Participation and Democracy: Dynamics, Causes ... - Jacobs University

Participation and Democracy:
Dynamics, Causes and Consequences of
Elite-Challenging Activities
by
Franziska Deutsch
a Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in
Political Science
Approved Dissertation Committee
Prof. Dr. Christian Welzel
Prof. Dr. Klaus Boehnke
Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel
Date of Defense: 29.06.2009
School of Humanities and Social Sciences

Acknowledgement
Writing this PhD thesis was a long process that would not have been possible without the
help and support of many others:
First and foremost, I’d like to thank Chris Welzel for encouraging me to pursue an
academic career and a PhD under his supervision. His generous support and his curiosity
and enthusiasm for research have been motivation and inspiration. Most valuably, he has
introduced me to the potentials of survey research and especially to the fascinating world
of the World Values Survey.
I also want to thank Klaus Boehnke and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel for their support and
for agreeing to become members of my dissertation committee.
Furthermore, I thank my colleagues Nicola Bücker, Yuliya Salauyova, Daniel Fuss and
Bernhard Gißibl for their encouragement and friendship and for sharing this special time
in our lives. I’d like to thank Julian Wucherpfennig for his assistance and our stimulating
discussions. I am also grateful to Matthijs Bogaards for his encouraging words and
helpful academic advice.
Finally, I want to thank my family and friends: Over the past years, Jana Steinert, Claus
Hilgetag, Holger Kenn, Antonia Gohr and Steffi Markert have supported, consoled,
advised and encouraged me. I am grateful for their friendship.
My family has been my greatest source of comfort and strength. I would like to thank my
parents and brothers for their unbelievable unconditional love and support.

Declaration:
I herewith declare that this thesis is my own work and that I have used only the sources
listed. No part of this thesis has been accepted or is currently being submitted for any
degree or other qualification at this university or elsewhere.
Franziska Deutsch Bremen, 04 June 2009

CONTENTS
Figures and Tables
Introduction 1
A
Theoretical Considerations
1 Elite-Challenging Activities as Political Participation 9
2 Theoretical Framework: What Explains Dynamics, Causes and
Consequences of Elite-Challenging Activities? 15
2.1 Modernization and Value Change 15
2.2 Organizational Changes and Social Capital 21
2.2.1 Organizational Changes 21
2.2.2 Declining Social Capital and Elite-Challenging Activities 25
2.3 Resources, Motivation and the Question of Political Equality 30
2.3.1 Political Equality 30
2.3.2 Resources, Equality and Elite-Challenging Activities 33
2.3.3 Motivation, Equality and Elite-Challenging Activities 35
2.4 Opportunity Structures and Elite-Challenging Activities 38
2.5 Crisis of Democracy: Government Overload and Elite-
Challenging Activities 41
3 Hypotheses 44
B
Methods and Data
4 Methodological Background, Data and Measures 50
4.1 Survey Research and Alternative Ways to Measure
Participation 51
4.2 Country Selection 56
4.3 Data Sets and Measures of Elite-Challenging Behavior 61
4.4 Measurement of Elite-Challenging Political Action (dependent
variable) 66

C
Empirical Analyses
5 “The Rise and Fall” of Elite-Challenging Political Participation?
Trends and Cross-Country Differences in Elite-Challenging
Activities 70
5.1 Cross-Country Differences in Levels and Forms of Elite-
Challenging Activities 70
5.2 Trends in Elite-Challenging Activities 81
6 Common Patterns of Complement or Displacement? Elite-
Challenging Activities and Other Forms of Political Activism 89
6.1 Voting 91
6.2 Conventional Participation 95
6.3 Civic Activism 98
7 Down and Down We Go? Social Capital and Elite-Challenging
Activities 107
7.1 The Structural Component: Voluntary Associations and
Informal Networks 109
7.2 The Motivational or Cultural Component: Social Trust 121
7.3 Networks or Trust: Which Component of Social Capital
Generates Elite-Challenging Activities? 126
8 Individual Characteristics or Context Factors: What Matters for
Elite-Challenging Participation? 135
8.1 Elite-Challenging Participation and Individual-Level
Resources and Motivation: The Question of Inequality 136
8.2 Elite-Challenging Activities and Context Factors 143
8.3 The Multilevel Model: What Determines Elite Challenging
Activities? 155
9 Elite-Challenging Activities and Democracy 167
9.1 The Societal Level: Elite-Challenging Activities and
Democracy 167
9.1.1 Measures of Democracy 168
9.1.2 Measures of Elite Integrity 173
9.2 The Individual Level: Elite-Challenging Activities and
Democratic Orientations 178

9.2.1 Support for Democracy 178
9.2.2 Political Involvement 184
9.2.3 Liberal Orientations 187
Conclusion 194
Bibliography 201
Appendix 226

Figures and Tables
Figure 2-1 Change in Party Membership (1980-2000, in %) 23
Figure 4-1 Thresholds in Unconventional Participation 67
Figure 5-1 Participation in Elite-Challenging Activities, by Country in %
(pooled WVS/EVS 2000-02/2005-07) 71
Figure 5-2
Elite-Challenging Activities in Various Societies, in %, pooled
WVS/EVS 1999-2001 and WVS 2005-07 73
Figure 5-3 Elite-Challenging Activities in Various Societies, in %
(WVS/EVS 1999-2002) 75
Figure 5-4 Signed Petition during the past 12 Months, ESS 2004, in % 77
Figure 5-5 Attended Demonstration during the past 12 Months, ESS 2004,
in % 78
Figure 5-6 Political Consumerism, ESS 2002, in % 80
Figure 5-7
Figure 5-8a
Figure 5-8b
Elite-Challenging Activities 1974-1999 in Six Postindustrial
Democracies, in % 81
Elite-Challenging Activities in Postindustrial Democracies:
English-Speaking Societies and Japan, in %, WVS/EVS 81
Elite-Challenging Activities in Postindustrial Democracies:
Western European Societies, in %, WVS/EVS 81
Figure 5-9 Elite-Challenging Activities in Ex-Communist Societies, in %,
WVS/EVS 85
Figure 5-10
Elite-Challenging Activities in Ex-Communist Post-Soviet
Societies, in %, WVS/EVS 86
Figure 5-11 Elite-Challenging Activities in Other Societies, in %, WVS 87
Figure 6-1 Elite-Challenging Activities and Voting (ESS 2002) 93
Figure 6-2
Elite-Challenging Activities and Conventional Participation
(ESS 2002) 96
Figure 6-3 Elite-Challenging Activities and Activity in Interest 100

Organizations (WVS/EVS 1999-2001)
Figure 6-4
Figure 6-5
Figure 7-1
Figure 7-2
Elite-Challenging Activities and Activity in Citizen Action
Groups (WVS/EVS 1999-2001) 101
Elite-Challenging Activities and Civic Activism in Selected
Postindustrial Democracies 1981-1999 (WVS/EVS) 105
Elite-Challenging Activities and Membership in Associations
(ESS 2002) 112
Elite-Challenging Activities and Active Membership in
Associations (ESS 2002) 114
Figure 7-3 Elite-Challenging Activities and Social Activity (ESS 2002) 115
Figure 7-4
Figure 7-5
Elite-Challenging Activities and Average Membership in
European Societies (ESS 2002) 116
Informal Networks in European Societies and Elite-
Challenging Activities (ESS 2002) 119
Figure 7-6 Trust Level and Elite-Challenging Activities (ESS 2002) 123
Figure 8-1
Figure 8-2
Figure 8-3
Figure 8-4
Figure 8-5
Figure 8-6
Figure 9-1
Figure 9-2
Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005) and Voice &
Accountability 145
Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005) and
Democracy Stock 147
Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005) and National
Affluence 148
Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005) and Inequality
in a Society 149
Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005) and
Tertiarization 151
Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005) and the
Happiness Level in a Society 152
Elite-Challenging Activities and Institutional Democracy
(POLITY I-IV, 2001-2004) 169
Elite-Challenging Activities and Democracy: Freedom House
(2000-2006) 171

Figure 9-3
Figure 9-4
Elite-Challenging Activities and Perception of Corruption
(Transparency International, 2001-2006) 173
Elite-Challenging Activities and Control of Corruption (World
Bank, 2002-2006) 175
Table 3-1 Summary of Hypotheses 48
Table 4-1
Democratic Societies Included in the Survey Projects: Political
Action Study (PA), World Values Survey/European Values
Survey (WVS/EVS) and European Social Survey (ESS) 59
Table 4-2 Factor Analysis for Elite-Challenging Activities 68
Table 5-1 Elite-Challenging Activities, in %, ESS 2002, 2004 76
Table 6-1
Table 6-2
Table 6-3
Individual-Level Correlations between Elite-Challenging
Activities and Voting (ESS 2002) 94
Individual-Level Correlations between Elite-Challenging
Activities and Conventional Participation (ESS 2002) 97
Individual-Level Correlation between Elite-Challenging Activities
and Civic Activism (WVS/EVS 1999-2001) 103
Table 7-1 Factor Analyses for Measures of Informal Networks (ESS 2002) 118
Table 7-2
Table 7-3
Individual-Level Correlation: Measures of Social Capital’s
Structural Components and Elite-Challenging Activities (ESS
2002) 121
Individual-Level Correlation: Social Trust and Elite-Challenging
Activities (ESS 2002) 125
Table 7-4 Individual-Level, Binary Logistic Regression (ESS 2002) 127
Table 7-5
Table 8-1
Multi-Level (Hierarchical Generalized Linear) Model of Social
Capital and Elite-Challenging Activities (ESS 2002) 133
Binary-Logistic Regression: Resources and Participation (Political
Action Study 1974 and ESS 2004) 138

Table 8-2
Table 8-3a
Table 8-3b
Binary-Logistic Regression: Resources, Motivation and
Participation (Political Action Study 1974 and ESS 2004) 141
T-Test for Electoral System and Elite-Challenging Activities
(WVS 2000-2005) 154
T-Test for System of Governance and Elite-Challenging Activities
(WVS 2000-2005) 154
Table 8-4 Correlation Effects Among Level-2 Variables 157
Table 8-5
Table 9-1
Table 9-2
Table 9-3
Table 9-4
Table 9-5
Multi-Level Model (HGLM): Individual-Level and Contextual
Determinants of Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005) 163
Zero-Order and Partial Correlation: Elite-Challenging Activities
and Democracy 177
Individual-Level Correlation: Elite-Challenging Activities and
Support for Democracy (WVS/EVS 1999-2001) 179
Individual-Level Correlation: Elite-Challenging Activities and
Understanding of Democracy (WVS/EVS 2005-07) 183
Individual-Level Correlation: Elite-Challenging Activities and
Political Involvement (WVS/EVS 1999-2001) 186
Individual-Level Correlation: Elite-Challenging Activities and
Liberal Orientation (WVS/EVS 1999-2001) 189
Table 9-6 Binary-Logistic Regression Analysis (WVS/EVS 1999-2001)
(dependent variable: Elite-Challenging Activities) 192
Table C1 Results of Hypotheses Testing 196

Introduction
“The effective isolation of protest to the materialist grievances of the poorer and
less-educated will restore unconventional politics pretty much to the position it
occupied before the rise of the 1960s protest movements: largely confined to
groups whose loyalty to the system is most questionable, to marginal groups,
and to situationally generated protests whose rationales may be relatively
difficult to identify and which are therefore always susceptible to being labeled
‘irrational’. From that point it is but a short step to the progressive
delegitimation of protest” (Rootes 1981: 428).
When Barnes and Kaase et al. (1979) published their landmark empirical study on the
expansion of the participation repertoire in Western democracies 30 years ago, the
authors faced harsh criticism by fellow scholars. The critique was mostly directed at one
essential result of the comparative study: the future role of unconventional participation.
In sharp contrast to the above statement, Barnes and Kaase et al. (1979) predicted a
permanent change in Western societies, considering the rise in protest activism not to be
a short-term, anecdotal event: “We interpret this increase in potential for protest to be a
lasting characteristic of democratic mass publics and not just a sudden surge in political
involvement bound to fade away as time goes by” (Kaase and Barnes 1979: 524).
Ever since that study, a number of important books and essays have documented the
spread and acceptance of protest activism or elite-challenging activities around the globe
(Jennings and van Deth et al. 1990; Inglehart 1990; Parry, Moyser and Day 1992; Verba,
Schlozman and Brady 1995; Roller and Wessels 1996; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001;
Dalton 2002; Norris 2002; Inglehart and Catterberg 2003; Dalton and van Sickle 2004;
Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst 2005).
Along similar lines, the social movement literature has described elite-challenging
activities as contentious forms of collective action (Mc Adam 1988; Jenkins and
Klandermans 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1998; Rucht, Koopmans and Neidhardt
1998; Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999; della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht 1999; Rucht 2001;
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Diani and McAdam 2003; Davis et al. 2005).
1

Whereas the early, more qualitatively oriented research in the tradition of Charles Tilly
usually focused on single movements or nations, the more recent quantitative studies on
these movements are of comparative nature, although limited in their scope due to the
availability of protest event data. What these studies have in common is their focus on
the movement or the contentious action itself, not on the resources or motivation of the
participants or the large-scale democratic consequences of an expanded citizen action
repertoire.
Today participation in demonstrations and signing petitions are far from being a tool for
marginal or democracy-endangering groups of societies. At the same time, we do not
only observe rising numbers of participants but also an increase in the legitimacy that
people attribute to these activities (Topf 1995; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001).
According to Fuchs (1990) we have faced a “normalization of the unconventional” (see
also Della Porta 1999), although it should be noted that the term “unconventional
participation” has been subject to debate since the very time it was introduced by the
Political Action scholars. 1 Originally, the term “unconventional” referred to that
political behavior in a regime that did not match its norms of law and custom with
respect to political participation (Kaase and Marsh 1979: 41). Reflecting this academic
dispute, the Political Action group has admitted that the term “unconventional” was
already misleading by the time when it was introduced: “Only after getting into our data
did we - and most other scholars - begin to realize that most, though not all, of the
protest activities that we had targeted were in fact by that time viewed as quite
conventional by large numbers of people and sometimes by strong majorities of the
population. What is considered normal, conventional, even acceptable forms of political
behavior is thus variable” (Barnes 2004: 4; emphasis as in the original).
As these activities have become more widespread and accepted as a normal, even
‘conventional’ political tool by the wider publics, the term ‘unconventional’ does no
longer capture the nature of these activities. Inglehart has suggested referring to these
1 Since then, the appropriateness of terminology has been debated, including counter-proposals for new
typologies in participation research (Uehlinger 1988).
2

forms of participation as elite-challenging activities (Inglehart 1990, 1997; Inglehart and
Catterberg 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). These activities take place outside
institutionalized channels of political participation (like voting or joining a political
party) and are therefore distinct from elite-directed forms of mass activities (Inglehart
and Welzel 2005: 118). Elite-challenging activities are a spontaneous, short-term and
issue-oriented rather than long-term and permanent form of engagement. They range
from participation in demonstrations such as the Belgian white march 2 in 1996 or antiwar
protests around the globe in 2003, to petitioning against child labor, or to
deliberately buying CFC-free products, cosmetics that were not tested on animals, or
fair-trade products. As these activities confront political and other elites with demands
and pressure from below, “[c]itizen participation is becoming more closely linked to
citizen influence” (Dalton 2000b: 929). It should be noted that the term “elite” is not
referring to a group in a society that stands out by characteristics such as social class or
education but refers to people in leadership positions who regularly take part in
(political) decision-making (Hoffmann-Lange 2007: 910). In this sense, it follows a
broad understanding of the term as elites are not necessarily limited to political elites.
What are the implications of the expanded action repertoire? Addressing this question,
the thesis aims at contributing to the debate about declining civic activism (Putnam
(1993, 1995a, 2000, 2002). The research question guiding this thesis is: What are the
dynamics, causes (determinants) and consequences of elite-challenging activities? This
question will be answered using a broad empirical database which combines information
from different large-scale comparative survey projects over a period of more than 30
years. The dynamic dimension refers to the expansion of the political action repertoire
and is the starting point of the empirical analyses: How has participation in elitechallenging
activities changed over the past decades? The descriptive part provides a
first test for the robustness of the findings in other studies: Is the increase in noninstitutionalized
forms occurring in all societies, or is this development restricted to
2 The Belgian white march took place in the aftermath of a large case of child abuse and murder. Around
300.000 people gathered in October 1996 in Brussels to demonstrate their solidarity with the victims and
their families and to display their anger about deficiencies in the police investigation and the judiciary
system (Lippens 1998).
3

