The Paradox of Ipseity and Difference: Derrida's Deconstruction and ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

R. PADA 45 The Differing Difference of Ipseity In seeking the center in which deconstruction tries to unsettle, one finds that the answer lies on Derrida’s notion of difference or, specifically, différance. Différance is the ontology of ipseity and difference that explains the entire activity of the repetition in which logocentrism is used as an eccentric center. The intention of this neologism is to show the function of ipseity and difference under one singular activity in which meaning is transferred and inscribed. As I have stated earlier, this neologism is a movement away from the original towards the Other, while at the same time retaining its old self. This neologism itself is based on various philosophemes and even psychoanalytic themes that express the simultaneous activity of ipseity and difference. Derrida would, for example, refer to Nietzsche in terms of his writing style, as an activity of moving against the different forces that has controlled or even dominated metaphysical grammar, without abandoning the very language in which these forces imposes upon philosophical discourse. 44 Freud, also, was used as an example of how the ego, in its instinct for self-preservation, moves into reality without abandoning the intentions of the ego of obtaining pleasure for itself, thus retaining its selfhood and at the same time moving towards others as its means of acquiring pleasure 45 [Jouissance]. Derrida would even go as far as using différance as an explanation of how the consciousness of the self in Hegel engages in a dialectical encounter with its other to obtain its own self-consciousness through sublation or Aufhebung [or in French, as Derrida would translate, la reléve]. 46 The most common and obvious example, however, is his alteration of the word différence to différance. 47 The difference in spelling is a blatant defiance of Saussurean linguistics, wherein the valorization of speech over writing is done due to the immediacy of speech over writing, which Saussure finds important primarily because of the semiotic capability of speech to phonetically distinguish one word from another. 48 To put Saussure’s claim into irony (which Derrida takes seriously), Derrida’s modification of the letter e in différence provides a mockery of Saussure’s position that words are distinguished from one another phonetically, for in its pronunciation, différance, does not have any phonetic difference from différence. 49 What is notable about this demonstration of the 44 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 18. 45 Ibid., 19. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., 3-4. 48 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. by R. Harris, ed. C. Bally and A. Schehaye (Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1983), 23-24. 49 “. . . But I would say that this in itself – the silence that functions within only a socalled phonetic writing – quite opportunely conveys or reminds us that, contrary to a very widespread prejudice, there is no phonetic writing… from this point of view, that the difference marked in the “differ( )nce” between the e and the a eludes both vision and hearing perhaps happily suggests that here we must be permitted to refer to an order which no longer belongs to sensibility. But neither can it belong to intelligibility, to the ideality which is not fortuitously affiliated with the objectivity of theôrein or understanding. The order that resists the opposition,
46 THE PARADOX OF IPSEITY AND DIFFERENCE activity of différance is its essential erasure and retention of metaphysics. The logos in which différance operates and erases the transaction of reference, to which the signifier finds itself transposed as a signified, can be likened to what Heidegger would refer to as the essential swaying of being, in which the inquiry towards “correctness” is put against an ontological lagging that serves as an impetus to respond towards the distress of the absence of presence in the signification of Being. 50 In différance, we see an opportunity for epistemic contextualization rather than an abyss of nothingness. Derrida opines that différance ought to be understood as an activity of differing/deferring, 51 in which the fundamental grounding of the history of onto-theology is deferred and differed. 52 To understand this, we must go back to Derrida’s gesture of writing under erasure. To write under erasure is to efface the sign and at the same time retain the sign under its effacement. Derrida, as Spivak notes, borrows this gesture from Heidegger’s crossing out of the word “Being” as a sign of the inarticulability of Be-ing; 53 whereas, in contrast to Saussure’s claims of the sign arbitration of what it signifies, Derrida crosses out the copula “is” 54 for it connotes an arbitrary deferral that forgets the essential differing of the subject. The point of emphasis towards difference is that its inclusion within the act of deferring should not be taken absolutely, and this is also applicable towards the seemingly endless referral of signifier towards another signifier. To write under erasure means the retention and the effacement of the origin in writing. Hence, one would recall that trace being a residue of presence is essentially retained as its origin. One has to be wary of this statement. As a caution it can be recalled that Derrida does not entirely deny the originary, the source, or the object, rather, what he denies is the possibility of a full retrieval of the absolute origin 55 in which the determination of writing becomes determined even in its inception. Derrida will even go as far as stating that différance itself is an arbitrary nomination of an activity that can never be named which, despite this, is referred to as différance merely as a nominal provision. 56 Significations, as it is revealed and written towards its interlocutors are instantaneous singular occurrences of différance. As I project in my thoughts the various orders of the words that I have to write to signify my memory of my sense of Derrida’s discourse, I become engaged in referring from my memory the discourse in which I have already perceived and made sense out of. The traces that I recall in one of the founding oppositions of philosophy, between the sensible and the intelligible. The order which resists this opposition, and resists it because it transports it, is announced in a movement of différance (with an a) between two difference or two letters, a différance which belongs neither to the voice nor to writing in the usual sense.” Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 4-6. 50 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (On Enowning), trans. by K. Maly and P. Emad, (Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1999), 229-230. 51 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 23. 52 Ibid. 53 Translator’s Preface, Of Grammatology, xvii. 54 Ibid. 55 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 65. 56 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 26.
Page 1 and 2: KRITIKĒ VOLUME ONE NUMBER ONE (JUN
Page 3 and 4: 34 THE PARADOX OF IPSEITY AND DIFFE
Page 13: 44 THE PARADOX OF IPSEITY AND DIFFE

The Paradox of Ipseity and Difference: Derrida's Deconstruction and ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?