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ANNUAL REPORT 2010 - Konkurentsiamet

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<strong>ANNUAL</strong><br />

<strong>REPORT</strong><br />

Estonian<br />

Competition<br />

Authority <strong>2010</strong>


CONTACT<br />

Auna 6<br />

10317 Tallinn<br />

Phone: (+372) 667 2400<br />

Fax: (+372) 667 2401<br />

E-mail: info@konkurentsiamet.ee<br />

Homepage: www.konkurentsiamet.ee<br />

Director General<br />

Märt Ots<br />

E-mail: mart.ots@konkurentsiamet.ee<br />

Head of the Competition Division – Deputy Director General<br />

Kristel Rõõmusaar<br />

E-mail: kristel.roomusaar@konkurentsiamet.ee<br />

Head of the Energy and Water Regulatory Division<br />

Külli Haab<br />

E-mail: kylli.haab@konkurentsiamet.ee<br />

Head of the Railway and Communications Division – Deputy Director General<br />

Margus Kasepalu<br />

E-mail: margus.kasepalu@konkurentsiamet.ee<br />

Head of the External and Public Relations Department<br />

Maarja Uulits<br />

E-mail: maarja.uulits@konkurentsiamet.ee


CONTENTS<br />

FOREWORD ....................................................................................................... 3<br />

HIGHLIGHTS ..................................................................................................... 5<br />

ORGANISATION ................................................................................................. 6<br />

STRUCTURE 6<br />

PERSONNEL AND BUDGET 7<br />

EXTERNAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS .................................................................. 8<br />

CHANGES IN LEGISLATION .............................................................................. 10<br />

ESTABLISHMENT OF PRICE RESTRICTIONS ON THE MONOPOLIES ACT 10<br />

LENIENCY PROGRAMME 15<br />

BLOCK EXEMPTIONS 17<br />

YEAR <strong>2010</strong> IN THE COMPETITION DIVISION ...................................................... 19<br />

COMPETITION SUPERVISION 19<br />

RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY RELATED TO THE ISSUING OF<br />

LINE PERMITS 23<br />

PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENT OF THE FUNDED PENSIONS ACT 25<br />

RECOMMENDATION TO THE TALLINN CITY GOVERNMENT FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF<br />

THE COMPETITION SITUATION IN THE FIELD OF WASTE HANDLING 26<br />

ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY OF THE SUPPORT FOR RENEWABLE<br />

ENERGY SOURCES 28<br />

CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS 31<br />

YEAR <strong>2010</strong> IN THE ENERGY AND WATER REGULATORY DIVISION ..................... 33<br />

OPENING OF THE ELECTRICITY MARKET 34<br />

ACTIVATION OF THE POWER EXCHANGE AND OVERVIEW OF TRADING 37<br />

REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY NETWORK OPERATORS 39<br />

SUPPLY DEPENDABILITY OF NATURAL GAS 40<br />

PRICE REGULATION OF HEATING UNDERTAKINGS 45<br />

SUPERVISION PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO STORAGE OF RESERVE FUEL 46<br />

DISPUTES OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS 47<br />

PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM 49<br />

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS MARKET IN THE YEAR<br />

<strong>2010</strong> ................................................................................................................. 51<br />

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DATA COMMUNICATIONS MARKET 53<br />

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CABLE TELEVISION SERVICE MARKET 55<br />

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PUBLIC MOBILE TELEPHONE SERVICE MARKET 56<br />

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MARKET OF TELEPHONE SERVICES 59<br />

UNIVERSAL SERVICE 61<br />

FIXED LINE SERVICE MARKET 61<br />

ANALYSES OF THE COMMUNICATIONS MARKET CONDUCTED IN THE YEAR <strong>2010</strong> 62<br />

AMENDMENT OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS ACT 65<br />

POSTAL SERVICES ............................................................................................ 66


FOREWORD<br />

Dear Reader,<br />

The year <strong>2010</strong> was the third year of activity for the new Competition Authority. The general<br />

economic development in <strong>2010</strong> can be characterised by the preparation for adopting the<br />

euro, the end of the economic depression and the first signs of economic recovery, but also<br />

continually high unemployment and accelerating inflation.<br />

Adopting the European single currency undoubtedly has a significant meaning. Besides being<br />

the means of payment, the Estonian kroon was the symbol of our independence, freedom and<br />

cultural self-awareness. It is a little sad that we can no longer keep banknotes with pictures of<br />

our luminaries – Jakobson, Koidula, Tobias, Tammsaare, Hurt, Keres, Baer, Raud - in our<br />

wallets. Nevertheless, I am still convinced that our cultural memory is strong enough and<br />

important people from our history will not become less significant.<br />

At the same time, adopting the euro and becoming a full member of the OECD are essential<br />

for integration. Now we are in a position to state that the more than a century-old dream of<br />

Mr Gustav Suits: “Let us remain Estonians, but let us also become Europeans!” has been<br />

fulfilled. I am convinced that our national security is also more stable today than ever before.<br />

Being a member of NATO, the EU as well as the OECD and having a global currency as the<br />

means of payment raises the question as to what is next. It seems that we have accomplished<br />

all and one may doubt if we have any destinations remaining. There is an answer to the last<br />

question. We do have many high goals to follow – economic welfare, wealth, and higher<br />

Human Development Index, just to name a few. Estonia is not among the wealthiest countries<br />

in the EU, GDP per capita is remarkably lower than the EU´s average, and thus it is important<br />

not to rest on your laurels, but keep on moving forward.<br />

The Estonian Competition Authority plays a certain role in order to achieve previously<br />

mentioned goals and to promote economic development and a better business environment.<br />

Here we can review some critical subjects in <strong>2010</strong>. Let us take the price increase of foodstuff as<br />

an example. Estonia is a country with a small and open economy and the price increase on<br />

world markets shortly carries over to our prices. That instantly raises a question if the state and<br />

government have specific means for repressing price increases, and there are not very many<br />

direct options. The turnover tax could be lowered, but that would only provide a short-term<br />

effect, because it is not possible to cut it to zero and below that it would already be direct<br />

subsidising. What the state can do is creating a better business environment. It means that<br />

equal rules apply to all market participants, market barriers for possible new entrants have<br />

3


een removed and the market is not divided with prohibited agreements. It seems somewhat<br />

similar to sports competition. It is not acceptable if an athlete achieves results with the help of<br />

prohibited substances. In the circumstances of free enterprise there should also be fair rules<br />

applied to all. A cartel agreement concluded in order to share a market is the same as doping<br />

in a sports contest and economic results achieved with the help of prohibited agreements are<br />

not accepted. Strengthening the fight against cartels was one of the main accomplishments of<br />

the last year.<br />

In addition, last year will be remembered by the new tasks entrusted to the Competition<br />

Authority for price regulation of larger water companies and all heating companies. We have<br />

always stressed that the best way to reach economic welfare is promoting free competition,<br />

but there are sectors where it is not possible and the monopoly status is inevitably the only<br />

option. Considering the technical development today it is unthinkable for each consumer to<br />

build an individual bore well or establish an individual power station. Therefore the price<br />

regulation of monopoly undertakings is necessary to ensure balance between the interests of<br />

undertakings and consumers. We will also do our best in that area to ensure the development<br />

of undertakings from one side, but from the other side to guarantee the high quality service<br />

for an acceptable price for the consumers.<br />

We hope that the year 2011 will be as successful and the Estonian Competition Authority can<br />

assist the economic development and the growth of consumer welfare.<br />

With best wishes<br />

Märt Ots<br />

Director General<br />

4


HIGHLIGHTS<br />

February 4 - 5<br />

European Regulators Group/Independent Regulators Group<br />

(IRG/ERG) Contact Network Meeting in Tallinn<br />

February 27<br />

An Amendment Act to the Penal Code, Code of Criminal<br />

Procedure and Competition Act entered into force which<br />

introduces a leniency programme.<br />

April 1<br />

Partial electricity market opening in Estonia<br />

June 2 - 3 7 th Regional Competition Conference – the annual meeting<br />

between the competition authorities of the Baltic States, Finland<br />

and Poland in Pärnu<br />

June 4<br />

10 th Baltic Electricity Market Mini-Forum in Kuressaare<br />

November 1<br />

Establishment of Price Restrictions on Monopolies Act entered into<br />

force<br />

November 11<br />

Estonian Competition Day <strong>2010</strong> in Tallinn<br />

December 9<br />

Estonia became the full member of the Organisation for Economic<br />

Co-operation and Development. The Estonian Competition<br />

Authority participates in the work of the OECD Competition<br />

Committee.<br />

5


ORGANISATION<br />

Structure<br />

In <strong>2010</strong> the Competition Authority underwent structural changes, which also meant<br />

changing the names of structural units and to some extent the reallocation of tasks. The<br />

Establishment of Price Restrictions on Monopolies Act that entered into force on November<br />

1, <strong>2010</strong>, brought along additional tasks to the Authority and therefore it was expedient to<br />

implement the certain re-allocation of tasks between structural units. Basically the Authority<br />

continued to operate under the effective function-based structure that enables the units to<br />

closely co-operate by changing expertise concerning specific fields.<br />

According to the statutes of the Competition Authority, the Authority includes three filedbased<br />

divisions, which since 01.11.<strong>2010</strong> are the Competition Division, the Energy and<br />

Water Regulatory Division and the Railway and Communications Regulatory Division. In<br />

addition to the divisions, there is an administrative unit, previously named as the General<br />

Administration Department which is responsible for ensuring effective support services.<br />

Since November <strong>2010</strong> the administrative department has been named the External and<br />

Public Relations Department. The Director General is at the head of the Authority (Figure<br />

1). Structural divisions are directed by the Heads of Divisions, who are at the same time the<br />

Deputy Directors General.<br />

FIGURE 1. Structure of the Competition Authority since 01.11.<strong>2010</strong><br />

6


According to the statutes, the functions of the Authority are divided between structural units<br />

or divisions as follows:<br />

The main functions of the Competition Division are: conducting the proceedings of<br />

complaints and concentration notifications submitted by undertakings; conducting<br />

proceedings of cases on its own initiative; replying to inquiries of undertakings and their<br />

representatives; counselling and raising competition related awareness of the public.<br />

The main functions of the Energy and Water Regulatory Division are: price regulation;<br />

activity licences; market supervision; security of supply and quality control in energy and<br />

water sectors.<br />

The main functions of the Railway and Communications Regulatory Division are<br />

regulating the communications market; monitoring the performance of imposed measures;<br />

monitoring developments on the markets of electronic communications; settlement of<br />

competition and electronic communications related disputes regarding communications<br />

services and networks; regulating the postal market; organising the provision and exercising<br />

the supervision of the universal service; settlement of applications, inquiries and complaints<br />

regarding postal services, perform duties regarding railway regulation.<br />

The main functions of the External and Public Relations Department are: coordination of<br />

the relations between the Authority and the general public; organisation of international<br />

relations; ensuring administrative organisation; organisation of state assets and means in the<br />

possession of the Authority and organising public procurement; ensuring the existence of<br />

tools and inventory; organisation of personnel work and training; preparation of a draft<br />

budget and performance of financial monitoring; organisation of customer service,<br />

document management and administration of archives.<br />

Personnel and budget<br />

The Competition Authority employed 52 persons as of the end of <strong>2010</strong>, 5 new employees<br />

joined the Authority and 2 people left the organisation during the year. The division of<br />

personnel between the structural units was as follows:<br />

External and Public Relations Department<br />

6 persons<br />

Competition Division<br />

19 persons<br />

Energy and Water Regulatory Division<br />

18 persons<br />

Railway and Communications Regulatory Division 16 persons<br />

7


Officials with up to 10 years of public service were the majority. Most staff members have<br />

higher education in economics (business administration, business management, finance,<br />

economics, etc) or in law. The third group of officials consisted of officials with higher<br />

education in other disciplines, such as radio electronics, telecommunications, thermal<br />

energy, public administration or other.<br />

In <strong>2010</strong> the budget of the Competition Authority was approximately 28.6 million Estonian<br />

kroons (approx 1.83 million euros).<br />

EXTERNAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS<br />

As regards external and public relations, <strong>2010</strong> was as busy as usual. Besides the everyday<br />

work in working groups of international organisations, the Estonian Competition<br />

Authority hosted many important events promoting international co-operation. In<br />

addition many officials gave talks or presentations at various Estonian or international<br />

events and responded to numerous inquiries from undertakings and organisations in<br />

Estonia and other states.<br />

The Competition Authority participates in the work of competition, energy,<br />

communications and railway related working groups and unions. During <strong>2010</strong> the officials<br />

of the Competition Division attended meetings and discussions of the ECN (European<br />

Competition Network), the ECA (European Competition Authorities) and the ICN<br />

(International Competition Network) working groups and subgroups. Officials of the<br />

Energy and Water Regulatory Division participated in the meetings of the CEER (Council<br />

of European Energy Regulators) and the ERRA (Energy Regulators Regional Association).<br />

The Railway and Communications Regulatory Division was actively involved in the<br />

organisation comprising European national communications regulators – IRG/ERG<br />

(European Regulators Group/Independent Regulators Group) by taking part in the working<br />

groups of mobile and fixed termination rates, cost accounting, transparency and designation<br />

of undertaking with significant market power.<br />

On the 4 th - 5 th of February the Estonian Competition Authority hosted the IRG/ERG<br />

Contact Network meeting, bringing together representatives from 31 IRG/ERG member<br />

states.<br />

8


The annual meeting between competition authorities from the Baltic States, Finland and<br />

Poland took place in Pärnu on June 2 nd -3 rd . The Regional Competition Conference was<br />

organised for the 7 th time and it has appeared to be a mutually effective format of cooperation,<br />

helping the exchange of experience and know-how in the competition area. Until<br />

<strong>2010</strong> the conference had been divided into two parts – day one was dedicated to a general<br />

panel discussion and the second day focused on the sectoral working groups. However as<br />

the participants have stated that the main value of the conference is rather the exchange of<br />

practical experience on the case handlers level and therefore it was decided to slightly<br />

change the format this year by dedicating most of the time to the discussions in a working<br />

group. In addition, the heads of the competition authorities introduced the latest<br />

developments in legislation and in organisations.<br />

On the 4 th of June the Authority hosted an international Electricity Market Forum in<br />

Kuressaare, which brings together the energy market regulators, undertakings,<br />

representatives from the European Commission and other interested parties to discuss<br />

creating and developing a single electricity market in the Baltic States twice a year. This<br />

year the forum´s core attention was focused on creating a single electricity power exchange<br />

in Estonia and Lithuania, which is a leap towards a single Baltic electricity market. The<br />

Nordic countries presented their experiences in market supervision, overviews of markets<br />

and work done to date was given.<br />

The year can be described by various international lectures in the framework of<br />

development aid projects. The officials of the Authority provided expert advice in Albania,<br />

Georgia, Namibia, Turkey and Ukraine.<br />

Becoming a full member of the OECD in December was a significant milestone for the<br />

Estonian foreign policy in general. The Competition Authority has developed relations with<br />

the OECD Competition Committee, which has over the years actively contributed to the<br />

training of Estonian competition officials.<br />

<strong>2010</strong> was a remarkable year for the Competition Authority, because the public interest<br />

towards the Authority´s work grew to a great extent in connection with the establishment of<br />

various legislative acts and many specific cases attracted extraordinary attention. The<br />

Authority has knowingly made efforts to raise competition related awareness in the society<br />

and the first steps in that area have provided a remarkable result. The Estonian<br />

Competition Day was organised for the second time, which brought together entrepreneurs<br />

9


from different sectors and competition experts. Practitioners from different sectors focused<br />

on subjects that have gained the most attention during the year. The Competition Authority<br />

is glad to realise that tradition initiated in 2009 has justified itself, therefore the intention is<br />

to continue organising this annual event. The Authority tested hosting a so-called regional<br />

competition day in Tartu, but found it more expedient to organize a one pan-Estonian event<br />

that gladly also welcomes entrepreneurs outside Tallinn.<br />

CHANGES IN LEGISLATION<br />

Establishment of Price Restrictions on the Monopolies Act<br />

On 1 November <strong>2010</strong>, the Establishment of Price Restrictions on the Monopolies Act<br />

(further MHKS) 1 entered into force, which is commonly known as the monopolies<br />

control act. This is essentially a package including amendments to several existing acts,<br />

mainly the amendments to the Public Water Supply and Sewerage Act (further ÜVVKS)<br />

and the District Heating Act (further KKütS).<br />

In the stage of legislative proceeding, MHKS was much discussed in the media,<br />

concentrating largely on the critics against the profit margin of AS Tallinna Vesi and related<br />

political statements. Furthermore, the President of the Republic first refused to proclaim the<br />

draft Act due to the insufficiency of the implemented provisions. The implementation side<br />

of the act has been much less discussed and it can be asserted on the basis of feedback<br />

received by the Competition Authority that the parties of the market have rather different<br />

opinions of its legal effects, regulation principles and other aspects of practical importance.<br />