Western postindustrial democracies? In addition to cross-country differences, a second
emphasis is given to the relation between elite-challenging activities and
institutionalized forms of participation, discussing whether one goes at the expense of
the other. The cause dimension examines determinants for elite-challenging activities: at
the individual level as resources and motivation, and at the societal level as context
factors. Political mobilization does not happen in a vacuum but is always the result of an
interplay between personal characteristics and environmental factors. The two-level data
structure also allows testing how the determinants on both levels are related to each
other: Is participation in elite-challenging activities more driven by individual
characteristics or rather by contextual factors? The consequence dimension looks at
implications of elite-challenging activities, treating it no longer as a dependent but as an
independent variable. Many consequences of elite-challenging activities have been
claimed, most of them in an implicit way, a few explicitly. The core question here is
whether elite-challenging forms of participation are overburdening the democratic
system with demands from below, or rather call for responsive, accountable elite
behavior.
Contribution of the study
The thesis contributes to the study of political participation in general and of noninstitutionalized
participation in particular in several ways:
First, it is a comparative study with a large N, going beyond classical studies that remain
focused on single-nations and are dominating research on political participation (Norris
2007: 643). It covers more than 90 societies on six continents that vary significantly in
their political, social and economic developments. Even if studies are comparative in
nature, they often only briefly touch on non-institutionalized forms of participation,
examining it as one variant among many types. While those studies provide a
comprehensive picture of citizen participation, they often leave little room for
systematic in-depth analyses targeted at elite-challenging activities. To be sure, there is a
growing literature on single forms of non-institutionalized participation, e.g. on political
consumerism. These studies, however, often fall short of putting these activities in the
broader research context of citizen participation and democracy. By contrast, this study
4

attempts to link the different approaches by providing a systematic examination of
dynamics, causes and consequences of elite-challenging activities.
Second, the study looks both at determinants and consequences of elite-challenging
activities. Shifting the perspective from elite-challenging activities as a dependent
variable (cause dimension) to a perspective where it is treated as an independent variable
(consequence dimension) allows examining the implications of these actions. This is
particularly vital as several determinants-related theories actually imply consequences of
elite-challenging activities that are seldom tested empirically. The focus is here on the
impact of these non-institutionalized activities for democracy and for social inequality.
Third, when looking at determinants and consequences of elite-challenging activities,
the study combines individual level and aggregate level factors. It therefore remedies
one of the well-known shortcomings of participation studies: Despite the growing action
repertoire “the analysis of contextual effects remained underdeveloped” (Norris 2007:
630). Moreover, the study allows for a simultaneous testing of the individual and
societal influences, providing more knowledge to the question whether participation in
elite-challenging activities is more driven by the participant’s personal characteristics or
by his/her environment.
The evaluation of elite-challenging activities as a bliss or bless for the flourishing of
democracy is still a contested field. Normative evaluations differ so strongly not only
because the interpretations are driven by contradictory normative concepts of democracy
(such as elitist versus participative). They also differ because the empirical evidence is
still patchy and too fragmentary in terms of longitudinal and geographical scope and
levels of analyses. This is where this thesis aims to contribute to existing research:
providing an encompassing overview of the determinants, dynamics, and consequences
of elite-challenging in both old and new democracies, so as to come to a
substantiated re-evaluation of the contradictory normative assessments of elitechallenging
activities on the basis of the broadest empirical evidence possible.
Structure of the thesis
The structure of the thesis follows the classical composition to answer the research
question outlined above. The theory part (Section A) will provide the theoretical
5

framework of the study with the objective to derive testable hypotheses. The methods
part (Section B) will outline the methodological principles and present the data basis for
the empirical analyses. The main part of the thesis is dedicated to the empirical analyses
and their discussion (Section C).
In more detail, I will proceed in the following way:
Section A outlines the theoretical framework of the thesis. It has three objectives: to
locate elite-challenging activities in the study of political participation research; to
present theoretical approaches that can explain dynamics, causes and consequences of
elite-challenging activities; and to develop testable hypotheses. Chapter 1 examines how
elite-challenging activities can be anchored conceptually in the context of political
participation research. Chapter 2 examines five theoretical approaches to political
participation with the goal to extract those relevant factors that can help to explain the
dynamics, causes and consequences of elite-challenging activities: In a first step, the
concept of modernization is introduced, linking socio-economic development with
emancipative value change and an expanding participation repertoire for citizens. After
that, organizational changes are in the focus and put into the broader context of social
capital and participation. Special attention is given to the relationship between
traditional forms of political and social participation on the one hand, and elitechallenging
activities on the other hand. In a third step, two different sets of individuallevel
determinants are being looked at: resources and motivation. This part highlights
the importance of political equality for the study of political participation. Elitechallenging
activities are often considered to be more demanding in terms of required
resources and motivation, thus contributing to a widening gap between those who can
exercise political influence and those who cannot. Beyond individual-level resources
and motivation, fourthly, context factors are presented, shedding light on the opportunity
structures and societal resources for people to become active as well. Finally, the elitist
and the participatory approach to democracy are contrasted, as the interpretation of the
empirical findings – in particular with regard to the expansion of the political action
repertoire – yield different results. Based on these theoretical approaches, Chapter 3
summarizes the testable hypotheses.
6

Section B then outlines the methodological basis of the study and introduces the data
sets and measures (Chapter 4). The study applies a comparative perspective and uses
survey data from longitudinal representative large-scale survey projects to measure
participation in elite-challenging activities: the Political Action Study (1974), the World
Values Surveys/European Values Surveys (1981-2005), and the European Social Survey
(2002-2004). It includes more than 90 societies on six continents, thereby covering not
only the majority of the world population, but also a great variety of economic, social
and political environments. There is a limitation to this most different cases design: In
order to assure that political participation – in particular in elite-challenging activities –
is meaningful, case selection (beyond data availability) is guided by an external
assessment of a country’s compliance with political rights and civil liberties. Finally, the
measurement of the dependent variable (participation in elite-challenging activities) is
introduced.
Section C presents the empirical analyses – the testing of the hypotheses developed at
the end of the theory section and the discussion of the results. The empirical part is
organized as follows: Chapter 5 (“The ‘rise and fall’ of elite-challenging participation?”)
provides a first descriptive data overview for succeeding empirical analyses. Covering
more than 70 societies over a period of more than 25 years, it looks at trends and crosscountry
differences in levels and forms of elite-challenging activities. A first overview
suggests major differences in elite-challenging activities, with participation levels from
as low as 10 percent in Jordan to up to more than 80 percent in Sweden. On average, at
least twice as many people in high-income societies use petitions, demonstrations and
boycotts than in other societies. An inspection of the ESS data also shows a significant
discrepancy between Western and Eastern Europe, the latter facing a “post-honeymoon”
decline of civic action (Inglehart and Catterberg 2003).
Chapter 6 (“Common patterns of complement or displacement?”) looks at the
relationship between elite-challenging activities and other forms of political
participation such as voting, conventional participation, or participation in interest
organizations and citizen action groups. It addresses the question whether elitechallenging
activities are going at the expense of more traditional forms of participation,
7

or whether civic activism in general is even in decline, as some scholars suggest
(Putnam and Goss 2002). The empirical results do not support any of the two
propositions. Chapter 7 extends the analysis to the social capital debate, providing
evidence that participation in elite-challenging activities can be understood as an
outcome of prevailing social capital at the societal level and as an individual resource.
Taking up the discussion about the role of resources as determinants of elite-challenging
activities, Chapter 8 (“What matters for elite-challenging participation?”) asks which
determinants have a greater impact on participation in elite-challenging activities:
individual characteristics or context factors? The final empirical chapter (Chapter 9)
considers participation in elite-challenging activities no longer as a dependent but as an
independent variable. It examines the linkage between these forms of participation and
democracy on two levels: pro-democratic orientations at the individual level, and quality
of democracy and elite compliance at the aggregate level.
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings and discusses implications of the results
for future research of citizen participation in today’s representative democracies.
8

A
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The theoretical framework has three aims. First, the question should be answered how
elite-challenging activities can be anchored in the context of political participation
research. A summarizing overview about the participation concept will be given,
followed by a discussion about the challenges that these new action forms pose to the
traditional concept. In a second step, theories on political participation are examined
with the goal to extract those relevant factors that can help to explain the dynamics,
causes and consequences of elite-challenging activities. Finally, testable hypotheses are
derived from the theoretical approaches and summarized in a concluding chapter.
1. Elite-Challenging Activities as Political Participation
Definitions of political participation that can be found in the literature are numerous, and
philosophers and social scientists have early pointed to the importance of participation
for democracy. Aristotle, for example, argued that man is by nature a political animal
(Kraut 2002: 95) and that participation together with others in shared activities is closely
linked with having a good and happy life. Pericles stressed that a citizen without an
interest in public affairs is a useless character (quoted in Popper 2002: 199). Although
scholars ever since have argued about how much participation of what kind is needed
and desirable in a democracy, there is little disagreement that political participation – in
particular the right to vote in free and fair elections – is included in most definitions and
measurements of democracy, most prominently coined in Dahl’s constituting elements
of polyarchy: competition and participation (Dahl 1971). In a nutshell, “any book about
political participation is also a book about democracy” (Parry, Moyser and Day 1992:
3), with democratic legitimacy being the link between the two.
Broadly speaking, political participation is defined as “the opportunity for large numbers
of citizens to engage in politics” (Abramson 1995: 913), referring to “those action of
private citizens by which they seek to influence or to support government and politics”
(Milbrath and Goel 1977: 2). More concretely, it encompasses “those legal activities by
9

private citizens that are more less directly aimed at influencing the selection of
governmental personnel and/or the actions they take” (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978: 46).
Brady (1999: 737) summarizes four defining aspects of political participation: its
reference to ordinary citizens as actors; the action component; the political nature of
activity; and the instrumental aspect of attempting to influence politics.
In addition, a fifth aspects should be highlighted – the voluntary element of
participation. The authors of the Political Action Study explicitly refer to political
participation as “all voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence
either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system”
(Kaase and Marsh 1979: 42).
With the expansion of the political action repertoire to non-institutionalized forms of
citizen activism the question arises whether this narrow definition of political
participation is still adequate – in particular, as these activities share characteristics
uncommon to forms of traditional participation:
New targets
The definition of political participation provided by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) focuses
on the specific target of participation: the governmental personnel. Traditionally,
participation studies have focused on institutionalized channels of participation linked to
the electoral process, national or local government and parties (Norris 2007: 638).
Today, the addressee of citizens activities are often found outside political institutions,
such as non-governmental organization or multinational corporations. For example,
ordinary citizens articulate their concerns through various forms of political
consumerism where the market is used as a political arena – with the goal to change
market practices (Stolle and Micheletti 2005). This can either be done in its positive
form by buying fair trade products in a supermarket, in its negative form by boycotting
clothing produced in sweatshops, or by engaging in discourses about market practices.
These new targets of the expanded action repertoire also show the declining importance
of the nation state. Often, governmental elites at the national level are bypassed by
citizens’ activities, and multinational corporations or international political organizations
are targeted directly (Norris 2002: 193). Reasons can be manifold, either because
10

citizens think that national governments and legislatures are not able (or willing) to
change the legislative framework accordingly, or because they consider a direct
targeting to be the most effective approach. Importantly, citizens “aim at targets
regardless of whether they represent public or private institutions, the importance is that
they have de facto political power” (Stolle and Hooghe 2005: 5). This is also the reason
why these elite-challenging activities are not necessarily “state-challenging” or
“institution-challenging”, as the targets are no longer to be found only among state
actors or institutions. Any study on political participation that fails to include these new
targets, will leave major new forms of mass activities unconsidered.
New issues: Political or non-political participation?
The past decades have not only brought new targets but also new topics on the agenda,
blurring the distinction between political and nonpolitical activities as well as between
political and social forms of participation. These new issues are closely linked to the
expansion of the action repertoire for citizens. In particular younger generations have
been found to engage in sporadic and issue-oriented forms outside hierarchical networks
– rather than long-term commitment in a centralized mass organization that deal with
governmental affairs.
Among others, these new issues have been labeled lifestyle politics (Bennett 1998). Its
main characteristic is a connection between activity and self-identity: “With each
lifestyle there is a corresponding life story, in the sense that by creating this specific
unity of practices the actor expresses who he or she wants to be” (Spaargaren and van
Vliet 2000: 55). In fact, issues that have been characterized as lifestyle topics – such as
environmental protection or health and child care issues – are not new per se. “However,
the intensely personal way in which they are framed is more recent” (Bennett 1998:
759), such as the discussion about abortion rights in the context of freedom of personal
choice. Along similar lines, the emergence of identity politics, in particular since the rise
of the New Social Movements in the 1980ies, has blurred the distinction between what
is political and what is private even further, exemplified in Carol Hanisch’s famous
phrase “the personal is the political” (1969). Postmaterialist or emancipative values such
as gender equality or ethnicity are always related to personal identities, but the fact that
11

they are not related to traditional areas of state activity (such as providing existential
security) does not make them less political in their scope. “Because personal identity is
replacing collective identity as the basis for contemporary political engagement, the
character of politics itself is changing” (Bennett 1998: 755). Thus, an exclusive focus on
traditional forms might underestimate how marginalized groups in a society – such as
women, in particular housewives – are a politically active part of society (Stolle and
Micheletti 2005: 3).
In addition to the emergence of identity politics, there is another reason why the
traditional distinction between political and nonpolitical activities does no longer hold.
The long period of economic growth and stability and the expansion of the welfare state
over the past decades have led to growing state interventions and a politicization of
other spheres: “The result is that democratic government in advanced industrial societies
increasingly occupies a substantial part of the national product and is a party to such
divergent aspects of social life as housing, education, transportation, social security,
foreign trade, and health care” (van Deth 2001: 9). Due to the growth of the public
sector over the past decades, more people than ever are affected by decisions about
government spending, and politics is difficult to avoid. As a consequence, the dividing
line between the political and the social sphere dissolves; the same applies to the
distinction between what is public and what is private.
New network structures and mobilization tactics
Participants of elite-challenging activities are mainly organized in horizontal, less
permanent and more flexible networks. Also the forms of mobilization follow a different
logic than in permanent organizations such as political parties or interest groups. As
elite-challenging actions are often less planned ahead, mobilization processes can be
rather spontaneous and irregular. On the other hand, forms of political consumerism are
often implemented into people’s daily consumption activities (Shah et al. 2007), “hoping
that my choice, in concert with others, might influence public policy” (Sapiro 2000: 11).
Accordingly, new channels of mobilization provide the means to get people involved:
Electronic forms of communication such as internet websites or electronic newsletters
are used to coordinate action; in Spain, one day after the bomb attack in Madrid in 2004,
12

citizens used SMS to keep informed and mobilize each other into what later became the
largest mass demonstration in Spanish history. Online or email campaigns themselves
have developed into new forms of action. Clearly, these activities and the way they are
coordinated do not follow the logic of regular face-to-face meetings known from
voluntary organizations. As a consequence, there exists an easy exit option for
participants (Stolle and Hooghe 2005: 5), which contributes to the ad-hoc and sporadic
character of these activities.
New forms of action: Individual acts and collective outcomes
It is obvious that any form of political participation, including elite-challenging actions,
needs many to achieve an effect (Sapiro 2000:11). These new activities are collective in
their effects as well. The difference, however, is that the participation act itself is a more
individualized form of political action. Examples are forwarding emails, buy-cotting a
certain product in the supermarket or signing a petition. It is clear, however, that all
these activities, though individual in nature, still need an opportunity structure and the
coordination of the activities in order to be successful. “This leads to a paradox: while
these forms of protest and participation can often be seen as examples of coordinated
collective action, most participants simply performs such acts alone, at home before a
computer screen or in a supermarket” (Stolle and Hooghe 2005: 6).
In the past decades we could observe a change in the political action repertoire. The
expansion towards elite-challenging activities such as demonstrations, petitions or
political consumerism has posed the question whether and how these activities fit into
the definition of political participation. Some have even claimed that we are running into
the danger of a “broad theory of everything” when expanding the concept of political
participation to all these new action forms (van Deth 2001). However, a conception of
political participation that focuses too narrowly on traditional forms, targets and issues
falls into the trap of falling behind reality and ignoring innovations, thus
underestimating the interest and willingness of citizens around the world to be
politically engaged. It also has important consequences for the way possible
implications of elite-challenging activities are interpreted.
13

