ANNUAL REPORT 2010 - Konkurentsiamet
ANNUAL REPORT 2010 - Konkurentsiamet
ANNUAL REPORT 2010 - Konkurentsiamet
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<strong>ANNUAL</strong><br />
<strong>REPORT</strong><br />
Estonian<br />
Competition<br />
Authority <strong>2010</strong>
CONTACT<br />
Auna 6<br />
10317 Tallinn<br />
Phone: (+372) 667 2400<br />
Fax: (+372) 667 2401<br />
E-mail: info@konkurentsiamet.ee<br />
Homepage: www.konkurentsiamet.ee<br />
Director General<br />
Märt Ots<br />
E-mail: mart.ots@konkurentsiamet.ee<br />
Head of the Competition Division – Deputy Director General<br />
Kristel Rõõmusaar<br />
E-mail: kristel.roomusaar@konkurentsiamet.ee<br />
Head of the Energy and Water Regulatory Division<br />
Külli Haab<br />
E-mail: kylli.haab@konkurentsiamet.ee<br />
Head of the Railway and Communications Division – Deputy Director General<br />
Margus Kasepalu<br />
E-mail: margus.kasepalu@konkurentsiamet.ee<br />
Head of the External and Public Relations Department<br />
Maarja Uulits<br />
E-mail: maarja.uulits@konkurentsiamet.ee
CONTENTS<br />
FOREWORD ....................................................................................................... 3<br />
HIGHLIGHTS ..................................................................................................... 5<br />
ORGANISATION ................................................................................................. 6<br />
STRUCTURE 6<br />
PERSONNEL AND BUDGET 7<br />
EXTERNAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS .................................................................. 8<br />
CHANGES IN LEGISLATION .............................................................................. 10<br />
ESTABLISHMENT OF PRICE RESTRICTIONS ON THE MONOPOLIES ACT 10<br />
LENIENCY PROGRAMME 15<br />
BLOCK EXEMPTIONS 17<br />
YEAR <strong>2010</strong> IN THE COMPETITION DIVISION ...................................................... 19<br />
COMPETITION SUPERVISION 19<br />
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY RELATED TO THE ISSUING OF<br />
LINE PERMITS 23<br />
PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENT OF THE FUNDED PENSIONS ACT 25<br />
RECOMMENDATION TO THE TALLINN CITY GOVERNMENT FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF<br />
THE COMPETITION SITUATION IN THE FIELD OF WASTE HANDLING 26<br />
ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY OF THE SUPPORT FOR RENEWABLE<br />
ENERGY SOURCES 28<br />
CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS 31<br />
YEAR <strong>2010</strong> IN THE ENERGY AND WATER REGULATORY DIVISION ..................... 33<br />
OPENING OF THE ELECTRICITY MARKET 34<br />
ACTIVATION OF THE POWER EXCHANGE AND OVERVIEW OF TRADING 37<br />
REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY NETWORK OPERATORS 39<br />
SUPPLY DEPENDABILITY OF NATURAL GAS 40<br />
PRICE REGULATION OF HEATING UNDERTAKINGS 45<br />
SUPERVISION PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO STORAGE OF RESERVE FUEL 46<br />
DISPUTES OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS 47<br />
PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM 49<br />
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS MARKET IN THE YEAR<br />
<strong>2010</strong> ................................................................................................................. 51<br />
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DATA COMMUNICATIONS MARKET 53<br />
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CABLE TELEVISION SERVICE MARKET 55<br />
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PUBLIC MOBILE TELEPHONE SERVICE MARKET 56<br />
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MARKET OF TELEPHONE SERVICES 59<br />
UNIVERSAL SERVICE 61<br />
FIXED LINE SERVICE MARKET 61<br />
ANALYSES OF THE COMMUNICATIONS MARKET CONDUCTED IN THE YEAR <strong>2010</strong> 62<br />
AMENDMENT OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS ACT 65<br />
POSTAL SERVICES ............................................................................................ 66
FOREWORD<br />
Dear Reader,<br />
The year <strong>2010</strong> was the third year of activity for the new Competition Authority. The general<br />
economic development in <strong>2010</strong> can be characterised by the preparation for adopting the<br />
euro, the end of the economic depression and the first signs of economic recovery, but also<br />
continually high unemployment and accelerating inflation.<br />
Adopting the European single currency undoubtedly has a significant meaning. Besides being<br />
the means of payment, the Estonian kroon was the symbol of our independence, freedom and<br />
cultural self-awareness. It is a little sad that we can no longer keep banknotes with pictures of<br />
our luminaries – Jakobson, Koidula, Tobias, Tammsaare, Hurt, Keres, Baer, Raud - in our<br />
wallets. Nevertheless, I am still convinced that our cultural memory is strong enough and<br />
important people from our history will not become less significant.<br />
At the same time, adopting the euro and becoming a full member of the OECD are essential<br />
for integration. Now we are in a position to state that the more than a century-old dream of<br />
Mr Gustav Suits: “Let us remain Estonians, but let us also become Europeans!” has been<br />
fulfilled. I am convinced that our national security is also more stable today than ever before.<br />
Being a member of NATO, the EU as well as the OECD and having a global currency as the<br />
means of payment raises the question as to what is next. It seems that we have accomplished<br />
all and one may doubt if we have any destinations remaining. There is an answer to the last<br />
question. We do have many high goals to follow – economic welfare, wealth, and higher<br />
Human Development Index, just to name a few. Estonia is not among the wealthiest countries<br />
in the EU, GDP per capita is remarkably lower than the EU´s average, and thus it is important<br />
not to rest on your laurels, but keep on moving forward.<br />
The Estonian Competition Authority plays a certain role in order to achieve previously<br />
mentioned goals and to promote economic development and a better business environment.<br />
Here we can review some critical subjects in <strong>2010</strong>. Let us take the price increase of foodstuff as<br />
an example. Estonia is a country with a small and open economy and the price increase on<br />
world markets shortly carries over to our prices. That instantly raises a question if the state and<br />
government have specific means for repressing price increases, and there are not very many<br />
direct options. The turnover tax could be lowered, but that would only provide a short-term<br />
effect, because it is not possible to cut it to zero and below that it would already be direct<br />
subsidising. What the state can do is creating a better business environment. It means that<br />
equal rules apply to all market participants, market barriers for possible new entrants have<br />
3
een removed and the market is not divided with prohibited agreements. It seems somewhat<br />
similar to sports competition. It is not acceptable if an athlete achieves results with the help of<br />
prohibited substances. In the circumstances of free enterprise there should also be fair rules<br />
applied to all. A cartel agreement concluded in order to share a market is the same as doping<br />
in a sports contest and economic results achieved with the help of prohibited agreements are<br />
not accepted. Strengthening the fight against cartels was one of the main accomplishments of<br />
the last year.<br />
In addition, last year will be remembered by the new tasks entrusted to the Competition<br />
Authority for price regulation of larger water companies and all heating companies. We have<br />
always stressed that the best way to reach economic welfare is promoting free competition,<br />
but there are sectors where it is not possible and the monopoly status is inevitably the only<br />
option. Considering the technical development today it is unthinkable for each consumer to<br />
build an individual bore well or establish an individual power station. Therefore the price<br />
regulation of monopoly undertakings is necessary to ensure balance between the interests of<br />
undertakings and consumers. We will also do our best in that area to ensure the development<br />
of undertakings from one side, but from the other side to guarantee the high quality service<br />
for an acceptable price for the consumers.<br />
We hope that the year 2011 will be as successful and the Estonian Competition Authority can<br />
assist the economic development and the growth of consumer welfare.<br />
With best wishes<br />
Märt Ots<br />
Director General<br />
4
HIGHLIGHTS<br />
February 4 - 5<br />
European Regulators Group/Independent Regulators Group<br />
(IRG/ERG) Contact Network Meeting in Tallinn<br />
February 27<br />
An Amendment Act to the Penal Code, Code of Criminal<br />
Procedure and Competition Act entered into force which<br />
introduces a leniency programme.<br />
April 1<br />
Partial electricity market opening in Estonia<br />
June 2 - 3 7 th Regional Competition Conference – the annual meeting<br />
between the competition authorities of the Baltic States, Finland<br />
and Poland in Pärnu<br />
June 4<br />
10 th Baltic Electricity Market Mini-Forum in Kuressaare<br />
November 1<br />
Establishment of Price Restrictions on Monopolies Act entered into<br />
force<br />
November 11<br />
Estonian Competition Day <strong>2010</strong> in Tallinn<br />
December 9<br />
Estonia became the full member of the Organisation for Economic<br />
Co-operation and Development. The Estonian Competition<br />
Authority participates in the work of the OECD Competition<br />
Committee.<br />
5
ORGANISATION<br />
Structure<br />
In <strong>2010</strong> the Competition Authority underwent structural changes, which also meant<br />
changing the names of structural units and to some extent the reallocation of tasks. The<br />
Establishment of Price Restrictions on Monopolies Act that entered into force on November<br />
1, <strong>2010</strong>, brought along additional tasks to the Authority and therefore it was expedient to<br />
implement the certain re-allocation of tasks between structural units. Basically the Authority<br />
continued to operate under the effective function-based structure that enables the units to<br />
closely co-operate by changing expertise concerning specific fields.<br />
According to the statutes of the Competition Authority, the Authority includes three filedbased<br />
divisions, which since 01.11.<strong>2010</strong> are the Competition Division, the Energy and<br />
Water Regulatory Division and the Railway and Communications Regulatory Division. In<br />
addition to the divisions, there is an administrative unit, previously named as the General<br />
Administration Department which is responsible for ensuring effective support services.<br />
Since November <strong>2010</strong> the administrative department has been named the External and<br />
Public Relations Department. The Director General is at the head of the Authority (Figure<br />
1). Structural divisions are directed by the Heads of Divisions, who are at the same time the<br />
Deputy Directors General.<br />
FIGURE 1. Structure of the Competition Authority since 01.11.<strong>2010</strong><br />
6
According to the statutes, the functions of the Authority are divided between structural units<br />
or divisions as follows:<br />
The main functions of the Competition Division are: conducting the proceedings of<br />
complaints and concentration notifications submitted by undertakings; conducting<br />
proceedings of cases on its own initiative; replying to inquiries of undertakings and their<br />
representatives; counselling and raising competition related awareness of the public.<br />
The main functions of the Energy and Water Regulatory Division are: price regulation;<br />
activity licences; market supervision; security of supply and quality control in energy and<br />
water sectors.<br />
The main functions of the Railway and Communications Regulatory Division are<br />
regulating the communications market; monitoring the performance of imposed measures;<br />
monitoring developments on the markets of electronic communications; settlement of<br />
competition and electronic communications related disputes regarding communications<br />
services and networks; regulating the postal market; organising the provision and exercising<br />
the supervision of the universal service; settlement of applications, inquiries and complaints<br />
regarding postal services, perform duties regarding railway regulation.<br />
The main functions of the External and Public Relations Department are: coordination of<br />
the relations between the Authority and the general public; organisation of international<br />
relations; ensuring administrative organisation; organisation of state assets and means in the<br />
possession of the Authority and organising public procurement; ensuring the existence of<br />
tools and inventory; organisation of personnel work and training; preparation of a draft<br />
budget and performance of financial monitoring; organisation of customer service,<br />
document management and administration of archives.<br />
Personnel and budget<br />
The Competition Authority employed 52 persons as of the end of <strong>2010</strong>, 5 new employees<br />
joined the Authority and 2 people left the organisation during the year. The division of<br />
personnel between the structural units was as follows:<br />
External and Public Relations Department<br />
6 persons<br />
Competition Division<br />
19 persons<br />
Energy and Water Regulatory Division<br />
18 persons<br />
Railway and Communications Regulatory Division 16 persons<br />
7
Officials with up to 10 years of public service were the majority. Most staff members have<br />
higher education in economics (business administration, business management, finance,<br />
economics, etc) or in law. The third group of officials consisted of officials with higher<br />
education in other disciplines, such as radio electronics, telecommunications, thermal<br />
energy, public administration or other.<br />
In <strong>2010</strong> the budget of the Competition Authority was approximately 28.6 million Estonian<br />
kroons (approx 1.83 million euros).<br />
EXTERNAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS<br />
As regards external and public relations, <strong>2010</strong> was as busy as usual. Besides the everyday<br />
work in working groups of international organisations, the Estonian Competition<br />
Authority hosted many important events promoting international co-operation. In<br />
addition many officials gave talks or presentations at various Estonian or international<br />
events and responded to numerous inquiries from undertakings and organisations in<br />
Estonia and other states.<br />
The Competition Authority participates in the work of competition, energy,<br />
communications and railway related working groups and unions. During <strong>2010</strong> the officials<br />
of the Competition Division attended meetings and discussions of the ECN (European<br />
Competition Network), the ECA (European Competition Authorities) and the ICN<br />
(International Competition Network) working groups and subgroups. Officials of the<br />
Energy and Water Regulatory Division participated in the meetings of the CEER (Council<br />
of European Energy Regulators) and the ERRA (Energy Regulators Regional Association).<br />
The Railway and Communications Regulatory Division was actively involved in the<br />
organisation comprising European national communications regulators – IRG/ERG<br />
(European Regulators Group/Independent Regulators Group) by taking part in the working<br />
groups of mobile and fixed termination rates, cost accounting, transparency and designation<br />
of undertaking with significant market power.<br />
On the 4 th - 5 th of February the Estonian Competition Authority hosted the IRG/ERG<br />
Contact Network meeting, bringing together representatives from 31 IRG/ERG member<br />
states.<br />
8
The annual meeting between competition authorities from the Baltic States, Finland and<br />
Poland took place in Pärnu on June 2 nd -3 rd . The Regional Competition Conference was<br />
organised for the 7 th time and it has appeared to be a mutually effective format of cooperation,<br />
helping the exchange of experience and know-how in the competition area. Until<br />
<strong>2010</strong> the conference had been divided into two parts – day one was dedicated to a general<br />
panel discussion and the second day focused on the sectoral working groups. However as<br />
the participants have stated that the main value of the conference is rather the exchange of<br />
practical experience on the case handlers level and therefore it was decided to slightly<br />
change the format this year by dedicating most of the time to the discussions in a working<br />
group. In addition, the heads of the competition authorities introduced the latest<br />
developments in legislation and in organisations.<br />
On the 4 th of June the Authority hosted an international Electricity Market Forum in<br />
Kuressaare, which brings together the energy market regulators, undertakings,<br />
representatives from the European Commission and other interested parties to discuss<br />
creating and developing a single electricity market in the Baltic States twice a year. This<br />
year the forum´s core attention was focused on creating a single electricity power exchange<br />
in Estonia and Lithuania, which is a leap towards a single Baltic electricity market. The<br />
Nordic countries presented their experiences in market supervision, overviews of markets<br />
and work done to date was given.<br />
The year can be described by various international lectures in the framework of<br />
development aid projects. The officials of the Authority provided expert advice in Albania,<br />
Georgia, Namibia, Turkey and Ukraine.<br />
Becoming a full member of the OECD in December was a significant milestone for the<br />
Estonian foreign policy in general. The Competition Authority has developed relations with<br />
the OECD Competition Committee, which has over the years actively contributed to the<br />
training of Estonian competition officials.<br />
<strong>2010</strong> was a remarkable year for the Competition Authority, because the public interest<br />
towards the Authority´s work grew to a great extent in connection with the establishment of<br />
various legislative acts and many specific cases attracted extraordinary attention. The<br />
Authority has knowingly made efforts to raise competition related awareness in the society<br />
and the first steps in that area have provided a remarkable result. The Estonian<br />
Competition Day was organised for the second time, which brought together entrepreneurs<br />
9
from different sectors and competition experts. Practitioners from different sectors focused<br />
on subjects that have gained the most attention during the year. The Competition Authority<br />
is glad to realise that tradition initiated in 2009 has justified itself, therefore the intention is<br />
to continue organising this annual event. The Authority tested hosting a so-called regional<br />
competition day in Tartu, but found it more expedient to organize a one pan-Estonian event<br />
that gladly also welcomes entrepreneurs outside Tallinn.<br />
CHANGES IN LEGISLATION<br />
Establishment of Price Restrictions on the Monopolies Act<br />
On 1 November <strong>2010</strong>, the Establishment of Price Restrictions on the Monopolies Act<br />
(further MHKS) 1 entered into force, which is commonly known as the monopolies<br />
control act. This is essentially a package including amendments to several existing acts,<br />
mainly the amendments to the Public Water Supply and Sewerage Act (further ÜVVKS)<br />
and the District Heating Act (further KKütS).<br />
In the stage of legislative proceeding, MHKS was much discussed in the media,<br />
concentrating largely on the critics against the profit margin of AS Tallinna Vesi and related<br />
political statements. Furthermore, the President of the Republic first refused to proclaim the<br />
draft Act due to the insufficiency of the implemented provisions. The implementation side<br />
of the act has been much less discussed and it can be asserted on the basis of feedback<br />
received by the Competition Authority that the parties of the market have rather different<br />
opinions of its legal effects, regulation principles and other aspects of practical importance.<br />
This does not mean that the act would be weak, because all parties do not understand all<br />
details unambiguously. Taking into account the character of the regulation limiting business<br />
freedom, as specified in the act, some disputes will inevitably arise during implementation<br />
of the act, part of which shall be resolved in court.<br />
