Zeit und Geschichte Time and History - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein ...

similarity can be though of as an absolute notion (for each
speaker), as a binary relation which holds between objects
of the appropriate type. 4 The speaker may thus judge two
colour patches to be the sames; to be the same colour
relative to the speaker’s subjective standard of similarity.
Judgments of this kind are pre-linguistic; a speaker may
pre-linguistically judge that two colour samples are the
sames in the same way that a dog follows a scent or a bird
recognizes its chick when returning to a crowded colony.
It is assumed that speakers learn sensation
language by a process of internal ostensive definition in
which words are uniformlys associated with sensations.
Wittgenstein describes this process as consisting of the
speaker attending to samples of the sensation and
impressing upon themself the connection between the
word and the sensation (Wittgenstein 1953, §258). If the
speaker has always associated a word with samples of the
sames sensation (at least in all sincere uses of the word
which the speaker regards as correct), then the speaker is
said to have formed a semantics association between the
word and the sensation; the speaker is said to have used
the word in the sames way, or semanticallys. It is also
assumed that, on realizing that a word has been used
semanticallys, speakers are capable of grasping the
(implicit) general rule for the word, by inductively inferring
that the word should always be used in the sames way as it
has been. Following a rule (given that one has done so in
the past) thus consists of continuing to use the word
semanticallys.
It is further assumed that (prompted and
emboldened by accompanying dispositions) speakers
normally endeavour to use language semanticallys, and
that they are normally capable of doing so. Wittgenstein
argues, in effect, that semantics association is unintelligible
as a speaker has no justification for thinking that they are
currently using the word in the sames way as they have
done in the past; (Wittgenstein 1953, §§258, 265),
expounded in (Kenny 1973, ch. 10). However it seems to
me that this objection is decisively met by Ayer (Ayer
1954) and Kripke (Kripke 1982, n. 47), who argue that
speakers simply have to be trusted to identify their own
sensations correctly; for if they could not then no appeal to
public criteria would help them do so, as their ability to
identify external phenomena depends on their ability to
identify relevant sensory impressions. As the present
proposal seeks only to embellish the sceptical solution, it is
sufficient to assume that the speaker is normally successful
in endeavouring to use language semanticallys, and this
assumption can be supported by appealing to the causal
basis of perception, memory, etc., and by inductive
arguments for their reliability based on survival value and
natural selection. The speaker may occasionally be
unsuccessful without being aware of the fact. They may
also become aware of a systemic error; for example an
individual might go colour blind and discover this fact
through taste (on failing to distinguish, say, between ripe
and unripe fruit).
Speakers are normally justified in endeavouring to
use language semanticallys. They should normally
endeavour to do so in order to be able to refer to
significant features of (regularities in) the world in a
meaningful way; in order that their signs (marks, symbols,
4 As Quine notes (p. 122), a comparative notion of similarity (a is more similar
to b than to c) is needed to deal with vagueness. The speaker’s absolute
similarity judgments should thus be seen as the result of unconscious,
“elementary”, abstraction processes, which typically involve “delicate
comparisons and shrewd inferences”. However, the central problem of
Wittgenstein’s paradox arises once vagueness has been removed; when it is
assumed that we are dealing with “clear” cases.
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Subjective Similarity and Public Language - John Bell
sounds, etc.) signify (have significance). In exceptional
circumstances a speaker may justifiably use a word nonsemanticallys
(pragmaticallys), but such use is only
meaningful when contrasted with its normal semantics use.
Returning to the dispute between Green and Grue,
Green is disposed to call the grass “green” and not “blue”
at time T, and in intentionally doing so he is using ‘green’
semanticallys; he is following the rule that he has grasped
for ‘green’. As there are no unusual circumstances he is
also justified in doing so; and would not be justified in
answering any other way. Equally, and perhaps more
surprisingly, Grue is justified in thinking that the grass
should be called “blue” at T, as this would be to use ‘blue’
semantically relative to his subjective standard of similarity.
On this account, Grue turns out to be far less bizarre than
he at first seems. Like Green, he endeavours to use
language systematically, and differs only in having an
unusual sense of similarity.
The extension to the public case comes with the
further assumption that the subjective standards of the
speakers of the language are sufficiently similar. As Quine
puts it: “the ostensive learning of words … is a curiously
comfortable case of induction, a game of chance with
loaded dice. … For the learner [of ‘yellow’] is generalizing
on his yellow samples by similarity considerations, and his
neighbours have themselves acquired the use of the word
“yellow”, in their day, by the same similarity considerations”
(Quine 1969, p. 125). This assumption seems reasonable
given our common human nature (“we being birds of a
feather”).
The reinstatement of subjective similarity allows for
individual understanding of concepts. The commonsimilarity
assumption then provides an for agreement in
public language use; for agreement in language games,
for shared forms of life. Speakers who share a common
standard of similarity all use a word such as ‘green’ in the
same way because they all grasp the concept ‘green’ in
the same way, because they share a common concept of
green. 5 Reinstating subjective similarity also accounts for
significant isolated and novel use of language; such as
used by desert-island castaways improvising new
vocabulary and scientists introducing new theoretical
terms. In practice, public and private uses of language are
interwoven. Public meanings are established by agreement
or convention, while concepts are typically acquired
though a mixture of private ostension and public instruction.
Public correction is possible when a speaker is
mistaken about a definition or endeavours to use a word
semanticallys but fails; but in the latter case the correction
is only comprehensible if (at least some) agreement on
subjective similarity is assumed.
A formal theory of the individual acquisition and use
of ostensive concepts, on the basis of subjective similarity,
is given in (Bell 2005); including a formal treatment of the
proposed solution to Wittgenstein’s paradox.
5 It is possible that we only agree up to equivalence; that is, that our
sensations differ, but that we nevertheless make the same distinctions. This
gives rise to the familiar colour-swap problem: you and I both use the words
‘green’ and ‘red’ in the same way, but whenever I experience green, you
experience red, and vice-versa. It may thus seem odd to say that we have
these concepts in common. However, given the shared biological basis of our
perception, dramatic examples like this are unlikely. We may also be misled
here by the importance that we attach to perceptions; by “the blinding dazzle
of color vision” (Quine 1969, p. 128). Arguably a robot which intentionally (in
realizing a program) used the words ‘green’ and ‘red’ as we do, would share
these concepts with us. Consider also more abstract cases, such as ‘plus
one’, where it is hard to see what could be added to agreement up to
equivalence.