In fact, the “Political Action Study” was the first systematic empirical study that
challenged the – up to this point dominant – view among scholars and politicians that
protest activism happened to be a threat to the democratic political order, even
contributing to a “crisis of democracy” (Huntington 1968, 1974a, b; Croizier,
Huntington and Watanuki 1975). Later on I will elaborate in more detail on the debated
consequences of the “participatory revolution” (Kaase 1984) that has taken place in
postindustrial democracies.
To be sure, people gathering to voice their opinion, infuriated workers on strike, or any
other form of disobedience, even collective violence, is surely not exclusively a
characteristic of our time (Gurr 1970; Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975; Graham and Gurr
1979; Dalton 2002: 58-60). However, violent forms of protest activism have been and
still are a marginal phenomenon in all postindustrial societies. Whereas also the
acceptance to use violent means to support a political opinion is still very low,
acceptance and exercise of non-violent elite-challenging activities have gained
widespread popular support. The political action repertoire has expanded during the past
decades as societies have undergone tremendous political, economic and social changes,
summarized in the account of modernization theory. The following chapter will present
different theoretical approaches to explain the dynamics, causes and consequences of
elite-challenging activities.
14

2. Theoretical Framework: What Explains Dynamics, Causes and
Consequences of Elite-Challenging Activities?
2.1 Modernization and Value Change
Mostly linked with processes of democratization as their general outcome, theories of
modernization also provide one of the predominant explanations for long-term
developments in political participation (Norris 2002: 19). The cultural variant of
modernization theory links socio-economic development to value change – in particular
change in authority relations – to an expansion of the participation repertoire, allowing
for propositions on all three dimensions of analysis: the dynamics, determinants and
consequences of elite-challenging activities.
Despite its broad variety of meanings (Schmidt 2001: 9961-9963), the term
“modernization” usually refers to a transformation process from a traditional, rural,
agrarian society to a secular, urban and industrial society (Inglehart 2001: 9965-9971).
This process is accompanied by profound economic, cultural and political changes that
result in a deep societal reorganization which, in turn, affects the conditions for mass
participation. Most importantly, modernization theory claims that the economic and
social circumstances leave an imprint on the people exposed to them, affecting people’s
opportunities, their resources and what people think about and want out of life.
“Socioeconomic development brings roughly predictable cultural changes” (Inglehart
and Welzel 2005: 15) because with changing external conditions, experiences and
opportunities, people’s values tend to change into a similar direction. Obviously,
adherents of this approach attribute a certain outcome to the modernization process –
although scholars have argued extensively about the deterministic or probabilistic
character of this relationship.
In general, modernization is considered to be “one of the two giant leaps forward that
have transformed the human condition” (Inglehart 2001: 9966). The agrarian revolution
that marked the transition from hunting and gathering societies to agrarian societies is
deemed as the first fundamental cut in societal development. One could debate which of
these two crucial developments has been more fundamental in its scope of changing
existing societies. Interestingly, they have been equally successful if one considers
15

productivity and the possibility to provide people with food - in the course of both
revolutions those capacities have been raised by a hundredfold. But considering the time
span available for the changes to take place, a tremendous difference becomes apparent:
“[W]hile it took thousands of years for the discovery of agriculture to transform the
world, the industrial revolution spread throughout the world in only two centuries”
(Inglehart 2001: 9966).
Since the 1950ies, numerous debates about economic, social and political consequences
of modernization were stimulated in the social science community, even though
modernization theory was also then not a new phenomenon. Nevertheless, it did not
enjoy a broad scope of academic interest before the 1950ies and 60ies 3 , about 90 years
after Karl Marx had published his influential pieces of work, anticipating the societal
effects of economic growth (Marx 1990 [1867]; 1993 [1858]). Based on this work,
subsequent scholars have argued that modernization theory rests upon the assumption
that societal changes follow – to a certain degree – predictable pathways, meaning that
particular developments are inevitable for such a society, simply because they are
inherent to the process of modernization. Among those ‘side effects’, secularization,
bureaucratization and individualization play a significant role but the economic process
of industrialization is at the core of modernization (Inglehart and Baker 2000: 20;
Inglehart and Welzel 2005).
Lipset (1959, 1981 [1960], 1992, 1994; see also Lipset, Seong and Torres 1993) is one
of the most prominent proponents of this approach. Analyzing pathways to modernity in
Britain, the US and Western Europe during the 19 th century, he could show that modern
societies developed at the same time when these societies transformed into capitalist
ones. Lipset was not the only one noting a relationship between market economy and
democracy (see, for example, Schumpeter 1950; Moore 1966; Diamond 1992; Diamond,
Linz and Lipset 1988) but his résumé of what he considered to be a causal relationship
3 With the emerging broad interest in modernization, Rustow noted a trend of changing paradigms from an
institutional-legal to a behavioral-cultural approach within the discipline. This trend is also reflected in a
wider acknowledgement of sociological, anthropological as well as psychological concepts among
political scientists (Rustow 1968: 37-38).
16

has impacted generations of academic scholars: “The more well-to-do a nation, the
greater the chances that it will sustain democracies” (Lipset 1960: 48). 4
Considering the eminent consequences of modernization, Lipset also acknowledged
Marx’ prediction with regard to the relationship between capitalism and societal
changes. His failures, among others his prediction about a proletarian revolution, are
well known, but Marx (1990 [1867]; 1993 [1858]) succeeded in identifying very early
the specific political and social consequences of a society’s development towards
capitalism. And even though workers did not become the ruling class, they have been
the ones strongly and successfully pushing for expanding universal suffrage and the
rights of political parties (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). This line of
argument also follows assumptions according to which modernization brings along
social mobilization and, in the end, mass participation (Deutsch 1961).
In contrast to the designated role that Marx earmarked for the working class, Lipset
attributed a special role in pushing for democratization to the middle class of a society.
For Lipset, democracy was a direct outcome of capitalism. Looking at the history of
today’s representative democracies, his argument finds support in the fact that
democratic societies have almost exclusively occurred in modern capitalist societies. In
the past, this supposition (and the linear interpretation of the relationship between
socioeconomic factors and democracy) has (mis)led some scholars to present
“guidelines for democratizers” (Huntington 1991) – practical advice and instructions on
how to create democracy. Duly applied, so the impression, it works like a recipe for a
good lunch menu.
During the last years, non-linear approaches to modernization have come to the fore of
social science research. Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 25), for example, have followed
Bell (1973) in his differentiation between two distinct phases of modernization:
industrialization and postindustrialization. Both phases differ significantly in the way
4 To illustrate the importance of Lipset’s research: His 1959 article ranks amongst the all-time top-ten
citations of the discipline’s top journal, the American Political Science Review (Siegelman 2006).
“Excluding Duverger’s law on the effect of single-member districts on party systems, it may be the
strongest empirical generalization we have in comparative politics to date” Boix (2003: 1-2).
17

they affect societies: Whereas industrialization is accompanied by bureaucratization,
centralization, rationalization and secularization, postindustrial societies show an
increasing emphasis on autonomy, choice, creativity and self-expression. At the same
time, both processes have changed the way people relate to authorities. Nevertheless, the
authors acknowledge that cultures, even when they are exposed to the same (changing)
conditions, remain relatively persistent, rejecting the notion of converging value
patterns. So, societies are changing, and they change into similar directions – but the
differences between these societies largely remain the same (Inglehart and Welzel 2005:
19-20).
Technological innovations have been at the heart of the first modernization process, and
they had enormous implications. Before industrialization, “the vast majority made its
living from agriculture and depended on things that came from heaven, like the sun and
rain” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 26). When people gained, for the first time, control
over the natural environment, this also meant challenging the authority of the church:
“Praying to God for good harvest was no longer necessary when one could depend on
fertilizer and insecticides” (ibid.). So, industrialization brought a secularization of
authority, shifting the source of authority from religion to more secular ideologies.
However, these societies were still characterized by pronounced authority relations and
socioeconomic conditions that are shaped by the disciplined, standardized and uniform
mode of industrial production.
Emancipation from authority takes place only during the postindustrialization phase,
when the focus shifts from external authority to more individual autonomy and human
choice (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Economically,
postindustrial societies are characterized by a shift of the major workforce from the
industrial to the service sector. Working in service-oriented professions requires
different skills than working at the production line, for example to fast process
information, to make autonomous decisions or to propose creative ideas. “Service and
knowledge workers deal with people and concepts, operating in a world where
innovation and the freedom to exercise individual judgements are essential. Creativity,
imagination, and intellectual independence become central” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005:
18

28-29). The experience of these activities does not leave people’s value orientations
unaltered, shifting priorities from survival to self-expression values.
As Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 28-29) have argued, postindustrial societies differ from
industrial societies in three major aspects. First, postindustrial societies like the ones in
Western Europe or the USA after World War II have experienced an unprecedented
phase of peace, security and economic prosperity. As people tend to pursue goals that
are short in supply (Inglehart 1977: 22), and as they strive for higher goals once material
goals (like physical and economic security) are accomplished, people tend to put
stronger emphasis on self-actualization Maslow (1954). 5
Second, as tasks in the service sector tend to be cognitively more demanding than
previous activities, broad access to higher education becomes a necessary condition for
societies to become (or stay) competitive. Postindustrial societies are therefore
characterized by higher levels of formal education. At the same time, this cognitive
mobilization leaves an imprint on people’s belief systems. “Thus, rising levels of
education, increasing cognitive and informational requirements in economic activities,
and increasing proliferation of knowledge via mass media make people intellectually
more independent, diminishing cognitive constraints on human choice” (Inglehart and
Welzel 2005: 29).
Third, as their daily work activities become more independent and destandardized,
people demand the same kind of independence, choice and creative power in other areas
of their lives. The expansion of the welfare state has contributed to the realization of
these demands, protecting the individual against certain risks that previously have been
covered by close group ties. Today, the belonging to a group, be it the family or the
church, is no longer a question of survival but of choice (Beck 2002). Families and other
group affiliations are changing “from a community of need to elective affinities” (Beck-
Gernsheim 1998).
All three processes show how people change their values as a response to the conditions
that surround them. Given the favorable circumstances described above, all three
5 Inglehart (1977, 1990) has referred to Maslow’s values of self-actualization as postmaterialistic values,
emphasizing nonphysiological needs such as (self) esteem, self-enhancement and aesthetic satisfaction.
Opposed to that are materialistic values, fulfilling material or physiological needs such as survival and
security.
19

contribute to a change in people’s value priorities, shifting the emphasis from survival to
self-expression values. As people acquire most of their basic value priorities in their
formative years, that is during childhood and adolescence, it has been argued that value
change can only proceed as an intergenerational process (Inglehart 1977: 23, 1990: 33).
As political, social and economic conditions are changing as a consequence of
postindustrialization, younger generations adapt to these circumstances and internalize
postmaterialistic or self-expression values (Inglehart 1990: 136; Inglehart and Welzel
2005: 100-105).
These changing value priorities as consequences of societal modernization have had
important implications for political participation. Industrialization and the shifting
emphasis towards secular-rational values, on the one hand, opened, for the first time in
human history, the door for mass participation, promoting not only universal suffrage
but also mass organizations to represent interests of people, even majorities, who had so
far been excluded from any kind of political participation and interest representation. As
such, catch-all parties (like socialist parties as mass organizations for workers’ interests)
emerged (Kirchheimer 1965), and most of the parties that were formed as a response to
deeply rooted societal conflicts of that time still shape the structure of today’s Western
European party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 2000).
While industrialization brought unprecedented levels of inclusion and political
participation, the consequences of postindustrialization are less straightforward since
these social changes tend to produce “cross-cutting developments, some of which could
possibly depress activism, while others seem likely to encourage civic engagement”
(Norris 2002: 23). Postindustrialization produces a citizenry that is better educated, more
skilled and more informed than ever before. Generally, they also have more leisure time,
and through the expansion and diversification of the media system (e.g. internet),
information and knowledge is easier accessible. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) now argue
that the value change from survival to self-expression values brings about greater
skepticism towards all kinds of authorities, including political authorities (see also
Inglehart and Catterberg 2003: 79). As these authority relations become weaker, people
tend to question political elites, to become more critical and less inclined to participate
20

in mass-based, hierarchical organizations that could not function without the discipline
and ordination of its members.
The cultural variant of modernization theory leads to a number of hypotheses about the
dynamics, causes and consequences of elite-challenging activities.
On the individual level, younger citizens and those with higher emancipative values are
more actively participating in demonstrations, petitions and political consumerism. This
hypothesis refers to the cause dimension.
On the aggregate level, three propositions can be derived. First, as a consequence of
progressing postindustrialization, an increase in the overall level of elite-challenging
activities can be observed. This hypothesis refers to the dynamics dimension. Second,
societies with higher socioeconomic development show higher levels of elitechallenging
activities (cause dimension). Third, as elite-challenging activities push for
responsible and transparent elite behavior, thus limiting the abuse of entrusted power,
the quality of democracy improves with higher levels of elite-challenging activities. This
refers to the consequence dimension of elite-challenging participation.
As individualization affects several areas of their life, people are today less ready to
show a long-term commitment to any kind of organization. Rather, they prefer to
become politically involved in more short-term, issue-oriented and expressive forms of
political participation – forms that are rather elite-challenging than elite-directed
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 118). This has important consequences for traditional
organizations.
2.2 Organizational Changes and Social Capital
2.2.1 Organizational changes
Most visibly, this change has affected political parties. Repeatedly and almost
unanimously, political parties have been characterized as an integral part of modern
representative democracies (Schattschneider 1942; Sartori 1976). The complexity of
their various activities (interest aggregation, articulation and representation; political
21

education and information; elite recruitment; program development, to name only a few)
has led scholars to argue that modern democracy without political parties was
“unthinkable” (Schattschneider 1942: 1; see also Dalton and Wattenberg 2000a).
Recent literature on party politics, however, is more characterized by a depiction of
crisis than of enthusiasm: “Today, mounting evidence points to a declining role for
political parties in shaping the politics of advanced industrial democracies” (Dalton and
Wattenberg 2000a: 3). Summarizing a multitude of simultaneous processes, this trend of
decreasing importance of political parties has been described as “partisan dealignment”
(Dalton 1984; Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995; Dalton
2000). Processes of individualization are the driving force behind this development
where organizational changes and the rise of elite-challenging activities are often seen as
two sides of the same coin. This has important and multifaceted consequences for
representative democracies, ranging from questions of political socialization and civic
disengagement to questions of social coherence and political accountability. But what do
organizational changes mean?
For one, the decreasing importance of ‘old’ mobilizing institutions such as political
parties (but also labor unions, churches, and alike) is mirrored in a shrinking basis of
support, suggesting that the linkage between citizens and political parties has weakened.
First empirical evidence for this comes from inspecting time-series data on party
membership:
22

