Zeit und Geschichte Time and History - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein ...

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him that the notebook contains only the skeleton of the work, which is still in progress: it has to be integrated with sentences of previous manuscripts, separately documented. Wittgenstein had often indicated Russell as his posthumous editor, even when the forecast of his imminent death sounded less outlandish; now, the hypothesis is anything but remote, and the papers are predisposed to such evenness. The purpose is reaffirmed in the letter of 22nd October 1915: "If I don’t survive - he writes to Russell – get my people to send you all my manuscripts: among them you’ll find the final summary written in pencil on loose sheets. It will probably cost you some trouble to understand it all, but don’t be put off by that". The difficulty "to understand it all" does not refer as much to the content of the sentences, as instead to the unusual structure of the text, that has to be entirely recomposed. McGuinness thinks that, as can be assumed for the following year’s typescripts, the loose sheets listed the sentences in strict numeration order, according to the method of the final printed version. However numbered typescripts and loose sheets don’t have the same structure at all. A drawing up in numeration order is closely sequential, it doesn’t favour inserts and it doesn’t take advantage of a single sheet support. On the contrary, loose sheets – if exactly every sheet is dedicated to a specific level of numeration – allow alternated orderings and different reading modalities; on this reticulum of sheets it is easier to make additions and transfers. It is the technique today used for hypertextual documents. It doesn’t astonish that Wittgenstein did not think it was immediate not even for his elective addressee, Bertrand Russell, who even had a good familiarity with the decimal structure used also by Principia Mathematica. 6. Why A last issue is: why to conclude the remark with such a specific example, and why just with the three propositions of the 5.401 branch? The reading of the passages themselves offers one answer that is in some way amazing. 5.041 In particular, the truth of a proposition p follows from [folgt aus] the truth of an other one, q, if all the truth-grounds of the former are truth-grounds of the latter. 5.04101 We also say that the truth-grounds of the one are contained in those of the other; p follows from q. 5.0411 That one proposition follows from an other, we can see it from the structure of the proposition. As we can see, the sentences chosen to exemplify the way in which a sentence of the Abhandlung follows [folgt auf] an other, by consequence of theirs numerals, deal in effect with the manner how a sentence logically follows from [folgt aus] an other. Wittgenstein evidently suggests that his propositions follow from the departure sentence in a some analogous sense in which in logic p follows from q. To enunciate comments to the sentence q is equivalent to explicate the content of q. Wittgenstein’s example suggests that his way to enunciate tends to find the intimate nexus between thoughts. So his propositions can be cited outside context, but the general sense of the work cannot be set aside from the organic relation between them, on vertical and on horizontal line. A dramatic turn of events happens finally: in the Tractatus, the sentence 5.041 has been visibly corrected, The Strange Case of the Prototractatus Note - Luciano Bazzocchi because it contained a logical error. The truth-grounds of a complex sentence q are all those combinations of truthvalues of the elementary propositions that render the complex sentence true. Given a list of states of things represented from a truth-table with 4 rows that arranges two elementary sentences a and b, let q their logical product (a . b) and p their logical sum (a v b). We have that p logically follows from q; however, q has only one truthground (only one line of the four) while p has three truthgrounds. Therefore it is not true that all the truth-grounds of the consequence p are comprised between the truthgrounds of the premise q, but it exactly the opposite is true. The consequence has more truth-grounds in general than the premise from which it follows: its grounds are not ”contained in those of the other", like instead also 5.04101 says. The error is discovered in 1922 by Ramsey during the job of translation; Ramsey suggests that there was an oversight, an exchange between "ersten" and "zweiten" in sentence 5.041, now numbered as 5.12. Wittgenstein answers in a very dry way, accepting the relief: Your correction, the transposition of ”first" and "second", is quite right. Is "first" and "second" in the wrong order in the German too? If so, please set it right. Otherwise leave the German as it is (Wittgenstein 1973, p.31). The correction, although necessary, really distorts the whole passage. In effect it seemed natural that the premise sentence had more content than the single consequence: "If p follows from q, the sense of p is contained in the sense of q" (5.04102). However, the content of a sentence, how much it says, does not correspond to the truth content as number of "truthgrounds". If Wittgenstein had become aware in advance of the oversight, he could have made a step ahead, rather than to limit himself to a formal correction that leaves one inelegant situation. The content of a sentence is not in function of its possible verifications: it is not the number of "V”s in the truth-table to measure the empiricist content of a sentence, as rather the number of "F”s! In order to maintain the intuitive sense of "comprehensiveness" and "content", it would have been unavoidable to enter the road taken by (Popper 1934), recognising that the content of a sentence is proportional to its falsifiability, to the number of states of things that correspond to the "F"s of the table. In this way, the parallelism suggested by the sentences cited in the note to the Prototractatus would be totally strengthened and it could induce to an interpretation of the structure by decimals, so as the note suggested, still more meaningful and essential. 7. Epilogue After writing the remark at the beginning of the Prototractatus, a little before October 1915, the systematic rereading of previous manuscripts begins, to find by successive screenings the best usable material. The new sentences are brought back on a loose sheets support – sheets organised as hypertext’s pages. With the final 1918’s restructure, the architectonic complexity and the formal design become so expressive that they can totally be appreciated perhaps only with an analogous representation by hypertextual pages. 2 The final skim focuses on the second diary (and than the following one, today lost); the "good sentences" ultimately recovered have been copied (perhaps on little sheets singularly numbered) and marked at the same time 2 For a version of the Tractatus as hypertext, see at the Internet address www.bazzocchi.net/wittgenstein. 25
on the notebooks. Of these first 42 special marked phrases, only four 3 are comprised in the final typescript (but no more in the Prototractatus). A similar origin reasonably had the "supplement 72", stuck in extremis to the typescript sent in 1919 to Russell (and through Dorothy Wrinch to Ostwald for the publication in the Annalen der Naturphilosophie). The adding was not printed by Ostwald, who in its place leaves the reference: "4.0141 (Siehe Ergänzung Nr. 72)". The dance of the flying sheets, with the sentences to insert in between those of the book, continues until the end, and perhaps beyond. Until when, after an incautious solicitation of Ogden, publisher of the English edition, about the eventuality of other possible supplements, Wittgenstein loses his temper: "The supplements are exactly what must not be printed – he answers on May 1922 - To let you print the Ergänzungen would be no remedy. It would be just as if you had gone to a joiner and ordered a table and he had made the table too short and now would sell you the shavings and sawdust and other rubbish along with the table to make up for its shortness. (Rather than print the Ergänzungen to make the book fatter leave a dozen white sheets for the reader to swear into when he has purchased the book and cannot understand it)" (Wittgenstein 1973, p. 46). The last "sentences drawn from other manuscripts", evidently not equally ”good", are so omitted and the process of insertion, announced in 1915 note, finishes therefore in definitive way. Literature McGuinness, Brian 1989, Wittgenstein’s pre-Tractatus manuscripts, in Grazer Philosophische Studien, 33 McGuinness, Brian 2002, Wittgenstein’s 1916 Abhandlung, in Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy, R.Haller, K.Puhl eds., Wien Popper, Karl 1934, Logik der Forschung, Wien Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1971, Prototractatus, B.F McGuinness, T.Nyberg e G.H. von Wright editors, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1973, Letters to C.K. Ogden, G.H. von Wright ed., Oxford Luciano Bazzocchi 3 See Tractatus, 3.221 (first part), 3.221 (second part), 3.251 and 4.0311. 26 The Strange Case of the Prototractatus Note - Luciano Bazzocchi
Page 2 and 3: Zeit und Geschichte Time and Histor
Page 4 and 5: Time and History Papers of the 28th
Page 6 and 7: Inhalt / Contents Inhalt / Contents
Page 8 and 9: Inhalt / Contents “Time Flies”.
