REPA Booklet - Stop Epa

5
Europe’s New Plan for the ACP
What new arrangements did the European Commission propose in its 1996 Green Paper?
The Commission wanted to ‘breath fresh life’ into its partnership with the ACP by assessing what had, and had
not, worked in the past and the current political, economic and social needs of ACP countries. It said that times
had changed. ACP countries had become marginalised as a result of globalised production, distribution, capital
flows and information technology. They needed radical economic reforms. Leaving this to national governments
had proved inadequate and the WTO was too slow. The process needed a push from the bilateral and regional
levels. That required a radically different approach from Lomé.
“The proposals
suggested in the
Green Paper, when
stripped of their
diplomatic
pleasantries, are in
effect a recitation of
IMF/World Bank
structural adjustment
policies with a
politically correct
veneer of concern for
human rights, the
environment and
gender issues.”
(Grynberg, 1997)
What about the underlying principles of the Lomé acquis?
These would remain, but be updated. What the Green Paper described as the ‘fiction of equality’ under Lomé
would be replaced with a ‘true partnership’ that was treated as an objective, rather than a description of reality.
This new ‘true partnership’ ‘will require a new policy foundation and more effective dialogue, backed by a
commitment by ACP governments to reform’.
Who did the Commission say would decide on the model for reform in ACP countries?
Despite repeated references to dialogue, democratisation and the broad participation of civil society, the
Commission said the EU could not be bound by international commitments that were inconsistent with its own
internal policies. It would only support policies that reflected its (latest) view of what was good for ACP countries:
The EU can commit itself to supporting only economic and social organization models which contribute
to the objectives of its cooperation policy and which comply with the political and social values which
it means to promote.
Wasn’t there some role for the ACP to evaluate the past and assess their future needs?
No. This was the European Union’s Green Paper. So it reflected the European Union’s assessment of history,
the success and failures of Lomé, the current problems and the solutions. It displayed the colonial arrogance that
has underpinned Europe’s relationship with ACP countries for centuries. Lomé had provided trade preferences
and aid within a framework of economic and political relations that suited Europe’s interests at the time. Now
those interests had changed, the ACP was expected to fall into line. The trade economist for the Pacific Island
Forum Secretariat at the time, Roman Grynberg, described the Green Paper as a ‘policy monologue’, shared
by the IMF, World Bank and other donors who peddled the same ideology and economic agenda.
What did the European Commission suggest should replace the Lomé Convention?
It said a ‘coherent’ package of trade, aid and ‘true partnership’ would help ACP countries to achieve high rates
of export and economic growth, allow them to make the most of their development opportunities and avert the
threat of marginalisation. But this could only be achieved by adopting stable, secure and efficient internal trade
and investment policies that were embedded in ‘sound’ market driven policies. These policies would have to be
implemented by responsible governments and enforced through the rule of law.
That sounds like the same old - failed - neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes!
The Green Paper conceded that there had been past failures. But it blamed them on poor governance and
technical weaknesses in design. The ‘unexpected problems’ with structural adjustment programmes of the
1980s had been sorted out in 1990s, especially because the European Union had taken a more sensitive
approach that recognised the importance of good governance and the role of civil society. Again, the Green
Paper accepted that their initial attempts to impose ‘good governance’ conditionalities on ACP governments may
have been too formalistic to secure a sufficient level of political stability and the rule of law, but blamed this on the
lack of appropriate models for political and social organisation in such countries. This time would be different -
structural adjustment would succeed by ensuring that ‘sound’ neoliberal policies, ‘good governance’ and
democracy were backed by aid conditionalities that rewarded governments who implemented them.
How was the European Commission planning to link aid, trade and politics?
By making aid more ‘efficient’. The Green Paper said the Commission had (wrongly) filled the gap in the past
when ACP (mainly African) governments failed to ‘internalise’ development policies and it had shown too much
respect for states’ sovereignty by not insisting that those governments take responsibility. In the future, ACP
States would have to take sovereign responsibility for delivering what was promised in aid programmes. Failure
A People’s Guide To The Pacific’s Economic Partnership Agreement 17