Figure 2-1: Change in Party Membership (1980 – 2000, in %) *
Spain
Greece
Portugal
Germany
Belgium
Ireland
Denmark
Sweden
Switzerland
Austria
Netherlands
Finland
Norway
US
Italy
France
-100 -50 0 50 100 150 200
* Source: Numbers taken from Mair and van Biezen (2001: 12).
Time frame: Spain (1980-2000), Greece (1980-1998), Portugal (1980-2000), Germany (1980-1999), Belgium (1980-
1999), Ireland (1980-1998), Denmark (1980-1998), Sweden (1980-1998), Switzerland (1977-1997), Austria (1980-1999),
Netherlands (1980-2000), Finland (1980-1998), Norway (1980-1997), United States (1980-1998), Italy (1980-1998),
France (1979-1998).
As Figure 2-1 shows, with the exception of Southern Europe’s third wave democracies
Spain, Portugal and Greece, political parties in postindustrial democracies have been
facing a decline of membership rates over the past 20 years, some even around 50
percent It is not only the fall in absolute (and relative) numbers that should attract
attention but also the consistency with which the decline is occurring (Mair and van
Biezen 2001: 13). For political parties, declining membership rates have enormous
consequences. As citizens are less inclined to show long-term commitment to traditional
organizations, these organizational bodies are losing the capacities to mobilize and
engage citizens into politics, including electoral participation. The decrease of voter
turnout in postindustrial democracies can partially be attributed to this development. As
conventional participation is also revolving around party politics, it is very likely that
these forms of participation are affected as well. A shrinking membership basis does
23

also mean that political parties are faced with decreasing financial contributions through
missing membership fees. In addition, recruiting qualified political personnel also
becomes much more difficult, in particular among the younger generations that above
average tend to stay away from traditional, hierarchical organizations.
The “broad and ongoing decline in the role of political parties for contemporary publics”
(Dalton 2000: 23) is also reflected, second, in rising unfavorable orientations towards
these institutions among the citizenry. A growing number of citizens indicate that they
have lost confidence in politicians and a number of political institutions (Holmberg
1999; Dalton 1999, 2004). In fact, political parties are among those institutions with the
largest drop in confidence. This dissatisfaction seems to have a spill-over effect to other
institutions where party politics plays a decisive role within a democratic system:
government and parliament (Klingemann 1999: 51). At the same time, in almost all
postindustrial democracies, a considerable decline in party identifications can be
observed (Dalton 1999: 66; 2000). This is in fact a twofold trend: Not only is the general
number of identifiers in a country in decline. Of those citizens still holding a party
identification, it is also the strength of such an affective tie that is weakening. As
research on electoral behavior has shown, party identifications have been among the
most influential factors to mobilize citizens into electoral participation and to determine
their voting preference. Declining party identification means, as a consequence, higher
volatility in the electorate, so that political parties are, once again, losing their capacities
to mobilize citizens.
A third development that affects status and function of political parties in democracies is
the changing nature of collective actors. Until the 1960ies, citizens’ interest articulation
and aggregation operated almost exclusively through political parties and citizen
participation in elections. Opportunity structures were largely determined by party
competition. During the past decades, new collective actors have entered the political
scene, most of these organizations rooted in protest movements. They were labeled ‘new
social movements’ because they tackled ‘new’ political issues such as environmental
protection, women’s rights or nuclear power. In addition, they used new, unconventional
forms of political expression. “These actions forms had two sources: they had either
been reactivated from the tradition of the workers’ movement or were newly developed
24

in the context of the movements themselves” (Fuchs 1990: 1). These citizen action
groups that have emerged in various ways have been challenging the political parties in
their traditional role as organizations of interest representation 6 – by taking over some of
the core democratic functions of political parties. Not only do they provide political
information to citizens and contribute, thereby, to the political education of citizens.
Like political parties, they also aim at providing informational shortcuts that help people
to structure political reality. They also mobilize citizens into political participation.
Some of these movement groups have even started out their ‘march through the
institutions’, such as the Green parties in Western Europe that emanated from various
activist groups on anti-nuclear energy, women’s rights, environmental issues or peace.
The main mobilization focus of these loosely connected networks, however, is on noninstitutionalized
forms of participation, such as organizing petitions or calling for
boycotts around specific issues.
Summarizing the developments of organizational changes and party politics leads to the
following hypotheses:
On the individual level, the rise of elite-challenging activities goes at the expense of
participation in traditional forms of participation: Citizens participating in elitechallenging
activities abstain from engagement through traditional channels (cause
dimension). On the aggregate level, elite-challenging activities should go at the expense
of traditional forms of activity as well. First, as a cross-sectional result: Participation in
traditional forms of participation should be low in societies where elite-challenging
activities are widespread (cause dimension). Second, as diverging trends: As elitechallenging
activities are becoming more widespread over time, we observe a decrease
in institutionalized, traditional forms of political participation (dynamics dimension).
2.2.2 Declining Social Capital and Elite-Challenging Activities
Along similar lines, Putnam (1995a, 2000, 2002) reports about the diminishing role of
voluntary associations in general. Various scholars have been alerted by this depiction
6 In addition, political parties are also under pressure by rapidly changing mass media that have replaced
political parties as the main source of political information and communication. In this way, parties are
required to change their strategies how they present themselves to the public.
25

since they attribute a number of positive effects to the membership in these associations.
Next to the equality argument (only through pluralist forms of interest representation the
various, even conflicting, interests in a society can equally be protected and balanced,
see Schlozman, Verba and Brady 1999), mainly two kinds of organizational benefits are
discussed in the literature. The first one refers to the individual-level, the second one to
the aggregate level.
For one thing, civic benefits are attributed to the individual member(ship) in voluntary
associations. Through their engagement in groups, citizens do not only learn how to
cooperate with others for mutual benefit. Their work in an association, in particular the
sharing of information and knowledge about the objectives and routines, also equip them
with more competence and skills. Finally, the permanent contact and exchange with
others facilitates the adoption of civic virtues such as trust and tolerance among the
members of an association (Almond and Verba 1963: 322; Etzioni 1993; Putnam 1995a:
67; Bellah et al. 1996; Uslaner 2002).
Second, these individual civic skills, taken together, have important consequences for
the communal and democratic life in a society. Following the de Tocquevillian notion of
associations as “schools of democracy” (Tocqueville (2000 [1835/40]), Putnam argues
that such organizations provide platforms for face-to-face meetings which lead, on the
societal level, to dense social networks and the emergence of horizontal (social) trust
among the members of a society. In doing so, a vibrant associational life contributes to
the emergence of civic communities and produces high levels of social capital (Putnam
1993).
According to Putnam’s definition, social capital refers to “connections among
individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise
from them” (Putnam 2000: 19). It has been argued, for example, that societies with a
vibrant associational life and higher levels of social capital have more responsive,
accountable and effective political institutions, that their economy performs better, and
that they outperform societies where social capital is scarce in terms of lower crime
figures, better health and higher educational achievement (Putnam 1993; 1995a: 67;
Putnam 2000: 296-333; Smith 2001).
26

It is therefore no wonder that the concept of social capital has gained enormous
scientific, public and political attention during the past decades, offering an answer to
one of the most important questions of all social sciences: What keeps societies together
and lets them act for collective goals? (Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch 2005; Stolle and
Hooghe 2004). Putnam’s core argument is: Social capital is so important because it
helps societies to overcome the collective action dilemma and to cooperate for mutual
benefit. The ambiguity of the term has been repeatedly criticized, but this debate has not
prevented the increasing popularity of the concept. Recently, the concept of social
capital has also been adopted by the World Bank 7 , stating that “[i]ncreasing evidence
shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for
development to be sustainable. [...] Social networks can increase productivity by
reducing the costs of doing business. Social capital facilitates coordination and
cooperation”.
To be sure, the concept of social capital goes way back in social science research, in
particular to Hanifan (1916, 1920), Jacobs (1961), Granovetter (1973), Bourdieu (1983)
and Coleman (1988, 1990). However, Putnam’s work during the past decade has
brought social capital in the center of - also public – attention, stimulating innumerous
debates. One of the discussions is centered on definitional questions. According to
Putnam, the concept of social capital has two components: a structural component
(networks) that enables people to act together; and a motivational component (cultural
norms and values) that stimulates cooperation among people (Norris 2002: 138).
However, others have argued in favor of a more concise definition of social capital that
restricts the term to its core element of people’s connectedness (Coleman 1988; 1990).
A second debate aims at the question at which level social capital can be found. It has
been argued that social capital is a collective resource (Stolle and Rochon 1998) – “if
social capital is anything, it is a societal not an individual property” (Newton 2001:
207). Norris stresses the same point, “as social capital is a relational phenomenon that
can be the property of groups, local communities, and nations, but not of individuals”
(Norris 2002: 139). These authors explicitly contradict Bourdieu’s understanding of
social capital as an individual characteristic – the networks and ties that people can use
7 http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/poverty/scapital/whatsc.htm
27

in order to pursue goals in relation to others. Along similar lines, Nin (1999; 2001)
defines social capital as an individual investment in social relations with expected
returns, that is what a person anticipates as benefit or profit. However, irrespectively of
an individual or societal approach to the concept of social capital, it remains undisputed
that it is the interaction between people that constitutes the benefits of social capital (Nin
1999: 32).
A third – and probably most important – debate deals with Putnam’s observation of
decreasing membership rates and declining social capital. If one follows the appraisal of
voluntary associations and its civic consequences, then the future of democratic societies
as we know them must be seen in an alarming light. Consequently, Putnam’s thesis of
declining social capital and the decreased vibrancy of American civil society (Putnam
1995a: 65) has led to heated debates within the social science community (for an
overview see Stolle and Hooghe 2004).
As the main reason for the erosion of social capital Putnam blames the processes of
individualization. Those processes led to a significant decline in active membership
associations, such as PTAs, football teams or community groups. Instead of enjoying
community activities with others, people tend to spend their free time in individualized
leisure activities (“Bowling Alone”). As a result, social capital is eroding – which, in the
end, leads to a more general decline of political and social engagement. Among others,
Putnam reports about decreasing voting turnout, political interest and grass root
activities, so his diagnosis is not restricted to conventional forms of political
participation. Quite the contrary: By stating a decline in the willingness of American
citizens to sign petitions, declining social capital also seems to have an impact on
unconventional political participation (for a critique on the reliability of Putnam’s data,
measurement and interpretation see for example Ladd 1996, 1999, Paxton 1999; Stolle
and Hooghe 2004).
This observation has led to Putnam’s diagnosis that today’s democracies are facing a
general decline of political and social activities: “Ironically – just at the moment of
liberal democracy’s greatest triumph there is also unhappiness about the performance of
major social institutions, including the institutions of representative government, among
the established democracies (…). At least in the United States, there is reason to suspect
28

that some fundamental social and cultural preconditions for effective democracy may
have been eroded in recent decades, the result of a gradual but widespread process of
civic engagement“ (Putnam and Goss 2002: 4).
The same consequences of modernization that Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and so many
others have positively interpreted as giving rise to a more self-expressive, critical,
democratic and participatory citizenry, Putnam identifies as the forces that lead to
declining social capital and therefore declining levels of participation: individualization,
decreasing significance of traditional organizations, progressing participation of women
in the labor market, or increasing television usage (Putnam 1995a, b, 2000). This leads
to the next hypothesis: If Putnam and his coauthors are right, there should be empirical
evidence of a long-term trend towards civic disengagement, including forms of elitechallenging
activities (dynamics dimension).
Given the decline of organizational membership, the tradition in social capital research
to view voluntary association as the cradle for the emergence of social capital must,
sooner or later, inevitably result in the finding that social capital is in decline. But this
interpretation should be challenged for three reasons. First, because it confuses
community ties (e.g. civic networks) that are a prerequisite for social capital with
collective action (e.g. participation in voluntary organizations) as an outcome of social
capital (Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch 2005: 140-141). This distinction is important,
second, because it allows considering all kinds of community activities as a result of
social capital. Research on social movements could repeatedly show that it is through
networks (the main component of social capital) that activities are initiated, and that
networks are needed in order to mobilize people into action (McAdam 1986; Tarrow
1998, McAdam et al. 2001). This leads us to the next hypothesis: There should be
empirical evidence that participation in elite-challenging activities is a direct result of
social capital: embeddedness in networks and trust (cause dimension). The hypothesis
can be tested on the individual as well as on the aggregate level.
If it is true that elite-challenging activities are a consequence of mobilization within
networks, meaning a reflection of social capital available in a society, and if it is true
that elite-challenging activities are becoming more widespread, then social capital in
general is maybe not in decline. Rather, it has found a different way how to translate
29

into community action. Third, often too willingly democratic benefits are attributed to
voluntary organizations. But not all associations are alike (Stolle and Rochon 1998;
Warren 2001). Some organizations produce private, not public goods; some have
hierarchical, not horizontal inner structures; some cooperative skills that work within a
certain closed community may not cross the boundary to interaction scenarios outside
the group; and some associations simply have goals that run against basic principles in a
democracy (Boix and Posner 1996). So, in the end it remains an empirical question
whether declining membership in voluntary associations indeed poses a threat to
effective democracy, as Putnam claims (Putnam and Goss 2002: 4). The hypothesis to
be tested on the aggregate level is: Elite-challenging activities as individualized
activities have a negative impact on democracy (consequence dimension).
The following paragraph shifts the focus from overall tendencies in civic engagement to
individual characteristics of activism: “What matters is not only the amount of civic
activity but also its distribution, not just how many people take part but also who they
are. In short, concern for democratic equality forces us not only to inquire how many
people are bowling and whether they do it solo or in leagues, but also to ask who bowls”
(Schlozman, Verba and Brady 1999: 428).
2.3 Resources, Motivation and the Question of Political Equality
Some scholars have claimed that elite-challenging activities broaden the equality gap in
political participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995a; Skocpol 2003). What does
that mean? Which aspects of political equality are affected?
2.3.1 Political Equality
Political equality is a basic axiom of modern democracies (Dahl 1989, 1998, 2006), one
of the “bedrock principles in a democracy” (Verba 2001). The idea that all citizens are
equally qualified to take part in collective decision-making and, therefore, granted the
same political rights is reflected in several legal guarantees of today’s democratic
30

