Zeit und Geschichte Time and History - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein ...

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understand the nature of our understanding, the better we can understand Nature, and the more we understand Nature, the better we shall understand ourselves. In this spirit, Spinoza listed the properties of our understanding, which he could consider essential by relying on his present knowledge [TCU XV]. The third item in this list says that having a conception of a 3- dimensional space must be a property of our understanding because, it cannot not only be derived by induction from known spatial relations, but every such relation must presuppose it. The fifth item is a generalization of the former: when ideas are formed by understanding, the mind regards all things under ‘certain species of eternity,’ without considering their duration or number. This is contrary to things imagined or perceived, where things always have a definite spatial extension, duration and number. Spinoza's phrase ‘a certain species of eternity’ can be understood as the notion of an independent variable as used in statistics: abstractly, we think of it independently of any other variable. What mathematics does is to correlate the ways they in fact interact. Time is such a variable. According to Spinoza, we can discover these independent components of understanding by a method of conceptual reduction – by analysing each concept to its components until we reach those which cannot be further analysed. As the given examples of duration show, the fundamental concepts are not confined to any particular domain of knowledge. The concept of time must represent what is common to the duration of a season and a melody irrespective of other factors which determine their existence. Although he deals with conceptual reduction, Spinoza insists that those concepts which enter scientific knowledge must represent real physical things [TCU XIV]. He explains that it is difficult to think of any abstract concept [like ‘time’] as of a real physical thing because, being present everywhere, it is more easily conceived as a universal term – as nominalists say, as a name we give to all observed durations. In TCU XIII, Spinoza defines the conditions for considering such universal terms as real ‘uncreated’ properties of substance. ‘Uncreated’ means that, like substance itself, they have no cause outside themselves. These conditions are: I.No object outside it should be needed for explaining its definition. II.When the definition is given, no doubt should remain about whether or not it exists. III.It must contain no substantives which can be turned into adjectives. IV.All its properties should be concluded from its definition. Since time is conceived independently of any other concept, condition I is satisfied. Similarly, condition II seems to be satisfied because some conception of time is always used in mathematical equations in physics, so we never doubt its existence. However, Spinoza repeatedly warns that we cannot deduce properties of reality from an understanding derived by reflection on their essence alone [C.IX]. He accepted Descartes’ discovery that thinking is the essence of our being, in spite of its discovery by reflection alone, because, in this case, our awareness provides all the evidence we need and can have. But concerning knowledge of the world, he approved of the new scientists in England, who refused to deduce properties of the world from formal analysis, as Descartes did. This approval of empirical science is the meaning of Spinoza’s comment after his statement of condition III, that it means the same as a warning that a thing ought not be explained by abstractions. Although today no scientist will derive a methodological rule from grammatical terms, On Spinoza’s Conception of Time - Nancy Brenner-Golomb condition III suggests that from the fact that we need words [though, in this case, not adjectives] for judging whether an event occurs before, after or simultaneously with another event, we should not deduce that a noun derived from them necessarily names a unique physical entity. Condition IV is most clearly concerned with scientific theory, rather than with the real world. Since the rule concerns the most general concepts, applicable to all theories, they must agree with the general view of reality which serves as the ultimate standard of truth. However, since this unity of science is a result of the natural function of reason to create it, these concepts might be what Spinoza calls instruments of our mind. How do we know whether the concept of time is not merely a useful construct of our minds, which might be either wrong or non-existent? According to Spinoza, we know that it must represent a real and unique physical entity only if we accept his conception of Nature. This follows from his definition of life, as "the force through which things persevere in their own being" [MT p.120], from which he derives his definition of the mind; the tendency to create a coherent system of knowledge, and the best method to do so [ p.2].This method is based on the realization that the more we correlate true ideas to ‘their objects’ in reality, the more it becomes clear that things that are logically dependent (or independent) are also causally related (or unrelated) in reality; and conversely, the more we observe