Below we shall discuss some issues that help to explain the objectives of the amendments<br />
and implementation problems. For a more detailed overview it is also recommended to read<br />
1 http://www.riigiteataja.ee/ert/act.jsp?id=13348610<br />
10
the explanatory report of the draft 597 SE, annexed to the text of the draft and taking into<br />
account the later amendments 2 .<br />
Compared to the initial text of the draft, MHKS has totally changed in the final version. The<br />
part of ÜVVKS was amended, joining the ideas of the initial text of the draft submitted by<br />
parties with the provisions related to the economic regulation of the draft prepared in the<br />
Ministry of the Environment and taking into account the proposals of the Competition<br />
Authority. The draft was also specified in parts of the Penal Code and KKütS.<br />
In case of the latter a completely new amendment was added to the draft, regulating the<br />
access of a third party to the district heating network, while formerly these issues were not at<br />
all regulated in the District Heating Act. Thus the general regulation of an operator<br />
possessing the dominant position in the market specified in the Competition Act also<br />
extended to network operators. Pursuant to this, a network operator (e.g. AS Tallinna Küte)<br />
had to also enable other heat operators to access the network, i.e. to enable the sale of the<br />
heat produced by them to the network, avoiding discrimination of different heat operators<br />
on any basis. Unequal treatment of other heat operators by a network operator can be<br />
caused by various considerations. For example, preference of one producer may take place<br />
due to the used fuel, its security of provision, production technology, etc. In several cases,<br />
special treatment can be considered justified. However, discrimination can be caused by the<br />
interests of the network operator related to mutual competition of the producers for access<br />
to the district heating network. This is especially probable in a situation where the network<br />
operator or an operator belongs to the same group of companies also operating as a heat<br />
producer. In such case he can actually sell heat to the network under the conditions set by<br />
himself and reject any other offers, which could be more favourable for the end consumer,<br />
but will not ensure similar profitability for the heat operator. A monopoly heat operator is<br />
interested in excluding the access of competing producers to the district heating network or<br />
the provision of unfavourable conditions for the competitors, not enabling them to actually<br />
compete for the access to the district heating network. The method used in practice has been<br />
a conclusion of long-term bilateral supply contracts, restricting or excluding access of a third<br />
party to the district heating network. During the proceeding of the draft in the Riigikogu a<br />
proposal was made to enter clearly into the act not only the obligatory approval of long-term<br />
supply contracts by the Competition Authority, but also the basis for the refusal of the<br />
2 http://riigikogu.ee/?page=en_etapid&op=ems&eid=790420&u=<strong>2010</strong>0818135806<br />
11
approval to easily exclude simple disputes regarding the refusal in the course of<br />
implementation. Unfortunately this proposal was not taken into account.<br />
An amendment to the act provides for the preference of heat purchased to the district<br />
heating network depending on the energy sources used for production, facilitating the use of<br />
renewable energy sources, cogeneration of electricity and heat and other environmentally<br />
sustainable technologies. The preference takes place mainly on the account of the use of<br />
fossil fuels, such as natural gas.<br />
As a central amendment, MHKS assigns to the Competition Authority the tasks of a price<br />
regulator for all district heating operators and major water operators. The tasks of a<br />
regulator differ from the regular public supervision first and foremost with the fact that the<br />
price applied by the operator shall first pass the stage of approval. This is an important<br />
restriction of business freedom, which is justified, proceeding from the economic interests of<br />
the consumers and public interest related to competition. In the fields of the services of<br />
general interest such as the sale of gas and electricity, district heating and water services, the<br />
general competition supervision has not been considered sufficient and the price formation<br />
of a monopoly operator has been subjected to the preliminary control of a regulator with<br />
special competency. This is the case in the USA and in most EU member states. Thereby<br />
the price regulation of power and gas networks is obligatory for all member states. In the<br />
price regulation procedure the operator shall submit a price application to a competent<br />
regulator, who shall assess the compliance of the application with predetermined<br />
methodology. Sale with a non-approved price is prohibited. Preliminary regulation is the<br />
most suitable guarantee for controlling the cost-orientation and reasonable cost benefit of<br />
the service provider in a situation where the provision of a service of general interest has<br />
been privatised and the operator is not directly subordinated to the control of public<br />
authorities.<br />
In many cases the price formation of water operators has not functioned as necessary in<br />
Estonia. Although the earlier act also limited the price of the water service with the<br />
requirements of cost-orientation and reasonable cost benefit, the following of these<br />
requirements was questionable. The act provided only general principles of price formation<br />
and their following was completely subordinated to local governments, who were often<br />
simultaneously in the role of the controller and the controlled, as water operators are<br />
partially or completely in municipal ownership. The conflict of interests prevented the<br />
realisation of an efficient economic regulation and therefore the inclusion of the<br />
12
Competition Authority as an independent regulator was necessary. An essential<br />
development compared to the former situation takes place in the procedural stage. While in<br />
the past the local government established the price with its regulation, then according to the<br />
new act the price of a water service shall be established by the water operator, who shall be<br />
completely responsible for the compliance of the price with legal requirements. Before the<br />
price takes force, he shall obtain the approval of a competent regulator, i.e. the Competition<br />
Authority in case of approximately 70 major water operators and local government in case<br />
of smaller operators. The amendment to KKütS also brings under the regulation of the<br />
Competition Authority all smaller heat operators, whose price limit was formerly approved<br />
by the local government. In addition to the preliminary control, the new act entitles the<br />
Competition Authority to control the prices of the water service and subscription fees<br />
through supervision.<br />
In the past, when the prices of water services were established by the local governments,<br />
there was no possibility to ensure the legality of price formation with the means of<br />
competition supervision. Price formation of a water operator could be analysed on the basis<br />
of the Competition Act, but price regulations of local governments remained valid anyway.<br />
Regulations can be disputed in the constitutional review proceedings, which is outside the<br />
competence of the Competition Authority. In case of AS Tallinna Vesi, the Competition<br />
Authority submitted its economic analysis to the Chancellor of Justice. The latter took it<br />
forward to the Supreme Court, which assumed the opinion that the regulation was a general<br />
order, while disputing it is also outside the competence of the Chancellor of Justice. Thus<br />
the former practice of administrative courts, where price regulations had been treated as<br />
regulations and therefore did not proceed, was considered wrong. In conclusion the problem<br />
is fortunately rather theoretical, as the indicated weakness in the supervision system was<br />
corrected with MHKS, according to which prices are not established with an act of public<br />
authority, but by the water operator himself. Before implementation of the price the water<br />
operator shall obtain approval for the price, which shall be effected as a resolution of the<br />
regulator. The new act is undoubtedly a major step forward towards an operative and<br />
transparent economic regulation, even if it will not bring along the expected decrease of<br />
prices immediately. The regulation will start to function proactively and some disputed<br />
issues shall be first clarified, before starting to take extreme coercive measures such as an<br />
establishment of temporary prices, etc.<br />
13
Price regulation conducted on the basis of specific law, including supervision, is<br />
methodologically much more precise, leaving less space for disputes than the general<br />
competition supervision. In the price regulation procedure the operator is an actively<br />
involved party interested in a positive result. He shall coordinate his prices with the<br />
regulator pursuant to the law and, for example, delay tactics cannot provide any expected<br />
result here. As the operator is interested in a fast procedure, he is also ready to participate<br />
actively in the information exchange needed for approval. The practice of heat price<br />
regulation based on KKütS shows that approval procedures usually end without any timeconsuming<br />
court disputes. If a water operator still decides not to follow the price regulation,<br />
the law has specified a possibility to apply a penalty payment, necessary elements of<br />
misdemeanour, criminal punishment and as an extreme measure the establishment of<br />
temporary prices by the Competition Authority. It should be noted that the former ÜVVKS<br />
did not specify any punishments applicable to water operators at all. As the regulator of<br />
price formation and the subscription fee, the local government often acted in a situation<br />
where there was a conflict of interests, being a controller from one side and the owner of a<br />
water operator from the other side.<br />
Punishment provisions specified in MHKS are divided into two – necessary elements of<br />
misdemeanour in ÜVVKS (similarly the violation of the rules of price regulation is<br />
punishable on the basis of KKütS, the Electricity Market Act and the Natural Gas Act) and<br />
necessary elements of a criminal offence criminalising illegal price formation in the Penal<br />
Code. For the latter it has been said that when proceeding from the priority of criminal law,<br />
a criminal procedure should always be initiated, and therefore relevant necessary elements<br />
of misdemeanour become unnecessary (R. Rüütel „Kommunaalettevõtjatest<br />
kommunaalkurjategijateks“, 16.08.<strong>2010</strong>, raamatupidaja.ee). However, from the text of<br />
provisions it becomes obvious that necessary elements of misdemeanour are not identical<br />
with the necessary elements of a criminal offence, but cover various violations of the rules of<br />
price formation. Thus the necessary elements of misdemeanour are not unnecessary. For<br />
example, they can be applied in case when an operator subordinated to the price regulation<br />
pursuant to the law is violating the rules, but at the same time his activities are not qualified<br />
as a distortion of competition according to the Penal Code § 399 (1 1 ). The referred<br />
punishment norm belongs to the offences related to competition, and the attribute is an<br />
abuse of a dominant position. Necessary elements are applicable only in case of specific<br />
subjects, such as monopoly operators listed in the provision who are also subordinated to<br />
14
egional price regulation. In case of doubt it should first be clarified if the rules of price<br />
regulation have been violated. Then it should be assessed if it is simultaneously a crime<br />
related to competition described in the Penal Code § 399 (1 1 ). In case of a violation of the<br />
rules of price regulation specified in the law, where the Competition Authority does not find<br />
an abuse of a dominant position, a procedure can be initiated on the basis of the necessary<br />
elements of misdemeanour specified in the relevant specific law. Upon detection of a crime<br />
related to competition the main task of the body conducting proceedings is not the<br />
determination of a relevant market (as it is generally indisputable in case of a network<br />
monopoly), but an assessment of the possible abuse of a dominant position. Any minor<br />
violation of rules cannot be qualified as a crime related to competition, for which a fine up<br />
to 250 million EEK has been prescribed.<br />
Leniency Programme<br />
On 27 February <strong>2010</strong>, an amendment (Amendment Act) to the Penal Code, Code of<br />
Criminal Procedure and Competition Act entered into force which introduces a specific<br />
leniency programme. It means that a person that is involved in anti-competitive<br />
agreements, concerted practices or decisions of association of undertakings set out as<br />
punishable in § 400 of the Penal Code will have a chance to be released from liability or<br />
obtain a remarkable penalty reduction if the person will be the first to submit a leniency<br />
application to the Competition Authority and will meet other conditions stipulated in<br />
the Competition Act.<br />
Similar leniency programmes exist in almost all EU member states and are also used by the<br />
European Commission. Upon detection of an anti-competitive cooperation of operators<br />
(especially cartels) the major problems are verifiability of the act and a low amount of<br />
information available to the body conducting proceedings. Therefore the confession of a<br />
party itself and the submission of evidences will provide essential assistance in the detection<br />
and further verification of cartels. At the same time the party is motivated to cooperate with<br />
the Competition Authority and the Prosecutor’s Office due to the opportunity to be<br />
exempted from liability or achieve an essential reduction of the punishment, first and<br />
foremost in a case when the operator is actually wishing to stop participation in the anticompetitive<br />
cooperation.<br />
15
A participant in anti-competitive agreements, concerted practices or decisions of association<br />
of undertakings may submit a leniency application to the Competition Authority in the form<br />
enabling written reproduction. This can be done by a natural person on behalf of himself or<br />
a representative of a legal person on behalf of the legal person. Implementation of leniency<br />
and the fulfilment of the necessary terms and conditions shall be decided by the Public<br />
Prosecutor’s Office, whose regulation shall terminate the criminal procedure against the<br />
compliant applicant for leniency, who has first submitted the relevant application, if the<br />
information included in the application enables to initiate the criminal procedure. If the<br />
criminal procedure related to anti-competitive cooperation has already been initiated, the<br />
criminal procedure shall be terminated for the applicant who has first submitted a leniency<br />
application together with the evidences providing essential assistance to the prosecution in<br />
the opinion of the Prosecutor’s Office. Against an applicant for leniency, who meets the<br />
conditions of leniency, but has not submitted the leniency application first, a reduction of<br />
punishment can be applied in proportion with the support received from this person in the<br />
criminal procedure.<br />
In addition to the due submission of a leniency application the person shall also meet other<br />
conditions specified in the Competition Act. Among other things, the applicant for leniency<br />
may not have induced other persons to commit the crime specified in the Penal Code §400<br />
or organised its preparation or commission. The applicant for leniency shall also fulfil a<br />
cooperation obligation during the procedure, making all evidences concerning the crime<br />
mentioned in the Penal Code §400 disclosed to him available in full, openly and without<br />
distortions, as much as possible, and may not destroy or remove any relevant evidences in<br />
the procedure of the relevant crime in bad faith before or after the submission of the<br />
leniency application. The applicant for leniency may not disclose the circumstances of<br />
leniency application or criminal procedure without the permission of the Prosecutor’s<br />
Office. The applicant for leniency shall follow the condition specified in the law seriously,<br />
because even if after the order is issued for the termination of the criminal procedure against<br />
the applicant for leniency, any circumstances are identified which do not allow to<br />
implement leniency, the Public Prosecutor’s Office may renew the procedure against the<br />
applicant for leniency with its order.<br />
Based on the experiences gained from the implementation of the <strong>2010</strong> leniency programme,<br />
the Competition Authority can say that the new regulation has generally met its main<br />
objectives. Several leniency applications were submitted to the authority in <strong>2010</strong> and on<br />
16
their basis criminal procedures were also initiated to investigate relevant anti-competitive<br />
cooperation, which has also increased the number of criminal proceedings handled by the<br />
authority. Operators as well as their lawyers have had a positive attitude towards the<br />
programme and the interest in it has been remarkably high. Although the work for a better<br />
introduction and implementation of the leniency programme and development of related<br />
practice will continue for a longer period, the initial application of the programme can be<br />
considered successful at the moment.<br />
Block exemptions<br />
Similarly to the European Commission, the regulation applicable to vertical<br />
agreements was renewed in <strong>2010</strong>. From June 1 the new Regulation No. 60 of the<br />
Government of the Republic adopted on May 27, <strong>2010</strong> “Granting of permission for the<br />
conclusion of anti-competitive or potentially anti-competitive vertical agreements<br />
(block exemption)“ took force, regulating resale relations restricted to the territory of<br />
Estonia.<br />
From June 1 the resale agreements related to the trade between member states are<br />
subjected to the Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/<strong>2010</strong> of 20 April <strong>2010</strong> on the<br />
application of Article 101 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to<br />
categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices. A 1-year transfer period is valid<br />
for the agreements having been in force at the moment of enforcement of the regulation.<br />
The Estonian national regulation of block exemption is based almost entirely on the<br />
abovementioned relevant regulation of the European Commission. Thus the major<br />
amendment of both regulations means that while being in accordance with the formerly<br />
valid regulation of block exemption in the application of a block exemption, the main<br />
attention is paid to the market share of a supplier, which may not exceed 30%. Then in<br />
accordance with the new regulation the market share of the purchaser on the purchase<br />
market is also important, which similarly may not exceed 30%.<br />
The mentioned Regulation No. 60 of the Government of the Republic also includes the<br />
regulation of the agreements related to the repair and maintenance services of motor<br />
vehicles and the sale of spare parts. Marketing agreements of motor vehicles are subjected<br />
to the Regulation No. 66 of the Government of the Republic from 03.06.<strong>2010</strong> “Granting<br />
of permission for the conclusion of anti-competitive or potentially anti-competitive<br />
17
vertical agreements related to the marketing of motor vehicles (block exemption)“, which<br />
is similar to the former block exemption of motor vehicles 3 . The latter regulation will be<br />
valid until May 31, 2013, after which the general vertical block exemption (i.e. Regulation<br />
No 60) shall also be applied to the marketing agreements of motor vehicles. Marketing<br />
agreements of motor vehicles affecting the trade between member states are subjected<br />
from June 1, <strong>2010</strong> to the Commission Regulation (EU) No 461/<strong>2010</strong> of 27 May <strong>2010</strong> on<br />
the application of Article 101 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union<br />