This does not mean that the act would be weak, because all parties do not understand all<br />

details unambiguously. Taking into account the character of the regulation limiting business<br />

freedom, as specified in the act, some disputes will inevitably arise during implementation<br />

of the act, part of which shall be resolved in court.<br />

Below we shall discuss some issues that help to explain the objectives of the amendments<br />

and implementation problems. For a more detailed overview it is also recommended to read<br />

1 http://www.riigiteataja.ee/ert/act.jsp?id=13348610<br />

10


the explanatory report of the draft 597 SE, annexed to the text of the draft and taking into<br />

account the later amendments 2 .<br />

Compared to the initial text of the draft, MHKS has totally changed in the final version. The<br />

part of ÜVVKS was amended, joining the ideas of the initial text of the draft submitted by<br />

parties with the provisions related to the economic regulation of the draft prepared in the<br />

Ministry of the Environment and taking into account the proposals of the Competition<br />

Authority. The draft was also specified in parts of the Penal Code and KKütS.<br />

In case of the latter a completely new amendment was added to the draft, regulating the<br />

access of a third party to the district heating network, while formerly these issues were not at<br />

all regulated in the District Heating Act. Thus the general regulation of an operator<br />

possessing the dominant position in the market specified in the Competition Act also<br />

extended to network operators. Pursuant to this, a network operator (e.g. AS Tallinna Küte)<br />

had to also enable other heat operators to access the network, i.e. to enable the sale of the<br />

heat produced by them to the network, avoiding discrimination of different heat operators<br />

on any basis. Unequal treatment of other heat operators by a network operator can be<br />

caused by various considerations. For example, preference of one producer may take place<br />

due to the used fuel, its security of provision, production technology, etc. In several cases,<br />

special treatment can be considered justified. However, discrimination can be caused by the<br />

interests of the network operator related to mutual competition of the producers for access<br />

to the district heating network. This is especially probable in a situation where the network<br />

operator or an operator belongs to the same group of companies also operating as a heat<br />

producer. In such case he can actually sell heat to the network under the conditions set by<br />

himself and reject any other offers, which could be more favourable for the end consumer,<br />

but will not ensure similar profitability for the heat operator. A monopoly heat operator is<br />

interested in excluding the access of competing producers to the district heating network or<br />

the provision of unfavourable conditions for the competitors, not enabling them to actually<br />

compete for the access to the district heating network. The method used in practice has been<br />

a conclusion of long-term bilateral supply contracts, restricting or excluding access of a third<br />

party to the district heating network. During the proceeding of the draft in the Riigikogu a<br />

proposal was made to enter clearly into the act not only the obligatory approval of long-term<br />

supply contracts by the Competition Authority, but also the basis for the refusal of the<br />

2 http://riigikogu.ee/?page=en_etapid&op=ems&eid=790420&u=<strong>2010</strong>0818135806<br />

11


approval to easily exclude simple disputes regarding the refusal in the course of<br />

implementation. Unfortunately this proposal was not taken into account.<br />

An amendment to the act provides for the preference of heat purchased to the district<br />

heating network depending on the energy sources used for production, facilitating the use of<br />

renewable energy sources, cogeneration of electricity and heat and other environmentally<br />

sustainable technologies. The preference takes place mainly on the account of the use of<br />

fossil fuels, such as natural gas.<br />

As a central amendment, MHKS assigns to the Competition Authority the tasks of a price<br />

regulator for all district heating operators and major water operators. The tasks of a<br />

regulator differ from the regular public supervision first and foremost with the fact that the<br />

price applied by the operator shall first pass the stage of approval. This is an important<br />

restriction of business freedom, which is justified, proceeding from the economic interests of<br />

the consumers and public interest related to competition. In the fields of the services of<br />

general interest such as the sale of gas and electricity, district heating and water services, the<br />

general competition supervision has not been considered sufficient and the price formation<br />

of a monopoly operator has been subjected to the preliminary control of a regulator with<br />

special competency. This is the case in the USA and in most EU member states. Thereby<br />

the price regulation of power and gas networks is obligatory for all member states. In the<br />

price regulation procedure the operator shall submit a price application to a competent<br />

regulator, who shall assess the compliance of the application with predetermined<br />

methodology. Sale with a non-approved price is prohibited. Preliminary regulation is the<br />

most suitable guarantee for controlling the cost-orientation and reasonable cost benefit of<br />

the service provider in a situation where the provision of a service of general interest has<br />

been privatised and the operator is not directly subordinated to the control of public<br />

authorities.<br />

In many cases the price formation of water operators has not functioned as necessary in<br />

Estonia. Although the earlier act also limited the price of the water service with the<br />

requirements of cost-orientation and reasonable cost benefit, the following of these<br />

requirements was questionable. The act provided only general principles of price formation<br />

and their following was completely subordinated to local governments, who were often<br />

simultaneously in the role of the controller and the controlled, as water operators are<br />

partially or completely in municipal ownership. The conflict of interests prevented the<br />

realisation of an efficient economic regulation and therefore the inclusion of the<br />

12


Competition Authority as an independent regulator was necessary. An essential<br />

development compared to the former situation takes place in the procedural stage. While in<br />

the past the local government established the price with its regulation, then according to the<br />

new act the price of a water service shall be established by the water operator, who shall be<br />

completely responsible for the compliance of the price with legal requirements. Before the<br />

price takes force, he shall obtain the approval of a competent regulator, i.e. the Competition<br />

Authority in case of approximately 70 major water operators and local government in case<br />

of smaller operators. The amendment to KKütS also brings under the regulation of the<br />

Competition Authority all smaller heat operators, whose price limit was formerly approved<br />

by the local government. In addition to the preliminary control, the new act entitles the<br />

Competition Authority to control the prices of the water service and subscription fees<br />

through supervision.<br />

In the past, when the prices of water services were established by the local governments,<br />

there was no possibility to ensure the legality of price formation with the means of<br />

competition supervision. Price formation of a water operator could be analysed on the basis<br />

of the Competition Act, but price regulations of local governments remained valid anyway.<br />

Regulations can be disputed in the constitutional review proceedings, which is outside the<br />

competence of the Competition Authority. In case of AS Tallinna Vesi, the Competition<br />

Authority submitted its economic analysis to the Chancellor of Justice. The latter took it<br />

forward to the Supreme Court, which assumed the opinion that the regulation was a general<br />

order, while disputing it is also outside the competence of the Chancellor of Justice. Thus<br />

the former practice of administrative courts, where price regulations had been treated as<br />

regulations and therefore did not proceed, was considered wrong. In conclusion the problem<br />

is fortunately rather theoretical, as the indicated weakness in the supervision system was<br />

corrected with MHKS, according to which prices are not established with an act of public<br />

authority, but by the water operator himself. Before implementation of the price the water<br />

operator shall obtain approval for the price, which shall be effected as a resolution of the<br />

regulator. The new act is undoubtedly a major step forward towards an operative and<br />

transparent economic regulation, even if it will not bring along the expected decrease of<br />

prices immediately. The regulation will start to function proactively and some disputed<br />

issues shall be first clarified, before starting to take extreme coercive measures such as an<br />

establishment of temporary prices, etc.<br />

13


Price regulation conducted on the basis of specific law, including supervision, is<br />

methodologically much more precise, leaving less space for disputes than the general<br />

competition supervision. In the price regulation procedure the operator is an actively<br />

involved party interested in a positive result. He shall coordinate his prices with the<br />

regulator pursuant to the law and, for example, delay tactics cannot provide any expected<br />

result here. As the operator is interested in a fast procedure, he is also ready to participate<br />

actively in the information exchange needed for approval. The practice of heat price<br />

regulation based on KKütS shows that approval procedures usually end without any timeconsuming<br />

court disputes. If a water operator still decides not to follow the price regulation,<br />

the law has specified a possibility to apply a penalty payment, necessary elements of<br />

misdemeanour, criminal punishment and as an extreme measure the establishment of<br />

temporary prices by the Competition Authority. It should be noted that the former ÜVVKS<br />

did not specify any punishments applicable to water operators at all. As the regulator of<br />

price formation and the subscription fee, the local government often acted in a situation<br />

where there was a conflict of interests, being a controller from one side and the owner of a<br />

water operator from the other side.<br />

Punishment provisions specified in MHKS are divided into two – necessary elements of<br />

misdemeanour in ÜVVKS (similarly the violation of the rules of price regulation is<br />

punishable on the basis of KKütS, the Electricity Market Act and the Natural Gas Act) and<br />

necessary elements of a criminal offence criminalising illegal price formation in the Penal<br />

Code. For the latter it has been said that when proceeding from the priority of criminal law,<br />

a criminal procedure should always be initiated, and therefore relevant necessary elements<br />

of misdemeanour become unnecessary (R. Rüütel „Kommunaalettevõtjatest<br />

kommunaalkurjategijateks“, 16.08.<strong>2010</strong>, raamatupidaja.ee). However, from the text of<br />

provisions it becomes obvious that necessary elements of misdemeanour are not identical<br />

with the necessary elements of a criminal offence, but cover various violations of the rules of<br />

price formation. Thus the necessary elements of misdemeanour are not unnecessary. For<br />

example, they can be applied in case when an operator subordinated to the price regulation<br />

pursuant to the law is violating the rules, but at the same time his activities are not qualified<br />

as a distortion of competition according to the Penal Code § 399 (1 1 ). The referred<br />

punishment norm belongs to the offences related to competition, and the attribute is an<br />

abuse of a dominant position. Necessary elements are applicable only in case of specific<br />

subjects, such as monopoly operators listed in the provision who are also subordinated to<br />

14


egional price regulation. In case of doubt it should first be clarified if the rules of price<br />

regulation have been violated. Then it should be assessed if it is simultaneously a crime<br />

related to competition described in the Penal Code § 399 (1 1 ). In case of a violation of the<br />

rules of price regulation specified in the law, where the Competition Authority does not find<br />

an abuse of a dominant position, a procedure can be initiated on the basis of the necessary<br />

elements of misdemeanour specified in the relevant specific law. Upon detection of a crime<br />

related to competition the main task of the body conducting proceedings is not the<br />

determination of a relevant market (as it is generally indisputable in case of a network<br />

monopoly), but an assessment of the possible abuse of a dominant position. Any minor<br />

violation of rules cannot be qualified as a crime related to competition, for which a fine up<br />

to 250 million EEK has been prescribed.<br />

Leniency Programme<br />

On 27 February <strong>2010</strong>, an amendment (Amendment Act) to the Penal Code, Code of<br />

Criminal Procedure and Competition Act entered into force which introduces a specific<br />

leniency programme. It means that a person that is involved in anti-competitive<br />

agreements, concerted practices or decisions of association of undertakings set out as<br />

punishable in § 400 of the Penal Code will have a chance to be released from liability or<br />

obtain a remarkable penalty reduction if the person will be the first to submit a leniency<br />

application to the Competition Authority and will meet other conditions stipulated in<br />

the Competition Act.<br />

Similar leniency programmes exist in almost all EU member states and are also used by the<br />

European Commission. Upon detection of an anti-competitive cooperation of operators<br />

(especially cartels) the major problems are verifiability of the act and a low amount of<br />

information available to the body conducting proceedings. Therefore the confession of a<br />

party itself and the submission of evidences will provide essential assistance in the detection<br />

and further verification of cartels. At the same time the party is motivated to cooperate with<br />

the Competition Authority and the Prosecutor’s Office due to the opportunity to be<br />

exempted from liability or achieve an essential reduction of the punishment, first and<br />

foremost in a case when the operator is actually wishing to stop participation in the anticompetitive<br />

cooperation.<br />

15


A participant in anti-competitive agreements, concerted practices or decisions of association<br />

of undertakings may submit a leniency application to the Competition Authority in the form<br />

enabling written reproduction. This can be done by a natural person on behalf of himself or<br />

a representative of a legal person on behalf of the legal person. Implementation of leniency<br />

and the fulfilment of the necessary terms and conditions shall be decided by the Public<br />

Prosecutor’s Office, whose regulation shall terminate the criminal procedure against the<br />

compliant applicant for leniency, who has first submitted the relevant application, if the<br />

information included in the application enables to initiate the criminal procedure. If the<br />

criminal procedure related to anti-competitive cooperation has already been initiated, the<br />

criminal procedure shall be terminated for the applicant who has first submitted a leniency<br />

application together with the evidences providing essential assistance to the prosecution in<br />

the opinion of the Prosecutor’s Office. Against an applicant for leniency, who meets the<br />

conditions of leniency, but has not submitted the leniency application first, a reduction of<br />

punishment can be applied in proportion with the support received from this person in the<br />

criminal procedure.<br />

In addition to the due submission of a leniency application the person shall also meet other<br />

conditions specified in the Competition Act. Among other things, the applicant for leniency<br />

may not have induced other persons to commit the crime specified in the Penal Code §400<br />

or organised its preparation or commission. The applicant for leniency shall also fulfil a<br />

cooperation obligation during the procedure, making all evidences concerning the crime<br />

mentioned in the Penal Code §400 disclosed to him available in full, openly and without<br />

distortions, as much as possible, and may not destroy or remove any relevant evidences in<br />

the procedure of the relevant crime in bad faith before or after the submission of the<br />

leniency application. The applicant for leniency may not disclose the circumstances of<br />

leniency application or criminal procedure without the permission of the Prosecutor’s<br />

Office. The applicant for leniency shall follow the condition specified in the law seriously,<br />

because even if after the order is issued for the termination of the criminal procedure against<br />

the applicant for leniency, any circumstances are identified which do not allow to<br />

implement leniency, the Public Prosecutor’s Office may renew the procedure against the<br />

applicant for leniency with its order.<br />

Based on the experiences gained from the implementation of the <strong>2010</strong> leniency programme,<br />

the Competition Authority can say that the new regulation has generally met its main<br />

objectives. Several leniency applications were submitted to the authority in <strong>2010</strong> and on<br />

16


their basis criminal procedures were also initiated to investigate relevant anti-competitive<br />

cooperation, which has also increased the number of criminal proceedings handled by the<br />

authority. Operators as well as their lawyers have had a positive attitude towards the<br />

programme and the interest in it has been remarkably high. Although the work for a better<br />

introduction and implementation of the leniency programme and development of related<br />

practice will continue for a longer period, the initial application of the programme can be<br />

considered successful at the moment.<br />

Block exemptions<br />

Similarly to the European Commission, the regulation applicable to vertical<br />

agreements was renewed in <strong>2010</strong>. From June 1 the new Regulation No. 60 of the<br />

Government of the Republic adopted on May 27, <strong>2010</strong> “Granting of permission for the<br />

conclusion of anti-competitive or potentially anti-competitive vertical agreements<br />

(block exemption)“ took force, regulating resale relations restricted to the territory of<br />

Estonia.<br />

From June 1 the resale agreements related to the trade between member states are<br />

subjected to the Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/<strong>2010</strong> of 20 April <strong>2010</strong> on the<br />

application of Article 101 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to<br />

categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices. A 1-year transfer period is valid<br />

for the agreements having been in force at the moment of enforcement of the regulation.<br />

The Estonian national regulation of block exemption is based almost entirely on the<br />

abovementioned relevant regulation of the European Commission. Thus the major<br />

amendment of both regulations means that while being in accordance with the formerly<br />

valid regulation of block exemption in the application of a block exemption, the main<br />

attention is paid to the market share of a supplier, which may not exceed 30%. Then in<br />

accordance with the new regulation the market share of the purchaser on the purchase<br />

market is also important, which similarly may not exceed 30%.<br />

The mentioned Regulation No. 60 of the Government of the Republic also includes the<br />

regulation of the agreements related to the repair and maintenance services of motor<br />

vehicles and the sale of spare parts. Marketing agreements of motor vehicles are subjected<br />

to the Regulation No. 66 of the Government of the Republic from 03.06.<strong>2010</strong> “Granting<br />

of permission for the conclusion of anti-competitive or potentially anti-competitive<br />

17


vertical agreements related to the marketing of motor vehicles (block exemption)“, which<br />

is similar to the former block exemption of motor vehicles 3 . The latter regulation will be<br />

valid until May 31, 2013, after which the general vertical block exemption (i.e. Regulation<br />

No 60) shall also be applied to the marketing agreements of motor vehicles. Marketing<br />

agreements of motor vehicles affecting the trade between member states are subjected<br />

from June 1, <strong>2010</strong> to the Commission Regulation (EU) No 461/<strong>2010</strong> of 27 May <strong>2010</strong> on<br />

the application of Article 101 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union<br />

to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector.<br />

The mentioned regulation specifies that the period of application of the provisions of<br />

Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 relating to vertical agreements for the purchase, sale and<br />

resale of new motor vehicles shall be extended until May 31, 2013. The agreements<br />

related to the secondary market of motor vehicles shall be subjected to the general vertical<br />

block exemption or the Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/<strong>2010</strong> and also the<br />

provisions of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 461/<strong>2010</strong>.<br />

In addition to the regulations applied to vertical agreements, the regulations also applied<br />

to horizontal agreements amended at the end of <strong>2010</strong>. From the beginning of 2011 a new<br />

group exemption will take force for research and development agreements 4 and<br />

specialisation agreements 5 . As in the development of practice, the Competition Authority<br />

is also proceeding from the relevant guidelines of the European Commission, and the<br />

guidelines for horizontal cooperation 6 will provide good instructions for operators for the<br />

assessment of information exchange between competing operators, establishment of<br />

standards, purchase agreements and trade agreements.<br />

3 Regulation No 195 of the Government of the Republic from June 18, 2002 “Granting of permission for<br />

the conclusion of anti-competitive or potentially anti-competitive vertical agreements (block exemption).“<br />

4 Regulation No 9 of the Government of the Republic from January 13, 2011 "Granting of permission for<br />

the conclusion of anti-competitive or potentially anti-competitive research and development agreements<br />

(block exemption)" ( RT I, 19.01.2011, 3)<br />

5 Regulation No 197 of the Government of the Republic from December 30, <strong>2010</strong> "Granting of<br />

permission for the conclusion of anti-competitive or potentially anti-competitive specialisation<br />

agreements (block exemption)" ( RT I, 04.01.2011, 11)<br />

6<br />

Commission communication – Guidelines for applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the<br />

Functioning of the European Union to the horizontal cooperation agreements in EEA, applicable text<br />

Official Journal C 011 , 14/01/2011<br />

18


YEAR <strong>2010</strong> IN THE COMPETITION DIVISION<br />

Competition supervision<br />

In <strong>2010</strong> special attention was continuously paid to the fight against hard core cartels.<br />

Since the reorganisation of the Competition Authority at the beginning of 2008, the<br />

Authority has considered criminal proceedings to be one of its priority fields. The<br />

number of criminal proceedings increased, as well as their complicacy. Extensive cases<br />

and analyses should also be highlighted, which have observed the organisation of some<br />

business sectors as a whole. In several cases the Competition Authority submitted<br />

proposals for the amendment of acts.<br />

In the supervision department the characteristic feature of the year <strong>2010</strong> was a significant<br />

increase of the number of criminal proceedings. While in 2009 the number of criminal<br />

proceedings was 8, then only a year later the relevant figure was 14. Such development<br />

brought along an extremely high load for the staff overseeing the criminal matters and<br />

furthermore several employees inside the division were involved in the assistance. At the<br />

end of the year the recruitment of new employees started due to the increased workload.<br />

One major factor causing an increase of the load of criminal proceedings was the<br />

enforcement of the leniency programme. In global practice leniency programmes are<br />

extensively used for the detection of cartels. According to the programme, the person having<br />

first informed the law enforcement authority of a cartel or cooperated essentially with the<br />

authority shall be exempted from liability. Before the enforcement of the leniency<br />

programme, Estonia was one of the few developed countries lacking this programme in a<br />

clear form. During the year several applications were submitted to the Competition<br />

Authority, on which basis criminal procedures were initiated. Although the experiences of<br />

several countries have shown that launching a leniency programme could be rather difficult,<br />

the Estonian experience should be considered successful. It is good to say that various<br />

leading law offices dealing with competition law have understood that a leniency<br />

programme is a serious instrument and its use should be recommended to the clients.<br />

In the beginning of <strong>2010</strong> the criminal case concerning timber transportation public<br />

procurement procedures organised by the State Forest Management Centre (RMK) was<br />

handed over to the Prosecutor’s Office, which developed into the largest charge of a socalled<br />

cartel crime in Estonia until now. RMK carried out several public procurement<br />

19


procedures for timber transportation services at the end of the summer of 2008, where<br />

according to the accusation the tenderers were involved in extensive cooperation. As a<br />

result, the price of the timber transportation service purchased by RMK under public<br />

procurement increased by 41 million EEK. The court has not yet made a judgement in this<br />

criminal case.<br />

The year <strong>2010</strong> also included the main part of the procedure of an extensive criminal case<br />

related to the Estonian flour producers, investigating the agreement concluded between AS<br />

Tartu Veski and AS Stahlhut in 2006, according to which the latter terminated flour<br />

production. The Competition Authority passed the materials of the case to the Prosecutor’s<br />

Office in the beginning of 2011.<br />

The procedure was also initiated in several criminal cases drawing the excessive attention of<br />

the public. In August the Competition Authority conducted the first procedural acts in the<br />

so-called cases of milk and bread cartels. These are extremely large criminal cases, where<br />

the final result will not be reached very quickly.<br />

In <strong>2010</strong> the court passed judgements in two competition-related criminal cases, which have<br />

been enforced by now. The Supreme Court decided not to proceed with the appeals in<br />

cassation submitted in the so-called cartel case of ready-made shelf companies, and<br />

therefore the judgement of the Tallinn Circuit Court from 17.12.<strong>2010</strong> took force, keeping in<br />

force the judgement of the Harju County Court from 24.09.<strong>2010</strong> convicting several<br />

undertakings and natural persons dealing with the sale of ready-made shelf companies and<br />

were found guilty according to the conclusion of the anti-competitive agreement. In summer<br />

2009 the persons and undertakings agreed to raise the price of their provided service which<br />

was the foundation of companies. According to the judgement of the Harju County Court<br />

the convicted persons were punished with pecuniary punishments in the range from 10 000-<br />

150 000 EEK, in total 464 500 EEK, part of which was not enforced immediately. Another<br />

important judgement was the judgement of the Supreme Court of 07.05.<strong>2010</strong>, annulling the<br />

judgement of the Circuit Court, which held that the persons submitting tenders in the public<br />

procurement procedure of the Jõgeva County development strategy were guilty in a<br />

competition restricting agreement. The Supreme Court admitted that both the agreement as<br />

well as the concerted practice was present in the drafting of tenders, but after consideration<br />

of the specific circumstances of the case it was decided that this was not an agreement or<br />

concerted practice between the undertakings. In this case the Supreme Court provided<br />

20


several important interpretations of competition provisions, and therefore this was a<br />

judgement of crucial importance.<br />

In the field of administrative proceedings the Competition Authority conducted several<br />

major researches and analyses, which influenced further operation of the relevant business<br />

sectors. The examples could be the proceedings conducted in the district heating sector, in<br />

which the Riigikogu amended the District Heating Act. The first of these concerned the<br />

conditions under which AS Tallinna Küte (further Tallinna Küte) purchased heat from the<br />

Iru Cogeneration Plant belonging to AS Eesti Energia (further Eesti Energia). In some<br />

periods the latter offered heat for a lower price than the Väo Cogeneration Plant belonging<br />

to the same concern as Tallinna Küte. The second case concerned AS Kohtla-Järve Soojus<br />

(further KJ Soojus), which did not provide any clear answer to the sales offer of heat<br />

submitted by AS VKG (further VKG) for a long time. According to all assessments and the<br />

available district heating practice, the heat of VKG produced from retort gas and offered for<br />

sale is significantly cheaper than the heat produced from natural gas and would enable to<br />

provide heat for a more favourable price to the end consumers connected to the Ahtme-<br />

Jõhvi heat network of KJ Soojus. In both cases the Competition Authority issued a precept<br />

warning both operators of the district heating network, stating its clear suspicion that these<br />

operators could have abused their dominant position. A warning is the last action before<br />

issuing a precept, where the objective is to provide to the operator a possibility for the<br />

submission of any possible objections. First and foremost in the result of the case of Tallinna<br />

Küte a political resolution was adopted to regulate the conditions of access to the district<br />

heating network more in detail in the District Heating Act. In result of the amendments that<br />

took force from 01.11.<strong>2010</strong> a globally unique system was implemented in Estonia, where<br />

some heat producers are entitled to a certain advantage in the sale of heat in order to protect<br />

investments, but at the same time the owner of a heat network is obliged to organise a<br />

transparent competition for the purchase of heat under certain conditions.<br />

In addition to the aspects related to district heating the interests of homeowners were also<br />

undoubtedly affected by the disputes raised by the Competition Authority in the field of<br />

waste handling. Although traditionally the waste has been taken to one certain waste<br />

management facility in many local governments, several new possibilities to choose waste<br />

management facilities have arisen recently in connection with technical and business-related<br />

development. In the opinion of the Competition Authority such development has been<br />

positive, creating preconditions for investments into new and more progressive waste<br />

21


management facilities. However, many local governments have still tried to send waste to a<br />

certain waste management facility, thus excluding the competition. The Competition<br />

Authority finds that first it is not clear if such activities comply with the law, and second,<br />

the restriction of competition in waste handling is lacking any sense. The issue culminated<br />

in the beginning of <strong>2010</strong>, when the Tallinn City Government considered a possibility to<br />

direct all municipal waste generated in Tallinn to one certain facility. The Competition<br />

Authority issued a recommendation to the Tallinn City Government, which was essentially<br />

fulfilled. The discussion over waste management facilities will undoubtedly continue in<br />

2011, whereby it is very likely that the results of several court proceedings held under similar<br />

circumstances will affect the market. The Competition Authority does not exclude the<br />

submission of any necessary proposals for the initiation of legal amendments.<br />

Throughout the year the Competition Authority also conducted various important<br />

procedures in the postal sector. The postal market was opened to competition from April 1,<br />

2009. In <strong>2010</strong> AS Express Post was the only licensed postal service provider operating on<br />

the open postal market beside AS Eesti Post. To enable the development of functioning<br />

competition in the provision of postal services it is inevitable that AS Eesti Post as a<br />

historical owner of the largest postal network covering the whole of Estonia would enable<br />

the competitors to access its postal network. In particular, it is unrealistic that smaller<br />

competitors would establish a network duplicating the postal network of AS Eesti Post in<br />

sparsely populated areas. The Competitive Authority found that AS Eesti Post has not<br />

fulfilled its obligation to enable a non-discriminating access of another postal service<br />

provider to its postal network for the provision of a postal service and issued a prescript for<br />

the termination of a relevant violation in the beginning of 2011.<br />

These are just a few examples of the activities of the Competition Authority in various<br />

business sectors. In 2011 the supervision department of the Competition Authority will<br />

continue the following of formerly undertaken lines of activity. The end of the economic<br />

depression will inevitably also change the competitive situation in several fields of activity,<br />

which will also mean new challenges for the public supervision. In parallel to the increase of<br />

prices on the global market and the recovery of domestic demand for various goods,<br />

pressure can be expected to increase prices. Such a situation will also cause an increase of<br />

the risk of illegal cooperation between the operators. The competition division with its<br />

limited resources is considering it essential to concentrate on the most essential and highpriority<br />

competition problems, which often require making difficult and complicated<br />

22


choices. Furthermore, the updating of the Competition Act is planned for the year 2011, in<br />

which the competition division has high expectations. First and foremost, the reformation of<br />

the proceeding principles of the abuse of a dominant position is necessary in order to make<br />

the supervision more efficient. Currently it is based on the misdemeanour procedure in<br />

Estonia. This is a very exceptional method in global practice, which was initially meant<br />

rather for the simple and rapid proceeding of minor violations (such as driving without a<br />

seat belt). The proceeding of complex economic violations in a misdemeanour procedure is<br />

unnecessarily (not to say impossibly) complicated for several reasons and therefore also<br />

rather inefficient, compared to other countries. The competition division hopes that the year<br />

2011 will bring a positive development in this aspect, to facilitate the intensification of<br />

supervision in the future.<br />

Recommendation of the Competition Authority related to the issuing of<br />

line permits<br />

On 18.02.<strong>2010</strong> the Competition Authority submitted to the Ministry of Economic Affairs<br />

and Communications and on 22.04.<strong>2010</strong> to the Economic Commission of the Riigikogu<br />

its opinions of the competition restrictions found in the Public Transport Act. In the<br />

opinion of the Competition Authority there are no public interests that would justify the<br />

restriction of the appearance of new carriers to the market and an extension of the<br />

companies already operating on the market.<br />

In the last seven years the main aspect assessed upon granting permits for a long-distance<br />

regular service has been the issue of whether the line permit would interfere with the<br />

currently provided regular services in economic terms. In the opinion of the Competition<br />

Authority the provisions of the Public Transport Act § 41 (2)(2) constitute a very exceptional<br />

mechanism, which has not been specified in any other fields of business. In other fields<br />

usually no restrictions are set for the new operators, regardless of whether it interferes with<br />

the business of the existing active operators. The restriction included in the Public Transport<br />

Act limits business freedom and causes damage to competition as a public interest. Market<br />

concentration of some lines is very high, causing modest competition. However, according<br />

to the Constitution the business freedom may be restricted only if it is in a reasonable<br />

relationship with the objective. In this case the proportionality of restriction may not be<br />

ensured in the situation where the law grants to the administrative body a potentially<br />

unlimited right to refuse to grant a line permit, if the entry of a competitor would interfere<br />

23


with the operation of the operator already possessing the line permit and established on the<br />

market. In practice, this ensures a dominating position, excluding entry of competitors to<br />

the market and enabling a permanent advantage to one operator.<br />

The results of the analysis conducted by the Competition Authority allow us to conclude<br />

that economically it would be most practical to open the market of long-distance regular<br />

services completely to competition. Hereby it is important to notice that for example on the<br />

long-distance lines Tallinn-Tartu, Tallinn-Narva and Tallinn-Pärnu the carriage takes place<br />

fully on commercial bases and without the implementation of any public subsidies. As<br />

competition restrictions may essentially harm the interests of the consumers, they can be<br />

applied only in case of major public interests and if a similar result cannot be achieved with<br />

other measures less harmful to competition. In this case there are no public interests for<br />

which the protection of business freedom should be restricted in such a way. To ensure<br />

security and convenience in the markets of long-distance regular services the use of<br />

competition restrictions is not a suitable measure, on the contrary – in this context it would<br />

be the most non-transparent and irrelevant. Security should be ensured through technical<br />

supervision and for ensuring convenience various standards can be set for the carriers,<br />

without damaging their competition. The buses should be technically in good repair, but<br />

upon the fulfilment of the established requirements any operator should have a possibility to<br />

participate in the market. Furthermore, the competition restriction has been justified with<br />

the claim that it enables the carrier to keep less profitable lines on account of the profitable<br />

ones. Although many carriers are protected from competition on several lines, there is no<br />

legal mechanism that would enable to demand from them the operation on less profitable<br />

lines. It is also not clear, if and how much there are actually such lines. Furthermore, the<br />

currently operating carriers have not reached the market in result of a transparent<br />

competition, but for various historical reasons. As said above, the Competition Authority<br />

considers it justified to open the market completely to competition, but if the main<br />

remaining problem would be the possible lack of interest of the operators to provide services<br />

on less profitable lines, then the use of the so-called controlled competition model could also<br />

be considered, where line permits or groups of line permits are put for competition. In such<br />

case it should be ensured that there is actually a relevant need and that it would not<br />

unnecessarily increase the administrative burden of the state or set limits to free<br />

competition.<br />

24


The Competition Authority has the opinion that public interests do not justify the serious<br />

competition restriction included in the Public Transport Act §41 (2) (2). An authority<br />

granting the line permits should only have the right to demand that long-distance lines<br />

would not depart from a bus station with such a small interval that it would be mutually<br />

obstructive physically. Proceeding from the above, the Competition Authority<br />

recommended that the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications initiate the<br />

relevant amendment to remove the restriction specified in the Public Transport Act § 41<br />

(2)(2) and also submitted its opinions to the Economic Commission of the Riigikogu.<br />

Proposal for amendment of the Funded Pensions Act<br />

On 21.07.<strong>2010</strong> the Competition Authority submitted to the Ministry of Finance the<br />

amendment proposals of the draft for the amendment of the Funded Pensions Act and<br />

related acts. The Authority had already before repeatedly stressed the need to make the<br />

regulation of a mandatory funded pension more flexible for the consumers and more<br />

efficient from the standpoint of competition between trustees.<br />

On July 2, <strong>2010</strong> the Ministry of Finance submitted the draft for amendment of the Funded<br />

Pensions Act and related acts to the ministries for approval. Pursuant to the Funded<br />

