REPA Booklet - Stop Epa

pushing; and difficulties in ‘stabilising’ trade and investment policies to provide better guarantees for businesses
and investors.
“Talk of regions as
merely ‘regional trade
arrangements’ is
contemptuous as it
reduces the millions of
poor people in these
countries to nothing.
There is more to
regions than just trade
and markets. Justice
demands that the lives
of people of the South
should not be
subjected to this
narrow examination.”
(Percy Makombe,
SEATINI, 2004)
How would the European Union differentiate within the ACP?
The ‘ultimate objective’ was to conclude Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) in each of the 3 ACP regions
by negotiating with subgroups of countries that were already involved in a regional economic integration
process. Those subregional arrangements would also take into account their level of development, constraints
and capacities. The Commission said ‘of course’ it was for the ACP countries to choose their own regional
structures. But the mandate went on to identify the likely groupings: West Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa,
East Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific; plus a few larger individual countries (code for South Africa). There
was a particular problem with the Pacific, because there was no formal regional economic integration arrangement
and no regional partner for the Commission to negotiate with - hence the Commission’s support for the creation
of the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA).
What negotiating process and structure did the Europeans have in mind?
The plan was to have two levels of agreement:
1. an overall agreement, negotiated between 1998 and 2000. This would set out the overall objectives
and framework for the regional agreements, name the regional subgroups that would negotiate them,
and set down the negotiating timetable. It would also contain common provisions for ‘trade-related’
areas that could be expanded on later.
2. subregional negotiations (which could eventually be harmonised) for:
- economic cooperation agreements: these would contain an element of reciprocity for EU exports into
the subregion and provide for cooperation in trade-related areas, with a timetable for reviewing their
progress towards further liberalisation; or
- economic partnership agreements: these would provide for the gradual creation of free trade areas
that met WTO requirements (to cover all sectors and substantially all trade within a 10 year period) and
in accordance with the European Union’s Common Agriculture Policy.
When were these subregional agreements supposed to be completed by?
The Commission would seek a waiver from the WTO for a ‘transition’ period of 5 years – meaning the
subregional negotiations were originally supposed to be completed by 2003! The specific timetables for those
negotiations would reflect the state of regional integration arrangements.
What if some ACP States wanted to opt out?
They had two choices:
- Least Developed Countries could take up the Everything But Arms arrangement. This would allow
them duty free access to the European Union for ‘almost all’ goods, except arms. However, the
Europeans could end the scheme unilaterally at any time.
- Other ACP States would still have access to the General System of Preferences (GSP). However, this
meant they would be treated the same as other developing countries and lose their special treatment as
ACP States. They would also have to accept whatever deal the European Union was offering under
the GSP, which could also be altered or withdrawn unilaterally.
Was the Commission’s mandate non-negotiable?
Negotiations with the ACP were one of many competing considerations for the European Union. The mandate
reflected its internal politics, policies and priorities, its geo-political strategy and its objectives in the WTO and
other trade negotiations. The Commission wanted to avoid precedents that could undermine its arguments in
those negotiations and create favourable precedents it could use as leverage. If the ACP Group was going to
force the Commission to reconsider, it would have needed to seize the initiative at the earliest possible stage and
go beyond a critique of the Green Paper to develop clear, credible, principled alternatives that had popular
support within ACP countries and were backed by a strong lobby within Europe.
22
A People’s Guide To The Pacific’s Economic Partnership Agreement