Rebirth and the Western Buddhist - Khamkoo
Rebirth and the Western Buddhist - Khamkoo
Rebirth and the Western Buddhist - Khamkoo
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34 <strong>Rebirth</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Western</strong> <strong>Buddhist</strong><br />
Reasoning does not take place in a vacuum, but in <strong>the</strong><br />
context of a <strong>the</strong>ory that provides something to reason<br />
about <strong>and</strong> something to reason from. In Ma<strong>the</strong>matics or<br />
Science, a <strong>the</strong>ory starts with basic assumptions-axioms<br />
<strong>and</strong> postulates-supplemented by definitions, which enable<br />
deductions to be made. It is considered important to<br />
identify <strong>the</strong> assumptions clearly. In <strong>Buddhist</strong> philosophy,<br />
postulates are not identified as such: anything a proponent<br />
of a system would accept is an "assertion," but <strong>the</strong><br />
assertions are not independent. Challenged to prove assertion<br />
A, he may derive it from assertion B. Challenged<br />
to prove B, he could well derive it from A. He is not<br />
required to present his whole system at once as a sequence<br />
of deductions but only to answer questions on<br />
one point at a time. Losang Gyatso, however, begins with<br />
a series of assertions that we may regard as postulates, P1<br />
to P4. We shall have occasion to recall George Spencer<br />
Brown's definition:<br />
We may take a postulate to be a statement<br />
which is accepted without evidence, because it<br />
belongs to a set of such statements from which<br />
it is possible to derive o<strong>the</strong>r statements which<br />
it happens to be convenient to believe. The<br />
chief characteristic which has always marked<br />
such statements has been an almost total lack of<br />
any spontaneous appearance of truth. 70<br />
P1: Effective things are not mere conceptual<br />
imputations but exist in <strong>the</strong>ir own nature, reversed<br />
from, or lacking <strong>the</strong> nature of, o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
things. (LG 11-12, quoting Pramii7J.aviirttika I.40,<br />
which I have interpreted with <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />
commentary <strong>and</strong> Geshe Rabten's explanation.)<br />
Anyone versed in Prasali.gika-madhyamika philosophy<br />
or modem physics can see that this is not strictly true. But<br />
since it is embarrassing to perform logical analysis on