to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector.<br />
The mentioned regulation specifies that the period of application of the provisions of<br />
Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 relating to vertical agreements for the purchase, sale and<br />
resale of new motor vehicles shall be extended until May 31, 2013. The agreements<br />
related to the secondary market of motor vehicles shall be subjected to the general vertical<br />
block exemption or the Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/<strong>2010</strong> and also the<br />
provisions of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 461/<strong>2010</strong>.<br />
In addition to the regulations applied to vertical agreements, the regulations also applied<br />
to horizontal agreements amended at the end of <strong>2010</strong>. From the beginning of 2011 a new<br />
group exemption will take force for research and development agreements 4 and<br />
specialisation agreements 5 . As in the development of practice, the Competition Authority<br />
is also proceeding from the relevant guidelines of the European Commission, and the<br />
guidelines for horizontal cooperation 6 will provide good instructions for operators for the<br />
assessment of information exchange between competing operators, establishment of<br />
standards, purchase agreements and trade agreements.<br />
3 Regulation No 195 of the Government of the Republic from June 18, 2002 “Granting of permission for<br />
the conclusion of anti-competitive or potentially anti-competitive vertical agreements (block exemption).“<br />
4 Regulation No 9 of the Government of the Republic from January 13, 2011 "Granting of permission for<br />
the conclusion of anti-competitive or potentially anti-competitive research and development agreements<br />
(block exemption)" ( RT I, 19.01.2011, 3)<br />
5 Regulation No 197 of the Government of the Republic from December 30, <strong>2010</strong> "Granting of<br />
permission for the conclusion of anti-competitive or potentially anti-competitive specialisation<br />
agreements (block exemption)" ( RT I, 04.01.2011, 11)<br />
6<br />
Commission communication – Guidelines for applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the<br />
Functioning of the European Union to the horizontal cooperation agreements in EEA, applicable text<br />
Official Journal C 011 , 14/01/2011<br />
18
YEAR <strong>2010</strong> IN THE COMPETITION DIVISION<br />
Competition supervision<br />
In <strong>2010</strong> special attention was continuously paid to the fight against hard core cartels.<br />
Since the reorganisation of the Competition Authority at the beginning of 2008, the<br />
Authority has considered criminal proceedings to be one of its priority fields. The<br />
number of criminal proceedings increased, as well as their complicacy. Extensive cases<br />
and analyses should also be highlighted, which have observed the organisation of some<br />
business sectors as a whole. In several cases the Competition Authority submitted<br />
proposals for the amendment of acts.<br />
In the supervision department the characteristic feature of the year <strong>2010</strong> was a significant<br />
increase of the number of criminal proceedings. While in 2009 the number of criminal<br />
proceedings was 8, then only a year later the relevant figure was 14. Such development<br />
brought along an extremely high load for the staff overseeing the criminal matters and<br />
furthermore several employees inside the division were involved in the assistance. At the<br />
end of the year the recruitment of new employees started due to the increased workload.<br />
One major factor causing an increase of the load of criminal proceedings was the<br />
enforcement of the leniency programme. In global practice leniency programmes are<br />
extensively used for the detection of cartels. According to the programme, the person having<br />
first informed the law enforcement authority of a cartel or cooperated essentially with the<br />
authority shall be exempted from liability. Before the enforcement of the leniency<br />
programme, Estonia was one of the few developed countries lacking this programme in a<br />
clear form. During the year several applications were submitted to the Competition<br />
Authority, on which basis criminal procedures were initiated. Although the experiences of<br />
several countries have shown that launching a leniency programme could be rather difficult,<br />
the Estonian experience should be considered successful. It is good to say that various<br />
leading law offices dealing with competition law have understood that a leniency<br />
programme is a serious instrument and its use should be recommended to the clients.<br />
In the beginning of <strong>2010</strong> the criminal case concerning timber transportation public<br />
procurement procedures organised by the State Forest Management Centre (RMK) was<br />
handed over to the Prosecutor’s Office, which developed into the largest charge of a socalled<br />
cartel crime in Estonia until now. RMK carried out several public procurement<br />
19
procedures for timber transportation services at the end of the summer of 2008, where<br />
according to the accusation the tenderers were involved in extensive cooperation. As a<br />
result, the price of the timber transportation service purchased by RMK under public<br />
procurement increased by 41 million EEK. The court has not yet made a judgement in this<br />
criminal case.<br />
The year <strong>2010</strong> also included the main part of the procedure of an extensive criminal case<br />
related to the Estonian flour producers, investigating the agreement concluded between AS<br />
Tartu Veski and AS Stahlhut in 2006, according to which the latter terminated flour<br />
production. The Competition Authority passed the materials of the case to the Prosecutor’s<br />
Office in the beginning of 2011.<br />
The procedure was also initiated in several criminal cases drawing the excessive attention of<br />
the public. In August the Competition Authority conducted the first procedural acts in the<br />
so-called cases of milk and bread cartels. These are extremely large criminal cases, where<br />
the final result will not be reached very quickly.<br />
In <strong>2010</strong> the court passed judgements in two competition-related criminal cases, which have<br />
been enforced by now. The Supreme Court decided not to proceed with the appeals in<br />
cassation submitted in the so-called cartel case of ready-made shelf companies, and<br />
therefore the judgement of the Tallinn Circuit Court from 17.12.<strong>2010</strong> took force, keeping in<br />
force the judgement of the Harju County Court from 24.09.<strong>2010</strong> convicting several<br />
undertakings and natural persons dealing with the sale of ready-made shelf companies and<br />
were found guilty according to the conclusion of the anti-competitive agreement. In summer<br />
2009 the persons and undertakings agreed to raise the price of their provided service which<br />
was the foundation of companies. According to the judgement of the Harju County Court<br />
the convicted persons were punished with pecuniary punishments in the range from 10 000-<br />
150 000 EEK, in total 464 500 EEK, part of which was not enforced immediately. Another<br />
important judgement was the judgement of the Supreme Court of 07.05.<strong>2010</strong>, annulling the<br />
judgement of the Circuit Court, which held that the persons submitting tenders in the public<br />
procurement procedure of the Jõgeva County development strategy were guilty in a<br />
competition restricting agreement. The Supreme Court admitted that both the agreement as<br />
well as the concerted practice was present in the drafting of tenders, but after consideration<br />
of the specific circumstances of the case it was decided that this was not an agreement or<br />
concerted practice between the undertakings. In this case the Supreme Court provided<br />
20
several important interpretations of competition provisions, and therefore this was a<br />
judgement of crucial importance.<br />
In the field of administrative proceedings the Competition Authority conducted several<br />
major researches and analyses, which influenced further operation of the relevant business<br />
sectors. The examples could be the proceedings conducted in the district heating sector, in<br />
which the Riigikogu amended the District Heating Act. The first of these concerned the<br />
conditions under which AS Tallinna Küte (further Tallinna Küte) purchased heat from the<br />
Iru Cogeneration Plant belonging to AS Eesti Energia (further Eesti Energia). In some<br />
periods the latter offered heat for a lower price than the Väo Cogeneration Plant belonging<br />
to the same concern as Tallinna Küte. The second case concerned AS Kohtla-Järve Soojus<br />
(further KJ Soojus), which did not provide any clear answer to the sales offer of heat<br />
submitted by AS VKG (further VKG) for a long time. According to all assessments and the<br />
available district heating practice, the heat of VKG produced from retort gas and offered for<br />
sale is significantly cheaper than the heat produced from natural gas and would enable to<br />
provide heat for a more favourable price to the end consumers connected to the Ahtme-<br />
Jõhvi heat network of KJ Soojus. In both cases the Competition Authority issued a precept<br />
warning both operators of the district heating network, stating its clear suspicion that these<br />
operators could have abused their dominant position. A warning is the last action before<br />
issuing a precept, where the objective is to provide to the operator a possibility for the<br />
submission of any possible objections. First and foremost in the result of the case of Tallinna<br />
Küte a political resolution was adopted to regulate the conditions of access to the district<br />
heating network more in detail in the District Heating Act. In result of the amendments that<br />
took force from 01.11.<strong>2010</strong> a globally unique system was implemented in Estonia, where<br />
some heat producers are entitled to a certain advantage in the sale of heat in order to protect<br />
investments, but at the same time the owner of a heat network is obliged to organise a<br />
transparent competition for the purchase of heat under certain conditions.<br />
In addition to the aspects related to district heating the interests of homeowners were also<br />
undoubtedly affected by the disputes raised by the Competition Authority in the field of<br />
waste handling. Although traditionally the waste has been taken to one certain waste<br />
management facility in many local governments, several new possibilities to choose waste<br />
management facilities have arisen recently in connection with technical and business-related<br />
development. In the opinion of the Competition Authority such development has been<br />
positive, creating preconditions for investments into new and more progressive waste<br />
21
management facilities. However, many local governments have still tried to send waste to a<br />
certain waste management facility, thus excluding the competition. The Competition<br />
Authority finds that first it is not clear if such activities comply with the law, and second,<br />
the restriction of competition in waste handling is lacking any sense. The issue culminated<br />
in the beginning of <strong>2010</strong>, when the Tallinn City Government considered a possibility to<br />
direct all municipal waste generated in Tallinn to one certain facility. The Competition<br />
Authority issued a recommendation to the Tallinn City Government, which was essentially<br />
fulfilled. The discussion over waste management facilities will undoubtedly continue in<br />
2011, whereby it is very likely that the results of several court proceedings held under similar<br />
circumstances will affect the market. The Competition Authority does not exclude the<br />
submission of any necessary proposals for the initiation of legal amendments.<br />
Throughout the year the Competition Authority also conducted various important<br />
procedures in the postal sector. The postal market was opened to competition from April 1,<br />
2009. In <strong>2010</strong> AS Express Post was the only licensed postal service provider operating on<br />
the open postal market beside AS Eesti Post. To enable the development of functioning<br />
competition in the provision of postal services it is inevitable that AS Eesti Post as a<br />
historical owner of the largest postal network covering the whole of Estonia would enable<br />
the competitors to access its postal network. In particular, it is unrealistic that smaller<br />
competitors would establish a network duplicating the postal network of AS Eesti Post in<br />
sparsely populated areas. The Competitive Authority found that AS Eesti Post has not<br />
fulfilled its obligation to enable a non-discriminating access of another postal service<br />
provider to its postal network for the provision of a postal service and issued a prescript for<br />
the termination of a relevant violation in the beginning of 2011.<br />
These are just a few examples of the activities of the Competition Authority in various<br />
business sectors. In 2011 the supervision department of the Competition Authority will<br />
continue the following of formerly undertaken lines of activity. The end of the economic<br />
depression will inevitably also change the competitive situation in several fields of activity,<br />
which will also mean new challenges for the public supervision. In parallel to the increase of<br />
prices on the global market and the recovery of domestic demand for various goods,<br />
pressure can be expected to increase prices. Such a situation will also cause an increase of<br />
the risk of illegal cooperation between the operators. The competition division with its<br />
limited resources is considering it essential to concentrate on the most essential and highpriority<br />
competition problems, which often require making difficult and complicated<br />
22
choices. Furthermore, the updating of the Competition Act is planned for the year 2011, in<br />
which the competition division has high expectations. First and foremost, the reformation of<br />
the proceeding principles of the abuse of a dominant position is necessary in order to make<br />
the supervision more efficient. Currently it is based on the misdemeanour procedure in<br />
Estonia. This is a very exceptional method in global practice, which was initially meant<br />
rather for the simple and rapid proceeding of minor violations (such as driving without a<br />
seat belt). The proceeding of complex economic violations in a misdemeanour procedure is<br />
unnecessarily (not to say impossibly) complicated for several reasons and therefore also<br />
rather inefficient, compared to other countries. The competition division hopes that the year<br />
2011 will bring a positive development in this aspect, to facilitate the intensification of<br />
supervision in the future.<br />
Recommendation of the Competition Authority related to the issuing of<br />
line permits<br />
On 18.02.<strong>2010</strong> the Competition Authority submitted to the Ministry of Economic Affairs<br />
and Communications and on 22.04.<strong>2010</strong> to the Economic Commission of the Riigikogu<br />
its opinions of the competition restrictions found in the Public Transport Act. In the<br />
opinion of the Competition Authority there are no public interests that would justify the<br />
restriction of the appearance of new carriers to the market and an extension of the<br />
companies already operating on the market.<br />
In the last seven years the main aspect assessed upon granting permits for a long-distance<br />
regular service has been the issue of whether the line permit would interfere with the<br />
currently provided regular services in economic terms. In the opinion of the Competition<br />
Authority the provisions of the Public Transport Act § 41 (2)(2) constitute a very exceptional<br />
mechanism, which has not been specified in any other fields of business. In other fields<br />
usually no restrictions are set for the new operators, regardless of whether it interferes with<br />
the business of the existing active operators. The restriction included in the Public Transport<br />
Act limits business freedom and causes damage to competition as a public interest. Market<br />
concentration of some lines is very high, causing modest competition. However, according<br />
to the Constitution the business freedom may be restricted only if it is in a reasonable<br />
relationship with the objective. In this case the proportionality of restriction may not be<br />
ensured in the situation where the law grants to the administrative body a potentially<br />
unlimited right to refuse to grant a line permit, if the entry of a competitor would interfere<br />
23
with the operation of the operator already possessing the line permit and established on the<br />
market. In practice, this ensures a dominating position, excluding entry of competitors to<br />
the market and enabling a permanent advantage to one operator.<br />
The results of the analysis conducted by the Competition Authority allow us to conclude<br />
that economically it would be most practical to open the market of long-distance regular<br />
services completely to competition. Hereby it is important to notice that for example on the<br />
long-distance lines Tallinn-Tartu, Tallinn-Narva and Tallinn-Pärnu the carriage takes place<br />
fully on commercial bases and without the implementation of any public subsidies. As<br />
competition restrictions may essentially harm the interests of the consumers, they can be<br />
applied only in case of major public interests and if a similar result cannot be achieved with<br />
other measures less harmful to competition. In this case there are no public interests for<br />
which the protection of business freedom should be restricted in such a way. To ensure<br />
security and convenience in the markets of long-distance regular services the use of<br />
competition restrictions is not a suitable measure, on the contrary – in this context it would<br />
be the most non-transparent and irrelevant. Security should be ensured through technical<br />
supervision and for ensuring convenience various standards can be set for the carriers,<br />
without damaging their competition. The buses should be technically in good repair, but<br />
upon the fulfilment of the established requirements any operator should have a possibility to<br />
participate in the market. Furthermore, the competition restriction has been justified with<br />
the claim that it enables the carrier to keep less profitable lines on account of the profitable<br />
ones. Although many carriers are protected from competition on several lines, there is no<br />
legal mechanism that would enable to demand from them the operation on less profitable<br />
lines. It is also not clear, if and how much there are actually such lines. Furthermore, the<br />
currently operating carriers have not reached the market in result of a transparent<br />
competition, but for various historical reasons. As said above, the Competition Authority<br />
considers it justified to open the market completely to competition, but if the main<br />
remaining problem would be the possible lack of interest of the operators to provide services<br />
on less profitable lines, then the use of the so-called controlled competition model could also<br />
be considered, where line permits or groups of line permits are put for competition. In such<br />
case it should be ensured that there is actually a relevant need and that it would not<br />
unnecessarily increase the administrative burden of the state or set limits to free<br />
competition.<br />
24
The Competition Authority has the opinion that public interests do not justify the serious<br />
competition restriction included in the Public Transport Act §41 (2) (2). An authority<br />
granting the line permits should only have the right to demand that long-distance lines<br />
would not depart from a bus station with such a small interval that it would be mutually<br />
obstructive physically. Proceeding from the above, the Competition Authority<br />
recommended that the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications initiate the<br />
relevant amendment to remove the restriction specified in the Public Transport Act § 41<br />
(2)(2) and also submitted its opinions to the Economic Commission of the Riigikogu.<br />
Proposal for amendment of the Funded Pensions Act<br />
On 21.07.<strong>2010</strong> the Competition Authority submitted to the Ministry of Finance the<br />
amendment proposals of the draft for the amendment of the Funded Pensions Act and<br />
related acts. The Authority had already before repeatedly stressed the need to make the<br />
regulation of a mandatory funded pension more flexible for the consumers and more<br />
efficient from the standpoint of competition between trustees.<br />