constitutions: universal suffrage, the principle of “one man, one vote”, the freedom to
raise one’s voice and to form associations, or equality before law, to name just a few.
Given the definition of political equality as “the extent to which citizens have an equal
voice in governmental decisions” (Verba 2003: 663), equality and political participation
are closely related in democracies. Individual citizens and groups must become active to
be heard – it is only then that they can communicate their preferences, demands, wishes
and needs to political elites, and the same time, hold office holders responsible. In a
democracy, equality in participation is ensured, first, by giving each citizen a voice,
entitling her/him with equal rights to participate.
Whether these legal guarantees of equality are in place or not addresses the basic
question of whether a political system can be considered as democratic. Since
democratic regimes comply with this idea of equality, whereas literally all nondemocratic
regimes violate it (see for example the Freedom House methodology for
assessing political rights and civil liberties), it shall be of no further concern here. There
is almost no variation among democracies when it comes to this aspect of political
equality, the legal boundaries for elite-challenging participation. From a perspective
concerned with democratic quality, other aspects of equality are more interesting.
Referring to Rae et al. (1981), Verba argues that there are various forms of equalities
(Verba 2003: 664-665). Besides the equal right to participate, equality in participation
can also mean, second and among others 8 , that participation in its amount and form is
equally distributed among individuals and groups in a given society.
Importantly, Verba points here to a significant distinction between two important goals
of democratic rule: equality and legitimacy. In terms of democratic legitimacy,
participation by as many as possible is desirable. The more people contribute to the
input-flow in a political decision-making process, the more legitimacy a democratic
system can draw on. Both aspects, equality and legitimacy, are also closely related in the
sense that full participation (all citizens are active) also means the realization of full
equality (everyone is involved). However, a negative relationship between the two is
also possible. Participation of many, not all, can go at the expense of political equality:
8 Other forms of equality refer, for example, to the equal reception of one’s voice, or the equality of
response given by political elites.
31

There can be high levels of participation with low equality because not all groups in a
society have equal access to influencing government decisions and remain
unrepresented. Conversely, there can be low levels of participation with high equality
because the composition of the small active group reflects more or less the scope of
individual interests prevailing in a society. For elite-challenging activities this means:
Within a given society, participation in petitions, demonstrations or boycotts should be
distributed as equal as possible among its members and groups.
Closely related to this, Verba (2003: 664-665) points to a third interpretation of equality,
that is the equal capacity and opportunity to participate. This aspect of equality goes
beyond the constitutional guarantee for and equal distribution of citizen participation. It
addresses the question in how far these legal rights, equally granted to all citizens, are
ensured and implemented. In his concept of polyarchy, Dahl (1989, 1998) has argued
that political equality is at the heart of the democratic idea, deducing from that several
criteria for a democratic process, among them “effective participation”. Going beyond
constitutional rights to participate, “effective participation” also explicitly grants
effective opportunities to citizens to make their voices heard (Dahl 1998: 37). This
distinction is important: in modern democracies where people are granted equal rights to
participate, not all citizens make use of these rights. Some citizens participate more,
others less, a few never have. For social scientists this discrepancy between the
democratic ideal of equality on the one hand, and actual political activity on the other,
holds a puzzle: “If equal consideration of the needs and preferences of all citizens is a
central principle of democracy, then participatory inequality represents a violation of
democratic principles” (Verba 2003: 667).
It would be less problematic for a democracy as long as inactivity was a random
phenomenon in the sense that citizens participate at one occasion but not at another, with
no individual or group of citizens systematically being excluded from political
engagement. Facing reality, this is of course not true. The reason for unequal
participation is that rights also require resources, and resources are unequally distributed
among the members of a society (Verba 2003: 665). Besides individual resources,
empirical studies on political participation have shown that it is also the motivation to
participate that influences whether a person engages in politics or not. Both determinants
32

of political activism in general and elite-challenging activities in particular, resources
and motivation, are addressed in the following paragraph.
2.3.2 Resources, Equality and Elite-Challenging Activities
The resource model (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman
and Brady 1995a, b) argues that political activity depends on the availability of
individual resources. To intervene in the political decision-making process citizens need
at least some basic knowledge about political actors and procedures; skills are needed to
communicate own preferences in public; writing a letter to a politician requires time and
some intellectual skills; donating money for a political campaign requires material
resources, namely money; and any kind of political engagement requires at least some
interest in political processes, is often time-consuming and demands flexibility. “In
short, for citizen politics to be purposeful, the electorate must have at least a basic level
of political skills” (Dalton 2006: 15).
Several participation studies have indicated that a person’s socioeconomic background
(education and income) and its sociodemographic characteristics (such as age and
gender) are the most influential individual resources impacting political participation
(Almond and Verba 1963; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995a; Norris 2002; Dalton
2006). Resources help individuals to influence the political decision-making process in
two ways. Education, for example, does not only allow “people to surmount the barriers
of participation” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1996: 74), so that people with higher
education will become more active in the first place. Political elites, in return, also
appear to be more responsive to the higher educated – as the two authors put it, “they
travel in social circles that make them targets of both direct and indirect participation”
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1996: 76).
Another major problem that arises when resources are not equally available in a society
is that disadvantages in resources and disadvantages in unfavorable policy decisions
may reinforce each other. Those active citizens who have already more resources than
others may use this advantage to influence government decisions that favor already
privileged people and disfavor fringe groups. Also in that way, political inequality is
reinforced (Verba 2003: 667).
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It was mentioned earlier that the democratic principle of “one man, one vote” is the
basic link between the equal consideration of citizens and political participation. As
such, and not just on paper, voting in an election is the most common and widespread
form of participation. Through its preassigned procedures, institutionalized opportunity
structure and electoral campaigns, it requires the least individual resources in the matter
of time, skills or property. Looking at the individual characteristics of voters and
nonvoters it is, compared to other activities, one of the most equal forms of political
activism in democratic societies (Lutz and Gilland 2004).
By contrast, elite-challenging activities in particular have been blamed for contributing
to political inequality, widening the gap between those who participate and those who
do not (Skocpol 2003, 2004; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995a). Elite-challenging
activities are often characterized as being more demanding in terms of required
resources than other forms of political participation, indicating pronounced unequal
opportunities (determined by age, gender, education, income, etc.) to take part in public
life (Dalton 2000b: 929-930). For example, actors in conventional participation and
actors in unconventional, elite-challenging participation differ in the direction that age
affects activism. For conventional forms of political participation, the relationship
reveals a curvilinear pattern, indicating that individuals are most active in their middle
ages, whereas rather young or old people show less engagement. By contrast, empirical
studies so far have shown that age is negatively linked with elite-challenging forms of
protest activity (Barnes and Kaase et al. 1979; Jennings and van Deth 1990; Kaase 1990;
Jenkins and Wallace 1996). This is very much in line with Inglehart’s early observation
that unconventional participation was more prevalent among the more postmaterialist
younger generations, a finding that is still valid until today (Inglehart and Welzel 2005:
chapter 4). The resource hypothesis to be tested reads as follows: Participants in elitechallenging
activities are young, better educated and have a higher income (cause
dimension).
The general claim that elite-challenging activities are reinforcing political inequality
largely disregards that there are pronounced differences among the different elitechallenging
activities. Of course, looking at consumer buy-cotts (a positive form of
34

political consumerism) as the conscious decision to purchase a product for ethical,
political or environmental reasons, inequalities between buy-cotters and non-buy-cotters
are quite plausible. Buy-cotters are more educated, thus more aware and concerned with
issues of Fair Trade or sustainable development, and they have a higher income that
enables them to afford the more expensive Fair Trade products or organic foods (Goul
Andersen and Tobiasen 2004; Stolle and Micheletti 2005). On the other hand, forms of
political consumerism are one of the few activities exercised by more women than men,
turning old gender role models upside down (Stolle and Hooghe 2005: 10-11).
Furthermore, as Rosenstone and Hansen (1996: 74-76, 130-136) could demonstrate with
their US data, signing a petition requires even less social resources than other forms of
participation in governmental politics, including forms of electoral participation (among
them voting in a Presidential election). 9 Finally, in a comparison of party members, civic
joiners (members of voluntary associations) and demonstrators in Belgium, Norris,
Walgrave and van Aelst (2005) showed that participating in a demonstration is less
determined by unequal opportunities than other forms of activity: “A comparison of the
characteristics of the (…) activists indicates clearly that demonstrators most closely
resemble the electorate at large” (Norris, Walgrave and van Aelst 2005: 200). The
results suggest that the relationship between inequality and elite-challenging activities
deserves a closer look since it is not as straightforward as some scholars suggest.
2.3.3 Motivation, Equality and Elite-Challenging Activities
Resources are closely linked with the motivation to become active: People with
resources favorable for political participation may also show a higher motivation to
engage in political action. Empirical participation studies have so far focused on
attitudes like political interest, political efficacy, support for democracy, confidence in
political institutions, or satisfaction with government performance (Almond and Verba
1963; Barnes and Kaase et al. 1979; Jennings, van Deth et al. 1990; Parry, Moyser and
Day 1992; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995a; Norris 2002; Stolle and Hooghe 2005).
9 One should keep in mind, however, that in the United States participating in elections requires the citizen
to register beforehand, imposing another threshold for people with fewer resources.
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For some of these orientations it is reasonable to assume that they work in favor of
political activism in general and elite-challenging activism in particular: Without a
minimum of political interest “as the degree to which politics arouses a citizen’s
curiosity” (van Deth 1990: 278) 10 , no meaningful political participation is possible since
people would not know about the political issues at hand or the means of participation.
The more people are attentive towards politics (Zaller 1992: 18), the better the chances
for participation (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948; Milbrath and Goel 1977). The
same should be true for political efficacy. Internal political efficacy (the belief that one
is competent and able to understand and influence the political process) and external
political efficacy (the belief that the political system is, in general, open to citizen
demands, that is, responsive) should both contribute to political engagement – simply
because there is no point of becoming active if one considers the own behavior as totally
inconsequential (Almond and Verba 1963: 188; Milbrath and Goel 1977: 57).
Whereas we would expect that citizens who are interested in politics and feel more
confident to effectively influence the political decision-making process tend to be more
politically engaged, the link between other political orientations and activism is not that
straightforward. Consider, for example, dissatisfaction with how the current government
performs: Such discontent may stimulate participation, not only in order to express
discontent but also to push for political change. Since the early writings of Karl Marx
and Emile Durkheim, forms of protest activities have been associated with
dissatisfaction, deprivation and alienation (Gabriel 1996: 193). But these feelings do not
simply translate into action. Rather, at least two conditions have to be fulfilled. On the
one hand, people must be able to attribute their misery to be the result of action by other
people. Since uncertainty about whom to address thwarts any form of collective action,
such “blame attribution” turns out to be necessary condition to translate grievance into
action (Javeline 2003: 13; Rucht, Koopmans and Neidhardt 1998: 7). Second, people
must consider their action to have an effect, meaning that the selected form of action is
regarded as appropriate to improve the situation. This also means that citizens must have
a sense of political efficacy to become active. Political efficacy, or the feeling of
10 How political interest relates to political involvement or political motivation will not be discussed here
(for an overview, see van Deth 1990: 276-78). Whether political interest finds its manifestation in actual
36

“subjective political competence” (Almond and Verba 1963), is an intervening factor
that, if present, is conducive to elite-challenging activism. In case of absence, apathy and
withdrawal from politics is much more likely (Milbrath and Goel 1977: 69; Gabriel
1996: 198-199). Along similar lines, low levels of confidence in core political
institutions may be a driving force for activity, in particular when there’s a chance to
avoid institutionalized channels of participation. A citizen who does not have confidence
in the national parliament as a whole will probably be less inclined to participate in the
next national election that determines the composition of this institution. However, if
she/he wants to be politically engaged, it might be through other, alternative channels of
participation. In either case: Discontent in any form is not sufficient to stimulate action
when resources for this activity are absent and people do not consider their themselves
and their activities as being efficacious (Kitschelt 1986: 59).
This leads to the motivation hypothesis: Participants in elite-challenging activities are
politically interested, dissatisfied and show more pronounced feelings of political
efficacy (cause dimension).
Taking into account the discussion about political equality and the consequences of the
rise of elite-challenging activities, a third hypothesis can be developed: Participation in
elite-challenging activities is stronger determined by an unequal distribution of
resources and motivation than other forms of participation, thus contributing to a
manifestation of political inequality (consequence dimension).
“[W]hen we address the topic of citizen politics in the mass, the temptation appears to
be overwhelming to shift the level of understanding and analysis to that of independent
individuals...” (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993: 281). However, not only individuals but
also societies differ in their levels and forms of participation. This also applies to those
countries that show similar socioeconomic levels of development. Voter turnout, for
example, is lower in the US than it is in Sweden. And compared to the overall electorate,
the share of party members is higher in Norway than it is in Germany (Mair and van
Biezen 2001: 15-16). Some scholars have argued that these differences can be attributed
to differences in the opportunity structures for political activities. If this was true, we
behavior or not is an empirical question.
37

should also be able to find systematic differences in context factors for elite-challenging
activities.
2.4 Opportunity Structures and Elite-Challenging Activities
In order to “reconstruct a compelling account of political life (Huckfeldt and Sprague
1993: 281), the contextual approach (or: opportunity structure approach) acknowledges
that citizens do not become active in a political vacuum. Instead, political participation
does not only depend on individual characteristics but also evolves from an interaction
of the individual with its environment. “Political opportunity structures are comprised of
specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents
for social mobilization” (Kitschelt 1986: 58). This approach was originally developed in
the context of social movements, assessing the degree of openness and accessibility of a
political system to movement demands, and shifted the focus from actors and their
strategic choices to external conditions (Kitschelt 1986: 59; Tarrow 1998: 18). Since
then the concept has been widely used but often overloaded, so that it has been “in
danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement
environment” (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 275). 11 But despite all criticism for
operationalizational attempts, the main idea is a valid one - that external conditions, or
contexts, determine how successful activists are in mobilizing support and promoting
their demands (Meyer 2004: 126).
How opportunity structures affect the content, tactics, cycles and success of actors and
social movements has often been examined by focussing on a single movement over
time (see for example McAdam 1982; Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1989; Jenkins and
Klandermans 1995). However, opportunity structures are not only important for the
policy success of social movements and interest groups. Citizens in their decision to
participate are affected by direct and indirect contextual factors as well. Referring to the
Political Action Study (Barnes and Kaase et al 1979: 43) Roller and Wessels (1996)
11 An ambitious attempt to clarify and conceptualize political opportunity structures can be found in
Meyer and Minkhoff (2004).
38

have differentiated between two types of context factors that can mobilize citizens into
action. On the one hand, their environment is shaped by an interplay of collective actors,
for example political parties, interest groups, citizen groups, etc. On the other hand,
political and socioeconomic characteristics of a society can work in favor or against
citizen participation. Both kinds of contextual factors shape the opportunity structure for
individual activity.
Firstly, individual participation can be seen as an outcome of her/his personal
organizational context. Challenging Verba and his colleagues’ view on the importance
of individual characteristics for political activism (Verba et al. 1995a), Rosenstone and
Hansen (1993: 5) have argued that people “participate in politics not so much because of
who they are but because of the political choices and incentives they are offered”. In this
way, the mobilization approach is closely related to Putnam’s work on the importance of
dense social networks and a lively associational life (Putnam 1995, 2000). On the
individual level, opportunity structures closely relate to mobilizing capacities of
organizations, in particular organizational membership (Kaase 1990; Parry, Moyser and
Day 1992). Roller and Wessels (1996: 2) refer to the organizational context of an
individual as the close context. With respect to individual-level participation in elitechallenging
activities this means: Embeddedness into an organizational context (in an
association or an informal network) creates a favorable mobilization context, thus
increasing the chances that a person participates in elite-challenging activities (cause
dimension).
Beyond the individual embeddedness into an organizational context, societal and
political factors can also serve as opportunity structures for political participation. Roller
and Wessels (1996: 2) have defined these conditions as the wider context for
participation. In particular, the institutional set-up in a country can create or impede
opportunities for participation. A simple example is to differentiate between democratic
and non-democratic types of political regimes – whether citizens have the opportunity to
effectively participate depends on what participation means in a political system and
which functions it has. In addition, the time span people have experienced political and
civil rights, lowering the barrier for all kinds of political participation (Dahl 1975: 125).
39

