia 1 



Gambia 1 

Hong Kong 1 

Israel 1 

Norway 1 

Peru 1 

Puerto Rico 1 



Sudan 1 

Switzerland 1 

Togo 1 

Uganda 1 


Zimbabwe 1 




Table 4.46 Frequency with which US state measures have almost certainly harmed* 

foreign commercial interests. 




China 23 

Mexico 11 

Canada 8 

India 6 

Viet Nam 6 

Germany 5 

Japan 5 

Australia 4 

Austria 4 

Belgium 4 

Brazil 4 


France 4 

Indonesia 4 

Italy 4 

Philippines 4 



Sweden 4 

Switzerland 4 


Costa Rica 3 

Finland 3 

Hong Kong 3 

Hungary 3 

Israel 3 

Netherlands 3 

Poland 3 

Slovakia 3 

Spain 3 

Thailand 3 

The European Union 2 

Barbados 2 

Bulgaria 2 

Croatia 2 


Denmark 2 

Ecuador 2 

Estonia 2 

Guatemala 2 

Haiti 2 

Ireland 2 

Jamaica 2 

Luxembourg 2 

Malaysia 2




Morocco 2 

Nicaragua 2 

Norway 2 

Pakistan 2 

Peru 2 

Portugal 2 

Romania 2 


Singapore 2 

Swaziland 2 


Albania 1 

Bahrain 1 

Bangladesh 1 

Belarus 1 

Bolivia 1 


Botswana 1 

Brunei Darussalam 1 

Cambodia 1 

Cameroon 1 

Chile 1 

Colombia 1 


Egypt 1 

El Salvador 1 

Ethiopia 1 

Georgia 1 

Ghana 1 

Greece 1 

Guyana 1 

Honduras 1 

Jordan 1 

Kazakhstan 1 

Kenya 1 


Latvia 1 

Lesotho 1 

Lithuania 1 

Macedonia 1 

Madagascar 1 

Malawi 1 

Mali 1 

Mauritius 1 

Mongolia 1 

Namibia 1 

Nepal 1 






New Zealand 1 

Oman 1 

Saint Kitts and Nevis 1 

Slovenia 1 

Sri Lanka 1 


Tokelau 1 

Tunisia 1 

Turkey 1 


Ukraine 1 


Uruguay 1 

Uzbekistan 1 

Venezuela 1 

Zimbabwe 1 



Table 4.47 Implemented measures that harm* the US’s commercial interests, by type 


Number of 

measures 


measures 
























Total 752 100,00% 



Table 4.48 


The US’s implemented measures that harm* foreign commercial interests, 

by type. 

Number of 

measures 


measures 













Total 53 100,00% 



Released in advance of the G8 Summit in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, on 

17-18 June 2013, this twelth report from Global Trade Alert highlights the 

following findings: 

• Protectionism has made a quiet but aggressive return. The initial totals 

of protectionist measures imposed in Q4 2012 and Q1 2013 are the 

worst since our monitoring began. 

• In the year June 2012 to May 2013, 431 new protectionist measures 

were imposed, substantially outnumbering the 141 commerceliberalising 

measures implemented. A total of 183 more protectionist 

measures are in the pipeline. 

• Together, the G8 nations were responsible for 131 of the 431 protectionist 

measures imposed during the past 12 months. When the rest of the G20 

are included, the largest economies in the world are responsible for 

65% of all protectionism imposed. 

• The G8 has much to lose from beggar-thy-neighbour acts. Very often, 

their commercial interests have been adversely affected by protectionism 

in the past year, ranging from 70 counts for Russia and Canada to 146 

incidences harming American interests. 

• For the first time since our monitoring began, the number of dumping-, 

subsidy- and safeguard-related duties imposed exceeded the number of 

trade-distorting bailouts. 

Included in the report are: 

• Eight examples of far-reaching beggar-thy-neighbour measures imposed 

by G8 governments. 

• Maps showing the number of times each G8 country's crisis-era 

protectionism has harmed its trading partners worldwide. 

• New league tables of the top ten most protectionist nations on Earth. 

This report will be of interest to policymakers, advisers, diplomats, 

international officials, journalists, business associations, civil society, and 

analysts of the global trading system. 

Centre for Economic Policy Research 

77 BASTWICK STREET • LONDON EC1V 3pz • UK 

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Protectionism's Quiet Return: GTA's Pre-G8 ... - Global Trade Alert

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