that things are causally related (or unrelated) in reality the more we understand that they must be logically related (or unrelated) in thought. Methodologically this means that the more we understand that the concept of time is a most general instrument of the mind necessary for creating a logically coherent science, the more we understand that it must be found in causal explanations of all conceptions of duration. And the opposite assertion means that this instrument of reason can be discovered by reflecting on what is logically common to all known causes of the durations of their various ‘objects’ [ pp.2 and 3]. If a definition of time can be derived so that, as the fourth requirement says, all notions of duration follow from it, we have sufficient justification for considering it a true conception of a real component of the universe. The crux of the matter is that all this is valid provided Spinoza’s metaphysical conception of Nature is accepted. According to Spinoza, the more one interacts with one’s environment the more true knowledge is necessary for one’s survival, a thesis which, in agreement with his conception of the mind, he summarizes in the proposition that the more one interacts with one’s environment the more mind one has [E. II, note to proposition xiii]. That this ‘more mind’ must provide true knowledge which we need for survival, follows from his conception of life [p.4]. Yet, there are many ways by which ideas are formed in the mind. The function of reason is to accept the true and reject the false ones. However, we would not have had concepts embedded in our minds had they not been modifications of a real property of substance [p.1]. This, of course, follows from his naturalistic metaphysics, which cannot be proved. But, as Spinoza claimed, no science is possible without presupposing a general view of nature, even if to the dismay of most modern scientists this means a metaphysical view. 33
Literature (The translations are those I used) Spinoza, Benedictus (Baruch): A Political Treatise (PT), 1677. Translated by R.H.M. Elwes, Dover Publications Inc. New York.1951 – Correspondence of Spinoza (C.), translated and edited by A Wolf, 1966, Frank Cass & Co. – Ethics (E.), 1674, translated by A. Boyle, Everyman's Library, Dutton: New York. – Metaphysical Thoughts (MT), published with PCP. – Principles of Cartesian Philosophy (PCP), 1663. Translated by Samuel Shirley. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1998. The book includes also the Inauguration Dissertation on Matter by Lodewijk Meyer (1660). – Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding (TCU) published together with Ethics, in Everyman's Library. Nancy Brenner-Golomb 34 On Spinoza’s Conception of Time - Nancy Brenner-Golomb
Page 2 and 3: Zeit und Geschichte Time and Histor
Page 4 and 5: Time and History Papers of the 28th
Page 6 and 7: Inhalt / Contents Inhalt / Contents
Page 8 and 9: Inhalt / Contents “Time Flies”.
Page 10: Inhalt / Contents The Tacit Dimensi
Page 13 and 14: Idee, dass die Sprache und die Wirk
Page 15 and 16: Der Wittgensteinische Abgrund der H
Page 17 and 18: die Perspektive, die sich wirklich
Page 19 and 20: about them, he could then explain t
Page 21 and 22: 20 is not, or not simply, a matter
Page 23 and 24: elimination and sublimation are avo
Page 25 and 26: The Strange Case of the Prototracta
Page 27 and 28: on the notebooks. Of these first 42
Page 29 and 30: similarity can be though of as an a
Page 31 and 32: Wittgenstein’s Musing on the Self
Page 33: On Spinoza’s Conception of Time N
Page 37 and 38: 36 Perception of the World in the C
Page 39 and 40: Kuhn und Wittgenstein: Paradigmen,
Page 41 and 42: 40 Kuhn und Wittgenstein: Paradigme
Page 43 and 44: means of conventions and designatin
Page 45 and 46: The Transcendental Subject: Three G
Page 47 and 48: Konkrete Geometrie. Eine modale Rau
Page 49 and 50: 4. Konkrete Geometrie 48 Konkrete G
Page 51 and 52: 50 Conservativism or Progressivism
Page 53 and 54: Empirical Equivalence, Scientific R
Page 55 and 56: of the theory. 8 Given that the uni
Page 57 and 58: principles for them! Let now M be y
Page 59 and 60: 58 Wittgenstein on the Possibility
Page 61 and 62: Bye, Bye Time? Über die nicht ende
Page 63 and 64: 62 Bye, Bye Time? Über die nicht e
Page 65 and 66: Suppose that a general rule is give
Page 67 and 68: Der Philosoph als Schatzgräber. Mo
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Page 71 and 72: The Philosopher’s Garden Revisite
Page 73 and 74: 72 The Philosopher’s Garden Revis
Page 75 and 76: 6. The Lumpy Bumpy Present I have a
Page 77 and 78: Explanation and Definition: On Hall
Page 79 and 80: Time: A Social Construction? Georg
Page 81 and 82: Enthusiastic advocates of construct
Page 83 and 84: spatial extension something to do w
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elief is believed by the subject. O
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Welche A-Theorie der Zeit A-Theoret
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4. Die reine A-Theorie der Zeit als
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90 Space-Time Theories, Schlick’s
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Fluid Clocks: Emergence of Quantum
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d( δE) 2 d( δE) P= Pe δE= Pe ω
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Wittgenstein, Spengler and Time W.