Within democratic systems, empirical studies on the performances of different types of
democracies have repeatedly shown that institutional designs (such as parliamentary or
presidential systems, majoritarian or consensus democracies) make a difference
(Lijphart 1999; Linz and Valenzuela 1994). Studies on electoral behavior have shown
that turnout also depends on design of electoral laws. Citizens in Australia and Belgium,
for example, are faced with a peculiar form of electoral opportunity structure:
compulsory voting (Franklin 2004). But also where voting is not mandatory, incentives
for participating vary: In a majoritarian system like in the UK, it can be discouraging for
a voter, having just one vote, to go to the polls, when this constituency has always been
taken by one and the same party. In a proportional system, the voter has a greater chance
to be represented in the election result, so this might stimulate electoral participation.
The context factors shaped by the concrete design of political institutions could impact
the level of elite-challenging activities in various ways: The choice for a specific
electoral system and system of governance shapes the number and character of the
relevant political actors, determining the conditions under which citizen action groups
could gain influence. Another example is the guarantee and enforcement of freedom and
participation rights which lowers the entry barrier for participation, thus increasing
participation in elite-challenging activities. The aggregate-level hypothesis to be tested
is: Political conditions such as guaranteeing and enforcing freedom and participation
rights, or the fact that a society spent a long time under democratic rule, lower the entry
barriers for participation, thus increasing levels of elite-challenging activities (cause
dimension).
As argued before, not only political factors but also socioeconomic conditions should
shape opportunity structures on a societal level. As processes of modernization and
postindustrialization progress, more resources (e.g. education, economic and social
security, etc.) become available to the wider public. Increasing speed of information and
knowledge transfer as well as diversified communication structures offer people
opportunities to activate these resources and translate them into action (Roller and
Wessels 1996: 25-26). As a consequence, elite-challenging activities should be more
pronounced among societies with higher levels of socioeconomic conditions such as
high GDP or high levels of tertiarization (cause dimension).
40

For the design of an empirical participation studies the consideration of contextual
factors in addition to individual characteristics has important implications. “Contextual
theories of politics are inherently multi-level – they require cross-level inference – and
hence have consequences for the way in which politics is conceived as multiple levels of
analysis and meaning” (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993: 281). As a consequence, empirical
analyses have to make sure that cross-level inferences can be modeled, using measures
on multiple levels of analysis – not only for individual characteristics but also for the
environment the individual is imbedded in. However, as important these context factors
are, they have one important shortcoming. Due to the considerable stability of
institutional arrangements creating an opportunity structure, this approach partly fails to
explain variation over time.
2.5 Crisis of Democracy: Government Overload and Elite-Challenging
Activities
About 30 years ago, under the impression of upcoming, sometimes radical student and
worker protests, Croizier, Huntington and Watanuki (1975) published a highly debated
report that drew a rather pessimistic picture of the future of democracy. As the core
finding of their study, the authors argued that a “crisis of democracy” was troubling the
trilateral democracies in the United States, Europe and Japan: that the democracies faced
a government overload because citizens were displaying rising political demands
towards their governments. As a consequence, widespread concerns with regard to the
democracies’ governmentability capabilities were raised (Croizier, Huntington and
Watanuki 1975; see also Putnam, Pharr and Dalton 2000).
“These challenges, we argued, were leading to the delegitimation of governmental
authority, mounting political demands that pointed to the overloading of government,
the fracturing and disaggregation of political parties and political purposes, and
intensified parochialism and disagreement among democracies on international issues”
(Huntington 2000: xxiii-xxiv). The report outlined three general types of challenges: (1)
contextual challenges (from the outside: security threats, oil price increases, etc.); (2)
41

social trends (increasing power of popular movements, intellectuals, media, etc.); (3)
intrinsic characteristics of democracy that contribute to its own weakening. Croizier,
Huntington and Watanuki (1975) argued that democracies were confronted with citizens
who increasingly challenged authority, called for a new political agenda and an
expansion of participation rights, thus more and more overloading the political system
with their persistent demands (see also Putnam, Pharr and Dalton 2000; Kaase and
Newton 1995). The aim of the study was, according to the authors, to restore the balance
between democracy on the one hand and governability on the other.
As a response to the challenges, the authors suggested several counter measures to deal
with the crisis, “including measures for promoting sustained economic growth and the
reduction of poverty, strengthening executive and legislative institutions, reinvigorating
political parties, restoring a more balanced relationship between government and media,
slowing the expansion of higher education, achieving more participation of workers in
the organization and management of the workplace, and creating a permanent Trilateral
institute [...]“ (Huntington 2000: xxiv, own emphasis).
Croizer, Huntington and Watanuki rightly name a number of serious challenges that
trouble modern democracies until today - growing dissatisfaction and decreasing
confidence in the functioning of democratic institutions. Some of their conclusions,
however, are misleading and reflecting the authors’ suspicion of knowledgeable, welleducated,
critical democratic citizens who, as a part of the demands, show an increasing
intention to have a say and to question authority. By proposing to limit education
because democracies should fear educated, mature, demanding citizens, Croizer,
Huntington and Watanuki follow the Schumpeterian tradition of an elite-centered
understanding of democracy that largely restricts the role of the individual citizen:
“According to the view we have taken, democracy does not mean and cannot mean that
the people actually rule in any obvious sense of the term “people” and “rule”.
Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the
men who are to rule them” (Schumpeter 1976: 270).
For theorists like Schumpeter, participation by citizens has only played a marginal role.
This approach goes hand in hand with a general mistrust towards ordinary citizens: “The
electoral mass is incapable of action other than stampede” (Schumpeter 1942: 283). In
42

general, political participation should be restricted to voting in elections every few
years, where political parties and other actors are competing for citizens’ support. In
between elections, people’s involvement is considered to be a rather disturbing, or even
destabilizing, force, challenging the ‘division of labor’ between those who govern and
those who are governed. In Dahl’s minimal definition of democracy as “contestation
open to participation” (Dahl 1971: 20), adherents of elite-centered approaches
emphasize the competition (or contest) character of democracy, rather than the
participation aspect. A rise of elite-challenging activism is therefore viewed as a threat
for democracy, overburdening the political elites with demands from below. Thus, the
hypothesis to be tested reads as follows: Rising levels of elite-challenging activities lead
to government overload and overstressing of elites with demands from below, thus
interfering with the democratic political process. Democracy suffers from high levels of
elite-challenging action (consequence dimension).
By contrast, the school of participatory democracy stresses the participation (or
inclusion) aspect of democracy, emphasizing citizen involvement as the core idea of
democracy’s ‘government by the people’. In this sense, only a participatory democracy
can be a ‘strong’ democracy (Barber 1984; for an overview see Held 1996 and Pateman
1970). This is not to say that these theorists consider today’s democracies to meet the
ideal of participatory democracy. However, the important point is that citizens are
offered various opportunities to take part (see already John Stewart Mill 1975 [1861])
and that they are encouraged to use them. In modern democracies, there is a whole range
of possibilities available for citizens to make their voices heard, ranging from writing
letters or emails to politicians, joining campaign groups, signing petitions to attending
demonstrations or public debates. In this sense, citizen participation is not just a
‘necessary evil’ but an important and desirable feature of democracy.
As a consequence of the two opposing approaches, interpretations vary with respect to
levels and diversity of participation in democracies. In an elite-centered view, high
levels and diversified forms of citizen involvement are considered as a threat to
governmentability and, thus, to the stability of democracy. As empirical evidence for
declining confidence in government and political institutions in general accumulates
(Pharr and Putnam 2000), this concern is nourished: Distrust may spill over into a
43

deeper dissatisfaction with the democratic process, leading to decreasing support for
democracy and a serious challenge for democratic legitimacy (Easton 1965, 1975;
Norris 1999b).
By contrast, adherents of a participatory democracy should regard high levels and an
extended repertoire of participation forms as conducive for democracy, for these
activities are a sign of an alert, critical public that demand honest, transparent and
accountable elite behavior. Along similar lines, the rise of critical citizens (Norris
1999a) or dissatisfied democrats (Klingemann 1999: 32), who “clearly approve of
democracy as a mode of governance, but (…) are discontented with the way their own
system is currently operating” (ibid.) is seen as a potential for reforms and
improvements of democratic procedures, not as their death knell. The counter hypothesis
to be tested against the Huntington et al. claim is: Rising levels of elite-challenging
activities are an indication for a critical public that calls for accountable elite behavior.
Democracy benefits from high levels of elite-challenging action (consequence
dimension).
3. Hypotheses
What are the dynamics, causes and consequences of elite-challenging activities? To
answer this question, testable hypotheses are needed. To generate these hypotheses I
drew on a number of theoretical approaches on political participation and societal
change in general and applied them on elite-challenging activities in particular. Not all
hypotheses can be tested on all three dimensions, as the theories they originate from
differ in the way they relate to and allow for conclusions about the dynamics, causes,
and consequences of elite-challenging activities. Along similar lines, some of the
approaches are better suited for propositions at the individual level, whereas others refer
to the societal level, or to both. The different theoretical approaches are of course
interlinked. Organizational changes, for example, are a direct outcome of a value change
towards more emancipative values. The fact that these hierarchical mass organizations
face a significant decline in their memberships has, in turn, direct consequences for their
44

mobilization capacity. As these organizations act as mobilizing agents – be it in a
personal or in a societal context – fewer opportunities are created for citizens to become
active. As a consequence, participation levels should decline.
In the following, a systematic overview about the hypotheses will be given, concluding
with a summarizing table.
Modernization, value change, and elite-challenging activities
In a simplified form, the cultural variant of modernization suggests that socioeconomic
development has important consequences for the values people hold, in particular the
way they orient themselves towards authorities. Rising self expression or emancipative
values facilitate elite-challenging activities, which in turn have pro-democracy
consequences. The cultural variant of modernization theory leads to the following
hypotheses with regard to dynamics, causes and consequences of elite-challenging
activities:
Hypotheses on the individual level:
(1) Younger citizens and those with higher emancipative values are more actively
participating in demonstrations, petitions and political consumerism (cause dimension).
Hypotheses on the aggregate level:
(2a) As a consequences of progressing postindustrialization, an increase in the overall
level of elite-challenging activities can be observed (dynamics dimension).
(2b) Societies with higher socioeconomic development show higher levels of elitechallenging
activities (cause dimension).
(3) As elite-challenging activities push for responsible and transparent elite behavior,
thus limiting the abuse of entrusted power, the quality of democracy improves with
higher levels of elite-challenging activities (consequence dimension).
Organizational changes, social capital and elite-challenging activities
Theories on organizational changes and social capital suggest that traditional mobilizing
agents such as political parties, labor unions or churches are becoming less important.
As a consequence, political and social participation are negatively affected, social
capital and civic activism in general is in decline. As traditional agents are seen as
45

“schools of democracy”, a decline of their importance and membership has negative
consequences for democracy. The rise of elite-challenging activities is not seen as a
countertrend to this development. Here, adherents of an emancipative values change
contradict (see previous paragraph): Elite-challenging activities, as any other form of
community involvement, are a result of prevailing social capital. The rise of elitechallenging
activities has positive consequences for democracy.
Hypotheses on the individual level:
(1) The rise of elite-challenging activities goes at the expense of participation in
traditional forms of participation: Citizens participating in elite-challenging activities
abstain from engagement through traditional channels (cause dimension).
(2) Participation in elite-challenging activities is a result of social capital: embeddedness
in networks and trust (cause dimension).
Hypotheses on the aggregate level:
(3) There is a “gradual but widespread process of civic disengagement” (Putnam and
Goss 2002: 4), including forms of elite-challenging activities (dynamics dimension).
(4) In societies in which elite-challenging activities are widespread, participation in
traditional forms of participation should be low (cause dimension).
(5) Diverging trends: As elite-challenging activities are becoming more widespread over
time, we observe a decrease in institutionalized, traditional forms of political
participation (dynamics dimension).
(6) Elite-challenging activities as individualized activities have a negative impact on
democracy (consequence dimension).
Resources, motivation and elite-challenging activities
Resources and motivation as refer to the classical determinants approach in political
participation, including the SES (Socio-Economic Status) model of political activity.
How the distribution of resources and motivation affects elite-challenging participation
is closely linked to the question of political equality. The hypotheses only refer to the
individual level.
Hypotheses on the individual level:
46

(1) Resources: Participants in elite-challenging activities are young, better educated and
have a higher income (cause dimension).
(2) Motivation: Participants in elite-challenging activities are politically interested,
dissatisfied and show more pronounced feelings of political efficacy (cause dimension).
(3) Participation in elite-challenging activities is stronger determined by an unequal
distribution of resources and motivation than other forms of participation, thus
contributing to a manifestation of political inequality (consequence dimension).
Opportunity structures and elite-challenging activities
This approach acknowledges that participation in elite-challenging activities is not only
driven by the resources and motivation of an individual citizen, but develops as a result
of his/her interaction with the environment. Opportunity structures for elite-challenging
activities can be created at the individual and at the societal level.
Hypotheses on the individual level:
(1) Embeddedness into an organizational context (in an association or an informal
network) creates a mobilization context, thus increasing the chances that a person
participates in elite-challenging activities (cause dimension).
Hypotheses on the aggregate level:
(2) Socioeconomic conditions such as high GDP or high levels of tertiarization provide
favorable conditions for elite-challenging participation (cause dimension).
(3) Political conditions such as guaranteeing and enforcing freedom and participation
rights, or the fact that a society spent a long time under democratic rule, lower the entry
barriers for participation, thus increasing levels of elite-challenging activities (cause
dimension).
47