On July 2, <strong>2010</strong> the Ministry of Finance submitted the draft for amendment of the Funded<br />
Pensions Act and related acts to the ministries for approval. Pursuant to the Funded<br />
Pensions Act valid at that moment the units of a pension fund could be changed only once a<br />
year. In the opinion of the Competition Authority this was a serious restriction of the<br />
freedom of choice of the consumers and thus also of the competition between the trustees<br />
and the entry of new service providers to the market was difficult. Pursuant to the draft<br />
submitted by the Ministry of Finance the consumers would have had the possibility to<br />
change the existing units of a mandatory pension fund three times a year and channel new<br />
payments to another fund in three business days. The Competition Authority has the<br />
opinion that even the possibility to change a mandatory pension funds three times in a year<br />
still restricts the freedom of choice of the consumers and efficient competition. It would be<br />
difficult for new service providers to enter the market in a situation where it is possible only<br />
three times a year to compete efficiently for the clients.<br />
The restriction of the change of pension funds has been mainly explained by the fact that<br />
permission of more frequent change would incline the investment policy of trustees to<br />
orientate towards an undesirably short-term benefit and would send the wrong signal to the<br />
unit owner, whose knowledge of investment is probably not too high. On the other hand,<br />
25
estrictions may cause a decrease of competition and welfare of consumers through an<br />
increase of the price level and/or a deterioration of quality. In this case the restriction of the<br />
change of pension funds did not directly oblige the pension funds to develop their<br />
investment policy in a certain direction. Therefore it should have been considered if it would<br />
be possible and practical to regulate the investment policy of trustees with other, more<br />
suitable means. It is doubtful if the restriction of the freedom of choice would improve the<br />
investment decisions of the consumers.<br />
In the opinion of the Competition Authority a system should be created, where a unit owner<br />
would have a right to change his units against the units of another pension fund in a<br />
reasonably short period of time and without any restrictions. The establishment of such a<br />
system should in turn have a positive effect on the activities of trustees and make their<br />
competition more efficient. Therefore the Competition Authority is supporting the<br />
cancellation of the restrictions applied against the change of pension funds in the largest<br />
extent possible and submitted a proposal to the Ministry of Finance to enable a unit owner<br />
to change the pension fund after 30 days from the submission of the relevant application.<br />
The Competition Authority also found that the draft should make remuneration of trustees<br />
more transparent, specifying in the Funded Pensions Act the specific requirements for the<br />
disclosure of service charges. In the situation of the former regulation it was often difficult<br />
for the consumers to understand how much they had actually paid service charges to the<br />
trustee.<br />
On January 10, 2011 the Riigikogu adopted the Act on Amendment of the Funded Pensions<br />
Act and Related Acts, supplementing the requirements set to the trustees and amending the<br />
procedure of reporting and disclosure related to pension funds with the objective to make<br />
activities of the funds more transparent and better understandable for the owner of the unit<br />
of the pension fund. The rules of change of mandatory pension funds became more flexible<br />
and the change of funds once a year was replaced by the possibility to change the funds<br />
three times in a year. The act will take force from August 1, 2011.<br />
Recommendation to the Tallinn City Government for the improvement of<br />
the competition situation in the field of waste handling<br />
On 10.02.<strong>2010</strong> the Competition Authority submitted an assessment for the possible plan<br />
of the Tallinn City Government to direct all waste generated on the administrative<br />
26
territory of Tallinn to a waste incineration plant established by a single operator. The<br />
relevant resolution of the City Government may affect the competition situation for<br />
district heating as well as the electricity market. The Competition Authority submitted<br />
to the Tallinn City Government a recommendation to avoid granting the sole right or<br />
any other advantage to a single waste management facility.<br />
The Competition Authority received information (mainly through media) that the City of<br />
Tallinn was intending to conclude a contract for the directing of all municipal waste<br />
generated in the city of Tallinn to a single operator for handling, whereby the selection<br />
probably would have been made from among waste incineration plants. The Competition<br />
Authority is a national regulator in the field of district heating and electricity markets,<br />
whose one task is the provision of opinion to the administrative restrictions established in<br />
the mentioned fields. Therefore the Competition Authority initiated the supervision<br />
procedure in order to assess the situation.<br />
The Competition Authority found that the Waste Act does not oblige a local government to<br />
choose only one waste management facility, but there can be several such facilities. In<br />
addition to the issue, if a local government was obliged to choose one waste management<br />
facility, it is also important in this case if it still has the competency to make such a choice<br />
notwithstanding the lack of direct obligation. The Waste Act does not specify directly any<br />
such competency. The Tallinn City Government did not explain to the Competition<br />
Authority which legal acts provide its competency to conclude a contract, according to<br />
which all municipal waste generated in the city would be directed to a single waste<br />
management facility. It is important to note that the Competition Authority does not<br />
dispute the competency of a local government to establish various legal requirements to<br />
waste management facilities, which has also been specified in the Waste Act. For example,<br />
a local government may restrict the number of waste management facilities proceeding from<br />
the geographic criterion. However, this does not allow limiting the choice of waste<br />
management facilities to only one operator, and the possibility to provide the service must<br />
remain open to all operators meeting the legal criteria.<br />
The answer sent from the Tallinn City Government to the Competition Authority did not<br />
provide a clear explanation as to what is the advantage of the reservation of waste to a<br />
single operator, compared to the situation where all operators meeting certain criteria would<br />
compete for the waste. Thus it also remained vague as to which public interests are served<br />
by the decision of the city government to grant the sole right to a single operator, while<br />
27
several operators would like to provide a similar service. Granting of any sole right by the<br />
state or local government is a serious restriction to competition and it can only be justified<br />
with dominant public interest.<br />
Proceeding from the above, the Competition Authority recommended that the Tallinn City<br />
Government was not to grant the sole right or any other advantage to any waste<br />
management facility. If the city government still finds that granting of the relevant sole right<br />
would serve public interests, it should organise a relevant transparent competition in<br />
compliance with the Competition Act §14. Therefore other operators providing the service<br />
could also make their offer under transparent conditions.<br />
Analysis of the Competition Authority of the support for renewable energy<br />
sources<br />
In May <strong>2010</strong> the Competition Authority conducted an analysis of the impact of the<br />
support paid on the basis of the Electricity Market Act § 59 on the competitive situation,<br />
justification of the economic burden set on the electricity consumers as a renewable<br />
energy fee and the support rates.<br />
The support scheme of the Electricity Market Act § 59 has been developed, taking into<br />
account the objectives and indicators specified in the development plan “Development Plan<br />
of the Estonian Electricity Sector until 2018”:<br />
The percentage of renewable electricity in gross consumption has an increasing trend<br />
and will form at least 5,1% by <strong>2010</strong>; at least 15% by 2015.<br />
By 2020 the electric energy produced in a cogeneration regime will form at least 20% of<br />
the gross consumption.<br />
To achieve the objectives set in the development plan, the provisions related to support in<br />
the Electricity Market Act adopted by the Riigikogu in 2003 have been essentially improved<br />
and amended. From 27.02.<strong>2010</strong> the electricity producers are entitled to the following<br />
support pursuant to the Electricity Market Act § 59:<br />
From July 1, <strong>2010</strong> for the electricity produced from a renewable energy source, except<br />
biomass, 84 cents/kWh;<br />
From July 1, <strong>2010</strong> for the electricity produced from biomass in cogeneration regime 84<br />
cents/kWh;<br />
support shall be paid;<br />
if electricity is produced from biomass in a condensation regime, no<br />
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For electricity produced in an efficient cogeneration regime if waste within the meaning<br />
of the Waste Act, peat or oil-shale processing retort gas is used as a source of energy, 50<br />
cents/kWh;<br />
For electricity produced in an efficient cogeneration regime with a cogeneration<br />
installation which has an electric capacity not exceeding 10 MW, 50 cents/kWh;<br />
For usability of the installed net power of a production installation operating with oil<br />
shale, if the production installation has been commissioned in the period from January<br />
1, 2013 to January 1, 2016, 22-25 cents/kWh depending on the price of CO 2 quota.<br />
FIGURE 2. Renewable energy support in the period 2007-<strong>2010</strong><br />
Figure 2 shows that the consumers paid 2,18 s/kWh for the support of renewable energy in<br />
2007, 3,03 s/kWh in 2008, 6,07 s/kWh in 2009 and 12,64 s/kWh in <strong>2010</strong>. Thus the support<br />
has increased from 2,18 s/kWh to 12,64 s/kWh or approximately 6-fold.<br />
While in 2009 the total sum of support paid for 619 GWh of electricity was 405 million<br />
EEK, the estimated total sum of support of <strong>2010</strong> for the produced 1202 GWh of electricity<br />
is 962 million EEK. Thus in 2009 support was paid to 7,9% of the produced electricity (the<br />
total amount of electricity produced in Estonia in 2009 was 7 884 GWh). In the situation<br />
where the number of applicants for support is constantly increasing in Estonia, their<br />
29
percentage on the electricity invoice issued to the consumers has achieved an essential<br />
degree.<br />
Production price of electricity of the major electricity producer of Estonia (Eesti Energia<br />
Narva Elektrijaamad AS) sold to the closed market is 46,01 s/kWh. As the support sum of<br />
12,64 s/kWh was added in <strong>2010</strong> to the production price paid by the consumer, the actual<br />
consumer price was 58,65 s/kWh. Thus the percentage of support in the consumer price<br />
was almost 22%. Taking into account the planned support for the new wind parks (the<br />
support limit was increased from 400 MW to 600 MW) and the addition of new electricity<br />
producers, the percentage of the support of a renewable energy fee in the final price of<br />
electricity will still increase.<br />
Proceeding from the above, the Competition Authority analysed if the support paid on the<br />
basis of the Electricity Market Act § 59 are economically justified from the standpoint of the<br />
producer as well as the consumer and what is the impact of the support on the competitive<br />
situation. The Competition Authority has the opinion that in case of the valid support<br />
scheme the addition of new cogeneration plants, wind parks and hydroelectric stations will<br />
be achieved, but due to a distorted market situation, should be avoided. Due to the support<br />
an investor would not proceed from the price formed on the basis of the actual offer-demand<br />
ratio, but the entire business project would be built up on as short a payback period as<br />
possible, based on the support. An example would be cogeneration plants, as thermal<br />
capacity exceeds the actual heat needed in the relevant area, because the target is to achieve<br />
as high a power capacity as possible, in order to get the support. Thereby the produced<br />
electricity is sold to the open electricity market, where the producers of other countries<br />
(Finland, Latvia, Lithuania) are also participating in the conditions, where the market price<br />
is essentially exceeding the subsidized production price. The investor will earn a<br />
groundlessly high profit, which shall be paid by the consumer through the renewable energy<br />
fee. Thus some producers have a significant competitive advantage guaranteed by the state<br />
and much lower economic risks compared to the producers who do not receive the support.<br />
Therefore the situation, where new production capacities are established only due to various<br />
support schemes, is causing problems. With such consistency most of the producers will<br />
soon receive support and subsidised electricity production will increase in Estonia. Thereby<br />
the consumer will pay, in addition to the renewable energy fee, also for the electricity, a<br />
price that has developed on the open market. The Competition Authority reached the<br />
conclusion that the consumer is constantly more forced to pay for the financing of the<br />
30
support specified in the Electricity Market Act §59. Although the fulfilment of objectives set<br />
in the “Development Plan of the Estonian Electricity Sector until 2018” is important, the<br />
consumers would still expect to fulfil the mentioned objectives with reasonable costs,<br />
thereby not incurring any groundless economic burden. The support system based on the<br />
Electricity Market Act does not guarantee the fulfilment of legal expectations of the<br />
consumers, as the support will ensure an unreasonably high profit to some producers and<br />
unreasonable expenses for the consumers. Another essential disadvantage of the existing<br />
scheme is the fact that the paid support does not take into account the actual market price of<br />
electricity and the higher the market price, the higher the profitability will be of the<br />
producer. The Competition Authority submitted the summary of the analysis to the<br />
Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications, and also made the proposal that the<br />
established support scheme is not sustainable in a longer perspective from the point of view<br />
of the electricity market and the support rates specified in the Electricity Market Act § 59<br />
should be revised, correcting them in accordance with the actual situation. The proposal<br />
was driven by the intention to improve the competitive situation on the Estonian electricity<br />
market and reduce the unreasonably high economic burden of the electricity consumers.<br />
Control of Concentrations<br />
For the market economy to operate optimally, there exist certain rules in the competition<br />
law, which enable to preserve effective competition in a goods market through the<br />
control of concentrations. In the last year the number of concentrations between<br />
undertakings has decreased significantly.<br />
In <strong>2010</strong>, 10 notices of concentration were submitted to the Competition Authority, and 1<br />
case was brought over from 2009. Thus the Authority proceeded with 11 cases and made 10<br />
decisions to grant permission to concentration. In one case the proceedings and decision<br />
were postponed until 2011. All 10 decisions to grant permission to concentration were made<br />
in the first phase of the proceedings, i.e. during the 30 calendar days prescribed by law; in<br />
three cases the proceedings were suspended due to the requirement to eliminate the<br />
deficiencies contained in a notice of concentration. The actual average length of proceedings<br />
of the first phase was 18 days.<br />
31
The breakdown by types of concentration was as follows:<br />
an undertaking acquired control of the whole or a part of another undertaking in the<br />
case of 8 concentrations (§ 19 (1) p 2));<br />
undertakings jointly acquired control of the whole or a part of another undertaking in<br />
the case of 3 concentrations (§ 19 (1) p 3));<br />
Four concentrations took place among Estonian undertakings; in two concentrations both<br />
parties were foreign undertakings and in seven cases parties involved an undertaking<br />
registered abroad and an undertaking registered in Estonia.<br />
The number of notified concentrations in <strong>2010</strong> was significantly lower compared to<br />
previous years, mostly due to the slowing down of market mechanisms and stricter<br />
financing conditions. Due to their weak economic situation, Estonian undertakings were<br />
not particularly active in increasing their competitiveness through mergers and acquisitions.<br />
Foreign investors including private capital funds were more active in acquiring Estonian<br />
undertakings.<br />
In <strong>2010</strong> concentrations took place in the following goods markets:<br />
Production and sale of concentrated feed and fertilisers;<br />
Sale of tobacco products, food and consumer goods, alcohol;<br />
Confectionery;<br />
Concrete products;<br />
Building material;<br />
Services.<br />
32
YEAR <strong>2010</strong> IN THE ENERGY AND WATER REGULATORY DIVISION<br />
The year <strong>2010</strong> was significant for the Energy and Water Regulatory Division in several<br />
respects. On 1 November, the Establishment of Price Limitations to Monopolies Act<br />
entered into force, adding approximately 70 water operators and all heat operators<br />
which were previously under the jurisdiction of local governments to the area of<br />
regulation of the division. As a result of organisational restructuring the former Railway<br />
and Energy Regulatory Division was renamed to the Energy and Water Regulatory<br />
Division.<br />
One of the pivotal tasks of the Energy and Water Regulatory Division is to ensure stable<br />
conditions to consumers in the sectors of electricity, district heating, natural gas as well as<br />
public water supply and sewerage systems. The activities of the Energy and Water<br />
Regulatory Division are predominantly guided by the Electricity Market Act, the Natural<br />
Gas Act, the District Heating Act, the Liquid Fuel Act and the Public Water Supply and<br />
Sewerage Act. The Division made 212 decisions and one injunction during the year <strong>2010</strong>.<br />
The number of decisions was affected mainly by changes in fuel and electricity prices. The<br />
most work intensive were price approval proceedings. As of 31 October, one electricity<br />
transmission network operator, 39 electricity distribution network operators, one natural gas<br />
transmission network operator, 27 natural gas distribution network operators, 50 heating<br />
operators in various network sections, three electricity and heat producers and oil shale<br />
miners were under regulation in the energy sector.<br />
Electricity, natural gas, district heating as well as public water supply and sewerage services<br />
reach the consumers via a corresponding infrastructure. As the infrastructure consists of<br />
natural monopolies, their price regulation falls into the area of regulation of the<br />
Competition Authority. In case of the infrastructure of electricity and natural gas, the<br />
network usage fees do not depend on fluctuations of crude oil prices in the global market but<br />
rather on local economic circumstances involving investment needs, changes of product and<br />
service prices based on internal inflation and technical efficiency.<br />
Pursuant to the electricity and natural gas directive of the European Union, all electricity<br />
and natural gas consumers are provided with free access to the network. Therefore,<br />
consumers are entitled to choose their electricity or natural gas providers and change the<br />
providers when they so desire. Regarding the opening of the electricity market, Estonia has<br />
a transition period until the year 2013. By the year <strong>2010</strong>, Estonia had to open its electricity<br />
33
market to the extent of 35%, meaning that major consumers were given a possibility to<br />