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Literature Altieri, C. (1976) "Witt
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all about: one part of a thing givi
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The Historical Wittgenstein: Biogra
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104 The Historical Wittgenstein: Bi
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Several more sophisticated temporal
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On the Intelligibility of Tenseless
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however, the reason for calling the
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tionistischen Zeittheorie im Anschl
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114 Geschichte(n) - Die Wittgenstei
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116 Geschichte(n) - Die Wittgenstei
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118 Zeit und Gemeinschaft. Soziale
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120 Zeit und Gemeinschaft. Soziale
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4. Reconstruction For the presentat
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Parables Charles W. Johnson, Logan,
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Literature Ackermann, Robert John 1
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128 Time, Credit, & Debt. An Essay
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130 Time, Credit, & Debt. An Essay
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132 Warum McTaggarts Beweis für di
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Better Learning from One’s Case L
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not depend on any private ostension
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138 Regel für „Es ist jetzt der
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“Time Flies”. On Time Metaphors
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142 “Time Flies”. On Time Metap
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Unvorhersehbarkeit nicht ein Charak
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Wittgensteins Tractatus im Lichte d
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Literatur 148 Wittgensteins Tractat
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150 The Role of Time for Personal A
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The Conceptual Basis of a Biologica
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Literature 154 The Conceptual Basis
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the first exact treatment of the ki
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Time and the Experience of Voluntar
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easons which favour doing so; it se
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162 Relations and Objects : A New A
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Ästhetik und Logische Form: Wittge
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selbst gestaltet hat. Fast anekdote
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exactly the problem of determinism
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Literature Bolzano, Bernard 1838?
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the word ‘somehow’ in the last
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causally linked in the relevant way
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Zeit und Konstruktion bei Aleida As
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treffen kann oder nicht. Wenn nicht
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180 „Die Aufnahme des Zeitlichen
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„Ars in artificiale“ - Das musi
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184 „Ars in artificiale“ - Das
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186 Die Irreduzibilität der Zeitmo
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Russell’s Second Philosophy of Ti
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190 (i) In time, dates do, to some
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absolutely false. In this sense, th
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Wittgenstein´s ‘Idealism’ Kare
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Concluding Remarks This result leav
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198 Einige Aspekte des Prozessieren
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Clockworks Everywhere. Cycles of Se
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202 Clockworks Everywhere. Cycles o
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Time in Cultural Analysis Wolfgang
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Absolute und erlebte Zeit. Zur Rich
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auch dort die kalendarische Zeit um
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Theorem 1. It follows from TCB that
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Can Wittgenstein Explain our Knowle
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214 Can Wittgenstein Explain our Kn
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Time, Homogeneity and Phenomenology
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Mneme und Nachträglichkeit: einige
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220 Mneme und Nachträglichkeit: ei
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time dimension is circular, threadi
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224 The Present as the Only Reality
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Schlick’s Early Conventionalism T
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228 Space and time are never object
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contradictions, although of course
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The Private Language Argument and P
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234 The Private Language Argument a
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236 Outline of an Argument for a
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Beyond the Process and Object. Rema
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240 Beyond the Process and Object.
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4. Semantics To describe the semant
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The Notions of State of Affairs, Fa
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246 The Notions of State of affairs
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3. Mathematik und Filme 248 Tanzen,
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Formal Concepts as Typographic Sign
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252 Formal Concepts as Typographic
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254 „Was ist Zeit?“ Wittgenstei
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A New Reading of Russell’s ‘Int
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Literature 258 A New Reading of Rus
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260 Der Radikale Konstruktivismus a
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Literature 262 Der Radikale Konstru
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to philosophy, however great that p
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Intrinsischer Eigenschaftswechsel u
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268 Intrinsischer Eigenschaftswechs
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270 Transparentes Weiß und das Ver
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Bolzano zur Zeit Benjamin Schnieder
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eide einem Gegenstand zugeschrieben
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Accelerating Turing Machines Oron S
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Literature Copeland, Jack B. 1998a
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general theory of relativity claims
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Zeit und Gegenwart bei Wittgenstein
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innewohnt, und sofern das Aspektseh
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286 The Tacit Dimensions of Transce
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scientific measurements of distance
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Time and Media Culture. Findings of
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Literature 292 Time and Media Cultu
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294 Entscheidungen mit Zeitpunkten
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296 Entscheidungen mit Zeitpunkten
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is used in philosophy, namely that
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Wittgenstein’s Phenomenology: Rec
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302 Wittgenstein’s Phenomenology:
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304 III Perhaps we can also speak o
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Wittgenstein as a Detenser, Tractat
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also a fact, this involves the corr
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The Mode Approach to Time can there
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Literature Black, Max 1964, A compa
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3. Eternal and Immortal Falsities?
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Grenzen der Zeit: Wie die Urknall-K
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Investigating Wittgenstein’s Note
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Literature Biggs, Michael A.R. 1996
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322 Presentist Variations on the Th
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324 „In unserer Sprache ist eine
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Ist der Satz „Romeo küsst Julia
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328 Ist der Satz „Romeo küsst Ju
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330 Are the Laws of Nature Time Rev
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Literature 332 Are the Laws of Natu
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experiencing subject, individuals w
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Time Structure and the Structure of
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areas characteristically respond to
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On the (Im)Possibility of Time with
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In light of the fact that a necessa
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fellows as “logistician”, is no
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The Beginning of Cosmic Time Henrik
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Acknowledgements I would like to th
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350 Thucydides: A New Vision of Tim
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