Pensions Act valid at that moment the units of a pension fund could be changed only once a<br />

year. In the opinion of the Competition Authority this was a serious restriction of the<br />

freedom of choice of the consumers and thus also of the competition between the trustees<br />

and the entry of new service providers to the market was difficult. Pursuant to the draft<br />

submitted by the Ministry of Finance the consumers would have had the possibility to<br />

change the existing units of a mandatory pension fund three times a year and channel new<br />

payments to another fund in three business days. The Competition Authority has the<br />

opinion that even the possibility to change a mandatory pension funds three times in a year<br />

still restricts the freedom of choice of the consumers and efficient competition. It would be<br />

difficult for new service providers to enter the market in a situation where it is possible only<br />

three times a year to compete efficiently for the clients.<br />

The restriction of the change of pension funds has been mainly explained by the fact that<br />

permission of more frequent change would incline the investment policy of trustees to<br />

orientate towards an undesirably short-term benefit and would send the wrong signal to the<br />

unit owner, whose knowledge of investment is probably not too high. On the other hand,<br />

25


estrictions may cause a decrease of competition and welfare of consumers through an<br />

increase of the price level and/or a deterioration of quality. In this case the restriction of the<br />

change of pension funds did not directly oblige the pension funds to develop their<br />

investment policy in a certain direction. Therefore it should have been considered if it would<br />

be possible and practical to regulate the investment policy of trustees with other, more<br />

suitable means. It is doubtful if the restriction of the freedom of choice would improve the<br />

investment decisions of the consumers.<br />

In the opinion of the Competition Authority a system should be created, where a unit owner<br />

would have a right to change his units against the units of another pension fund in a<br />

reasonably short period of time and without any restrictions. The establishment of such a<br />

system should in turn have a positive effect on the activities of trustees and make their<br />

competition more efficient. Therefore the Competition Authority is supporting the<br />

cancellation of the restrictions applied against the change of pension funds in the largest<br />

extent possible and submitted a proposal to the Ministry of Finance to enable a unit owner<br />

to change the pension fund after 30 days from the submission of the relevant application.<br />

The Competition Authority also found that the draft should make remuneration of trustees<br />

more transparent, specifying in the Funded Pensions Act the specific requirements for the<br />

disclosure of service charges. In the situation of the former regulation it was often difficult<br />

for the consumers to understand how much they had actually paid service charges to the<br />

trustee.<br />

On January 10, 2011 the Riigikogu adopted the Act on Amendment of the Funded Pensions<br />

Act and Related Acts, supplementing the requirements set to the trustees and amending the<br />

procedure of reporting and disclosure related to pension funds with the objective to make<br />

activities of the funds more transparent and better understandable for the owner of the unit<br />

of the pension fund. The rules of change of mandatory pension funds became more flexible<br />

and the change of funds once a year was replaced by the possibility to change the funds<br />

three times in a year. The act will take force from August 1, 2011.<br />

Recommendation to the Tallinn City Government for the improvement of<br />

the competition situation in the field of waste handling<br />

On 10.02.<strong>2010</strong> the Competition Authority submitted an assessment for the possible plan<br />

of the Tallinn City Government to direct all waste generated on the administrative<br />

26


territory of Tallinn to a waste incineration plant established by a single operator. The<br />

relevant resolution of the City Government may affect the competition situation for<br />

district heating as well as the electricity market. The Competition Authority submitted<br />

to the Tallinn City Government a recommendation to avoid granting the sole right or<br />

any other advantage to a single waste management facility.<br />

The Competition Authority received information (mainly through media) that the City of<br />

Tallinn was intending to conclude a contract for the directing of all municipal waste<br />

generated in the city of Tallinn to a single operator for handling, whereby the selection<br />

probably would have been made from among waste incineration plants. The Competition<br />

Authority is a national regulator in the field of district heating and electricity markets,<br />

whose one task is the provision of opinion to the administrative restrictions established in<br />

the mentioned fields. Therefore the Competition Authority initiated the supervision<br />

procedure in order to assess the situation.<br />

The Competition Authority found that the Waste Act does not oblige a local government to<br />

choose only one waste management facility, but there can be several such facilities. In<br />

addition to the issue, if a local government was obliged to choose one waste management<br />

facility, it is also important in this case if it still has the competency to make such a choice<br />

notwithstanding the lack of direct obligation. The Waste Act does not specify directly any<br />

such competency. The Tallinn City Government did not explain to the Competition<br />

Authority which legal acts provide its competency to conclude a contract, according to<br />

which all municipal waste generated in the city would be directed to a single waste<br />

management facility. It is important to note that the Competition Authority does not<br />

dispute the competency of a local government to establish various legal requirements to<br />

waste management facilities, which has also been specified in the Waste Act. For example,<br />

a local government may restrict the number of waste management facilities proceeding from<br />

the geographic criterion. However, this does not allow limiting the choice of waste<br />

management facilities to only one operator, and the possibility to provide the service must<br />

remain open to all operators meeting the legal criteria.<br />

The answer sent from the Tallinn City Government to the Competition Authority did not<br />

provide a clear explanation as to what is the advantage of the reservation of waste to a<br />

single operator, compared to the situation where all operators meeting certain criteria would<br />

compete for the waste. Thus it also remained vague as to which public interests are served<br />

by the decision of the city government to grant the sole right to a single operator, while<br />

27


several operators would like to provide a similar service. Granting of any sole right by the<br />

state or local government is a serious restriction to competition and it can only be justified<br />

with dominant public interest.<br />

Proceeding from the above, the Competition Authority recommended that the Tallinn City<br />

Government was not to grant the sole right or any other advantage to any waste<br />

management facility. If the city government still finds that granting of the relevant sole right<br />

would serve public interests, it should organise a relevant transparent competition in<br />

compliance with the Competition Act §14. Therefore other operators providing the service<br />

could also make their offer under transparent conditions.<br />

Analysis of the Competition Authority of the support for renewable energy<br />

sources<br />

In May <strong>2010</strong> the Competition Authority conducted an analysis of the impact of the<br />

support paid on the basis of the Electricity Market Act § 59 on the competitive situation,<br />

justification of the economic burden set on the electricity consumers as a renewable<br />

energy fee and the support rates.<br />

The support scheme of the Electricity Market Act § 59 has been developed, taking into<br />

account the objectives and indicators specified in the development plan “Development Plan<br />

of the Estonian Electricity Sector until 2018”:<br />

The percentage of renewable electricity in gross consumption has an increasing trend<br />

and will form at least 5,1% by <strong>2010</strong>; at least 15% by 2015.<br />

By 2020 the electric energy produced in a cogeneration regime will form at least 20% of<br />

the gross consumption.<br />

To achieve the objectives set in the development plan, the provisions related to support in<br />

the Electricity Market Act adopted by the Riigikogu in 2003 have been essentially improved<br />

and amended. From 27.02.<strong>2010</strong> the electricity producers are entitled to the following<br />

support pursuant to the Electricity Market Act § 59:<br />

From July 1, <strong>2010</strong> for the electricity produced from a renewable energy source, except<br />

biomass, 84 cents/kWh;<br />

From July 1, <strong>2010</strong> for the electricity produced from biomass in cogeneration regime 84<br />

cents/kWh;<br />

support shall be paid;<br />

if electricity is produced from biomass in a condensation regime, no<br />

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For electricity produced in an efficient cogeneration regime if waste within the meaning<br />

of the Waste Act, peat or oil-shale processing retort gas is used as a source of energy, 50<br />

cents/kWh;<br />

For electricity produced in an efficient cogeneration regime with a cogeneration<br />

installation which has an electric capacity not exceeding 10 MW, 50 cents/kWh;<br />

For usability of the installed net power of a production installation operating with oil<br />

shale, if the production installation has been commissioned in the period from January<br />

1, 2013 to January 1, 2016, 22-25 cents/kWh depending on the price of CO 2 quota.<br />

FIGURE 2. Renewable energy support in the period 2007-<strong>2010</strong><br />

Figure 2 shows that the consumers paid 2,18 s/kWh for the support of renewable energy in<br />

2007, 3,03 s/kWh in 2008, 6,07 s/kWh in 2009 and 12,64 s/kWh in <strong>2010</strong>. Thus the support<br />

has increased from 2,18 s/kWh to 12,64 s/kWh or approximately 6-fold.<br />

While in 2009 the total sum of support paid for 619 GWh of electricity was 405 million<br />

EEK, the estimated total sum of support of <strong>2010</strong> for the produced 1202 GWh of electricity<br />

is 962 million EEK. Thus in 2009 support was paid to 7,9% of the produced electricity (the<br />

total amount of electricity produced in Estonia in 2009 was 7 884 GWh). In the situation<br />

where the number of applicants for support is constantly increasing in Estonia, their<br />

29


percentage on the electricity invoice issued to the consumers has achieved an essential<br />

degree.<br />

Production price of electricity of the major electricity producer of Estonia (Eesti Energia<br />

Narva Elektrijaamad AS) sold to the closed market is 46,01 s/kWh. As the support sum of<br />

12,64 s/kWh was added in <strong>2010</strong> to the production price paid by the consumer, the actual<br />

consumer price was 58,65 s/kWh. Thus the percentage of support in the consumer price<br />

was almost 22%. Taking into account the planned support for the new wind parks (the<br />

support limit was increased from 400 MW to 600 MW) and the addition of new electricity<br />

producers, the percentage of the support of a renewable energy fee in the final price of<br />

electricity will still increase.<br />

Proceeding from the above, the Competition Authority analysed if the support paid on the<br />

basis of the Electricity Market Act § 59 are economically justified from the standpoint of the<br />

producer as well as the consumer and what is the impact of the support on the competitive<br />

situation. The Competition Authority has the opinion that in case of the valid support<br />

scheme the addition of new cogeneration plants, wind parks and hydroelectric stations will<br />

be achieved, but due to a distorted market situation, should be avoided. Due to the support<br />

an investor would not proceed from the price formed on the basis of the actual offer-demand<br />

ratio, but the entire business project would be built up on as short a payback period as<br />

possible, based on the support. An example would be cogeneration plants, as thermal<br />

capacity exceeds the actual heat needed in the relevant area, because the target is to achieve<br />

as high a power capacity as possible, in order to get the support. Thereby the produced<br />

electricity is sold to the open electricity market, where the producers of other countries<br />

(Finland, Latvia, Lithuania) are also participating in the conditions, where the market price<br />

is essentially exceeding the subsidized production price. The investor will earn a<br />

groundlessly high profit, which shall be paid by the consumer through the renewable energy<br />

fee. Thus some producers have a significant competitive advantage guaranteed by the state<br />

and much lower economic risks compared to the producers who do not receive the support.<br />

Therefore the situation, where new production capacities are established only due to various<br />

support schemes, is causing problems. With such consistency most of the producers will<br />

soon receive support and subsidised electricity production will increase in Estonia. Thereby<br />

the consumer will pay, in addition to the renewable energy fee, also for the electricity, a<br />

price that has developed on the open market. The Competition Authority reached the<br />

conclusion that the consumer is constantly more forced to pay for the financing of the<br />

30


support specified in the Electricity Market Act §59. Although the fulfilment of objectives set<br />

in the “Development Plan of the Estonian Electricity Sector until 2018” is important, the<br />

consumers would still expect to fulfil the mentioned objectives with reasonable costs,<br />

thereby not incurring any groundless economic burden. The support system based on the<br />

Electricity Market Act does not guarantee the fulfilment of legal expectations of the<br />

consumers, as the support will ensure an unreasonably high profit to some producers and<br />

unreasonable expenses for the consumers. Another essential disadvantage of the existing<br />

scheme is the fact that the paid support does not take into account the actual market price of<br />

electricity and the higher the market price, the higher the profitability will be of the<br />

producer. The Competition Authority submitted the summary of the analysis to the<br />

Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications, and also made the proposal that the<br />

established support scheme is not sustainable in a longer perspective from the point of view<br />

of the electricity market and the support rates specified in the Electricity Market Act § 59<br />

should be revised, correcting them in accordance with the actual situation. The proposal<br />

was driven by the intention to improve the competitive situation on the Estonian electricity<br />

market and reduce the unreasonably high economic burden of the electricity consumers.<br />

Control of Concentrations<br />

For the market economy to operate optimally, there exist certain rules in the competition<br />

law, which enable to preserve effective competition in a goods market through the<br />

control of concentrations. In the last year the number of concentrations between<br />

undertakings has decreased significantly.<br />

In <strong>2010</strong>, 10 notices of concentration were submitted to the Competition Authority, and 1<br />

case was brought over from 2009. Thus the Authority proceeded with 11 cases and made 10<br />

decisions to grant permission to concentration. In one case the proceedings and decision<br />

were postponed until 2011. All 10 decisions to grant permission to concentration were made<br />

in the first phase of the proceedings, i.e. during the 30 calendar days prescribed by law; in<br />

three cases the proceedings were suspended due to the requirement to eliminate the<br />

deficiencies contained in a notice of concentration. The actual average length of proceedings<br />

of the first phase was 18 days.<br />

31


The breakdown by types of concentration was as follows:<br />

an undertaking acquired control of the whole or a part of another undertaking in the<br />

case of 8 concentrations (§ 19 (1) p 2));<br />

undertakings jointly acquired control of the whole or a part of another undertaking in<br />

the case of 3 concentrations (§ 19 (1) p 3));<br />

Four concentrations took place among Estonian undertakings; in two concentrations both<br />

parties were foreign undertakings and in seven cases parties involved an undertaking<br />

registered abroad and an undertaking registered in Estonia.<br />

The number of notified concentrations in <strong>2010</strong> was significantly lower compared to<br />

previous years, mostly due to the slowing down of market mechanisms and stricter<br />

financing conditions. Due to their weak economic situation, Estonian undertakings were<br />

not particularly active in increasing their competitiveness through mergers and acquisitions.<br />

Foreign investors including private capital funds were more active in acquiring Estonian<br />

undertakings.<br />

In <strong>2010</strong> concentrations took place in the following goods markets:<br />

Production and sale of concentrated feed and fertilisers;<br />

Sale of tobacco products, food and consumer goods, alcohol;<br />

Confectionery;<br />

Concrete products;<br />

Building material;<br />

Services.<br />

32


YEAR <strong>2010</strong> IN THE ENERGY AND WATER REGULATORY DIVISION<br />

The year <strong>2010</strong> was significant for the Energy and Water Regulatory Division in several<br />

respects. On 1 November, the Establishment of Price Limitations to Monopolies Act<br />

entered into force, adding approximately 70 water operators and all heat operators<br />

which were previously under the jurisdiction of local governments to the area of<br />

regulation of the division. As a result of organisational restructuring the former Railway<br />

and Energy Regulatory Division was renamed to the Energy and Water Regulatory<br />

Division.<br />

One of the pivotal tasks of the Energy and Water Regulatory Division is to ensure stable<br />

conditions to consumers in the sectors of electricity, district heating, natural gas as well as<br />

public water supply and sewerage systems. The activities of the Energy and Water<br />

Regulatory Division are predominantly guided by the Electricity Market Act, the Natural<br />

Gas Act, the District Heating Act, the Liquid Fuel Act and the Public Water Supply and<br />

Sewerage Act. The Division made 212 decisions and one injunction during the year <strong>2010</strong>.<br />

The number of decisions was affected mainly by changes in fuel and electricity prices. The<br />

most work intensive were price approval proceedings. As of 31 October, one electricity<br />

transmission network operator, 39 electricity distribution network operators, one natural gas<br />

transmission network operator, 27 natural gas distribution network operators, 50 heating<br />

operators in various network sections, three electricity and heat producers and oil shale<br />

miners were under regulation in the energy sector.<br />

Electricity, natural gas, district heating as well as public water supply and sewerage services<br />

reach the consumers via a corresponding infrastructure. As the infrastructure consists of<br />

natural monopolies, their price regulation falls into the area of regulation of the<br />

Competition Authority. In case of the infrastructure of electricity and natural gas, the<br />

network usage fees do not depend on fluctuations of crude oil prices in the global market but<br />

rather on local economic circumstances involving investment needs, changes of product and<br />

service prices based on internal inflation and technical efficiency.<br />

Pursuant to the electricity and natural gas directive of the European Union, all electricity<br />

and natural gas consumers are provided with free access to the network. Therefore,<br />

consumers are entitled to choose their electricity or natural gas providers and change the<br />

providers when they so desire. Regarding the opening of the electricity market, Estonia has<br />

a transition period until the year 2013. By the year <strong>2010</strong>, Estonia had to open its electricity<br />

33


market to the extent of 35%, meaning that major consumers were given a possibility to<br />

select their own providers or producers of electricity. In January <strong>2010</strong>, amendments to the<br />