select their own providers or producers of electricity. In January <strong>2010</strong>, amendments to the<br />
Electricity Market Act were passed, which, among other things, prescribed the separation of<br />
ownership of system operators and transmission network operators. The amendments also<br />
laid down the following steps towards the opening of the market. Namely, eligible<br />
consumers cannot buy electricity for a regulated price from 1 April; instead they have to do<br />
it for the market price. In April, the power exchange of Nordic countries Nord Pool Spot<br />
(NSP) extended to Estonia by creating the NSP Estlink price area.<br />
The Competition Authority initiated proceedings relating to Eesti Energia Jaotusvõrk OÜ in<br />
order to verify the compliance of its activities with the Electricity Market Act. § 67 of the<br />
Electricity Market Act requires network operators to ensure that measurement data are<br />
collected and then processed by means of metering devices conforming to the technical<br />
requirements.<br />
In August <strong>2010</strong>, Eesti Energia Jaotusvõrk OÜ (Jaotusvõrk) served the Competition<br />
Authority with an overview of how the operator carried out the Competition Authority’s<br />
injunction. Jaotusvõrk explained that it managed to replace most of the problematic and<br />
unverified metering devices during the time period prescribed by the Competition<br />
Authority. At the same time, the operator declared that it was unable to replace 2 000<br />
metering units because of the failure to reach the owners of the respective properties, refusal<br />
of the owners to allow the replacement of metering equipment or due to other<br />
complications. Jaotusvõrk confirmed to the Competition Authority that these problems are<br />
continuously being addressed and the company hopes to replace the metering equipment<br />
soon. In that respect, the Competition Authority plans to carry out another inspection of<br />
Eesti Energia Jaotusvõrk OÜ during the year 2011.<br />
Opening of the electricity market<br />
On 01.04.<strong>2010</strong> the Estonian electricity market opened up to the extent of 35% (it will<br />
fully open in Estonia on 01.01.2013). For the partial opening of the electricity market,<br />
the Electricity Market Act prescribes that it is mandatory to purchase electricity from the<br />
free market for persons (a person is deemed to be an eligible consumer) who use<br />
electricity in such fixed consumption sites where the consumption volume is at least 2<br />
GWh of electricity per calendar year.<br />
34
In addition to the above, legislations prescribe that a consumption site is recognised as a<br />
connection point or a collection of connection points, electrically interconnected by the<br />
electrical installation of the eligible consumer, and of the electrical installation of an eligible<br />
consumer.<br />
From the position of passing and entry into force of legislations, the opening of the<br />
electricity market was relatively urgent, for which reason it can be concluded in retrospect<br />
that the parties were left with little time for thorough preparation, as the Riigikogu only<br />
passed the amendments to the Act on 28.01.<strong>2010</strong>, and that made the opening of the<br />
electricity market possible (the amendments entered into force on 27.02.<strong>2010</strong>). As the<br />
electricity market was supposed to open on 01.04.<strong>2010</strong>, distribution network operators<br />
already commenced identifying and informing eligible consumers in February <strong>2010</strong> when<br />
the respective amendments to the Electricity Market Act had not yet entered into force.<br />
Before the actual entry into force of the amendments, the sellers of electricity also informed<br />
the eligible consumers of the cancellation of the electricity contracts. It was necessary for<br />
distribution network operators and sellers of electricity to identify and inform eligible<br />
consumers to ensure that eligible consumers would be able to choose from which provider<br />
and for what price they will buy electricity starting from 01.04.<strong>2010</strong>.<br />
The activities of distribution network operators and sellers of electricity encouraged eligible<br />
consumers to ask questions and many of them turned to the Competition Authority for<br />
answers.<br />
Several persons submitted complains to the Competition Authority regarding their<br />
identification as an eligible consumer. The reasons for non-qualification as an eligible<br />
consumer were numerous. Conflict of the activities of distribution network operators and<br />
electricity sellers with the Electricity Market Act was mentioned among the major reasons.<br />
Several eligible consumers found that distribution network operators and sellers of<br />
electricity lacked legal grounds for the identification of persons as eligible consumers and<br />
the cancellation of electricity contracts prior to entry into force of the respective<br />
amendments of the Electricity Market Act. Many eligible consumers also found that they<br />
have not consumed electricity for their own purposes in the amount of 2 GWh in a calendar<br />
year, but rather partially or fully sold it on to third parties (in case of shopping centres, for<br />
example, to lessees, in case of industrial parks to other properties). In several cases a<br />
question also arose as to whether a distribution network operator has identified the<br />
consumption site of the eligible consumer pursuant to the Electricity Market Act, as<br />
35
according to the eligible consumer the distribution network operator should not have<br />
summed two different connection points and the electricity consumed through them, as<br />
these connection points were not electrically connected by an electrical installation of the<br />
eligible consumer. Therefore, it should not have been possible to define them as one<br />
consumption site. The Competition Authority explained its position in each case to the<br />
eligible consumer as well as to the distribution network operator based on the respective<br />
instance and recommended that the parties find a common understanding based on the<br />
Electricity Market Act.<br />
From the statistical point of view, it is important to mention that the Competition Authority<br />
only once settled a complaint in favour of the identified eligible consumer. In all other cases<br />
the distribution network operator and the seller of electricity acted in accordance with the<br />
Electricity Market Act when identifying a person as an eligible consumer and cancelling a<br />
contract. One eligible consumer challenged the decision of the Competition Authority in the<br />
Tallinn Administrative Court and they ruled in favour of the Competition Authority. The<br />
court decided that regardless of the fact that relevant amendments to the Electricity Market<br />
Act had not entered into force, the distribution network operators and sellers of electricity<br />
had legal grounds to identify persons as eligible consumers and cancel their electricity<br />
contracts. The Tallinn Administrative Court considered it significant that the person became<br />
an eligible consumer, meaning that the rights and obligations of the eligible consumer were<br />
applied to the person on 01.04.<strong>2010</strong>, as the reason is the fact that a distribution network<br />
operator sent out notices to eligible consumers before that time and could not bring about<br />
any obligations to the new eligible consumers. As contracts for the sale of electricity were<br />
cancelled starting from 01.04.<strong>2010</strong>, the sending of early notices could not have violated the<br />
rights of new eligible consumers. Another significant conclusion was that the Tallinn<br />
Administrative Court found that in case a person resold electricity on its own property, for<br />
example to lessees (shopping centres, office buildings, etc), then the entire resold quantity of<br />
resold electricity was to be considered as consumed by the person for their own purposes<br />
and the person was to be deemed an eligible consumer. The reason for this is the fact that<br />
for the distribution network operator the consumer was still the eligible consumer, and not<br />
its lessees with whom the distribution network operator had no legal relations whatsoever.<br />
The Competition Authority believes that in case the person of the consumer has changed<br />
during the course of the consumption year, the distribution network operator, upon<br />
identification of the eligible consumer, is not allowed to add the electricity quantities<br />
36
consumed by the previous consumer to the consumption of the new one. Additionally, in<br />
case a consumption site has two or more different connection points that are not electrically<br />
interconnected by an electrical installation of the person then the distribution network<br />
operator is not entitled to interpret these connection points as a single consumption site. In<br />
such case the distribution network operator should have considered each particular<br />
connection point as a separate consumption site and calculated the electricity quantities<br />
consumed in the previous calendar year separately. As a result of the explanation of the<br />
Competition Authority, the distribution network operators partially reviewed their activities<br />
and in several cases the identified eligible consumers were exempt from their statuses and<br />
redirected back to the closed market.<br />
Although the partial opening of the Estonian electricity market brought about some<br />
problems and the associated information was occasionally insufficient, the Competition<br />
Authority still considers the process relatively quick and successful. The experience of the<br />
partial opening of the electricity market helps to avoid similar problems in the full opening<br />
of the market on 01.01.2013.<br />
Activation of the Power Exchange and overview of trading<br />
The Power Exchange became operational in Elektribörs on 01.04.<strong>2010</strong> when Nord Pool<br />
Spot AS (NPS) opened the Estlink bidding area. The name of NPS Estlink bidding area is<br />
now NPS Eesti. For Estonian producers, sellers and eligible consumers of electricity, this<br />
created a trading spot for buying and selling electricity under free market conditions.<br />
Market participants from Latvia, Lithuania and third (non-EU) countries can also trade<br />
electricity in the NPS Eesti bidding area.<br />
An amendment to the Electricity Market Act entered into force on 01.04.<strong>2010</strong>, forbidding<br />
eligible consumers to purchase electricity for regulated prices, and offers an alternative to<br />
purchase electricity from the Power Exchange. In conjunction with the activation of the<br />
Power Exchange, a new market participant was added to the Electricity Market Act – the<br />
organiser of the Power Exchange. The organiser of the Power Exchange is NPS whose<br />
activities are supervised by a Norwegian regulator (Norwegian Water Resources and Energy<br />
Directorate). In order to commence trading in the NPS Eesti bidding area, a previous entry<br />
into a corresponding contract is necessary.<br />
37
Activation of the NPS Eesti bidding area can predominantly be regarded as a success. The<br />
volume of traded electricity exceeded the limits of 1 TWh already during the first four<br />
months of operation. The average exchange price was 46.31 €/MWh in the year <strong>2010</strong>. The<br />
lower monthly average price 34.81 €/MWh was in May and the highest average price 56.62<br />
€/MWh was in August. In total, electricity was purchased and sold in the NPS Eesti<br />
bidding area during the year <strong>2010</strong> in the amount of 6,660,195 MWh.<br />
However, the activation of the Power Exchange did not go without setbacks. Namely, on<br />
24.08.<strong>2010</strong>, for five hours the price of electricity in the NPS Eesti bidding area was on the<br />
level of 2000 €/MWh, which was also the highest possible price. In order to investigate the<br />
situation, the Competition Division of the Competition Authority instituted proceedings.<br />
On 19 October, the intra-day market of NPS Elbas was opened in Estonia, allowing intraday<br />
trading in electricity in a bidding area covering all countries that have joined the NPS<br />
Power Exchange – from the Nordic countries to Germany. If the day-ahead spot market<br />
Elspot is predominantly meant and usable for the purchasing and sale of electricity, then the<br />
intra-day market grants the market participants a possibility to sell or buy surplus or deficit<br />
electricity during the same day based on predetermined rules.<br />
As of today, the NPS Eesti bidding area allows trading on Elspot (one day ahead) as well as<br />
Elbas (intra-day) markets, indicating that the electricity market of Estonia is successfully<br />
integrating with the electricity market of the Nordic countries. As of the moment of<br />
publishing the annual report, 16 market participants traded in the Elspot market and 4 in the<br />
Elbas market of the NPS Eesti bidding area. The list of market participants is available on<br />
the website of NPS. 7 Monthly average electricity price level in NSP Eesti area in <strong>2010</strong> are<br />
presented in figure 3.<br />
7 http://www.nordpoolspot.com/about/Participant-list---Elspot2/ (02.03.2011)<br />
38
FIGURE 3. Monthly average electricity price in NPS Eesti in <strong>2010</strong><br />
Regulation of electricity network operators<br />
Pursuant to § 73 subsection 3 of the Electricity Market Act, a network operator has the<br />
right to submit requests to the Competition Authority for the approval of different<br />
network charges both collectively and separately. Pursuant to § 94 subsection 1 clause 8,<br />
the Competition Authority must establish network charges of network operators, except<br />
transmission charges for the transit of electricity.<br />
Pursuant to the law, the criteria used as the basis upon the establishment of network charges<br />
must be transparent and follow the principles of equal treatment. The price formation of<br />
network charges must take into account the requirement to ensure supply dependability and<br />
efficiency, allow network operators to carry out the obligations arising from legislations and<br />
the conditions of activity licences, and allow a reasoned return on the invested capital.<br />
Pursuant to on § 72 subsection 4 of the Electricity Market Act, the Competition Authority<br />
has prepared and published “uniform methods for the calculation of electricity network<br />
charges” (hereinafter referred to as the Methods), based on which the electricity network<br />
charges are approved. The Methods are applied for the purposes of avoiding unequal<br />
39
treatment in a similar and uniform manner and for the approval of the network charges of<br />
all network operators. The prices of network charges are formed as cost-based.<br />
In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the Competition Authority made 39 decisions about the weighted average<br />
price and network charges of electricity, whereas 2 price applications were left unapproved.<br />
The most significant of the proceedings involved the prices of network charges of AS<br />
Elering and Eesti Energia Jaotusvõrk OÜ.<br />
For AS Elering a new 3-year regulation period was established, starting from 01.01.2011<br />
and ending on 31.12.2013. Changes in network charges were only caused by price<br />
components relating to investments, whereas the operating expenses of the operator<br />
decreased in the year <strong>2010</strong> by 4.6 million € (72 million kroons) and they will also not<br />
increase in the year 2011. The total volume of investments during the following three years<br />
is 0.447 billion €, i.e. 7 billion kroons. The most significant investments were the buyout of<br />
Estlink1, and construction of the second high voltage direct current connection Estlink2 and<br />
two rapidly starting emergency reserve power stations (with power outputs of 100 MW and<br />
150 MW). In addition, AS Elering will build numerous new connections and distribution<br />
hubs in order to increase the transmission capacity of power networks and decrease network<br />
costs.<br />
On 26 August the Competition Authority submitted its opinions about the price<br />
applications of network charges to Eesti Energia Jaotusvõrk OÜ. The operator applied for<br />
an average of 18.8% increase, including an 11.3% increase of operating expenses, compared<br />
to the current network charges. Pursuant to the Electricity Market Act, the network charges<br />
must be cost-based and reasoned, for which reason the Authority did not consider the<br />
network charges’ price application of the operator reasoned. At a time when companies<br />
operating under free market conditions have started to cut their costs, such course is also<br />
expected from monopolies, and the Competition Authority cannot tolerate significant<br />
increases of operating expenses under the current circumstances. On 12.10.<strong>2010</strong>, Eesti<br />
Energia Jaotusvõrk OÜ withdrew its application of approval of network charges.<br />
Supply dependability of natural gas<br />
A regulation passed by the European Parliament and the Council on 20.10.<strong>2010</strong> laid<br />
down the procedures for the proper and consistent functioning of the internal market of<br />
natural gas, allowing the use of extraordinary measures in case the market is no longer<br />
40
capable of supplying the required gas quantities. The regulation prescribes creating a<br />
preventive action plan and an emergency plan in the future.<br />
The share of natural gas in the primary energy supply of Estonia is 10.7% (see figure 4),<br />
whereas the share of natural gas in the production of electricity only amounts to 4.0% and<br />
as Estonia is an exporter of electricity, it is possible to cover the entire electricity demand<br />
without the use of natural gas.<br />
FIGURE 4. Share of primary energy by fuel types<br />
From the perspective of supply dependability, natural gas bears great significance in the<br />
production of heat where the share of natural gas reaches 48.1%. Of the biggest cities,<br />
district heating is 100% dependant on natural gas in Rakvere, Jõgeva, Rapla, Põlva, etc. The<br />
share of gas is significant, for example, in the production of heat in Tallinn, Viljandi,<br />
Sillamäe and Narva. In the year <strong>2010</strong>, AS Kohtla-Järve Soojus started to produce heat<br />
partially from natural gas in its gas boiler house with a 100 MW thermal output that was<br />
built a year earlier.<br />
Compared to Western Europe, local natural gas heating is relatively unpopular in Estonia.<br />
Smaller gas networks were actively developed mostly in real estate development areas until<br />
the economic crisis of the year 2008. The gas quantity that AS Eesti Gaas, the biggest<br />
natural gas retailer, sold to homeowners in the year 2009 only amounted to 9.3% of total gas<br />
41
sales. If in most district heating systems it is possible to use alternative fuels besides natural<br />
gas, then in case of local gas heating there are no such alternative solutions and the<br />
consumers would be left without heat upon possible supply disturbances.<br />
AS Eesti Gaas has entered into a natural gas supply contract with AS Gazprom that will be<br />
valid until the end of the year 2015, specifying a total supply quantity of 7 million m³/a day<br />
(guaranteed pressure 35 bar), which exceeds the previous maximum daily consumption<br />
volume by 11%. Therefore the above mentioned gas quantity is sufficient for ensuring a<br />
strategically necessary gas supply to Estonia. AS Gazprom stores natural gas in the<br />
Inčukalns gas storage facility (which has an active storage capacity of 2,300 million m³),<br />
ensuring a gas supply sufficient to Estonia and Latvia and partially sufficient to Russia and<br />
Lithuania.<br />
The gas storage facility is refilled from April to October and the refilling process is<br />
monitored by AS Eesti Gaas. In case the refilling of the facility does not take place, it<br />
indicates a possible risk for the gas supply, as the supply for the winter peak consumption<br />
period is ensured from the facility. In such case, system operators have sufficient time to<br />
take measures for covering the winter peak consumption period from other sources.<br />
In terms of gas supply dependability, Estonia fully depends on Russia’s gas supply. Estonia<br />
has two transmission connections with Russia: one in Narva (Eastern direction) and the<br />
other in Värska (South-Eastern direction), as well as a connection with Latvia in Karksi.<br />
Under normal circumstances, only the connection with Latvia is open and the connection<br />
with Russia is organised through Värska. The transmission capacity of the Narva<br />
connection is limited by the transmission limit on the Russian side and the connection is<br />