Page 10: Inhalt / Contents The Tacit Dimensi
Page 13 and 14: Idee, dass die Sprache und die Wirk
Page 15 and 16: Der Wittgensteinische Abgrund der H
Page 17 and 18: die Perspektive, die sich wirklich
Page 19 and 20: about them, he could then explain t
Page 21 and 22: 20 is not, or not simply, a matter
Page 23 and 24: elimination and sublimation are avo
Page 25: The Strange Case of the Prototracta
Page 29 and 30: similarity can be though of as an a
Page 31 and 32: Wittgenstein’s Musing on the Self
Page 33 and 34: On Spinoza’s Conception of Time N
Page 35 and 36: Literature (The translations are th
Page 37 and 38: 36 Perception of the World in the C
Page 39 and 40: Kuhn und Wittgenstein: Paradigmen,
Page 41 and 42: 40 Kuhn und Wittgenstein: Paradigme
Page 43 and 44: means of conventions and designatin
Page 45 and 46: The Transcendental Subject: Three G
Page 47 and 48: Konkrete Geometrie. Eine modale Rau
Page 49 and 50: 4. Konkrete Geometrie 48 Konkrete G
Page 51 and 52: 50 Conservativism or Progressivism
Page 53 and 54: Empirical Equivalence, Scientific R
Page 55 and 56: of the theory. 8 Given that the uni
Page 57 and 58: principles for them! Let now M be y
Page 59 and 60: 58 Wittgenstein on the Possibility
Page 61 and 62: Bye, Bye Time? Über die nicht ende
Page 63 and 64: 62 Bye, Bye Time? Über die nicht e
Page 65 and 66: Suppose that a general rule is give
Page 67 and 68: Der Philosoph als Schatzgräber. Mo
Page 69 and 70: 68 Der Philosoph als Schatzgräber.
Page 71 and 72: The Philosopher’s Garden Revisite
Page 73 and 74: 72 The Philosopher’s Garden Revis
Page 75 and 76: 6. The Lumpy Bumpy Present I have a
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Explanation and Definition: On Hall
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Time: A Social Construction? Georg
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Enthusiastic advocates of construct
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spatial extension something to do w
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elief is believed by the subject. O
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Welche A-Theorie der Zeit A-Theoret
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4. Die reine A-Theorie der Zeit als
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90 Space-Time Theories, Schlick’s
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Fluid Clocks: Emergence of Quantum
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d( δE) 2 d( δE) P= Pe δE= Pe ω
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Wittgenstein, Spengler and Time W.
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Literature Altieri, C. (1976) "Witt
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all about: one part of a thing givi
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The Historical Wittgenstein: Biogra
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104 The Historical Wittgenstein: Bi
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Several more sophisticated temporal
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On the Intelligibility of Tenseless
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however, the reason for calling the
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tionistischen Zeittheorie im Anschl
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114 Geschichte(n) - Die Wittgenstei
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116 Geschichte(n) - Die Wittgenstei
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118 Zeit und Gemeinschaft. Soziale
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120 Zeit und Gemeinschaft. Soziale
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4. Reconstruction For the presentat
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Parables Charles W. Johnson, Logan,
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Literature Ackermann, Robert John 1
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128 Time, Credit, & Debt. An Essay
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130 Time, Credit, & Debt. An Essay
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132 Warum McTaggarts Beweis für di
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Better Learning from One’s Case L
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not depend on any private ostension
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138 Regel für „Es ist jetzt der
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“Time Flies”. On Time Metaphors
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142 “Time Flies”. On Time Metap
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Unvorhersehbarkeit nicht ein Charak
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Wittgensteins Tractatus im Lichte d
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Literatur 148 Wittgensteins Tractat
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150 The Role of Time for Personal A
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The Conceptual Basis of a Biologica
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Literature 154 The Conceptual Basis
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the first exact treatment of the ki
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Time and the Experience of Voluntar
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easons which favour doing so; it se
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162 Relations and Objects : A New A
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Ästhetik und Logische Form: Wittge
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selbst gestaltet hat. Fast anekdote
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exactly the problem of determinism
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Literature Bolzano, Bernard 1838?