Electricity Market Act were passed, which, among other things, prescribed the separation of<br />

ownership of system operators and transmission network operators. The amendments also<br />

laid down the following steps towards the opening of the market. Namely, eligible<br />

consumers cannot buy electricity for a regulated price from 1 April; instead they have to do<br />

it for the market price. In April, the power exchange of Nordic countries Nord Pool Spot<br />

(NSP) extended to Estonia by creating the NSP Estlink price area.<br />

The Competition Authority initiated proceedings relating to Eesti Energia Jaotusvõrk OÜ in<br />

order to verify the compliance of its activities with the Electricity Market Act. § 67 of the<br />

Electricity Market Act requires network operators to ensure that measurement data are<br />

collected and then processed by means of metering devices conforming to the technical<br />

requirements.<br />

In August <strong>2010</strong>, Eesti Energia Jaotusvõrk OÜ (Jaotusvõrk) served the Competition<br />

Authority with an overview of how the operator carried out the Competition Authority’s<br />

injunction. Jaotusvõrk explained that it managed to replace most of the problematic and<br />

unverified metering devices during the time period prescribed by the Competition<br />

Authority. At the same time, the operator declared that it was unable to replace 2 000<br />

metering units because of the failure to reach the owners of the respective properties, refusal<br />

of the owners to allow the replacement of metering equipment or due to other<br />

complications. Jaotusvõrk confirmed to the Competition Authority that these problems are<br />

continuously being addressed and the company hopes to replace the metering equipment<br />

soon. In that respect, the Competition Authority plans to carry out another inspection of<br />

Eesti Energia Jaotusvõrk OÜ during the year 2011.<br />

Opening of the electricity market<br />

On 01.04.<strong>2010</strong> the Estonian electricity market opened up to the extent of 35% (it will<br />

fully open in Estonia on 01.01.2013). For the partial opening of the electricity market,<br />

the Electricity Market Act prescribes that it is mandatory to purchase electricity from the<br />

free market for persons (a person is deemed to be an eligible consumer) who use<br />

electricity in such fixed consumption sites where the consumption volume is at least 2<br />

GWh of electricity per calendar year.<br />

34


In addition to the above, legislations prescribe that a consumption site is recognised as a<br />

connection point or a collection of connection points, electrically interconnected by the<br />

electrical installation of the eligible consumer, and of the electrical installation of an eligible<br />

consumer.<br />

From the position of passing and entry into force of legislations, the opening of the<br />

electricity market was relatively urgent, for which reason it can be concluded in retrospect<br />

that the parties were left with little time for thorough preparation, as the Riigikogu only<br />

passed the amendments to the Act on 28.01.<strong>2010</strong>, and that made the opening of the<br />

electricity market possible (the amendments entered into force on 27.02.<strong>2010</strong>). As the<br />

electricity market was supposed to open on 01.04.<strong>2010</strong>, distribution network operators<br />

already commenced identifying and informing eligible consumers in February <strong>2010</strong> when<br />

the respective amendments to the Electricity Market Act had not yet entered into force.<br />

Before the actual entry into force of the amendments, the sellers of electricity also informed<br />

the eligible consumers of the cancellation of the electricity contracts. It was necessary for<br />

distribution network operators and sellers of electricity to identify and inform eligible<br />

consumers to ensure that eligible consumers would be able to choose from which provider<br />

and for what price they will buy electricity starting from 01.04.<strong>2010</strong>.<br />

The activities of distribution network operators and sellers of electricity encouraged eligible<br />

consumers to ask questions and many of them turned to the Competition Authority for<br />

answers.<br />

Several persons submitted complains to the Competition Authority regarding their<br />

identification as an eligible consumer. The reasons for non-qualification as an eligible<br />

consumer were numerous. Conflict of the activities of distribution network operators and<br />

electricity sellers with the Electricity Market Act was mentioned among the major reasons.<br />

Several eligible consumers found that distribution network operators and sellers of<br />

electricity lacked legal grounds for the identification of persons as eligible consumers and<br />

the cancellation of electricity contracts prior to entry into force of the respective<br />

amendments of the Electricity Market Act. Many eligible consumers also found that they<br />

have not consumed electricity for their own purposes in the amount of 2 GWh in a calendar<br />

year, but rather partially or fully sold it on to third parties (in case of shopping centres, for<br />

example, to lessees, in case of industrial parks to other properties). In several cases a<br />

question also arose as to whether a distribution network operator has identified the<br />

consumption site of the eligible consumer pursuant to the Electricity Market Act, as<br />

35


according to the eligible consumer the distribution network operator should not have<br />

summed two different connection points and the electricity consumed through them, as<br />

these connection points were not electrically connected by an electrical installation of the<br />

eligible consumer. Therefore, it should not have been possible to define them as one<br />

consumption site. The Competition Authority explained its position in each case to the<br />

eligible consumer as well as to the distribution network operator based on the respective<br />

instance and recommended that the parties find a common understanding based on the<br />

Electricity Market Act.<br />

From the statistical point of view, it is important to mention that the Competition Authority<br />

only once settled a complaint in favour of the identified eligible consumer. In all other cases<br />

the distribution network operator and the seller of electricity acted in accordance with the<br />

Electricity Market Act when identifying a person as an eligible consumer and cancelling a<br />

contract. One eligible consumer challenged the decision of the Competition Authority in the<br />

Tallinn Administrative Court and they ruled in favour of the Competition Authority. The<br />

court decided that regardless of the fact that relevant amendments to the Electricity Market<br />

Act had not entered into force, the distribution network operators and sellers of electricity<br />

had legal grounds to identify persons as eligible consumers and cancel their electricity<br />

contracts. The Tallinn Administrative Court considered it significant that the person became<br />

an eligible consumer, meaning that the rights and obligations of the eligible consumer were<br />

applied to the person on 01.04.<strong>2010</strong>, as the reason is the fact that a distribution network<br />

operator sent out notices to eligible consumers before that time and could not bring about<br />

any obligations to the new eligible consumers. As contracts for the sale of electricity were<br />

cancelled starting from 01.04.<strong>2010</strong>, the sending of early notices could not have violated the<br />

rights of new eligible consumers. Another significant conclusion was that the Tallinn<br />

Administrative Court found that in case a person resold electricity on its own property, for<br />

example to lessees (shopping centres, office buildings, etc), then the entire resold quantity of<br />

resold electricity was to be considered as consumed by the person for their own purposes<br />

and the person was to be deemed an eligible consumer. The reason for this is the fact that<br />

for the distribution network operator the consumer was still the eligible consumer, and not<br />

its lessees with whom the distribution network operator had no legal relations whatsoever.<br />

The Competition Authority believes that in case the person of the consumer has changed<br />

during the course of the consumption year, the distribution network operator, upon<br />

identification of the eligible consumer, is not allowed to add the electricity quantities<br />

36


consumed by the previous consumer to the consumption of the new one. Additionally, in<br />

case a consumption site has two or more different connection points that are not electrically<br />

interconnected by an electrical installation of the person then the distribution network<br />

operator is not entitled to interpret these connection points as a single consumption site. In<br />

such case the distribution network operator should have considered each particular<br />

connection point as a separate consumption site and calculated the electricity quantities<br />

consumed in the previous calendar year separately. As a result of the explanation of the<br />

Competition Authority, the distribution network operators partially reviewed their activities<br />

and in several cases the identified eligible consumers were exempt from their statuses and<br />

redirected back to the closed market.<br />

Although the partial opening of the Estonian electricity market brought about some<br />

problems and the associated information was occasionally insufficient, the Competition<br />

Authority still considers the process relatively quick and successful. The experience of the<br />

partial opening of the electricity market helps to avoid similar problems in the full opening<br />

of the market on 01.01.2013.<br />

Activation of the Power Exchange and overview of trading<br />

The Power Exchange became operational in Elektribörs on 01.04.<strong>2010</strong> when Nord Pool<br />

Spot AS (NPS) opened the Estlink bidding area. The name of NPS Estlink bidding area is<br />

now NPS Eesti. For Estonian producers, sellers and eligible consumers of electricity, this<br />

created a trading spot for buying and selling electricity under free market conditions.<br />

Market participants from Latvia, Lithuania and third (non-EU) countries can also trade<br />

electricity in the NPS Eesti bidding area.<br />

An amendment to the Electricity Market Act entered into force on 01.04.<strong>2010</strong>, forbidding<br />

eligible consumers to purchase electricity for regulated prices, and offers an alternative to<br />

purchase electricity from the Power Exchange. In conjunction with the activation of the<br />

Power Exchange, a new market participant was added to the Electricity Market Act – the<br />

organiser of the Power Exchange. The organiser of the Power Exchange is NPS whose<br />

activities are supervised by a Norwegian regulator (Norwegian Water Resources and Energy<br />

Directorate). In order to commence trading in the NPS Eesti bidding area, a previous entry<br />

into a corresponding contract is necessary.<br />

37


Activation of the NPS Eesti bidding area can predominantly be regarded as a success. The<br />

volume of traded electricity exceeded the limits of 1 TWh already during the first four<br />

months of operation. The average exchange price was 46.31 €/MWh in the year <strong>2010</strong>. The<br />

lower monthly average price 34.81 €/MWh was in May and the highest average price 56.62<br />

€/MWh was in August. In total, electricity was purchased and sold in the NPS Eesti<br />

bidding area during the year <strong>2010</strong> in the amount of 6,660,195 MWh.<br />

However, the activation of the Power Exchange did not go without setbacks. Namely, on<br />

24.08.<strong>2010</strong>, for five hours the price of electricity in the NPS Eesti bidding area was on the<br />

level of 2000 €/MWh, which was also the highest possible price. In order to investigate the<br />

situation, the Competition Division of the Competition Authority instituted proceedings.<br />

On 19 October, the intra-day market of NPS Elbas was opened in Estonia, allowing intraday<br />

trading in electricity in a bidding area covering all countries that have joined the NPS<br />

Power Exchange – from the Nordic countries to Germany. If the day-ahead spot market<br />

Elspot is predominantly meant and usable for the purchasing and sale of electricity, then the<br />

intra-day market grants the market participants a possibility to sell or buy surplus or deficit<br />

electricity during the same day based on predetermined rules.<br />

As of today, the NPS Eesti bidding area allows trading on Elspot (one day ahead) as well as<br />

Elbas (intra-day) markets, indicating that the electricity market of Estonia is successfully<br />

integrating with the electricity market of the Nordic countries. As of the moment of<br />

publishing the annual report, 16 market participants traded in the Elspot market and 4 in the<br />

Elbas market of the NPS Eesti bidding area. The list of market participants is available on<br />

the website of NPS. 7 Monthly average electricity price level in NSP Eesti area in <strong>2010</strong> are<br />

presented in figure 3.<br />

7 http://www.nordpoolspot.com/about/Participant-list---Elspot2/ (02.03.2011)<br />

38


FIGURE 3. Monthly average electricity price in NPS Eesti in <strong>2010</strong><br />

Regulation of electricity network operators<br />

Pursuant to § 73 subsection 3 of the Electricity Market Act, a network operator has the<br />

right to submit requests to the Competition Authority for the approval of different<br />

network charges both collectively and separately. Pursuant to § 94 subsection 1 clause 8,<br />

the Competition Authority must establish network charges of network operators, except<br />

transmission charges for the transit of electricity.<br />

Pursuant to the law, the criteria used as the basis upon the establishment of network charges<br />

must be transparent and follow the principles of equal treatment. The price formation of<br />

network charges must take into account the requirement to ensure supply dependability and<br />

efficiency, allow network operators to carry out the obligations arising from legislations and<br />

the conditions of activity licences, and allow a reasoned return on the invested capital.<br />

Pursuant to on § 72 subsection 4 of the Electricity Market Act, the Competition Authority<br />

has prepared and published “uniform methods for the calculation of electricity network<br />

charges” (hereinafter referred to as the Methods), based on which the electricity network<br />

charges are approved. The Methods are applied for the purposes of avoiding unequal<br />

39


treatment in a similar and uniform manner and for the approval of the network charges of<br />

all network operators. The prices of network charges are formed as cost-based.<br />

In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the Competition Authority made 39 decisions about the weighted average<br />

price and network charges of electricity, whereas 2 price applications were left unapproved.<br />

The most significant of the proceedings involved the prices of network charges of AS<br />

Elering and Eesti Energia Jaotusvõrk OÜ.<br />

For AS Elering a new 3-year regulation period was established, starting from 01.01.2011<br />

and ending on 31.12.2013. Changes in network charges were only caused by price<br />

components relating to investments, whereas the operating expenses of the operator<br />

decreased in the year <strong>2010</strong> by 4.6 million € (72 million kroons) and they will also not<br />

increase in the year 2011. The total volume of investments during the following three years<br />

is 0.447 billion €, i.e. 7 billion kroons. The most significant investments were the buyout of<br />

Estlink1, and construction of the second high voltage direct current connection Estlink2 and<br />

two rapidly starting emergency reserve power stations (with power outputs of 100 MW and<br />

150 MW). In addition, AS Elering will build numerous new connections and distribution<br />

hubs in order to increase the transmission capacity of power networks and decrease network<br />

costs.<br />

On 26 August the Competition Authority submitted its opinions about the price<br />

applications of network charges to Eesti Energia Jaotusvõrk OÜ. The operator applied for<br />

an average of 18.8% increase, including an 11.3% increase of operating expenses, compared<br />

to the current network charges. Pursuant to the Electricity Market Act, the network charges<br />

must be cost-based and reasoned, for which reason the Authority did not consider the<br />

network charges’ price application of the operator reasoned. At a time when companies<br />

operating under free market conditions have started to cut their costs, such course is also<br />

expected from monopolies, and the Competition Authority cannot tolerate significant<br />

increases of operating expenses under the current circumstances. On 12.10.<strong>2010</strong>, Eesti<br />

Energia Jaotusvõrk OÜ withdrew its application of approval of network charges.<br />

Supply dependability of natural gas<br />

A regulation passed by the European Parliament and the Council on 20.10.<strong>2010</strong> laid<br />

down the procedures for the proper and consistent functioning of the internal market of<br />

natural gas, allowing the use of extraordinary measures in case the market is no longer<br />

40


capable of supplying the required gas quantities. The regulation prescribes creating a<br />

preventive action plan and an emergency plan in the future.<br />

The share of natural gas in the primary energy supply of Estonia is 10.7% (see figure 4),<br />

whereas the share of natural gas in the production of electricity only amounts to 4.0% and<br />

as Estonia is an exporter of electricity, it is possible to cover the entire electricity demand<br />

without the use of natural gas.<br />

FIGURE 4. Share of primary energy by fuel types<br />

From the perspective of supply dependability, natural gas bears great significance in the<br />

production of heat where the share of natural gas reaches 48.1%. Of the biggest cities,<br />

district heating is 100% dependant on natural gas in Rakvere, Jõgeva, Rapla, Põlva, etc. The<br />

share of gas is significant, for example, in the production of heat in Tallinn, Viljandi,<br />

Sillamäe and Narva. In the year <strong>2010</strong>, AS Kohtla-Järve Soojus started to produce heat<br />

partially from natural gas in its gas boiler house with a 100 MW thermal output that was<br />

built a year earlier.<br />

Compared to Western Europe, local natural gas heating is relatively unpopular in Estonia.<br />

Smaller gas networks were actively developed mostly in real estate development areas until<br />

the economic crisis of the year 2008. The gas quantity that AS Eesti Gaas, the biggest<br />

natural gas retailer, sold to homeowners in the year 2009 only amounted to 9.3% of total gas<br />

41


sales. If in most district heating systems it is possible to use alternative fuels besides natural<br />

gas, then in case of local gas heating there are no such alternative solutions and the<br />

consumers would be left without heat upon possible supply disturbances.<br />

AS Eesti Gaas has entered into a natural gas supply contract with AS Gazprom that will be<br />

valid until the end of the year 2015, specifying a total supply quantity of 7 million m³/a day<br />

(guaranteed pressure 35 bar), which exceeds the previous maximum daily consumption<br />

volume by 11%. Therefore the above mentioned gas quantity is sufficient for ensuring a<br />

strategically necessary gas supply to Estonia. AS Gazprom stores natural gas in the<br />

Inčukalns gas storage facility (which has an active storage capacity of 2,300 million m³),<br />

ensuring a gas supply sufficient to Estonia and Latvia and partially sufficient to Russia and<br />

Lithuania.<br />

The gas storage facility is refilled from April to October and the refilling process is<br />

monitored by AS Eesti Gaas. In case the refilling of the facility does not take place, it<br />

indicates a possible risk for the gas supply, as the supply for the winter peak consumption<br />

period is ensured from the facility. In such case, system operators have sufficient time to<br />

take measures for covering the winter peak consumption period from other sources.<br />