opened only under special circumstances.<br />
Theoretically, Estonia has sufficient infrastructure and connections to ensure a steady gas<br />
supply and thus Estonia has no problems with the depletion of transmission capacity.<br />
Problems may arise with gas deliveries in conjunction with peak consumption periods on<br />
the Russian side. Namely, disturbances in the gas supply may occur during peak<br />
consumption periods in case the Karksi connection between Estonia and Latvia breaks<br />
down or if the Latvian Inčukalns storage facility is depleted. For transmission capacity, the<br />
Narva and Värska connections between Estonia and Russia are sufficient for ensuring the<br />
supply of gas needed by Estonia, but the transmission capacity of the Narva connection is<br />
limited by a transmission limit on the Russian side. Even if the Narva connection is opened<br />
42
under special circumstances, ensuring sufficient pressure may prove problematic for<br />
ensuring the supply of gas quantities required by Estonia. Therefore the Competition<br />
Authority considers the situation a risk to supply dependability, as the entire gas supply is<br />
provided by only one source.<br />
At the same time the supply channels from the Latvian gas storage facility through the<br />
Karksi connection and from Russia through the Värska and Narva connections can be<br />
considered independent. Namely, the gas storage facility is located on the territory of the<br />
EU and its refills can be monitored by AS EG Võrguteenus. The supply dependability could<br />
be significantly improved by the construction of a liquefied natural gas storage facility in the<br />
Baltic-Finland area, but only if that would be accompanied by the construction of a natural<br />
gas pipeline system that would connect the Baltic countries and Finland. The Natural Gas<br />
Act provides several methods for the improvement of supply dependability. Gas supply to a<br />
household customer may not be suspended or restricted during the period from 1 October to<br />
1 May. Gas supply to undertakings who produce heat for the heating of residential spaces<br />
and who have no possibility to use fuel other than gas for fuel may not be suspended or<br />
restricted during the above mentioned period. Gas supply may be suspended in cases of<br />
danger to the life, health or property of persons or to the environment, or by agreement of<br />
the parties. A heat producing undertaking whose estimated annual production volume<br />
exceeds 500,000 MWh per network area is required to ensure a reserve fuel capability for<br />
the production of heat starting from 01.07.2008, guaranteeing the heat supply for a period of<br />
three days. Upon the emergence of a factor that constitutes a threat to supply dependability,<br />
life or the health of persons or preservation of a network, the system operator immediately<br />
notifies the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and the Competition<br />
Authority and makes a proposal for taking measures to ensure the supply dependability.<br />
The Ministry cooperates with the Competition Authority to analyse the proposal received<br />
from the system operator and, if necessary, makes a proposal to the Government of the<br />
Republic for taking the following measures in ensuring the supply dependability:<br />
To limit gas supply to persons who use gas for any other purpose except the production<br />
of heat;<br />
To allow limitation of the gas supply to undertakings producing heat;<br />
To allow decreasing of the temperature of the heat carrier used for the heating of<br />
residential spaces;<br />
To require the heat producing undertakings to use reserve fuel as fuel.<br />
43
As the primary concern in Estonia is to ensure gas supply to heat producing undertakings<br />
and residential consumers, limitation of the gas supply to heat producers of Tallinn and<br />
Narva is seen as the primary means for overcoming supply interruptions. Principally, the<br />
legislative amendment prescribes that the district heating undertakings that supply heat to<br />
Tallinn and Narva are required to ensure means for the use of reserve fuel and switch to the<br />
reserve fuel upon gas supply interruptions. In Iru Power Plant, it is possible to switch from<br />
co-production mode to the production of heat in order to decrease the gas consumption.<br />
This is possible in Estonia, since the share of natural gas in the production of electricity is<br />
minute and the necessary electrical power can be ensured by the oil shale burning power<br />
plants of AS Narva Elektrijaamad. It is also important to take into account that power<br />
plants that use gas add up to less than 10% of the entire installed capacity. Pursuant to the<br />
legislative amendments that have entered into force, the system operator (AS EG<br />
Võrguteenus) is required to draw up a description of emergencies constituting a threat to the<br />
functionality of the gas system, and an emergency management plan which must be<br />
submitted to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications. The plan is<br />
implemented in a situation when the activities of the balance provider no longer allow<br />
ensuring the balance and it is necessary to limit the consumption of a certain consumer<br />
group.<br />
The Competition Authority is of the opinion that the risks of the gas supply are related to<br />
the supply from one source – Russia. Considering the estimates of consumption and<br />
transmission capacity, prepared by AS EG Võrguteenus, there will not be any deficiency of<br />
transmission capacity until the year 2016 and probably even in the farthest future. In terms<br />
of natural gas supply, the risks associated with supply dependability can be significantly<br />
lowered by the fact that during wintertime, gas supply is predominantly organised from the<br />
Latvian gas storage facility. As the latter is located on the territory of the European Union,<br />
it can be considered an independent supply source in addition to the direct link from Russia.<br />
The risk lies in the fact that refilling of the Latvian gas storage facility is organised through<br />
Russia. At the same time we cannot ignore such possible risks relating to the supply<br />
dependability of natural gas that would mostly jeopardise the gas-dependant heat supply.<br />
For possible emergencies, a plan has been drawn in Estonia, allowing to significantly<br />
decrease the consumption of gas and to switch the district heating system over to alternative<br />
fuel.<br />
44
Price regulation of heating undertakings<br />
Pursuant to the District Heating Act, a local government has the right to determine<br />
district heating regions within the boundaries of its administrative territory. The only<br />
permitted heating alternative in district heating regions is district heating (except for<br />
persons who did not use district heating at the time of determination of the district<br />
heating region), due to which reason the consumers cannot choose an alternative heating<br />
method and the heating undertaking enjoys a monopoly status.<br />
Based on the Establishment of Price Limitations to Monopolies Act, significant<br />
amendments to the District Heating Act entered into force on 01.11.<strong>2010</strong>. If at earlier times<br />
the Competition Authority and local governments carried out supervision of the District<br />
Heating Act and approved the maximum prices of heat sold by heat undertakings in parallel<br />
(both according to jurisdiction arising from the District Heating Act), then starting from<br />
01.11.<strong>2010</strong>, only the Competition Authority has the respective rights and obligations. The<br />
major objective of the amendments to the District Heating Act was to ensure more<br />
comprehensive and intensive supervision of the district heating sector, as compared to local<br />
governments the Competition Authority has significantly greater experience in the<br />
regulation and supervision of the district heating sector, thus contributing to a more<br />
homogeneous regulation and equal treatment of undertakings in the entire sector of district<br />
heating.<br />
In addition to the above, the approval principles of the maximum price of sold heat were<br />
changed so that the heating undertakings had more obligations to ensure the sale of heat to<br />
consumers for fair and reasoned prices. For this reason, a principle has been provided in the<br />
District Heating Act that a heat undertaking is required to monitor such circumstances,<br />
independent of its activities, that affect the price of heat to consumers, and submit a new<br />
limit price approval application to the Competition Authority within 30 days from the<br />
emergence of such circumstance that can affect the price of heat to consumers by more than<br />
5 per cent. Hence, a heat undertaking is required to harmonise a new limit price of heat with<br />
the Competition Authority, for example in case of a decrease of the purchasing price of fuel.<br />
Among the most significant amendments, the Competition Authority was given the right to<br />
invalidate a current approval of the maximum price of heat and establish a temporary sales<br />
price of heat to a heat undertaking if the heat undertaking sells heat for a price that does not<br />
45
correspond to the conditions provided in § 8 subsection 3 of the District Heating Act and<br />
has failed to carry out an injunction of the Competition Authority.<br />
In addition, the regulation of § 14 1 of the District Heating Act deserves special attention, as<br />
it allows heat producers and network operators in the future to enter into contracts with<br />
validity periods of up to 12 years from the beginning of production with certain production<br />
equipment in order to ensure investment security. It is important that the entry into such<br />
contracts requires the organisation of a competition, the winners of which are awarded with<br />
the contracts. This ensures that heat producers or network operators enter into contracts for<br />
ensuring investment security with the best price, in order to guarantee a safe, reliable,<br />
efficient, reasonably priced heat supply that matches the environmental requirements and<br />
the needs of the consumers.<br />
Supervision proceedings relating to storage of reserve fuel<br />
Based on § 28 subsection 1 of the District Heating Act, the Competition Authority<br />
instituted supervision proceedings in December 2009 relating to the performance of § 7<br />
subsections 3 and 4 and § 41 1 of the District Heating Act. Based on § 7 subsection 3 of the<br />
District Heating Act, a heat producing undertaking whose estimated annual production<br />
volume exceeds 500,000 MWh per network area is a provider of a vital service in the<br />
meaning of the Emergency Act and therefore required to ensure a reserve fuel capability<br />
for the production of heat, guaranteeing the heat supply for a period of three days.<br />
Pursuant to the District Heating Act, calculation of the reserve fuel quantity is based on the<br />
maximum daily consumption of the previous year. The heating undertaking must have<br />
ensured a reserve fuel capability for the production of heat starting from 1 July 2008. The<br />
objective of the instituted supervision proceedings was to identify whether the heating<br />
undertaking mentioned in § 7 subsection 3 of the District Heating Act carry out their duties<br />
arising from the District Heating Act.<br />
Pursuant to § 7 subsection 3 of the District Heating Act, there are three heating undertaking<br />
in Estonia (AS Tallinna Küte, Eesti Energia AS Iru Elektrijaam and Eesti Energia Narva<br />
Elektrijaamad AS) whose annual heat production volume exceeds 500,000 MWh per<br />
network area. Therefore, these undertakings are required to ensure the existence of reserve<br />
fuel and the capability of its use for the production of heat.<br />
46
During the course of the supervision proceedings, the Competition Authority came to<br />
the following conclusions:<br />
1. AS Tallinna Küte has ensured the performance of the requirements set forth in § 7<br />
subsection 3 and 4 and § 411 in the Lääne district of its network area (heat supply is<br />
organised from Mustamäe and Kadaka boiler plants), but in the Kesklinn-Lasnamäe-<br />
Maardu district (heat supply is organised from Ülemiste boiler plant, Tallinn Power<br />
Plant and the power plant Eesti Energia AS Iru Elektrijaam) the reserve fuel amount<br />
required by § 7 subsection 3, 4, § 411 of the District Heating Act is absent.<br />
2. Eesti Energia Narva Elektrijaamad AS-s has properly carried out its obligations<br />
arising from § 7 subsection 3 and 4 and § 41 1 of the District Heating Act.<br />
3. Eesti Energia AS-s Iru Elektrijaam has ensured the existence of reserve fuel pursuant<br />
to the requirements of § 7 subsection 4 and § 41 1 of the District Heating Act, but the<br />
heating undertaking does not guarantee the performance of obligations arising from<br />
§ 7 subsection 3 of the District Heating Act in the meaning of § 34 subsection 1 of the<br />
Emergency Act, as an undertaking that supplies heat to the network and provides a<br />
vital service and is not able to ensure the consistent functioning of a vital service or<br />
resuming of the vital service after its suspension. Iru Elektrijaam has on its own side<br />
defined the period of transition to reserve fuel to be 24 hours which is too short and thus<br />
cannot be considered reasonable in an emergency situation.<br />
The Competition Authority ended the supervision proceedings relating to Eesti Energia<br />
Narva Elektrijaamad AS in the year <strong>2010</strong>, but continued the proceedings relating to AS<br />
Tallinna Küte and Eesti Energia AS Iru Elektrijaam.<br />
Disputes of market participants<br />
Resolution of disputes between market participants has been provided by the Electricity<br />
Market Act as well as in the Natural Gas Act. In the district heating sector, the<br />
Competition Authority can institute supervision proceedings in case a violation of the<br />
law by a heating undertaking is discovered. One of the major problems in the year <strong>2010</strong><br />
was the suspension of a consumer’s network connection by a network operator.<br />
Suspension of the electricity supply has been regulated in great detail. It is the opinion of the<br />
Competition Authority that the protection of socially sensitive consumers upon the<br />
47
emergence of solvency problems has been sufficiently ensured. A network operator may<br />
suspend a consumer’s network connection if the consumer has failed to pay the monetary<br />
amount due based on a contract entered into with the network operator or a contract<br />
entered into with a seller appointed by the network operator for the purposes of carrying out<br />
the sales obligation of the network operator, or if the consumer has otherwise severely<br />
violated an obligation laid down in the above mentioned contracts. Before the suspension of<br />
the network connection, the network operator is required to send a notice of the planned<br />
suspension. The notice must identify the reason for the suspension of the network<br />
connection as well as the planned time of the suspension. A consumer’s network connection<br />
may be suspended when at least 15 days have passed from the sending of the above<br />
mentioned notice and during that time the consumer has not removed the circumstance that<br />
constitutes the grounds for the suspension and informed the network operator<br />
correspondingly.<br />
If the network connection is suspended due to the reason that a consumer who is a natural<br />
person has failed to pay in due time for the consumed electricity as a result of severe illness<br />
or temporary insolvency caused by becoming unemployed, the consumer may submit a<br />
respective written notice of such circumstances to the network operator. The notice must be<br />
accompanied by a certificate substantiating the above mentioned circumstance. A network<br />
operator who has received a written notice and the substantiating evidence may suspend the<br />
network connection of a consumer who is a natural person when at least 30 days have<br />
passed from the moment of sending a notice to the consumer and during that time the<br />
consumer has not removed the circumstance that constitutes the grounds for the suspension<br />
of the network connection and informed the network operator correspondingly.<br />
If the network connection is suspended due to the reason that a consumer has failed to pay<br />
in due time for the consumed electricity, then the network connection may be suspended<br />
during the period from 1 October to 30 April in a building or a part thereof that is a<br />
dwelling, and that is used as a permanent residence and heated fully or predominantly by<br />
means of electricity only after at least 90 days have passed from the moment of sending the<br />
notice to the consumer and during that time the consumer has not removed the<br />
circumstance that constitutes the grounds for the suspension of the network connection and<br />
informed the network operator or the seller correspondingly. If a consumer has failed to pay<br />
for electricity in due time, the network operator is entitled to limit the capacity of the<br />
48
network connection. A prior notice of limitation of the capacity must be given to the<br />
consumer at least 15 days in advance.<br />
A network operator has the right to suspend a consumer’s network connection immediately<br />
if the consumer increases the limited capacity without authorisation, uses electricity or the<br />
network service illegally or uses electrical installations that do not correspond to established<br />
requirements, are dangerous or disturb the function of the entire network or threaten the<br />
supply dependability.<br />
All market participants, including the operators and the consumers, have the right to turn to<br />
the Competition Authority as the body conducting extra-judicial proceedings. A market<br />
participant may submit a written complaint to the Competition Authority against another<br />
market participant’s activities or lack of activity that violates the Electricity Market Act or<br />
legislations enacted based on the Electricity Market Act. A total of 33 decisions (including<br />
decisions on challenges) were made in the year <strong>2010</strong> about the solving of complaints. 256<br />
answers to inquiries and requests for information were made (incl. relating to the Public<br />
Water Supply and Sewerage Act). In order to ensure the rights granted to energy consumers<br />
by law, the Competition Authority continuously monitors the accession fee methods,<br />
standard terms and other matters provided by the law. In the year <strong>2010</strong>, 23 decisions were<br />
heard and made relating to the approval of accession fee methods (3) and general terms (20).<br />
Public water supply and sewerage system<br />
In August <strong>2010</strong>, the Riigikogu passed the Establishment of Price Limitations to<br />
Monopolies Act, which among other things amended the Public Water Supply and<br />
Sewerage Act (hereinafter referred to as PWSSA) since 01.11.<strong>2010</strong>. Arising from the law<br />
amendment, the water undertakings whose territory is located on a sewerage collection<br />
area with a pollution load of 2,000 population equivalents or more are required to coordinate<br />
the price of the water service and the calculation methods of the accession fee<br />
with the Competition Authority.<br />
Pursuant to the law amendment, the Competition Authority had to prepare and publish on<br />
its website an instruction material “Recommended principles of calculating the price of the<br />
water service” (hereinafter referred to as the Instructions). The creators of the Instructions<br />
were guided by the regulation principles of monopoly undertakings (electricity, district<br />
heating, and natural gas) that were already in place in Estonia. The Instructions are applied<br />
49
to the approval of water service prices similarly and homogenously upon the analysis and<br />
approval of the activities of all water undertakings that are under the area of regulation of<br />
the Competition Authority. The said Instructions may also be used upon the approval of<br />
prices of the water service by local governments. While preparing the Instructions, the<br />
Competition Authority asked for the opinion of different institutions and water<br />
undertakings, and during the process more than 200 opinions and questions were submitted<br />
to the Competition Authority. The Competition Authority has provided its answers to the<br />
submitted opinions and the generated discussion in a document “Explanations of the<br />
Competition Authority on Instructions to water undertakings “Recommended principles of<br />
calculating the price of the water service”” that the Competition Authority has published on<br />