Table 3-1:
Summary of Hypotheses
Theoretical
Approach
Dimension
Dynamics
in elite-challenging
activities
Causes/determinants
of elite-challenging
activities
Consequences
of elite-challenging
activities
Modernization and Value
Change
Increase
(1) Self expression
values, pro-democratic
orientations, youth
(positive)
Positive impact on
democracy
(2) Postindustrialization
(positive)
Organizational Changes
and Social Capital
Decrease /
Increase
(1) Social capital:
networks and trust
(positive);
Negative impact on
democracy
(2) Traditional forms of
political participation
(negative)
Resources and Motivation
--
(1) Resources: young and
high-skilled citizens
(positive)
Increasing political
inequality
(2) Motivation: political
interest, dissatisfaction,
efficacy (positive)
Opportunity Structures
--
(1) Close context for
mobilization:
organizational
membership (positive)
--
(2) Wider context for
mobilization: political
and economic conditions
(positive)
Crisis of Democracy and
Government Overload
--
Non-democratic
orientations
Crisis of democracy
Crisis of democracy: Government overload and elite-challenging activities
The government overload debate centers on the question what kind of consequences the
expanded action repertoire of citizens in today’s representative democracies has.
Depending on their stance in democratic theory, elite-challenging activities are either
seen as a threat or as an asset for democracy.
48

Hypotheses on the aggregate level:
(1) Rising levels of elite-challenging activities lead to government overload and
overstressing of elites with demands from below, thus interfering with the democratic
political process. Democracy suffers from high levels of elite-challenging action
(consequence dimension).
As a counter hypothesis:
(2) Rising levels of elite-challenging activities are an indication for a critical public that
calls for accountable elite behavior. Democracy benefits from high levels of elitechallenging
action (consequence dimension).
Table 3-1 summarizes the hypotheses according to their explanatory power for the three
dimensions under consideration: dynamics, causes and consequences of elitechallenging
activities.
Before continuing to testing the hypotheses, the following chapter presents the
methodological background of the study and introduces the data and measurement.
49

B
METHODS AND DATA
4. Methodological Background, Data and Measures
In order to systematically examine the dynamics, causes and consequences of elitechallenging
activities, this study adopts a comparative research design. It covers a large
number of countries, aiming to find recognizable, general patterns in elite-challenging
activities. It follows the assumption “that human or social behavior can be explained in
term of general laws established by observation” (Przeworski/Teune 1970: 4). 12 For
several reasons, comparative cross-national studies are essential for social science theory
building: They a) help to formulate clear and culturally salient concepts; b) allow to
cover the largest possible variation in the dependent and independent variable(s), which
means that several potential factors are included in the analysis, and help, therefore, c) to
determine the generality of a finding (Warwick and Osherson 1973: 8). Cross-national
studies enable us to assess whether a postulated relationship (that might be based on an
individual case) is also valid across national boundaries: “General theories of why
people participate in democratic politics should apply to citizens regardless of their
nationality” (Dalton 2002: 3). This is of course also true for the consequence dimension
of elite-challenging activities. So, only by taking up a comparative perspective, it is
possible to draw general conclusions and to distinguish factors that are system-specific
from those ones that can claim to be universal (Warwick and Osherson 1973: vi).
Among the five types of comparative studies that Peters (1998: 10) distinguishes, this
study on elite-challenging activities falls into the fifth category: statistical analyses
testing relationships or developing patterns across a whole range of countries. 13
12 Such comparative observation can address more than one social system (“synchronous comparison”), or
the same social system at more than one point in time (“diachronous comparison”), or a combination of
both (Warwick and Osherson 1973: 8; Schmidt 1995: 1001).
13 The first four types of comparative research are: (1) single case study; description of politics in a
country, region, etc.; (2) limited number of countries, selected for analytical reasons; analysis of similar
processes, institutions, etc.; (3) typologies or classification schemes; typologies for analyzing single
country’s internal politics as well as for comparisons of country groups; (4) statistical analysis for a
subgroup of the world’s countries; testing of hypotheses for sub-sample.
50

To measure participation in elite-challenging challenging activities, survey data are used
as the main source of information on reported political participation. Before presenting
the comparative survey data sets, the criteria for country selection will be explained.
Finally, the measures for elite-challenging action are introduced, as they provide the
basis for the subsequent empirical analyses.
4.1 Survey Research and Alternative Ways to Measure Participation
To test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, participation data are required both on
the individual and on the aggregate level. These types of information are best
represented in cross-national survey programs. How can elite-challenging participation
be measured?
Measuring means, in a nutshell, to assign numbers to objects according to certain rules
(Stevens 1946), and for social scientists this process is almost never free of problems.
Accordingly, measuring elite-challenging political action is not a straightforward thing
to do, and any method of quantifying political participation has its benefits and flaws
(Parry, Moyser and Day 1992: 31). Besides methods like participant observation, indepth
interviews with participants or activists, or using event data as a source of
information, research on political activism can also be based on survey data.
Standardized surveys allow for the collection, processing and analysis of mass data,
covering a considerable time span. Looking at the social science literature, Brady (1999:
742) distinguishes three survey approaches “to get ordinary citizens to provide valid
reports of their political activities”. Besides a) the study of institutions and organization
where action might occur 14 , and b) the identification of problems that might lead to
14 The institutions approach follows the assumption that participation is usually a group activity. Survey
questions about the respondent’s work life, church life, family life, etc. are followed by questions about
specific activities (contacted officials, etc.) as part of the group activity. It is almost unnecessary to point
out that this form of surveying is highly time-consuming and might be inattentive to forms of engagement
outside voluntary organizations.
51

participation 15 , the most prominent approach is simple and direct: c) to ask people
whether they have participated in a particular form of activity or not.
The main idea to use surveys for information on elite-challenging activities is to focus
on those who are actually taking part in various forms of political activities - the people
- and to use their reports as a source for immediate information, because: “If one is
interested in finding out what a person thinks or believes one had better asked directly”
(Esmer 2004: 385). In addition, the results based on representative sample allow for a, of
course always careful, generalization and inference from the sample to the larger
population (Parry, Moyser and Day 1992: 31).
By contrast, early studies on violent forms of political protest (Gurr 1970) have mainly
relied on event data, derived from reports in diverse media formats (newspapers,
journals, TV, etc.). The integration of protest as a subject of study into the field of social
movement research has added to the increasing popularity of content analyses of media
reports (Rucht and Ohlemacher 1992). During the past decades, the use of newspaper
data has not only contributed to the theorizing of collective action but has also enabled
researchers to conduct empirical studies. For a number of historical research questions
where alternative sources are hardly available, newspaper articles are sometimes the
only source of historical data. 16 However, due to resource limitations truly comparative
studies are rare. A counter example is the impressive data collection on political protest
in 136 countries (1948-1977) for several volumes of the World Handbook (Russet et al.
1964; Taylor and Hudson 1972; Taylor and Jodice 1983). Another cross-national
research project was conducted by Kriesi and others (Rucht and Ohlemacher 1992;
Kriesi et al. 1995; Dekker, Koopmans and van den Broek 1997; for an overview about
the analysis of protest event data, see Rucht, Koopmans and Neidhardt 1998), analyzing
political protest in Germany, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Spain between
1977 and 1989. Focusing on developments in the context of New Social Movements, the
15 The problems approach follows the assumption that people must have concerns, worries or needs in
order to get involved. The survey questions are formulated in such a way that the respondents are asked
about issues that are important to them, and afterwards whether they have become active in order to
articulate their concern. The goal is to establish direct link between motivation and action.
16 Collecting event data is very resource intensive and, in particular, time-consuming, especially when the
data are intended to cover a longer time span. Examples of such hard-work endeavors can be found in
Charles Tilly’s work on France or Great Britain (Tilly 1978; 1986; 1995), Sidney Tarrow’s research on
Italy (Tarrow 1989), or Dieter Rucht’s work on Germany (Rucht 2001).
52

authors have demonstrated how a comparative approach can be applied in a large-scale
project based on media reports in several countries. 17
However, aiming at dynamics of protests, this approach focuses on a protest event or a
series of events as the unit(s) of analysis. 18 The information that can be gathered from
media reports is usually not very detailed and restricted to the individual event (Rucht
and Ohlemacher 1992: 77). Thus, media reports concentrate on an event as the unit of
analysis, and this focus may not suit all research questions addressing scope and changes
in political behavior. In particular, the fact that media-reported events provide only little
information about the individuals who are participating appears to be a major drawback
of this approach.
In comparison to alternative ways to gain knowledge about people’s attitudes and
behavior, asking people directly whether they have participation in elite-challenging
activities appears to be the most fruitful approach. In contrast to measures of
institutionalized participation, information about spontaneous and irregular political
activities cannot be obtained through official data collections about membership rates or
the number of participants (an exception might be when the number of participants is
estimated by police officials). Official statistics exist, for example, only for voter
turnout, very often broken down to levels of national, regional and local elections. Their
advantage is, in most cases, that the data are quite reliable and easily accessible. 19 Also
available for a number of cases but less precise are membership figures for political
parties or labor unions. However, for elite-challenging participation this is not an option,
given the short-term, issue-specific, transient and irregular nature of this activity. As a
consequence, the subsequent empirical analyses on elite-challenging participation will
be based on data provided by cross-national surveys.
Survey research has often been criticized for various reasons that I will not outline here
in detail, and it also did not escape criticism when applied to measure participation.
Three major points of critique as well as suggestions on how to deal with these problems
17 The research project was coordinated at the Science Centre in Berlin, Germany (Wissenschaftszentrum
Berlin, WZB).
18 „A protest event is defined as a distinct collective action pursuing an explicit goal by the use of
confrontative, disruptive or violent means“ (Rucht and Ohlemacher 1992: 77).
53

are discussed in the following section. Basically all of them address the question of
reliability with respect to the information that respondents provide during a standardized
survey.
First, one of the difficulties in measuring political activism can be attributed to the
differences between attitudes and behavior. Whereas people’s attitudes are rather stable
and can, therefore, more easily be measured at one point in timed, people’s participation
in political action is seldom an activity that people engage in with steady enthusiasm and
dedication (Brady 1999: 741). Because of its rather spontaneous and irregular character,
this is even more true for elite-challenging action. Since the respondents are asked to
report about their behavior that lies in the past, people’s memory can be another
potential source of error. Tulving (1983) speaks here about a respondent’s “episodic
memory” (as distinct from the “semantic memory”).
Second, survey-based research plays a crucial role in the empirical study of social
behavior (Niedermayer 1997: 89). However, for studies that cover a considerate number
of nations, questions of measurement, comparability and equivalence become important
(van Deth 1998a, 1998b; Peters 1998: 209). Inglehart, too, points out that comparative
research, in particular survey research, is dispensable if the problem that given words
have comparable meanings in different societies is not satisfyingly solved (Inglehart
1998).
There has been a tendency in survey research to shift the focus on comparable measures
away from a claim for identity, to a claim for (functional) equivalence (Allerbeck 1977;
van Deth 1998a). In short, equivalence refers to a characteristic that two phenomena
have in common with respect to their value, their use or their function. The similarity
here does not refer to all characteristics but rather to those ones that are of importance
and relevance for the research interest (van Deth 1998a: 5). Considering the wide range
of societies and cultures included for example in the World Values Survey, questions of
general validity and cross-cultural equivalence are of great importance for such
comparative projects.
There are ways to cope with the problem of equivalence. After decades of cross-cultural
research, a good deal of knowledge has accumulated on how to conduct surveys in
19 For example, by using data from IDEA: www.idea.org .
54

different countries and languages. Extensive pilot studies and pre-tests additionally help
to ensure that questions have a shared meaning to the respondents. In a survey project
that involves several countries, also a close cooperation with national researchers is
essential. In case of the World Values Surveys, most of the principal investigators in a
participating country come from and work in the respective country where the survey is
conducted. With their in-depth knowledge about cultural particularities, they are also
responsible for the back-translation of the questionnaire. This standard method ensures
that the given words and questions show as much cross-cultural equivalence as possible.
Another strategy to ensure that questions are meaningful to respondents (whatever their
background is) to increase the level of abstraction: More general questions are preferred
to questions that address a very specific situation (Inglehart and Caballo 1997; van Deth
1998a; Inglehart 1998).
After the survey data are collected, there are additional methods to validate the quality
of the data. An attempt to check for internal validation can include tests for internal
consistency (e.g. the structure of an item battery), stability over time or correlations with
other attitudes or socio-economic characteristics. Besides analyzing the structures or
crystallization of answers given by respondents in different societies, there are attempts
to externally validate results. This can be done by correlating the data with external data
on the aggregate level, or by confirming the results through independent observation (or
written report) of activity.
All attempts to ensure cross-cultural equivalence notwithstanding, it needs to be noted
that “[g]iven words almost never mean the same thing in different settings or different
languages” (Inglehart 1998). However, this is not an exclusive problem of comparative,
cross-national research. There is no guarantee that a given question will mean the same
to people within one society, not even within the same city. “This line of reasoning can
easily lead us to the position that since no two individuals’ cognitive processes are
identical, a question cannot be standardized even for two persons in the same
household” (Esmer 2004: 387). Since this is not an option for social scientists interested
in profound relationships and general patterns, cross-cultural cooperation seems to be a
promising way to deal with the challenge of equivalence.
55

4.2 Country Selection
The following empirical analyses will be focusing on democracies. Selection criterion is
how the Freedom House Organization assesses a country’s compliance with political
and civil rights.
Since 1972, the yearly “Freedom in the World” report informs about basic political,
social and economic developments in the countries of the world. As its main task, the
nonprofit organization monitors the countries’ compliance with two essential parts of
freedom: political rights and civil liberties. 20 The information is collected through expert
surveys and then presented in a standardized form. Political rights are assessed by
evaluating the electoral process (free and fair elections), presence or absence of political
pluralism and participation opportunities, functioning of government and protection of
minority rights in a country. Freedom of expression and belief, the right to form an
association and organization, compliance with the rule of law as well as the guarantee of
personal autonomy and individual rights are among the standards for evaluating civil
liberties. 21 The measurement of freedom is based on the two scales, ranging between 1
and 7, with 1 meeting the highest standards (=highest level of freedom) and 7 failing to
meet the standards (=lowest level of freedom). An average value for the two scales is
calculated, indicating whether a country can be classified as “free” (average of 1 to 2.5),
“partly free” (average of 3 to 5.0) or “not free” (average of 5.5 to 7). 22 According to the
Freedom House index, free and partly free countries qualify as electoral democracies. 23
Since its beginning, Freedom House has documented both an enormous increase in the
number of independent states and, most importantly, a substantial spread of freedom and
democracy around the world (Karatnycky 2003: 100). Parallel to this development,
Freedom House itself has made an impressive career in the social sciences. After the
breakdown of communist regimes and the presumed victory of democracy and the rule
20 In 2008, “Freedom in the World” covered 193 countries and 15 related and disputed territories. For
detailed information, see www.freedomhouse.org .
21 For a detailed list of the criteria applied by Freedom House, see Appendix A4-2.
22 Until 2003, countries with average ratings between 1.0 and 2,5 were considered “free”; between 3.0 and
5.5 “partly free” and between 5.5 and 7.0 “not free.”
56