In terms of gas supply dependability, Estonia fully depends on Russia’s gas supply. Estonia<br />

has two transmission connections with Russia: one in Narva (Eastern direction) and the<br />

other in Värska (South-Eastern direction), as well as a connection with Latvia in Karksi.<br />

Under normal circumstances, only the connection with Latvia is open and the connection<br />

with Russia is organised through Värska. The transmission capacity of the Narva<br />

connection is limited by the transmission limit on the Russian side and the connection is<br />

opened only under special circumstances.<br />

Theoretically, Estonia has sufficient infrastructure and connections to ensure a steady gas<br />

supply and thus Estonia has no problems with the depletion of transmission capacity.<br />

Problems may arise with gas deliveries in conjunction with peak consumption periods on<br />

the Russian side. Namely, disturbances in the gas supply may occur during peak<br />

consumption periods in case the Karksi connection between Estonia and Latvia breaks<br />

down or if the Latvian Inčukalns storage facility is depleted. For transmission capacity, the<br />

Narva and Värska connections between Estonia and Russia are sufficient for ensuring the<br />

supply of gas needed by Estonia, but the transmission capacity of the Narva connection is<br />

limited by a transmission limit on the Russian side. Even if the Narva connection is opened<br />

42


under special circumstances, ensuring sufficient pressure may prove problematic for<br />

ensuring the supply of gas quantities required by Estonia. Therefore the Competition<br />

Authority considers the situation a risk to supply dependability, as the entire gas supply is<br />

provided by only one source.<br />

At the same time the supply channels from the Latvian gas storage facility through the<br />

Karksi connection and from Russia through the Värska and Narva connections can be<br />

considered independent. Namely, the gas storage facility is located on the territory of the<br />

EU and its refills can be monitored by AS EG Võrguteenus. The supply dependability could<br />

be significantly improved by the construction of a liquefied natural gas storage facility in the<br />

Baltic-Finland area, but only if that would be accompanied by the construction of a natural<br />

gas pipeline system that would connect the Baltic countries and Finland. The Natural Gas<br />

Act provides several methods for the improvement of supply dependability. Gas supply to a<br />

household customer may not be suspended or restricted during the period from 1 October to<br />

1 May. Gas supply to undertakings who produce heat for the heating of residential spaces<br />

and who have no possibility to use fuel other than gas for fuel may not be suspended or<br />

restricted during the above mentioned period. Gas supply may be suspended in cases of<br />

danger to the life, health or property of persons or to the environment, or by agreement of<br />

the parties. A heat producing undertaking whose estimated annual production volume<br />

exceeds 500,000 MWh per network area is required to ensure a reserve fuel capability for<br />

the production of heat starting from 01.07.2008, guaranteeing the heat supply for a period of<br />

three days. Upon the emergence of a factor that constitutes a threat to supply dependability,<br />

life or the health of persons or preservation of a network, the system operator immediately<br />

notifies the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and the Competition<br />

Authority and makes a proposal for taking measures to ensure the supply dependability.<br />

The Ministry cooperates with the Competition Authority to analyse the proposal received<br />

from the system operator and, if necessary, makes a proposal to the Government of the<br />

Republic for taking the following measures in ensuring the supply dependability:<br />

To limit gas supply to persons who use gas for any other purpose except the production<br />

of heat;<br />

To allow limitation of the gas supply to undertakings producing heat;<br />

To allow decreasing of the temperature of the heat carrier used for the heating of<br />

residential spaces;<br />

To require the heat producing undertakings to use reserve fuel as fuel.<br />

43


As the primary concern in Estonia is to ensure gas supply to heat producing undertakings<br />

and residential consumers, limitation of the gas supply to heat producers of Tallinn and<br />

Narva is seen as the primary means for overcoming supply interruptions. Principally, the<br />

legislative amendment prescribes that the district heating undertakings that supply heat to<br />

Tallinn and Narva are required to ensure means for the use of reserve fuel and switch to the<br />

reserve fuel upon gas supply interruptions. In Iru Power Plant, it is possible to switch from<br />

co-production mode to the production of heat in order to decrease the gas consumption.<br />

This is possible in Estonia, since the share of natural gas in the production of electricity is<br />

minute and the necessary electrical power can be ensured by the oil shale burning power<br />

plants of AS Narva Elektrijaamad. It is also important to take into account that power<br />

plants that use gas add up to less than 10% of the entire installed capacity. Pursuant to the<br />

legislative amendments that have entered into force, the system operator (AS EG<br />

Võrguteenus) is required to draw up a description of emergencies constituting a threat to the<br />

functionality of the gas system, and an emergency management plan which must be<br />

submitted to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications. The plan is<br />

implemented in a situation when the activities of the balance provider no longer allow<br />

ensuring the balance and it is necessary to limit the consumption of a certain consumer<br />

group.<br />

The Competition Authority is of the opinion that the risks of the gas supply are related to<br />

the supply from one source – Russia. Considering the estimates of consumption and<br />

transmission capacity, prepared by AS EG Võrguteenus, there will not be any deficiency of<br />

transmission capacity until the year 2016 and probably even in the farthest future. In terms<br />

of natural gas supply, the risks associated with supply dependability can be significantly<br />

lowered by the fact that during wintertime, gas supply is predominantly organised from the<br />

Latvian gas storage facility. As the latter is located on the territory of the European Union,<br />

it can be considered an independent supply source in addition to the direct link from Russia.<br />

The risk lies in the fact that refilling of the Latvian gas storage facility is organised through<br />

Russia. At the same time we cannot ignore such possible risks relating to the supply<br />

dependability of natural gas that would mostly jeopardise the gas-dependant heat supply.<br />

For possible emergencies, a plan has been drawn in Estonia, allowing to significantly<br />

decrease the consumption of gas and to switch the district heating system over to alternative<br />

fuel.<br />

44


Price regulation of heating undertakings<br />

Pursuant to the District Heating Act, a local government has the right to determine<br />

district heating regions within the boundaries of its administrative territory. The only<br />

permitted heating alternative in district heating regions is district heating (except for<br />

persons who did not use district heating at the time of determination of the district<br />

heating region), due to which reason the consumers cannot choose an alternative heating<br />

method and the heating undertaking enjoys a monopoly status.<br />

Based on the Establishment of Price Limitations to Monopolies Act, significant<br />

amendments to the District Heating Act entered into force on 01.11.<strong>2010</strong>. If at earlier times<br />

the Competition Authority and local governments carried out supervision of the District<br />

Heating Act and approved the maximum prices of heat sold by heat undertakings in parallel<br />

(both according to jurisdiction arising from the District Heating Act), then starting from<br />

01.11.<strong>2010</strong>, only the Competition Authority has the respective rights and obligations. The<br />

major objective of the amendments to the District Heating Act was to ensure more<br />

comprehensive and intensive supervision of the district heating sector, as compared to local<br />

governments the Competition Authority has significantly greater experience in the<br />

regulation and supervision of the district heating sector, thus contributing to a more<br />

homogeneous regulation and equal treatment of undertakings in the entire sector of district<br />

heating.<br />

In addition to the above, the approval principles of the maximum price of sold heat were<br />

changed so that the heating undertakings had more obligations to ensure the sale of heat to<br />

consumers for fair and reasoned prices. For this reason, a principle has been provided in the<br />

District Heating Act that a heat undertaking is required to monitor such circumstances,<br />

independent of its activities, that affect the price of heat to consumers, and submit a new<br />

limit price approval application to the Competition Authority within 30 days from the<br />

emergence of such circumstance that can affect the price of heat to consumers by more than<br />

5 per cent. Hence, a heat undertaking is required to harmonise a new limit price of heat with<br />

the Competition Authority, for example in case of a decrease of the purchasing price of fuel.<br />

Among the most significant amendments, the Competition Authority was given the right to<br />

invalidate a current approval of the maximum price of heat and establish a temporary sales<br />

price of heat to a heat undertaking if the heat undertaking sells heat for a price that does not<br />

45


correspond to the conditions provided in § 8 subsection 3 of the District Heating Act and<br />

has failed to carry out an injunction of the Competition Authority.<br />

In addition, the regulation of § 14 1 of the District Heating Act deserves special attention, as<br />

it allows heat producers and network operators in the future to enter into contracts with<br />

validity periods of up to 12 years from the beginning of production with certain production<br />

equipment in order to ensure investment security. It is important that the entry into such<br />

contracts requires the organisation of a competition, the winners of which are awarded with<br />

the contracts. This ensures that heat producers or network operators enter into contracts for<br />

ensuring investment security with the best price, in order to guarantee a safe, reliable,<br />

efficient, reasonably priced heat supply that matches the environmental requirements and<br />

the needs of the consumers.<br />

Supervision proceedings relating to storage of reserve fuel<br />

Based on § 28 subsection 1 of the District Heating Act, the Competition Authority<br />

instituted supervision proceedings in December 2009 relating to the performance of § 7<br />

subsections 3 and 4 and § 41 1 of the District Heating Act. Based on § 7 subsection 3 of the<br />

District Heating Act, a heat producing undertaking whose estimated annual production<br />

volume exceeds 500,000 MWh per network area is a provider of a vital service in the<br />

meaning of the Emergency Act and therefore required to ensure a reserve fuel capability<br />

for the production of heat, guaranteeing the heat supply for a period of three days.<br />

Pursuant to the District Heating Act, calculation of the reserve fuel quantity is based on the<br />

maximum daily consumption of the previous year. The heating undertaking must have<br />

ensured a reserve fuel capability for the production of heat starting from 1 July 2008. The<br />

objective of the instituted supervision proceedings was to identify whether the heating<br />

undertaking mentioned in § 7 subsection 3 of the District Heating Act carry out their duties<br />

arising from the District Heating Act.<br />

Pursuant to § 7 subsection 3 of the District Heating Act, there are three heating undertaking<br />

in Estonia (AS Tallinna Küte, Eesti Energia AS Iru Elektrijaam and Eesti Energia Narva<br />

Elektrijaamad AS) whose annual heat production volume exceeds 500,000 MWh per<br />

network area. Therefore, these undertakings are required to ensure the existence of reserve<br />

fuel and the capability of its use for the production of heat.<br />

46


During the course of the supervision proceedings, the Competition Authority came to<br />

the following conclusions:<br />

1. AS Tallinna Küte has ensured the performance of the requirements set forth in § 7<br />

subsection 3 and 4 and § 411 in the Lääne district of its network area (heat supply is<br />

organised from Mustamäe and Kadaka boiler plants), but in the Kesklinn-Lasnamäe-<br />

Maardu district (heat supply is organised from Ülemiste boiler plant, Tallinn Power<br />

Plant and the power plant Eesti Energia AS Iru Elektrijaam) the reserve fuel amount<br />

required by § 7 subsection 3, 4, § 411 of the District Heating Act is absent.<br />

2. Eesti Energia Narva Elektrijaamad AS-s has properly carried out its obligations<br />

arising from § 7 subsection 3 and 4 and § 41 1 of the District Heating Act.<br />

3. Eesti Energia AS-s Iru Elektrijaam has ensured the existence of reserve fuel pursuant<br />

to the requirements of § 7 subsection 4 and § 41 1 of the District Heating Act, but the<br />

heating undertaking does not guarantee the performance of obligations arising from<br />

§ 7 subsection 3 of the District Heating Act in the meaning of § 34 subsection 1 of the<br />

Emergency Act, as an undertaking that supplies heat to the network and provides a<br />

vital service and is not able to ensure the consistent functioning of a vital service or<br />

resuming of the vital service after its suspension. Iru Elektrijaam has on its own side<br />

defined the period of transition to reserve fuel to be 24 hours which is too short and thus<br />

cannot be considered reasonable in an emergency situation.<br />

The Competition Authority ended the supervision proceedings relating to Eesti Energia<br />

Narva Elektrijaamad AS in the year <strong>2010</strong>, but continued the proceedings relating to AS<br />

Tallinna Küte and Eesti Energia AS Iru Elektrijaam.<br />

Disputes of market participants<br />

Resolution of disputes between market participants has been provided by the Electricity<br />

Market Act as well as in the Natural Gas Act. In the district heating sector, the<br />

Competition Authority can institute supervision proceedings in case a violation of the<br />

law by a heating undertaking is discovered. One of the major problems in the year <strong>2010</strong><br />

was the suspension of a consumer’s network connection by a network operator.<br />

Suspension of the electricity supply has been regulated in great detail. It is the opinion of the<br />

Competition Authority that the protection of socially sensitive consumers upon the<br />

47


emergence of solvency problems has been sufficiently ensured. A network operator may<br />

suspend a consumer’s network connection if the consumer has failed to pay the monetary<br />

amount due based on a contract entered into with the network operator or a contract<br />

entered into with a seller appointed by the network operator for the purposes of carrying out<br />

the sales obligation of the network operator, or if the consumer has otherwise severely<br />

violated an obligation laid down in the above mentioned contracts. Before the suspension of<br />

the network connection, the network operator is required to send a notice of the planned<br />

suspension. The notice must identify the reason for the suspension of the network<br />

connection as well as the planned time of the suspension. A consumer’s network connection<br />

may be suspended when at least 15 days have passed from the sending of the above<br />

mentioned notice and during that time the consumer has not removed the circumstance that<br />

constitutes the grounds for the suspension and informed the network operator<br />

correspondingly.<br />

If the network connection is suspended due to the reason that a consumer who is a natural<br />

person has failed to pay in due time for the consumed electricity as a result of severe illness<br />

or temporary insolvency caused by becoming unemployed, the consumer may submit a<br />

respective written notice of such circumstances to the network operator. The notice must be<br />

accompanied by a certificate substantiating the above mentioned circumstance. A network<br />

operator who has received a written notice and the substantiating evidence may suspend the<br />

network connection of a consumer who is a natural person when at least 30 days have<br />

passed from the moment of sending a notice to the consumer and during that time the<br />

consumer has not removed the circumstance that constitutes the grounds for the suspension<br />

of the network connection and informed the network operator correspondingly.<br />

If the network connection is suspended due to the reason that a consumer has failed to pay<br />

in due time for the consumed electricity, then the network connection may be suspended<br />

during the period from 1 October to 30 April in a building or a part thereof that is a<br />

dwelling, and that is used as a permanent residence and heated fully or predominantly by<br />

means of electricity only after at least 90 days have passed from the moment of sending the<br />

notice to the consumer and during that time the consumer has not removed the<br />

circumstance that constitutes the grounds for the suspension of the network connection and<br />

informed the network operator or the seller correspondingly. If a consumer has failed to pay<br />

for electricity in due time, the network operator is entitled to limit the capacity of the<br />

48


network connection. A prior notice of limitation of the capacity must be given to the<br />

consumer at least 15 days in advance.<br />

A network operator has the right to suspend a consumer’s network connection immediately<br />

if the consumer increases the limited capacity without authorisation, uses electricity or the<br />

network service illegally or uses electrical installations that do not correspond to established<br />

requirements, are dangerous or disturb the function of the entire network or threaten the<br />

supply dependability.<br />

All market participants, including the operators and the consumers, have the right to turn to<br />

the Competition Authority as the body conducting extra-judicial proceedings. A market<br />

participant may submit a written complaint to the Competition Authority against another<br />

market participant’s activities or lack of activity that violates the Electricity Market Act or<br />

legislations enacted based on the Electricity Market Act. A total of 33 decisions (including<br />

decisions on challenges) were made in the year <strong>2010</strong> about the solving of complaints. 256<br />

answers to inquiries and requests for information were made (incl. relating to the Public<br />

Water Supply and Sewerage Act). In order to ensure the rights granted to energy consumers<br />

by law, the Competition Authority continuously monitors the accession fee methods,<br />

standard terms and other matters provided by the law. In the year <strong>2010</strong>, 23 decisions were<br />

heard and made relating to the approval of accession fee methods (3) and general terms (20).<br />

Public water supply and sewerage system<br />

In August <strong>2010</strong>, the Riigikogu passed the Establishment of Price Limitations to<br />

Monopolies Act, which among other things amended the Public Water Supply and<br />

Sewerage Act (hereinafter referred to as PWSSA) since 01.11.<strong>2010</strong>. Arising from the law<br />

amendment, the water undertakings whose territory is located on a sewerage collection<br />

area with a pollution load of 2,000 population equivalents or more are required to coordinate<br />

the price of the water service and the calculation methods of the accession fee<br />

with the Competition Authority.<br />

Pursuant to the law amendment, the Competition Authority had to prepare and publish on<br />

its website an instruction material “Recommended principles of calculating the price of the<br />

water service” (hereinafter referred to as the Instructions). The creators of the Instructions<br />

were guided by the regulation principles of monopoly undertakings (electricity, district<br />

heating, and natural gas) that were already in place in Estonia. The Instructions are applied<br />