its website.<br />
Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, the Competition Authority has the right to<br />
determine the form of procedural acts based on the right of discretion, based on which the<br />
price application forms (hereinafter referred to as the Questionnaires) “Detailed<br />
questionnaire to water undertakings” and “Simplified questionnaire to water undertakings”<br />
have been prepared and published. Upon filling out the Questionnaires, a water undertaking<br />
can be guided by the “Instructions for the submission of a price application”.<br />
If a lower price of the water service has been established for natural persons than to legal<br />
persons, then pursuant to the requirements of equal treatment the water undertaking is<br />
required to start minimising the price difference, but not faster than during a period of 15<br />
years. The Competition Authority has prepared the “Model for minimisation of the price<br />
difference of the water service” and published the document on its website. In the year <strong>2010</strong><br />
the Competition Authority did not receive any properly formed price applications of the<br />
water service or applications for the approval of calculation methods of accession fees.<br />
Nevertheless, there were numerous inquiries from water undertakings and consumers<br />
regarding the new wording of the Public Water Supply and Sewerage Act.<br />
50
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS MARKET IN<br />
THE YEAR <strong>2010</strong><br />
Similar to earlier years, the developments occurring in the Estonian market of electronic<br />
communications were also affected by global processes in the year <strong>2010</strong>. For the third<br />
year in a row, the turnover of electronic communications decreased, but compared to the<br />
record braking year of 2007, the decrease was only 3.9%. At the same time, the decrease<br />
was not only caused by the economic recession, but also by intense competition and<br />
market regulation.<br />
It is possible to support the sustainability of the electronic communications sector by<br />
ensuring efficient competition, and any regulatory intervention of the Competition<br />
Authority must be well reasoned, as excessive measures may have a negative effect on the<br />
development of the sector. Data of the year <strong>2010</strong> indicates that regulatory intervention is<br />
still necessary in several electronic communications markets and the applied measures have<br />
contributed to an improvement of the competition situation. Regulatory intervention also<br />
supported the price stability in the retail market during rapid economic growth and when<br />
the consumer price index was quickly increasing.<br />
The electronic communications market of the year <strong>2010</strong> was predominantly characterised<br />
by:<br />
turnover decrease of the interconnection service;<br />
continuous but minimum growth of the data communication service and mobile data<br />
communications;<br />
stabilisation of cable television service volumes.<br />
The estimated turnover of telecommunication services provided by the companies operating<br />
in the market in the year <strong>2010</strong> was approximately 709.4 million euros (11.1 billion kroons),<br />
which corresponds to only a 1% decrease compared to the year 2009. Although the<br />
turnovers of interconnection and mobile communication services decreased, an increase in<br />
the volumes of telephone and other services had an overall positive effect on the total<br />
turnover of the sector. Conditionally, the electronic communications sector can be divided<br />
into eight market segments: telephone, mobile telephone, data communications, fixed line,<br />
interconnection, access, cable television and other services, incl. broadcasting and radio<br />
communications.<br />
51
FIGURE 5 Division of the total turnover of the electronic communications sector in the years<br />
2009 and <strong>2010</strong> by services.<br />
Compared to the year 2009, the share of the total turnover of telephone services increased in<br />
the market of electronic communications from 12% to 14%. The biggest providers of the<br />
telephone service were Elion Ettevõtted Aktsiaselts (hereinafter referred to as Elion),<br />
Telefant AS (hereinafter referred to as Telefant), STV AS (hereinafter referred to as STV)<br />
and AS Starman (hereinafter referred to as Starman). The number of end-users of the<br />
telephone service decreased during the year by 22,000 consumers. The retail market of the<br />
mobile telephone service was characterised by a slight decrease in turnover, but the<br />
number of end-users of the service increased by approximately 5.1%. The service market<br />
had reached the developed market state where the existing client base is being redistributed<br />
between service providers. Within the total turnover of the electronic communications<br />
market, the market of the mobile telephone service decreased by 1% compared to the year<br />
2009. The market of the interconnection service involves the interconnection services of<br />
the fixed telephone networks as well as mobile telephone networks. The share of the<br />
above mentioned market in the total turnover of the electronic communications market<br />
decreased compared to the previous year by 1.5%, whereas the turnover of the<br />
interconnection service decreased over the course of the year by 11.9%. The decrease of<br />
turnover was greatly affected by a continuous decrease of call termination charges that<br />
originated from a regulatory intervention of the Competition Authority. The turnover of<br />
the access service decreased and added up to only a minimum share of the total turnover<br />
52
of the electronic communications market, reaching a mere 0.1%. The number of end-users<br />
of fixed broadband service in the data communications market continued to increase,<br />
growing during the course of the year by 3.5%, however the service turnover decreased by<br />
2.2% at the same time. Compared to earlier years, the growth of the number of end-users<br />
has slowed down and the reasons for such a decrease in growth may be related to the<br />
economic recession. At the same time, the fixed broadband service segment suffers from<br />
increasing competition from the mobile broadband technology. The market of the fixed<br />
line service in the electronic communications sector has one of the smallest volumes<br />
where the consumption remained on the same level compared to the year 2009. The<br />
turnover of the cable television service also remained on the same level. Nevertheless,<br />
undertakings continuously invest in cable television networks to widen their coverage area<br />
and offer the consumers new and high-quality package services.<br />
Developments in the data communications market<br />
The data communications retail market is a rapidly growing and developing market with 79<br />
active service providers as of 31.12.<strong>2010</strong>, of which Elion, Starman, STV and Televõrgu AS<br />
are the biggest. The number of end-users of the broadband service increased compared to<br />
the year 2009 by 3.5% (without taking into account the mobile broadband connection).<br />
FIGURE 6 Use of the broadband service by technologies in 2004-<strong>2010</strong>.<br />
Competition increased in the said market mostly between the undertakings that own<br />
network infrastructure. Of the biggest service providers, Elion mostly provided the ADSL<br />
service and cable television undertakings Starman and STV provided fixed broadband<br />
service over cable modems or fibre optic networks. 81% of the end-users consumed the<br />
broadband services of Elion, Starman and STV and the total volume of the market share of<br />
53
these market participants has decreased minimally over the year. Since the year 2009, the<br />
Competition Authority also started to collect data on the number of such users of the mobile<br />
broadband service who use the service predominantly for accessing the Internet from their<br />
computers (over data communication terminals, USB modems, etc.). The mobile broadband<br />
connection offers increasing competition to fixed data communications, as the service prices<br />
and connection speeds are comparable and sometimes even more favourable compared to<br />
the prices of fixed data connections. Total substitution is yet hindered by volume limitations<br />
and ensuring of the speed of connection. The number of users of the mobile broadband<br />
service increased over the course of the year more than three-fold, reaching 70,000 by the<br />
end of the year <strong>2010</strong>.<br />
On the broadband market, services were mostly provided over the telephone network, fibre<br />
optic network and cable television networks. Compared to the year 2009, the number of<br />
xDSL end-users increased by 11% and the number of end-users of fibre optics increased by<br />
4%, whereas the number of users of cable modems decreased by 3%. Although so far, the<br />
number of end-users of the broadband service provided over radio communications has<br />
increased rapidly since the year 2008 (38% increase in 2008 and 8% in 2009), the year <strong>2010</strong><br />
brought about a 5% decrease in this segment. The number of end-users of xDSL, cable<br />
modem and fibre optic based broadband services amounted to 84% of all broadband users<br />
by the end of the year <strong>2010</strong>. As of the end of the year, the estimated number of users of the<br />
broadband service amounted to 55% of all households.<br />
FIGURE 7 Change of the number of users of the broadband service over the years 2004–<strong>2010</strong>.<br />
The end-users increasingly use different services in a parallel manner (the broadband,<br />
telephone, cable television and mobile telephone services), which also increases the<br />
popularity of Bundled communication services where one monthly fee allows a consumer to<br />
use at least two communications services. As of the end of the year <strong>2010</strong>, a similar Bundled<br />
54
services was used by approximately 70% of consumers. The Bundled services are often more<br />
attractively priced than the broadband service separately.<br />
The data communications wholesale markets can be divided into two segments: markets of<br />
copper pair access and broadband access. On these markets, the Competition Authority has<br />
declared Elion an undertaking with significant market power and the services of this<br />
company have been subject to access, equal treatment, transparency and price obligations<br />
since the year 2007. In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the number of access lines given to the use of other<br />
service providers started to decrease, shrinking by 4.5% during the year. By the end of the<br />
year <strong>2010</strong>, the supply of the broadband access service had also decreased by 19%. The<br />
turnover of access services was practically equal to the level of the year 2009. Compared to<br />
the year 2009, the monthly fee for the copper pair access increased by 15% and the monthly<br />
fee for the selected copper pair access increased by 3%. Depending on the speed of the<br />
broadband connection, the monthly fees for broadband access decreased by up to 50%.<br />
FIGURE 8 Number of access lines given to the use of other service providers in the years<br />
2004-<strong>2010</strong>.<br />
Developments in the cable television service market<br />
In the year <strong>2010</strong>, 15 operators were active in the cable television service market (including<br />
the IPTV service), of which Starman, STV and Elion were the biggest. Elion’s market entry<br />
in the year 2005 quickened the increase of the number of end-users and the overall<br />
development in the otherwise relatively stable market, while trends also continued in the<br />
year <strong>2010</strong> in relation to the transition to digital television. Compared to the year 2009, the<br />
number of end-users of the cable television service increased by 5.3% or approximately<br />
17,000 consumers. Accordingly, the market shares of service providers changed to some<br />
55
degree. Elion has significantly increased the availability of the IPTV service through its<br />
communications network.<br />
FIGURE 9 Division of market shares of providers of cable television services based on the<br />
number of end-users, 2004-<strong>2010</strong><br />
Developments in the public mobile telephone service market<br />
The consolidated data of the retail market of the public mobile telephone service indicated<br />
relative stability in the year <strong>2010</strong>. Nevertheless, this market is the most competitive in the<br />
electronic communications sector, as three of the biggest operators are vigorously competing<br />
against each other for clients. During the year, three network operators operated in the<br />
public mobile telephone service market: AS EMT (hereinafter referred to as EMT), Tele2<br />
Eesti AS (hereinafter referred to as Tele2) and Elisa Eesti AS (hereinafter referred to as<br />
Elisa); there were also two virtual providers of the public mobile telephone service:<br />
ProGroup Holding OÜ and Top Connect OÜ. ProGroup Holding OÜ ended the provision<br />
of services to GSM consumers on1 November, and delivered all of its clients to Elisa. The<br />
number of end-users did not increase significantly in the year <strong>2010</strong>, remaining on the level<br />
of a 5.2% increase.<br />
The number of contractual end-users increased compared to the year 2009 by 2.5% and the<br />
number of end-users of prepaid calling cards increased during the same period by 10.6% (see<br />
figure 10).<br />
56
FIGURE 10 Change of the number of contractual end-users and end-users of prepaid calling<br />
cards of the public mobile telephone service during the years 2004–<strong>2010</strong><br />
FIGURE 11 Density of end-users of the public mobile telephone service per 100 residents during<br />
the years 2001-<strong>2010</strong><br />
The number of end-users’ started minutes in a public mobile telephone network increased in<br />
the year <strong>2010</strong> by 10%. At the same time, the number of calling minutes initiated in a<br />
telephone network decreased by 4%. Therefore, end-users still consider the public mobile<br />
telephone service as the preferred way of consuming voice services, however the decrease of<br />
the number of minutes initiated from a telephone network has slowed down. Calls initiated<br />
from mobile telephone networks make up 74% of all initiated calls and only 26% of calls are<br />
initiated from a telephone network.<br />
Development of mobile data communication services and 3G/3.5G networks resulted in a<br />
rapid growth of the consumption of data communication services provided through GPRS<br />
and 3G/3.5G networks also in the year <strong>2010</strong>. Compared to the total volumes of the year<br />
2009, the total volume of the year <strong>2010</strong> increased four-fold.<br />
57
The following significant developments in the provision of the service deserve mentioning:<br />
1) the operators significantly expanded the coverage area of their 3.5G networks where endusers<br />
can use broadband services with speeds comparable to the fixed connection (2-42<br />
Mbit/s), providing the broadband service also to residents of areas which are beyond the<br />
reach of fixed network connections. Starting from 30 December, EMT increased the<br />
download speed in its 3.5G network to 42 Mbit/s. Starting from the beginning of the year<br />
2011, Tele2 increased the maximum download speed in its network to 21.6 Mbit/s;<br />
2) all operators opened their fourth generation LTE (Long Term Evolution) 2.6GHz test<br />
networks that are particularly suitable for covering densely populated areas, as they<br />
provide five-fold faster download speeds compared to the current 3G+ technology. On 16<br />
December <strong>2010</strong>, EMT opened Estonia’s first 4G mobile communications network,<br />
making Estonia the eleventh country in the world where the 4G network is open for endusers.<br />
3) operators organised a joint campaign to increase the users’ awareness of the necessity and<br />
simplicity of the use of the mobiil-ID solution. This solution allows the same transactions<br />
as the ID-card – digitally sign various contracts; log onto internet banking systems and<br />
participate in elections. Mobiil-ID has been used in Estonia since the year 2007 and has<br />
been used for making over four million transactions.<br />
Estonia is fifth in the world on the Broadband Quality Score and fourteenth place on the<br />
broadband service quality score, outscoring close neighbours such as Finland (27th place),<br />
Lithuania (38th place) and Latvia (51st place).<br />
On the mobile telephone networks interconnection market, market shares are divided<br />
between operators in a more uniform manner than in the interconnection markets of<br />
telephone networks, which is a phenomenon that can be explained by a more intense<br />
competition in the public mobile telephone service retail market.<br />
Compared to the year 2009, the number of call minutes terminated in mobile telephone<br />
networks (including calls made from fixed telephone networks, international, inter and intra<br />
network calls) increased in the year <strong>2010</strong> by 2.5%.<br />
Since July <strong>2010</strong>, the upper limit of the termination price of voice calls, established to<br />
Estonian public mobile telephone network operators by the Competition Authority, is 0.078<br />
EUR/min (1.22 kroons/min), which will decrease by 10% from July 2011.<br />
58
FIGURE 12 Prices of mobile telephone network interconnection services in the EU,<br />
kroons/min. Source: ERG<br />
Developments in the market of telephone services<br />
In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the biggest service providers in the telephone service market were Elion,<br />
Tele2 and Starman.<br />
The year was characterised by a decrease of the number of end-users of the telephone<br />
service market (5.8%), whereas the number of customer lines used also decreased by 2%.<br />
The telephone service market is a market which is decreasing in the long-term. In the year<br />
<strong>2010</strong>, the number of calls initiated from telephone networks decreased by approximately<br />
4%.<br />
FIGURE 13 Change of the number of users of the telephone service over the years 2004-<strong>2010</strong>.<br />
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In the year <strong>2010</strong>, Elion was an undertaking with significant market power (hereinafter<br />
referred to as USMP) in the interconnection service market. Accordingly, the company was<br />
also subject to special obligations, incl. the obligations of providing the interconnection, call<br />
origination and termination services. Elion was also subject to price control of the above<br />
listed services (obligation to follow the cost-oriented principle). The other service providers<br />
are USMP-s (a total of 10 communication undertakings) in the call termination market.<br />
The fixed communications networks’ interconnection market is deemed to consist of<br />
(telephone) networks that are used to provide the interconnection service that is necessary<br />
for the function of the voice communications service. The biggest companies operating in<br />
this market are Elion, Elisa, Starman and Top Connect. The total number of call minutes<br />
terminated in a fixed communications network decreased in the year <strong>2010</strong> by 3% (see figure<br />
14).<br />
FIGURE 14 Change of the volume of call minutes terminated between fixed communications<br />
networks of Estonia in the years 2004-<strong>2010</strong><br />
In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the prices of initiation and termination of calls in a fixed location of the<br />
telephone network of Elion decreased by approximately 5% on the national level and<br />
approximately 20% on the local level. Prices of other communication undertakings did not<br />
change.<br />
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Universal service<br />
Universal service is a set of services which conforms to the technical and quality<br />
requirements established by the EU law, which is of a specified quality and available to all<br />
end-users requesting it, regardless of their geographical location, uniformly and at an<br />
affordable price. The universal service includes the following:<br />
1) connection to the public telephone network;<br />
2) public pay-phone service;<br />
3) accessibility of a universal electronic Public Number Directory and directory enquiry<br />
services.<br />
31. As of 31 December <strong>2010</strong>, there was one company in Estonia that was required to<br />
provide the universal service – Elisa – and there were 11 end-users of the universal service.<br />
The universal service must enable originating and receiving national and international calls,<br />
