REPA Booklet - Stop Epa
REPA Booklet - Stop Epa
REPA Booklet - Stop Epa
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29 Sugar<br />
How might a Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement impact on agriculture?<br />
Agriculture will not be a major issue for the Pacific, except for the Sugar Protocol. Unlike Africa, few Pacific<br />
Islands (Fiji, PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu) are suitable for large-scale commercial agriculture. However,<br />
the impact of imported food on subsistence producers may be significant once PACER is factored in.<br />
What is the Sugar Protocol?<br />
The Sugar Protocol guarantees that ACP countries (and India) can export a set quota of sugar to the European<br />
Union each year at a guaranteed minimum price. That price is linked to the price the Commission pays to<br />
domestic producers, which is up to four times higher than the global market rate. A second related arrangement<br />
known as Special Preferential Sugar, is limited to certain ACP countries and guarantees a supply of cane sugar<br />
to European refineries at around 85% of the Sugar Protocol price.<br />
“The agreement<br />
between some of the<br />
world’s richest<br />
countries and the<br />
poorest will see the<br />
latter lose revenue<br />
through the<br />
elimination of tariffs,<br />
increased<br />
unemployment<br />
following the<br />
collapse of local<br />
industries and<br />
threaten the<br />
livelihoods of<br />
millions of small<br />
scale farmers<br />
through competition<br />
from European<br />
imports.”<br />
(Ashok Subron,<br />
Resistance and<br />
Alternatives, Mauritius)<br />
When did the Sugar Protocol come about and why?<br />
The British had encouraged sugar cane production in Fiji (using indentured labour) and its Caribbean colonies<br />
to supply its factories. When England joined the European Common Market it ensured a secure supply of<br />
unrefined sugar for its major producer, Tate & Lyle, by signing a Sugar Protocol. That Protocol was incorporated<br />
into the first Lomé Convention but it maintained an independent legal existence. That means it is not dependent<br />
on the Contonou Agreement and continues indefinitely - although the European Commission can renounce it at<br />
2 years’ notice. It is noteworthy that most of the sugar imported from ACP States is still processed in Europe and<br />
re-exported - raising the question of how many billions of dollars have European companies have made over<br />
the years on the backs of their former colonies, while claiming this was concession to promote their development?<br />
Which ACP countries does the Sugar Protocol primarily affect?<br />
The European Union imports nearly 1.3 million tonnes of sugar under the Sugar Protocol from ACP countries.<br />
Mauritius has the largest share of 38.25%. Fiji’s share is 12.75% (around 165,000 tonnes). This quota level<br />
originally ran from 1995-2001 and was extended to 2006. Fiji also gets 9.3% of the Special Preferential Sugar<br />
scheme, just over 30,000 tonnes. In total, 60% of Fiji’s sugar production goes to the European Union.<br />
Why is the Sugar Protocol under threat?<br />
For three reasons:<br />
1. The European Union is a very inefficient producer of sugar. It uses massive domestic subsidies that are<br />
very expensive for the EU and for consumers. That will get worse because the enlargement of the<br />
European Union requires these subsidies to be extended to sugar producing countries in Eastern<br />
Europe. This is the main reason that the Commission is committed to reforming its sugar regime.<br />
2. Major sugar producers in Brazil, Thailand and Australia have long complained that the European<br />
Union’s sugar regime discriminates against their exports, because direct and indirect subsidies undercut<br />
the price they receive on world markets. Several times the Commission vetoed the findings of the GATT<br />
panels that their regime breached GATT Rules. Under the new WTO rules it lost the power of veto. In<br />
October2004 a WTO panel rejected the Commission’s arguments, including that the ACP imports were<br />
protected by a footnote in its agriculture schedule. But it said the EC should still honour its commitment<br />
under Article 36.4 of the Cotonou Agreement to review the protocols ‘with a view to safeguarding the<br />
benefitsderived therefrom, bearing in mind the special legal status of the Sugar Protocol’. The<br />
Commission has appealed.<br />
3. The Everything But Arms arrangement for the (non-ACP) Least Developed Countries includes a<br />
progressive increase in their sugar quotas between 2001 and 2006. Then, from 2006 to 2009, the<br />
Commission will phase in duty free access and much larger quotas for Least Developed Countries at<br />
the same preferential tariff rate it pays to ACP countries. This will have a serious impact on Fiji.<br />
How is the European Commission proposing to reform its domestic sugar policy?<br />
It is replacing the sugar subsidies with a system of direct price support for producers under the Common<br />
Agricultural Policy (which would provide a slightly reduced level of payment) and cutting production. The WTO<br />
58<br />
A People’s Guide To The Pacific’s Economic Partnership Agreement