49


to the approval of water service prices similarly and homogenously upon the analysis and<br />

approval of the activities of all water undertakings that are under the area of regulation of<br />

the Competition Authority. The said Instructions may also be used upon the approval of<br />

prices of the water service by local governments. While preparing the Instructions, the<br />

Competition Authority asked for the opinion of different institutions and water<br />

undertakings, and during the process more than 200 opinions and questions were submitted<br />

to the Competition Authority. The Competition Authority has provided its answers to the<br />

submitted opinions and the generated discussion in a document “Explanations of the<br />

Competition Authority on Instructions to water undertakings “Recommended principles of<br />

calculating the price of the water service”” that the Competition Authority has published on<br />

its website.<br />

Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, the Competition Authority has the right to<br />

determine the form of procedural acts based on the right of discretion, based on which the<br />

price application forms (hereinafter referred to as the Questionnaires) “Detailed<br />

questionnaire to water undertakings” and “Simplified questionnaire to water undertakings”<br />

have been prepared and published. Upon filling out the Questionnaires, a water undertaking<br />

can be guided by the “Instructions for the submission of a price application”.<br />

If a lower price of the water service has been established for natural persons than to legal<br />

persons, then pursuant to the requirements of equal treatment the water undertaking is<br />

required to start minimising the price difference, but not faster than during a period of 15<br />

years. The Competition Authority has prepared the “Model for minimisation of the price<br />

difference of the water service” and published the document on its website. In the year <strong>2010</strong><br />

the Competition Authority did not receive any properly formed price applications of the<br />

water service or applications for the approval of calculation methods of accession fees.<br />

Nevertheless, there were numerous inquiries from water undertakings and consumers<br />

regarding the new wording of the Public Water Supply and Sewerage Act.<br />

50


DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS MARKET IN<br />

THE YEAR <strong>2010</strong><br />

Similar to earlier years, the developments occurring in the Estonian market of electronic<br />

communications were also affected by global processes in the year <strong>2010</strong>. For the third<br />

year in a row, the turnover of electronic communications decreased, but compared to the<br />

record braking year of 2007, the decrease was only 3.9%. At the same time, the decrease<br />

was not only caused by the economic recession, but also by intense competition and<br />

market regulation.<br />

It is possible to support the sustainability of the electronic communications sector by<br />

ensuring efficient competition, and any regulatory intervention of the Competition<br />

Authority must be well reasoned, as excessive measures may have a negative effect on the<br />

development of the sector. Data of the year <strong>2010</strong> indicates that regulatory intervention is<br />

still necessary in several electronic communications markets and the applied measures have<br />

contributed to an improvement of the competition situation. Regulatory intervention also<br />

supported the price stability in the retail market during rapid economic growth and when<br />

the consumer price index was quickly increasing.<br />

The electronic communications market of the year <strong>2010</strong> was predominantly characterised<br />

by:<br />

turnover decrease of the interconnection service;<br />

continuous but minimum growth of the data communication service and mobile data<br />

communications;<br />

stabilisation of cable television service volumes.<br />

The estimated turnover of telecommunication services provided by the companies operating<br />

in the market in the year <strong>2010</strong> was approximately 709.4 million euros (11.1 billion kroons),<br />

which corresponds to only a 1% decrease compared to the year 2009. Although the<br />

turnovers of interconnection and mobile communication services decreased, an increase in<br />

the volumes of telephone and other services had an overall positive effect on the total<br />

turnover of the sector. Conditionally, the electronic communications sector can be divided<br />

into eight market segments: telephone, mobile telephone, data communications, fixed line,<br />

interconnection, access, cable television and other services, incl. broadcasting and radio<br />

communications.<br />

51


FIGURE 5 Division of the total turnover of the electronic communications sector in the years<br />

2009 and <strong>2010</strong> by services.<br />

Compared to the year 2009, the share of the total turnover of telephone services increased in<br />

the market of electronic communications from 12% to 14%. The biggest providers of the<br />

telephone service were Elion Ettevõtted Aktsiaselts (hereinafter referred to as Elion),<br />

Telefant AS (hereinafter referred to as Telefant), STV AS (hereinafter referred to as STV)<br />

and AS Starman (hereinafter referred to as Starman). The number of end-users of the<br />

telephone service decreased during the year by 22,000 consumers. The retail market of the<br />

mobile telephone service was characterised by a slight decrease in turnover, but the<br />

number of end-users of the service increased by approximately 5.1%. The service market<br />

had reached the developed market state where the existing client base is being redistributed<br />

between service providers. Within the total turnover of the electronic communications<br />

market, the market of the mobile telephone service decreased by 1% compared to the year<br />

2009. The market of the interconnection service involves the interconnection services of<br />

the fixed telephone networks as well as mobile telephone networks. The share of the<br />

above mentioned market in the total turnover of the electronic communications market<br />

decreased compared to the previous year by 1.5%, whereas the turnover of the<br />

interconnection service decreased over the course of the year by 11.9%. The decrease of<br />

turnover was greatly affected by a continuous decrease of call termination charges that<br />

originated from a regulatory intervention of the Competition Authority. The turnover of<br />

the access service decreased and added up to only a minimum share of the total turnover<br />

52


of the electronic communications market, reaching a mere 0.1%. The number of end-users<br />

of fixed broadband service in the data communications market continued to increase,<br />

growing during the course of the year by 3.5%, however the service turnover decreased by<br />

2.2% at the same time. Compared to earlier years, the growth of the number of end-users<br />

has slowed down and the reasons for such a decrease in growth may be related to the<br />

economic recession. At the same time, the fixed broadband service segment suffers from<br />

increasing competition from the mobile broadband technology. The market of the fixed<br />

line service in the electronic communications sector has one of the smallest volumes<br />

where the consumption remained on the same level compared to the year 2009. The<br />

turnover of the cable television service also remained on the same level. Nevertheless,<br />

undertakings continuously invest in cable television networks to widen their coverage area<br />

and offer the consumers new and high-quality package services.<br />

Developments in the data communications market<br />

The data communications retail market is a rapidly growing and developing market with 79<br />

active service providers as of 31.12.<strong>2010</strong>, of which Elion, Starman, STV and Televõrgu AS<br />

are the biggest. The number of end-users of the broadband service increased compared to<br />

the year 2009 by 3.5% (without taking into account the mobile broadband connection).<br />

FIGURE 6 Use of the broadband service by technologies in 2004-<strong>2010</strong>.<br />

Competition increased in the said market mostly between the undertakings that own<br />

network infrastructure. Of the biggest service providers, Elion mostly provided the ADSL<br />

service and cable television undertakings Starman and STV provided fixed broadband<br />

service over cable modems or fibre optic networks. 81% of the end-users consumed the<br />

broadband services of Elion, Starman and STV and the total volume of the market share of<br />

53


these market participants has decreased minimally over the year. Since the year 2009, the<br />

Competition Authority also started to collect data on the number of such users of the mobile<br />

broadband service who use the service predominantly for accessing the Internet from their<br />

computers (over data communication terminals, USB modems, etc.). The mobile broadband<br />

connection offers increasing competition to fixed data communications, as the service prices<br />

and connection speeds are comparable and sometimes even more favourable compared to<br />

the prices of fixed data connections. Total substitution is yet hindered by volume limitations<br />

and ensuring of the speed of connection. The number of users of the mobile broadband<br />

service increased over the course of the year more than three-fold, reaching 70,000 by the<br />

end of the year <strong>2010</strong>.<br />

On the broadband market, services were mostly provided over the telephone network, fibre<br />

optic network and cable television networks. Compared to the year 2009, the number of<br />

xDSL end-users increased by 11% and the number of end-users of fibre optics increased by<br />

4%, whereas the number of users of cable modems decreased by 3%. Although so far, the<br />

number of end-users of the broadband service provided over radio communications has<br />

increased rapidly since the year 2008 (38% increase in 2008 and 8% in 2009), the year <strong>2010</strong><br />

brought about a 5% decrease in this segment. The number of end-users of xDSL, cable<br />

modem and fibre optic based broadband services amounted to 84% of all broadband users<br />

by the end of the year <strong>2010</strong>. As of the end of the year, the estimated number of users of the<br />

broadband service amounted to 55% of all households.<br />

FIGURE 7 Change of the number of users of the broadband service over the years 2004–<strong>2010</strong>.<br />

The end-users increasingly use different services in a parallel manner (the broadband,<br />

telephone, cable television and mobile telephone services), which also increases the<br />

popularity of Bundled communication services where one monthly fee allows a consumer to<br />

use at least two communications services. As of the end of the year <strong>2010</strong>, a similar Bundled<br />

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services was used by approximately 70% of consumers. The Bundled services are often more<br />

attractively priced than the broadband service separately.<br />

The data communications wholesale markets can be divided into two segments: markets of<br />

copper pair access and broadband access. On these markets, the Competition Authority has<br />

declared Elion an undertaking with significant market power and the services of this<br />

company have been subject to access, equal treatment, transparency and price obligations<br />

since the year 2007. In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the number of access lines given to the use of other<br />

service providers started to decrease, shrinking by 4.5% during the year. By the end of the<br />

year <strong>2010</strong>, the supply of the broadband access service had also decreased by 19%. The<br />

turnover of access services was practically equal to the level of the year 2009. Compared to<br />

the year 2009, the monthly fee for the copper pair access increased by 15% and the monthly<br />

fee for the selected copper pair access increased by 3%. Depending on the speed of the<br />

broadband connection, the monthly fees for broadband access decreased by up to 50%.<br />

FIGURE 8 Number of access lines given to the use of other service providers in the years<br />

2004-<strong>2010</strong>.<br />

Developments in the cable television service market<br />

In the year <strong>2010</strong>, 15 operators were active in the cable television service market (including<br />

the IPTV service), of which Starman, STV and Elion were the biggest. Elion’s market entry<br />

in the year 2005 quickened the increase of the number of end-users and the overall<br />

development in the otherwise relatively stable market, while trends also continued in the<br />

year <strong>2010</strong> in relation to the transition to digital television. Compared to the year 2009, the<br />

number of end-users of the cable television service increased by 5.3% or approximately<br />

17,000 consumers. Accordingly, the market shares of service providers changed to some<br />

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degree. Elion has significantly increased the availability of the IPTV service through its<br />

communications network.<br />

FIGURE 9 Division of market shares of providers of cable television services based on the<br />

number of end-users, 2004-<strong>2010</strong><br />

Developments in the public mobile telephone service market<br />

The consolidated data of the retail market of the public mobile telephone service indicated<br />

relative stability in the year <strong>2010</strong>. Nevertheless, this market is the most competitive in the<br />

electronic communications sector, as three of the biggest operators are vigorously competing<br />

against each other for clients. During the year, three network operators operated in the<br />

public mobile telephone service market: AS EMT (hereinafter referred to as EMT), Tele2<br />

Eesti AS (hereinafter referred to as Tele2) and Elisa Eesti AS (hereinafter referred to as<br />

Elisa); there were also two virtual providers of the public mobile telephone service:<br />

ProGroup Holding OÜ and Top Connect OÜ. ProGroup Holding OÜ ended the provision<br />

of services to GSM consumers on1 November, and delivered all of its clients to Elisa. The<br />

number of end-users did not increase significantly in the year <strong>2010</strong>, remaining on the level<br />

of a 5.2% increase.<br />

The number of contractual end-users increased compared to the year 2009 by 2.5% and the<br />

number of end-users of prepaid calling cards increased during the same period by 10.6% (see<br />

figure 10).<br />

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FIGURE 10 Change of the number of contractual end-users and end-users of prepaid calling<br />

cards of the public mobile telephone service during the years 2004–<strong>2010</strong><br />

FIGURE 11 Density of end-users of the public mobile telephone service per 100 residents during<br />

the years 2001-<strong>2010</strong><br />

The number of end-users’ started minutes in a public mobile telephone network increased in<br />

the year <strong>2010</strong> by 10%. At the same time, the number of calling minutes initiated in a<br />

telephone network decreased by 4%. Therefore, end-users still consider the public mobile<br />

telephone service as the preferred way of consuming voice services, however the decrease of<br />

the number of minutes initiated from a telephone network has slowed down. Calls initiated<br />

from mobile telephone networks make up 74% of all initiated calls and only 26% of calls are<br />

initiated from a telephone network.<br />

Development of mobile data communication services and 3G/3.5G networks resulted in a<br />

rapid growth of the consumption of data communication services provided through GPRS<br />

and 3G/3.5G networks also in the year <strong>2010</strong>. Compared to the total volumes of the year<br />

2009, the total volume of the year <strong>2010</strong> increased four-fold.<br />

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The following significant developments in the provision of the service deserve mentioning:<br />

1) the operators significantly expanded the coverage area of their 3.5G networks where endusers<br />

can use broadband services with speeds comparable to the fixed connection (2-42<br />

Mbit/s), providing the broadband service also to residents of areas which are beyond the<br />

reach of fixed network connections. Starting from 30 December, EMT increased the<br />

download speed in its 3.5G network to 42 Mbit/s. Starting from the beginning of the year<br />

2011, Tele2 increased the maximum download speed in its network to 21.6 Mbit/s;<br />

2) all operators opened their fourth generation LTE (Long Term Evolution) 2.6GHz test<br />

networks that are particularly suitable for covering densely populated areas, as they<br />

provide five-fold faster download speeds compared to the current 3G+ technology. On 16<br />

December <strong>2010</strong>, EMT opened Estonia’s first 4G mobile communications network,<br />

making Estonia the eleventh country in the world where the 4G network is open for endusers.<br />

3) operators organised a joint campaign to increase the users’ awareness of the necessity and<br />

simplicity of the use of the mobiil-ID solution. This solution allows the same transactions<br />

as the ID-card – digitally sign various contracts; log onto internet banking systems and<br />

participate in elections. Mobiil-ID has been used in Estonia since the year 2007 and has<br />

been used for making over four million transactions.<br />

Estonia is fifth in the world on the Broadband Quality Score and fourteenth place on the<br />

broadband service quality score, outscoring close neighbours such as Finland (27th place),<br />

Lithuania (38th place) and Latvia (51st place).<br />

On the mobile telephone networks interconnection market, market shares are divided<br />

between operators in a more uniform manner than in the interconnection markets of<br />

telephone networks, which is a phenomenon that can be explained by a more intense<br />

competition in the public mobile telephone service retail market.<br />

Compared to the year 2009, the number of call minutes terminated in mobile telephone<br />

networks (including calls made from fixed telephone networks, international, inter and intra<br />

network calls) increased in the year <strong>2010</strong> by 2.5%.<br />

Since July <strong>2010</strong>, the upper limit of the termination price of voice calls, established to<br />

Estonian public mobile telephone network operators by the Competition Authority, is 0.078<br />

EUR/min (1.22 kroons/min), which will decrease by 10% from July 2011.<br />

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FIGURE 12 Prices of mobile telephone network interconnection services in the EU,<br />

kroons/min. Source: ERG<br />

Developments in the market of telephone services<br />

In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the biggest service providers in the telephone service market were Elion,<br />

Tele2 and Starman.<br />

The year was characterised by a decrease of the number of end-users of the telephone<br />

service market (5.8%), whereas the number of customer lines used also decreased by 2%.<br />

The telephone service market is a market which is decreasing in the long-term. In the year<br />

<strong>2010</strong>, the number of calls initiated from telephone networks decreased by approximately<br />

4%.<br />

FIGURE 13 Change of the number of users of the telephone service over the years 2004-<strong>2010</strong>.<br />

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In the year <strong>2010</strong>, Elion was an undertaking with significant market power (hereinafter<br />

referred to as USMP) in the interconnection service market. Accordingly, the company was<br />

also subject to special obligations, incl. the obligations of providing the interconnection, call<br />

origination and termination services. Elion was also subject to price control of the above<br />

listed services (obligation to follow the cost-oriented principle). The other service providers<br />

are USMP-s (a total of 10 communication undertakings) in the call termination market.<br />

The fixed communications networks’ interconnection market is deemed to consist of<br />

(telephone) networks that are used to provide the interconnection service that is necessary<br />

for the function of the voice communications service. The biggest companies operating in<br />

this market are Elion, Elisa, Starman and Top Connect. The total number of call minutes<br />

terminated in a fixed communications network decreased in the year <strong>2010</strong> by 3% (see figure<br />