sending and receipt of faxes and a data communication service with a download speed of up<br />
to 556kbit/s. Elion ended provision of the public pay-phone service on 1 December.<br />
There is a well-functioning competition in Estonia relating to universal electronic Public<br />
Number Directory and directory enquiry services. There are various databases of telephone<br />
and mobile telephone users freely available on the Internet. These services are reasonably<br />
available on the entire territory of Estonia and the needs of end-users are sufficiently<br />
covered. For this reason, there is no need to dedicate a provider of the universal service for<br />
the public pay-phone service and/or universal electronic Public Number Directory and<br />
directory enquiry services.<br />
Fixed line service market<br />
The fixed line service market is volume-wise among the smallest of all electronic<br />
communications markets. The turnover of the service has decreased by 5% over the last<br />
year. The number of fixed lines decreased in the year <strong>2010</strong> by 9%.<br />
In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the fixed line service was provided by 10 operators, of which Elion and<br />
Televõrgu AS were the biggest.<br />
Regulated prices did not change in the fixed line market during the year.<br />
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FIGURE 15 Change of the number of fixed lines in the years 2004–<strong>2010</strong>.<br />
Analyses of the communications market conducted in the year <strong>2010</strong><br />
Pursuant to § 41 and 44 of the Electronic Communications Act (hereinafter referred to as<br />
ECA) the Competition Authority analyses regularly, but not less frequently than once<br />
every three years, the competitive situation in the communications services markets,<br />
being guided by the directions of the European Commission and rulings of the European<br />
Court of Justice. The Competition Authority has the right to determine undertakings<br />
with significant market power in these markets and apply to them regulatory measures<br />
prescribed by law.<br />
In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the Competition Authority conducted market analyses in the markets of<br />
communications services, being guided by the Commission Recommendation of 17.12.2007<br />
on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector<br />
susceptible to Ex ante regulation 8 (hereinafter referred to as the recommendation), the annex<br />
to which defines seven electronic communications markets.<br />
In March <strong>2010</strong>, decisions of the Competition Authority entered into force in the markets of<br />
initiation and termination of calls in a telephone network. The Competition Authority<br />
identified Elion as an undertaking with significant market power in the market of initiation<br />
of calls in a telephone network, and Elioni, Elisa, Eleks Telefon OÜ, Starman, STV,<br />
Televõrk, Linxtelecom Estonia OÜ, Top Connect, State Infocommunication Foundation<br />
and ProGroup Holding in the market of termination of calls in a telephone network.<br />
8 Commission Recommendation of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service markets within<br />
the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive<br />
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for<br />
electronic communications networks and services. OJ L 344, 28.12.2007 P. 0065 – 0069.<br />
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Upon the establishment of price obligation in the market of termination of calls in a<br />
telephone network, the Competition Authority was guided also by the principle of efficiency<br />
and symmetrical prices which has been provided for the service of termination of calls in a<br />
telephone network by the Commission Recommendation of 07.05.2009 on the Regulatory<br />
Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU. Pursuant to this principle, all<br />
undertakings with significant market power operating in this market must apply an identical<br />
price which is the call termination price in the telephone network of Elion, calculated based<br />
on the cost accounting methodology established by the Competition Authority. As a result<br />
of the established cost accounting methodology, call termination prices significantly<br />
dropped in the networks of Elisa and ProGroup Holding, whereas the prices of other<br />
communication undertakings remained on the same level.<br />
In March <strong>2010</strong>, a decision of the Competition Authority entered into force relating to<br />
private and business customers on the market of access to a telephone network in a fixed<br />
location. The Competition Authority found that it is not necessary to prescribe obligations<br />
which are significantly more encumbering than the existing obligations to Elion. Pursuant<br />
to the decision, Elion must allow end-users to access the services of a telephone service<br />
provider interconnected to its network through dialling a carrier access code and using the<br />
preselection of the telephone service provider. At the same time, the end-user must be able<br />
to cancel a previous selection separately for each call when using the carrier access code.<br />
With a decision of the Competition Authority, Elion was declared an undertaking with<br />
significant market power in the wholesale market of fixed line terminating segments and<br />
access, non-discrimination, transparency and price obligations of an undertaking with<br />
significant market power were prescribed.<br />
In the trunk segment wholesale market, Elion was not deemed an undertaking with<br />
significant market power, because the results of the carried-out market analysis indicated<br />
that the competition situation has significantly improved in the fixed line trunk segment<br />
wholesale market. For this reason, continuation with sector specific regulations in this<br />
market was not reasoned and Elion’s obligations of an undertaking with significant market<br />
power were deemed invalid in this market.<br />
In the year <strong>2010</strong>, a market analysis was also started in the broadcasting service market and a<br />
respective draft decision corresponding to the analysis was sent to national consultations in<br />
November <strong>2010</strong>. As a result of the conducted market analysis, the Competition Authority<br />
found that AS Levira has significant market power in the said market. The Competition<br />
63
Authority has proposed to declare AS Levira an undertaking with significant market power<br />
to which the obligations of an undertaking with significant market power were prescribed.<br />
In the year 2011, the Competition Authority continues to conduct market analyses. The<br />
next market analysis will be conducted in the market of call termination in the public mobile<br />
telephone network. Consultations with communication undertakings for the acquisition of<br />
data necessary for market analyses will also continue.<br />
Supervision in the sector of electronic communications<br />
Although communication undertakings submitted several complaints regarding enabling of<br />
access to Elion’s Cable ducts in the years 2008 – 2009, there were no such disputes in the<br />
year <strong>2010</strong>. There were also no other disputes relating to access to communication networks.<br />
At the same time, the Competition Authority participated as a conciliator in several disputes<br />
arisen between communication undertakings that were mostly caused by insufficient<br />
communication between the companies. As a final result, the disputes reached solutions<br />
that satisfied all parties.<br />
The Competition Authority conducted six price and cost accounting supervision<br />
proceedings relating to undertakings with significant market power. Three of these<br />
proceedings related to Elion, one to ProGroup Holding, one to Starman and one to the<br />
communication services of Levira.<br />
Conflicts with the established methodology were identified in the price and cost accounting<br />
procedures of Elion's copper pair access service, relating to the fact an injunction was made<br />
in October <strong>2010</strong>. Elion challenged the said injunction in the administrative court. The<br />
challenge constitutes a dispute whether the calculation principles of the total volume of the<br />
service used under a unit of a monthly fee of the copper pair access service comply with the<br />
established methodology. The court proceedings will continue in the year 2011.<br />
A final solution was achieved by court proceedings relating to Elisa’s complaints regarding<br />
the price obligation established to it in the mobile telephone termination market and<br />
regarding its prescribed status as an undertaking with significant market power in the<br />
telephone network’s call termination market. Pursuant to a ruling of the Tallinn<br />
Administrative Court of 18 August <strong>2010</strong>, the complaint of Elisa regarding its price<br />
obligation established in the mobile telephone termination market was unsatisfied. Elisa<br />
waived its complaint on its prescribed status as an undertaking with significant market<br />
power in the telephone network’s call termination market and the case was deemed closed<br />
with the decision of the Tallinn Administrative Court of 12 October <strong>2010</strong>.<br />
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Amendment of the Electronic Communications Act<br />
In the year <strong>2010</strong>, a process of preparation of the draft Act to Amend Electronic<br />
Communications Act was started due to a need to ensure compliance of the ECA with the<br />
amendment package of the year 2009 to the internal market directives of the European<br />
Parliament and the Council. The need of amending the act also originated from the general<br />
development of the electronic communications sector, aiming to ensure the smooth and<br />
flawless regulation of the sector.<br />
To facilitate preparation of the draft Act, specialists from the Competition Authority were<br />
also included in the workgroup established by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and<br />
Communications.<br />
As an exceptional measure, a possibility is provided with the draft to establish an obligation<br />
to an undertaking with significant market power to ensure function-based separation only if<br />
the obligations previously prescribed to that undertaking have not yielded desired results.<br />
Function-based separation allows improvement of competition in several relevant markets,<br />
significantly decreasing discrimination causes and simplifying the verification and ensuring<br />
the obligation of equal treatment.<br />
The draft introduces a requirement for the Competition Authority to consult with the Body<br />
of European Regulators for Electronic Communications. The Competition Authority is also<br />
required to advance the investments of communications undertakings into next generation<br />
communications networks (Next Generation Network – NGN), contributing to increasing the<br />
availability of broadband (data communications) to end-users. The draft also prescribes the<br />
right of the Competition Authority to provide statistical information to interested parties<br />
based on their requests about the number of clients of public electronic communications<br />
services provided on the retail level by communications undertakings, and about the market<br />
shares calculated based on the number of clients of the communications undertaking<br />
providing the service. It is significant that although it is not possible to reveal these data<br />
based on the current ECA, the draft no longer interprets the said information as a business<br />
secret.<br />
65
POSTAL SERVICES<br />
The year <strong>2010</strong> did not bring about any significant changes in the postal services market.<br />
The universal postal service (hereinafter referred to as UPS) was provided for affordable<br />
fees defined by the Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications. In order to<br />
compensate for any possible unreasonably encumbering costs that the providers of UPS<br />
may bear, the funding obligation was borne by the companies providing postal services<br />
based on activity licences.<br />
D2D terminated its activities in the year <strong>2010</strong> and therefore there were two providers of<br />
postal services with a financing obligation in <strong>2010</strong> (AS Eesti Post hereinafter referred to as<br />
Eesti Post and AS Express Post hereinafter referred to as Express Post). No activity licence<br />
applications were submitted for the provision of postal services.<br />
There were also no significant changes in the market of such postal services that do not<br />
require an activity licence in the year <strong>2010</strong>. Similar to previous years, a few providers of<br />
courier services were removed from the register of economic activities, because they no<br />
longer provided the service. At the same time, five new providers of courier services, two<br />
direct mailing service providers and one forwarder of periodicals were registered in the year<br />
<strong>2010</strong>.<br />
As of 31 December <strong>2010</strong>, there were 38 providers of one or more postal services registered<br />
in the register of economic activities. There was one provider of UPS (pursuant to the Postal<br />
Act there can only be one such provider), two licensed forwarders of items of<br />
correspondence, one licensed forwarder of postal parcels, 35 providers of courier services,<br />
10 providers of the direct mail service and six forwarders of periodicals. However, not all of<br />
the above mentioned undertakings provided postal services in reality.<br />
Pursuant to its five-year activity licence, Eesti Post was also the provider of UPS in the year<br />
<strong>2010</strong>. Eesti Post used its right, arising from the Postal Act, to send quarterly applications to<br />
the Competition Authority for receiving compensation for unreasonably encumbering costs<br />
arising from the obligation to provide UPS. Proceedings relating to the applications of the<br />
year <strong>2010</strong> are still not completed, because the company has failed to explain the emergence<br />
of unreasonably encumbering costs (throughout different quarters, the company has<br />
continuously changed its cost allocation principles, it has failed to take into account the<br />
Competition Authority’s “Methodology of valuation of costs of the provider of universal<br />
postal service”, and upon finding a reserve volume, the company has not been guided by<br />
66
egulation No. 20 of the Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications of 06.03.2009<br />
“Requirements to revenue and cost accounting of the provider of universal postal service”).<br />
Pursuant to the Postal Act, at least 90 per cent of items of correspondence forwarded as<br />
ordinary items which are deposited with the UPS provider shall be delivered to the<br />
addressee during the day after deposit. A UPS provider ensures that a person independent of<br />
the service provider inspects compliance of the UPS with the quality requirements. In<br />
addition, the Competition Authority carries out annual verification. A verification mailing<br />
carried out in the year <strong>2010</strong> from July to October identified that the delivery quality of items<br />
of correspondence complies with the provisions of § 37 subsection 5 of the Postal Act.<br />
FIGURE 16 Quality of delivery of items of correspondence in the year <strong>2010</strong>.<br />
Upon verification of delivery, 826 of the total 900 mailed items of correspondence that were<br />
being accounted for were delivered to the addressee in due time, meaning that the share of<br />
mailed items delivered in time equalled to 91.8%. 6.5% or 59 items of correspondence were<br />
67
delivered to the addressee a day later. 1.1% or 10 items of correspondence reached the<br />
mailboxes of their addressees with a delay of two days or more (see figure 16).<br />
As mentioned, two undertakings were licensed to provide different postal services in the<br />
year <strong>2010</strong> – Eesti Post and Express Post. The activity licence prescribes the minimum<br />
number of access points of the provider of postal services. It means that a provider of postal<br />
services may have more access points, but in order to decrease the minimum supply, it must<br />
submit a respective reasoned application to the Competition Authority. A prerequisite of<br />
satisfying the application is compliance with the requirements of the Postal Act. As of 31<br />
December <strong>2010</strong>, the minimum number of access points prescribed by the activity licences<br />
was 3447, of which 347 were postal offices and 3100 mailboxes. Only Eesti Post had<br />
mailboxes. Pursuant to activity licences, postal offices were divided between Eesti Post and<br />
Express Post correspondingly – 344 and 3.<br />
No postal offices were being used jointly by the licensed providers of postal services in the<br />
year <strong>2010</strong>. The minimum number of postal offices of the companies as prescribed by activity<br />
licences is shown in table 1.<br />
Tabel 1 Minimum number of postal offices of companies possessing activity licences<br />
Provider of postal services As of 31.12.2009 As of 31.12.<strong>2010</strong><br />
Eesti Post 351 344<br />
Express Post 3 3<br />
In the year <strong>2010</strong>, proceedings continued regarding applications submitted by Eesti Post on<br />
04.08.2009, whereby Eesti Post wished to establish the minimum number of UPS postal<br />
offices to equal 344. Eesti Post reasoned the proposal with modernisation of the postal<br />
network and added that it would allow Eesti Post to choose more flexible open hours,<br />
contributing thereby to finding franchise partners and decreasing losses.<br />
In its application, Eesti Post mentioned that during the course of preparation for the<br />
decrease in the minimum number of postal offices it had analysed the postal offices’<br />
locations, demand for postal services and service profitability, and as a result of the analysis<br />
the company had prepared a list of possible postal offices where Eesti Post would have to<br />
find alternative means of presence in the future.<br />
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The vision of Eesti Post, the tasks of the stationary postal office will be carried out in the<br />
areas referred to in the application by a franchise partner and the so called motorised<br />
delivery is handled by Eesti Post. In case of motorised delivery, an employee of Eesti Post is<br />
sent to the place of residence or work of the user of postal services, where UPS is provided<br />
to the client.<br />
In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the Competition Authority continued proceedings relating to seven postal<br />
offices mentioned in the application of Eesti Post. The proceedings were delayed due to the<br />
failure of the motorised delivery service of Eesti Post to function in low density areas. Eesti<br />
Post failed to comply with the requirements established to the provision of UPS by means of<br />
the motorised delivery service. The motorised delivery service did not allow postal parcels to<br />
be accurately weighed. In the year <strong>2010</strong>, the Competition Authority repeatedly audited the<br />
provision of UPS by means of motorised delivery, and it became evident that the quality of<br />
the service has improved considerably. Hence, the Competition Authority satisfied the<br />
application of Eesti Post and the minimum number of UPS postal offices was decreased to<br />
344.<br />
As of 31 December <strong>2010</strong>, the Competition Authority lacked information about possible<br />
deterioration or obstruction of UPS as a result of the reorganisation of the postal network by<br />
the provider of UPS.<br />
The number of complaints submitted on postal services increased mostly in relation to<br />
Internet shopping. Various problems were associated with international postal<br />
consignments, returning of postal consignments to the sender due to expiry of storage time,<br />
tracing in foreign countries, improper addressing of consignments, sending of forbidden<br />
items, etc.<br />
The main conclusions drawn from the complaints:<br />
the provider of postal services cannot ex post facto attribute any such flaws to a postal<br />
consignment upon its loss or damage that were not identified upon its receipt;<br />
the provider of postal services cannot be held liable upon the loss or damage of an<br />
ordinary letter. As the path of an ordinary letter is not registered, an ordinary letter<br />
cannot be traced or tracked, and identification of the location where the ordinary letter<br />
might have been lost is impossible;<br />
the Postal Act does not regulate forwarding of unaddressed advertisements.<br />
69