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the word ‘somehow’ in the last
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causally linked in the relevant way
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Zeit und Konstruktion bei Aleida As
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treffen kann oder nicht. Wenn nicht
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180 „Die Aufnahme des Zeitlichen
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„Ars in artificiale“ - Das musi
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184 „Ars in artificiale“ - Das
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186 Die Irreduzibilität der Zeitmo
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Russell’s Second Philosophy of Ti
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190 (i) In time, dates do, to some
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absolutely false. In this sense, th
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Wittgenstein´s ‘Idealism’ Kare
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Concluding Remarks This result leav
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198 Einige Aspekte des Prozessieren
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Clockworks Everywhere. Cycles of Se
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202 Clockworks Everywhere. Cycles o
Page 205 and 206:
Time in Cultural Analysis Wolfgang
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Absolute und erlebte Zeit. Zur Rich
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auch dort die kalendarische Zeit um
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Theorem 1. It follows from TCB that
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Can Wittgenstein Explain our Knowle
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214 Can Wittgenstein Explain our Kn
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Time, Homogeneity and Phenomenology
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Mneme und Nachträglichkeit: einige
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220 Mneme und Nachträglichkeit: ei
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time dimension is circular, threadi
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224 The Present as the Only Reality
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Schlick’s Early Conventionalism T
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228 Space and time are never object
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contradictions, although of course
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The Private Language Argument and P
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234 The Private Language Argument a
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236 Outline of an Argument for a
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Beyond the Process and Object. Rema
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240 Beyond the Process and Object.
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4. Semantics To describe the semant
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The Notions of State of Affairs, Fa
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246 The Notions of State of affairs
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3. Mathematik und Filme 248 Tanzen,
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Formal Concepts as Typographic Sign
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252 Formal Concepts as Typographic
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254 „Was ist Zeit?“ Wittgenstei
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A New Reading of Russell’s ‘Int
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Literature 258 A New Reading of Rus
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260 Der Radikale Konstruktivismus a
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Literature 262 Der Radikale Konstru
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to philosophy, however great that p
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Intrinsischer Eigenschaftswechsel u
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268 Intrinsischer Eigenschaftswechs
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270 Transparentes Weiß und das Ver
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Bolzano zur Zeit Benjamin Schnieder
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eide einem Gegenstand zugeschrieben
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Accelerating Turing Machines Oron S
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Literature Copeland, Jack B. 1998a
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general theory of relativity claims
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Zeit und Gegenwart bei Wittgenstein
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innewohnt, und sofern das Aspektseh
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286 The Tacit Dimensions of Transce
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scientific measurements of distance
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Time and Media Culture. Findings of
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Literature 292 Time and Media Cultu
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294 Entscheidungen mit Zeitpunkten
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296 Entscheidungen mit Zeitpunkten
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is used in philosophy, namely that
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Wittgenstein’s Phenomenology: Rec
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302 Wittgenstein’s Phenomenology:
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304 III Perhaps we can also speak o
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Wittgenstein as a Detenser, Tractat
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also a fact, this involves the corr
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The Mode Approach to Time can there
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Literature Black, Max 1964, A compa
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3. Eternal and Immortal Falsities?
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Grenzen der Zeit: Wie die Urknall-K
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Investigating Wittgenstein’s Note
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Literature Biggs, Michael A.R. 1996
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322 Presentist Variations on the Th
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324 „In unserer Sprache ist eine
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Ist der Satz „Romeo küsst Julia
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328 Ist der Satz „Romeo küsst Ju
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330 Are the Laws of Nature Time Rev
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Literature 332 Are the Laws of Natu
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experiencing subject, individuals w
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Time Structure and the Structure of
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areas characteristically respond to
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On the (Im)Possibility of Time with
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In light of the fact that a necessa
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fellows as “logistician”, is no
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The Beginning of Cosmic Time Henrik
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Acknowledgements I would like to th
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350 Thucydides: A New Vision of Tim
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