14).<br />

FIGURE 14 Change of the volume of call minutes terminated between fixed communications<br />

networks of Estonia in the years 2004-<strong>2010</strong><br />

In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the prices of initiation and termination of calls in a fixed location of the<br />

telephone network of Elion decreased by approximately 5% on the national level and<br />

approximately 20% on the local level. Prices of other communication undertakings did not<br />

change.<br />

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Universal service<br />

Universal service is a set of services which conforms to the technical and quality<br />

requirements established by the EU law, which is of a specified quality and available to all<br />

end-users requesting it, regardless of their geographical location, uniformly and at an<br />

affordable price. The universal service includes the following:<br />

1) connection to the public telephone network;<br />

2) public pay-phone service;<br />

3) accessibility of a universal electronic Public Number Directory and directory enquiry<br />

services.<br />

31. As of 31 December <strong>2010</strong>, there was one company in Estonia that was required to<br />

provide the universal service – Elisa – and there were 11 end-users of the universal service.<br />

The universal service must enable originating and receiving national and international calls,<br />

sending and receipt of faxes and a data communication service with a download speed of up<br />

to 556kbit/s. Elion ended provision of the public pay-phone service on 1 December.<br />

There is a well-functioning competition in Estonia relating to universal electronic Public<br />

Number Directory and directory enquiry services. There are various databases of telephone<br />

and mobile telephone users freely available on the Internet. These services are reasonably<br />

available on the entire territory of Estonia and the needs of end-users are sufficiently<br />

covered. For this reason, there is no need to dedicate a provider of the universal service for<br />

the public pay-phone service and/or universal electronic Public Number Directory and<br />

directory enquiry services.<br />

Fixed line service market<br />

The fixed line service market is volume-wise among the smallest of all electronic<br />

communications markets. The turnover of the service has decreased by 5% over the last<br />

year. The number of fixed lines decreased in the year <strong>2010</strong> by 9%.<br />

In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the fixed line service was provided by 10 operators, of which Elion and<br />

Televõrgu AS were the biggest.<br />

Regulated prices did not change in the fixed line market during the year.<br />

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FIGURE 15 Change of the number of fixed lines in the years 2004–<strong>2010</strong>.<br />

Analyses of the communications market conducted in the year <strong>2010</strong><br />

Pursuant to § 41 and 44 of the Electronic Communications Act (hereinafter referred to as<br />

ECA) the Competition Authority analyses regularly, but not less frequently than once<br />

every three years, the competitive situation in the communications services markets,<br />

being guided by the directions of the European Commission and rulings of the European<br />

Court of Justice. The Competition Authority has the right to determine undertakings<br />

with significant market power in these markets and apply to them regulatory measures<br />

prescribed by law.<br />

In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the Competition Authority conducted market analyses in the markets of<br />

communications services, being guided by the Commission Recommendation of 17.12.2007<br />

on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector<br />

susceptible to Ex ante regulation 8 (hereinafter referred to as the recommendation), the annex<br />

to which defines seven electronic communications markets.<br />

In March <strong>2010</strong>, decisions of the Competition Authority entered into force in the markets of<br />

initiation and termination of calls in a telephone network. The Competition Authority<br />

identified Elion as an undertaking with significant market power in the market of initiation<br />

of calls in a telephone network, and Elioni, Elisa, Eleks Telefon OÜ, Starman, STV,<br />

Televõrk, Linxtelecom Estonia OÜ, Top Connect, State Infocommunication Foundation<br />

and ProGroup Holding in the market of termination of calls in a telephone network.<br />

8 Commission Recommendation of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service markets within<br />

the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive<br />

2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for<br />

electronic communications networks and services. OJ L 344, 28.12.2007 P. 0065 – 0069.<br />

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Upon the establishment of price obligation in the market of termination of calls in a<br />

telephone network, the Competition Authority was guided also by the principle of efficiency<br />

and symmetrical prices which has been provided for the service of termination of calls in a<br />

telephone network by the Commission Recommendation of 07.05.2009 on the Regulatory<br />

Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU. Pursuant to this principle, all<br />

undertakings with significant market power operating in this market must apply an identical<br />

price which is the call termination price in the telephone network of Elion, calculated based<br />

on the cost accounting methodology established by the Competition Authority. As a result<br />

of the established cost accounting methodology, call termination prices significantly<br />

dropped in the networks of Elisa and ProGroup Holding, whereas the prices of other<br />

communication undertakings remained on the same level.<br />

In March <strong>2010</strong>, a decision of the Competition Authority entered into force relating to<br />

private and business customers on the market of access to a telephone network in a fixed<br />

location. The Competition Authority found that it is not necessary to prescribe obligations<br />

which are significantly more encumbering than the existing obligations to Elion. Pursuant<br />

to the decision, Elion must allow end-users to access the services of a telephone service<br />

provider interconnected to its network through dialling a carrier access code and using the<br />

preselection of the telephone service provider. At the same time, the end-user must be able<br />

to cancel a previous selection separately for each call when using the carrier access code.<br />

With a decision of the Competition Authority, Elion was declared an undertaking with<br />

significant market power in the wholesale market of fixed line terminating segments and<br />

access, non-discrimination, transparency and price obligations of an undertaking with<br />

significant market power were prescribed.<br />

In the trunk segment wholesale market, Elion was not deemed an undertaking with<br />

significant market power, because the results of the carried-out market analysis indicated<br />

that the competition situation has significantly improved in the fixed line trunk segment<br />

wholesale market. For this reason, continuation with sector specific regulations in this<br />

market was not reasoned and Elion’s obligations of an undertaking with significant market<br />

power were deemed invalid in this market.<br />

In the year <strong>2010</strong>, a market analysis was also started in the broadcasting service market and a<br />

respective draft decision corresponding to the analysis was sent to national consultations in<br />

November <strong>2010</strong>. As a result of the conducted market analysis, the Competition Authority<br />

found that AS Levira has significant market power in the said market. The Competition<br />

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Authority has proposed to declare AS Levira an undertaking with significant market power<br />

to which the obligations of an undertaking with significant market power were prescribed.<br />

In the year 2011, the Competition Authority continues to conduct market analyses. The<br />

next market analysis will be conducted in the market of call termination in the public mobile<br />

telephone network. Consultations with communication undertakings for the acquisition of<br />

data necessary for market analyses will also continue.<br />

Supervision in the sector of electronic communications<br />

Although communication undertakings submitted several complaints regarding enabling of<br />

access to Elion’s Cable ducts in the years 2008 – 2009, there were no such disputes in the<br />

year <strong>2010</strong>. There were also no other disputes relating to access to communication networks.<br />

At the same time, the Competition Authority participated as a conciliator in several disputes<br />

arisen between communication undertakings that were mostly caused by insufficient<br />

communication between the companies. As a final result, the disputes reached solutions<br />

that satisfied all parties.<br />

The Competition Authority conducted six price and cost accounting supervision<br />

proceedings relating to undertakings with significant market power. Three of these<br />

proceedings related to Elion, one to ProGroup Holding, one to Starman and one to the<br />

communication services of Levira.<br />

Conflicts with the established methodology were identified in the price and cost accounting<br />

procedures of Elion's copper pair access service, relating to the fact an injunction was made<br />

in October <strong>2010</strong>. Elion challenged the said injunction in the administrative court. The<br />

challenge constitutes a dispute whether the calculation principles of the total volume of the<br />

service used under a unit of a monthly fee of the copper pair access service comply with the<br />

established methodology. The court proceedings will continue in the year 2011.<br />

A final solution was achieved by court proceedings relating to Elisa’s complaints regarding<br />

the price obligation established to it in the mobile telephone termination market and<br />

regarding its prescribed status as an undertaking with significant market power in the<br />

telephone network’s call termination market. Pursuant to a ruling of the Tallinn<br />

Administrative Court of 18 August <strong>2010</strong>, the complaint of Elisa regarding its price<br />

obligation established in the mobile telephone termination market was unsatisfied. Elisa<br />

waived its complaint on its prescribed status as an undertaking with significant market<br />

power in the telephone network’s call termination market and the case was deemed closed<br />

with the decision of the Tallinn Administrative Court of 12 October <strong>2010</strong>.<br />

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Amendment of the Electronic Communications Act<br />

In the year <strong>2010</strong>, a process of preparation of the draft Act to Amend Electronic<br />

Communications Act was started due to a need to ensure compliance of the ECA with the<br />

amendment package of the year 2009 to the internal market directives of the European<br />

Parliament and the Council. The need of amending the act also originated from the general<br />

development of the electronic communications sector, aiming to ensure the smooth and<br />

flawless regulation of the sector.<br />

To facilitate preparation of the draft Act, specialists from the Competition Authority were<br />

also included in the workgroup established by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and<br />

Communications.<br />

As an exceptional measure, a possibility is provided with the draft to establish an obligation<br />

to an undertaking with significant market power to ensure function-based separation only if<br />

the obligations previously prescribed to that undertaking have not yielded desired results.<br />

Function-based separation allows improvement of competition in several relevant markets,<br />

significantly decreasing discrimination causes and simplifying the verification and ensuring<br />

the obligation of equal treatment.<br />

The draft introduces a requirement for the Competition Authority to consult with the Body<br />

of European Regulators for Electronic Communications. The Competition Authority is also<br />

required to advance the investments of communications undertakings into next generation<br />

communications networks (Next Generation Network – NGN), contributing to increasing the<br />

availability of broadband (data communications) to end-users. The draft also prescribes the<br />

right of the Competition Authority to provide statistical information to interested parties<br />

based on their requests about the number of clients of public electronic communications<br />

services provided on the retail level by communications undertakings, and about the market<br />

shares calculated based on the number of clients of the communications undertaking<br />

providing the service. It is significant that although it is not possible to reveal these data<br />

based on the current ECA, the draft no longer interprets the said information as a business<br />

secret.<br />

65


POSTAL SERVICES<br />

The year <strong>2010</strong> did not bring about any significant changes in the postal services market.<br />

The universal postal service (hereinafter referred to as UPS) was provided for affordable<br />

fees defined by the Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications. In order to<br />

compensate for any possible unreasonably encumbering costs that the providers of UPS<br />

may bear, the funding obligation was borne by the companies providing postal services<br />

based on activity licences.<br />

D2D terminated its activities in the year <strong>2010</strong> and therefore there were two providers of<br />

postal services with a financing obligation in <strong>2010</strong> (AS Eesti Post hereinafter referred to as<br />

Eesti Post and AS Express Post hereinafter referred to as Express Post). No activity licence<br />

applications were submitted for the provision of postal services.<br />

There were also no significant changes in the market of such postal services that do not<br />

require an activity licence in the year <strong>2010</strong>. Similar to previous years, a few providers of<br />

courier services were removed from the register of economic activities, because they no<br />

longer provided the service. At the same time, five new providers of courier services, two<br />

direct mailing service providers and one forwarder of periodicals were registered in the year<br />

<strong>2010</strong>.<br />

As of 31 December <strong>2010</strong>, there were 38 providers of one or more postal services registered<br />

in the register of economic activities. There was one provider of UPS (pursuant to the Postal<br />

Act there can only be one such provider), two licensed forwarders of items of<br />

correspondence, one licensed forwarder of postal parcels, 35 providers of courier services,<br />

10 providers of the direct mail service and six forwarders of periodicals. However, not all of<br />

the above mentioned undertakings provided postal services in reality.<br />

Pursuant to its five-year activity licence, Eesti Post was also the provider of UPS in the year<br />

<strong>2010</strong>. Eesti Post used its right, arising from the Postal Act, to send quarterly applications to<br />

the Competition Authority for receiving compensation for unreasonably encumbering costs<br />

arising from the obligation to provide UPS. Proceedings relating to the applications of the<br />

year <strong>2010</strong> are still not completed, because the company has failed to explain the emergence<br />

of unreasonably encumbering costs (throughout different quarters, the company has<br />

continuously changed its cost allocation principles, it has failed to take into account the<br />

Competition Authority’s “Methodology of valuation of costs of the provider of universal<br />

postal service”, and upon finding a reserve volume, the company has not been guided by<br />

66


egulation No. 20 of the Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications of 06.03.2009<br />

“Requirements to revenue and cost accounting of the provider of universal postal service”).<br />

Pursuant to the Postal Act, at least 90 per cent of items of correspondence forwarded as<br />

ordinary items which are deposited with the UPS provider shall be delivered to the<br />

addressee during the day after deposit. A UPS provider ensures that a person independent of<br />

the service provider inspects compliance of the UPS with the quality requirements. In<br />

addition, the Competition Authority carries out annual verification. A verification mailing<br />

carried out in the year <strong>2010</strong> from July to October identified that the delivery quality of items<br />

of correspondence complies with the provisions of § 37 subsection 5 of the Postal Act.<br />

FIGURE 16 Quality of delivery of items of correspondence in the year <strong>2010</strong>.<br />

Upon verification of delivery, 826 of the total 900 mailed items of correspondence that were<br />

being accounted for were delivered to the addressee in due time, meaning that the share of<br />

mailed items delivered in time equalled to 91.8%. 6.5% or 59 items of correspondence were<br />

67


delivered to the addressee a day later. 1.1% or 10 items of correspondence reached the<br />

mailboxes of their addressees with a delay of two days or more (see figure 16).<br />

As mentioned, two undertakings were licensed to provide different postal services in the<br />

year <strong>2010</strong> – Eesti Post and Express Post. The activity licence prescribes the minimum<br />

number of access points of the provider of postal services. It means that a provider of postal<br />

services may have more access points, but in order to decrease the minimum supply, it must<br />

submit a respective reasoned application to the Competition Authority. A prerequisite of<br />

satisfying the application is compliance with the requirements of the Postal Act. As of 31<br />

December <strong>2010</strong>, the minimum number of access points prescribed by the activity licences<br />

was 3447, of which 347 were postal offices and 3100 mailboxes. Only Eesti Post had<br />

mailboxes. Pursuant to activity licences, postal offices were divided between Eesti Post and<br />

Express Post correspondingly – 344 and 3.<br />

No postal offices were being used jointly by the licensed providers of postal services in the<br />

year <strong>2010</strong>. The minimum number of postal offices of the companies as prescribed by activity<br />

licences is shown in table 1.<br />

Tabel 1 Minimum number of postal offices of companies possessing activity licences<br />

Provider of postal services As of 31.12.2009 As of 31.12.<strong>2010</strong><br />

Eesti Post 351 344<br />

Express Post 3 3<br />

In the year <strong>2010</strong>, proceedings continued regarding applications submitted by Eesti Post on<br />

04.08.2009, whereby Eesti Post wished to establish the minimum number of UPS postal<br />

offices to equal 344. Eesti Post reasoned the proposal with modernisation of the postal<br />

network and added that it would allow Eesti Post to choose more flexible open hours,<br />

contributing thereby to finding franchise partners and decreasing losses.<br />

In its application, Eesti Post mentioned that during the course of preparation for the<br />

decrease in the minimum number of postal offices it had analysed the postal offices’<br />

locations, demand for postal services and service profitability, and as a result of the analysis<br />

the company had prepared a list of possible postal offices where Eesti Post would have to<br />

find alternative means of presence in the future.<br />

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The vision of Eesti Post, the tasks of the stationary postal office will be carried out in the<br />

areas referred to in the application by a franchise partner and the so called motorised<br />

delivery is handled by Eesti Post. In case of motorised delivery, an employee of Eesti Post is<br />

sent to the place of residence or work of the user of postal services, where UPS is provided<br />

to the client.<br />

In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the Competition Authority continued proceedings relating to seven postal<br />

offices mentioned in the application of Eesti Post. The proceedings were delayed due to the<br />

failure of the motorised delivery service of Eesti Post to function in low density areas. Eesti<br />

Post failed to comply with the requirements established to the provision of UPS by means of<br />

the motorised delivery service. The motorised delivery service did not allow postal parcels to<br />

be accurately weighed. In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the Competition Authority repeatedly audited the<br />

provision of UPS by means of motorised delivery, and it became evident that the quality of<br />

the service has improved considerably. Hence, the Competition Authority satisfied the<br />

application of Eesti Post and the minimum number of UPS postal offices was decreased to<br />

344.<br />

As of 31 December <strong>2010</strong>, the Competition Authority lacked information about possible<br />

deterioration or obstruction of UPS as a result of the reorganisation of the postal network by<br />

the provider of UPS.<br />

The number of complaints submitted on postal services increased mostly in relation to<br />

Internet shopping. Various problems were associated with international postal<br />

consignments, returning of postal consignments to the sender due to expiry of storage time,<br />

tracing in foreign countries, improper addressing of consignments, sending of forbidden<br />

items, etc.<br />

The main conclusions drawn from the complaints:<br />

the provider of postal services cannot ex post facto attribute any such flaws to a postal<br />

consignment upon its loss or damage that were not identified upon its receipt;<br />

the provider of postal services cannot be held liable upon the loss or damage of an<br />

ordinary letter. As the path of an ordinary letter is not registered, an ordinary letter<br />

cannot be traced or tracked, and identification of the location where the ordinary letter<br />

might have been lost is impossible;<br />

the Postal Act does not regulate forwarding of unaddressed advertisements.<br />

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