of law, scholars became more and more interested in the quality of democracy. Together
with the concern to find reliable and valid empirical assessments for democracy and
democratization (for overview and discussion, see among others Beetham 1994;
Vanhanen 1997; 2000; Bollen and Paxton 2000; Lauth, Pickel and Welzel 2000;
Schmidt 2000; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Berg-Schlosser 2002), this interest has
contributed to the emergence of a new and young discipline – measuring democracy
(Lauth 2003: 2). In this context, Freedom House has become a widely accepted and
frequently used source for empirical comparative studies. 24
Strictly speaking, Freedom House is not aiming at assessing the quality of democracy
but of political rights and civil liberties (Gastil 1991; Karatnycky 1999). However, these
two scales cover central elements of democracy, such as prevailing political liberties and
equality, or political and judicial control (Lauth 2003: 4). Moreover, the scales are
designed to evaluate not only the constitutional requirement but also how these given
rights and rules work in reality on a day-to-day basis (Schmidt 2000: 409; Karatnycky
2003: 102).
According to the earlier definition, political participation needs to be a voluntary
activity. Consequently, there is an obvious reason to limit the study on elite-challenging
action to countries that adhere to fundamental democratic rules. Democracies are similar
in the basic functioning of the democratic process and the role that is given to citizens
within this process. The opportunity to articulate own interests and to participate at
one’s own discretion is the mechanism that links people to the political system and
constantly contributes to its democratic legitimacy. Only this mechanism ensures that
political decisions can, in principle, be traced back to people’s will. If this is not the
case, mass participation serves a fundamentally different purpose (like for example in
authoritarian or totalitarian regimes). Levels of participation can hardly be interpreted in
a meaningful way. Voter turnout, for example, has been highest in communist countries
with non-competitive elections where people did not experience electoral freedom
(Nohlen 2002, chapter 1). Along similar lines, non-democratic regimes have frequently
23 Freedom House formulated additional criteria for electoral democracies. They can be found in
Appendix A4-1.
57

used the image of mobilized masses participating in demonstrations, military parades or
similar ways, in order to display the own strength and superiority. Mass mobilization
and participation can be a characteristic of non-democratic regimes, especially of leftwing
authoritarianism (Dickersen and Flanagan 2002, chapter 19). Therefore, also from
a methodic point, information about how many people participated cannot be considered
as a reliable measure.
The focus on democracies follows also another rationale: Non-democracies do not allow
for this mixture of elite-challenging yet system-supporting participation which is unique
to democracies.
The second limitation of the study comes from the availability of survey data. To be
sure, the choice of cases for analysis must follow theoretical considerations. But reality
shows that the availability of data presents a serious constraint for the researcher.
Thanks to the World Values Survey group, the availability of survey data has
tremendously improved over the past 30 years. For a number of countries, the World
Values Surveys are the only available source of information about people’s attitudes,
beliefs and values. For reasons outlined before, the succeeding analyses will be limited
to those countries that meet basic requirements of granting human rights and liberties.
Table 4-1 gives an overview about all cases relevant for analysis. It documents for each
society whether it was included in one of the surveys of the three survey projects:
Political Action Study, World Values Survey/European Values Survey and European
Social Survey. If a society was covered by a survey, it is marked “x”. Surveys that did
not include questions about elite-challenging activities were not considered - they
contain other very interesting variables but the dependent variable is not reproducible.
This applies to China in all EVS/WVS waves, Hungary in the first wave (1982),
Romania in the second wave (1990), and Iran and Hong Kong in the fifth wave (2005).
24 This implies by no means that the Freedom House index has escaped criticism. For an critical
discussion, see Bollen and Paxton (2000); Schmidt (2000: 408-413); Lauth (2003) and Munck and
Verkuilen (2002).
58

Table 4-1: Democratic Societies Included in the Survey Projects: Political Action
Study (PA), World Values Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS)
and European Social Survey (ESS)
PA WVS/EVS ESS
1974 1980-81 1990-91 1995-97 1999-01 2005-07 2002/04
Australia x x x
New Zealand x x
United States x x x x x x
Canada x x x x
Andorra
x
Austria x x x x/x
Belgium x x x x/x
Denmark x x x x/x
Finland x x x x x x x/x
France x x x x x/x
Great Britain x x x x x x/x
Greece x x/x
Iceland x x x 0/x
Ireland x x x x/x
Italy x x x x x x/x
Luxembourg x x/x
Malta
x
Netherlands x x x x x x/x
N. Ireland x x x x/x
Norway x x x x x/x
Portugal x x x/x
Spain x x x x x x/x
Sweden x x x x x x/x
Switzerland x x x x x/x
W. Germany x x x x x x x/x
Albania x x
Armenia
x
Azerbaijan
x
Belarus x x (x)
Bosnia-Her. x x
Bulgaria x x x x
Croatia x x
Cyprus
x
Czech Rep. x x x x/x
Georgia
x
E. Germany x x x x x/x
Estonia x x x 0/x
Hungary x x x x/x
Latvia x x x
Lithuania x x x
Macedonia x x
Moldova x x x
Montenegro (x) x
Poland x x x x x/x
Romania x x x
Russia x x x x
Serbia (x) x x
59

PA WVS/EVS ESS
1974 1980-81 1990-91 1995-97 1999-01 2005-07 2002/04
Slovakia x x x 0/x
Slovenia x x x x x/x
Ukraine x x x 0/x
Bangladesh x x
China
(x)
Hong Kong
India x x x x
Indonesia x x
Israel x x/0
Japan x x x x x
Malaysia
x
Pakistan x (x)
Thailand
x
Turkey x x x x
Philippines x x
Singapore
x
South Korea x x x x x
Taiwan x x
Vietnam (x) (x)
Algeria
(x)
Burkina Faso
x
Egypt (x) (x)
Ethiopia
x
Ghana
x
Iraq
(x)
Iran
(x)
Jordan x x
Mali
x
Morocco x x
Nigeria x (x) x
Rwanda
(x)
South Africa x x x x x
Tanzania
x
Trinidad & Tobago
x
Uganda
x
Zambia
x
Argentina x x x x x
Brazil x x x
Chile x x x x
Colombia x x
Dom. Republic
x
El Salvador
(x)
Guatemala
x
Mexico x x x x x
Peru x x x
Uruguay x x
Venezuela x x
Kyrgyzstan
(x)
Zimbabwe
(x)
x indicates that the country will be included in the analyses. (x) indicates that the country will be excluded
from analysis. 0 indicates that the country was not included in one of the rounds of the ESS.
60

The empirical analyses exclude societies Freedom House considered as “not free” in the
year before, during and after the survey was conducted. 25 In Table 4-1, brackets “(x)”
mark that a survey was not considered for analysis. The Freedom House ratings 1981-
2008 for all societies included in the surveys can be found in Appendix A4-3.
4.3 Data Sets and Measures of Elite-Challenging Behavior
The succeeding empirical analyses will be based on data from different cross-cultural
survey projects, so the following section is dedicated to briefly introduce the various
survey data sets. Each of them holds different strengths. Indicators assessing individual
participation in elite-challenging activities that go farthest back in time can be found in
the studies conducted within the Political Action Project. One advantage of the project
(and its data) is it was conducted as an explicit participation study, designed “as a
substantial cross-national attempt to understand the nature of political participation in
advanced industrial democracies in the 1970ies” (Barnes 2004: 2).
Political Action Study
As a response to the student movements and emergence of new forms of citizens’
involvement, the Political Action Project was designed to understand the changing
nature of political participation in Western democracies of the 1970ies.
The major cross-national Political Action Study was conducted between 1973 and 1976,
covering eight countries: Austria, Great Britain, Finland, Italy, West Germany, the
Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States. Empirical results of that first Political
Action Study were published in Barnes, Kaase et al. (1979: “Political Action. Mass
Participation in Five Western Democracies”). 26 Between 1979 and 1981 a second study
followed in three of the eight original countries (West Germany, the Netherlands and the
25 Detailed information about when the fieldwork was conducted can be obtained from World Values
Survey Association website: www.worldvaluessurvey.org .
61

US). The follow-up project, looking at “Continuities in Political Action” (Jennings and
van Deth et al. 1990), replicated the measures introduced in the earlier survey. The
second Political Action Study was implemented in such a way that it had a crossnational
survey with a supplementary component in form of a panel study. For the panel
study, respondents of the first round were re-interviewed.
Both rounds of the Political Action Study included a broad variety of items to measure
elite-challenging activities. In order to assess (1) an affective orientation (indicating
approval or disapproval of action); (2) a cognitive orientation (judging effectiveness or
ineffectiveness of action); (3) a behavioral orientation (stating participation “have done”
or intention (“would do” or “would never do”), ten different forms of political
engagement were presented to the respondents:
(1) Signing a petition
(2) Joining in boycotts
(3) Attending lawful demonstrations
(4) Refusing to pay rent or taxes
(5) Joining in wildcat strikes
(6) Painting slogans on walls
(7) Occupying buildings or factories: “Sit ins”
(8) Blocking traffic with a street demonstration
(9) Damage things like breaking windows, removing road signs, etc.
(10) Using personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators or the police
The respondents were confronted with cards showing the activities, and the following
questions: “On each of these cards you will find a description of some kind of action
that people sometimes take to protest about something or simply to make their view
known to other people. Are there any you’ve never heard about or don’t understand?
(…) We would like to know how you feel about these things. Please look at this card.
26 Due to the fact that Italy, Switzerland and Finland joined the project only at a later point in time, the
analyses of the “Political Action” book are limited to the five original countries. A second book, published
in 1990 (Sänkiaho et al.: People and their Polities), encompasses results from all the eight countries.
62

Will you please place each of the little cards you have there on one of the parts of this
card to show me:
A) Whether, in a general way, you feel you approve strongly, approve, disapprove, or
disapprove strongly.
B) The extent to which these action may be effective when people use them in pressing
for changes. Are they usually very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, or
not at all effective?
C) Whether 1) you have actually done any of these things on the cards during the past
ten years; 2) you would do any of these things if it were important to you; 3) you might
do it in a particular situation or 4) you would never do it under any circumstances.”
Some of the items used in the first Political Action Study entered the questionnaire of
the World Values Survey project, providing the largest data set available in terms of
number and variety of societies.
World Values Surveys/European Values Surveys
The World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Survey (EVS) provide the
largest source for data on values and attitudes of people around the globe. First carried
out in 1981 and originally based on 10 countries in Europe (EVS) and additional 14
countries around the world (WVS), the Values Surveys have become the broadest crossnational
surveys with a gradually increasing number of participating countries. The
second wave, conducted 1990 and 1991, covered already 43 societies; the third wave
between 1995 and 1997 included 62 societies (Diez-Medrano and Luijkx 2004: 399).
The fourth wave - carried out between 1999 and 2002 - surveyed, all in all, 81 societies,
comprising (Inglehart, Halman and Welzel 2004: 1). The fifth wave of the World Values
Survey was carried out between 2005 and 2007 27 in 52 societies around the globe.
Altogether, the World Values Surveys include surveys from 97 societies, covering about
90 percent of the world population. 28
27 Exception: Egypt’s fieldwork was carried out in 2008.
28 Further information can be obtained from the following website: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
63

Coordinated by Ronald Inglehart, University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, and the WVS
Executive Board the implementation of the surveys are at the responsibility of principle
investigators in each participating country who also supervise the conducting of surveys
by established national research institutes.
The Values Surveys offer standardized cross-cultural measures of human values and
goals concerning politics, economics, religion, gender roles, family values, political and
civic participation, etc. The advantage of choosing these data are straightforward: First,
no other survey-based data set includes so many countries differing so strongly in terms
of political, economic and human development. This gives new rise to possibilities to
control for the impact of especially contextual or societal factors on political
participation. Second, the data set has the advantage of continuity, not only referring to
the country selection, but also (and especially) with respect to the wording of questions.
With all the drawbacks of survey research, this allows for as much comparability -
across time and nations - as possible. Besides, the World Values Surveys provide
continuous information on countries that were not at all or no longer covered by other
surveys. Most countries applied a stratified multistage random sample, drawn from the
entire population aged 18+ (Diez-Medrano and Luijkx 2004: 400). The respondents
were asked by conducting face-to-face interviews.
The Values Surveys contain the following question on elite-challenging behavior:
“Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some different forms of
political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether
you have actually done any on these things, whether you might do it or would never,
under any circumstances, do it.
(1) Signing a petition
(2) Joining in boycotts
(3) Attending lawful demonstrations
(4) Joining unofficial strikes
(5) Occupying buildings and factories.”
The most recent wave of the World Values Survey (WVS 2005-07) includes only the
first three items.
64

European Social Survey
The European Social Survey (ESS) is a large-scale survey project covering attitudes and
values in various European countries. Applying a high-quality methodology, the surveys
are “designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions
and the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of its diverse populations” 29 .
The fieldwork in the first round, completed in December 2002, encompassed 22
countries: EU’s 15 old member states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and the UK), four new member states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia)
plus Switzerland, Norway and Israel. The second round has been completed in
December 2004, increasing the number of countries to 26 (first round participants plus
Iceland, Slovakia, Ukraine and Estonia; Israel dropped out). The ESS samples are
representative probability samples, covering persons aged 15+ years who are residents
of the country, regardless of citizenship or nationality. The surveys were conducted in
face-to-face interviews; the sample sizes of the first ESS round vary from 950
respondents in France to 2.250 in Denmark.
The first round European Social Survey asked the following question on elitechallenging
activism:
“There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things
from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?
(1) Signed a petition
(2) Taken part in a lawful public demonstration
(3) Boycotted certain products
(4) Deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons
(5) Participated in illegal protest activities.”
The ESS 2004 wave includes the first three of the five items.
29 See the study description at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/. The project website also provides
more detailed information about the European Social Survey and its methodology.
65

4.4 Measurement of Elite-Challenging Political Action (dependent variable)
When Barnes and Kaase et al. (1979) published their landmark study on changing
political behavior in postindustrial democracies, the participating researchers considered
it rather unlikely that a considerable share of the population had already engaged in noninstitutionalized
forms of political action. Rather, they argued that considerable changes
had occurred with respect to citizens’ attitudes (not yet behavior) towards
unconventional participation. In order to trace these changes in a comprehensive way, it
was therefore of crucial importance to detect the size of a protest potential in a society.
In fact, the decision to also assess the protest potential in a society in addition to levels
of the (reported) behavior has generated a debate about the benefit of such undertaking.
In complementing reports of protest behavior with attitudes towards protest, the
researchers hoped to get a more precise picture about the development of new forms of
political activism. Respondents were asked to indicate, first, whether they approved that
form of action; and second, whether they were willing and/or could picture themselves
become politically involved in such a way. Moreover, it was also an empirical argument
to implement such a scale in order to overcome the problem of small numbers of
participants in unconventional action.
Today, the methodological problem of only few cases or participants has largely
vanished, in particular in postindustrial democracies where elite-challenging activities
have evolved into a conventional, widely accepted and frequently used mode of political
action. Some scholars have also put forward a theoretical concern against measuring
potentials. First, since “[a] potential which is not converted into behavior, however,
remains relatively ineffective politically” (Fuchs 1990: 7). In this sense, assessing a
potential for participation is a dispensable undertaking. Along similar lines, some have,
second, argued that “hypothetical questions (‘Might you ever demonstrate or join a
boycott?’) may well prove to be poor predictors of actual behavior” (Norris 2002: 194)
because of the social desirability of answers. Third, the argument that action potential
means that a political trigger situation has not yet occurred to turn the potential into
action, is contradicted by longitudinal survey research. The gap between action potential
66

and actual participation has not narrowed: “Rather, time-series data show that positive
responses to questions about hypothetical future actions are poor indicators of what
actions people do subsequently perform” (Topf 1995: 58). And fourth, elite-challenging
activities are conceptualized as a form of political participation which has an action
component as one of its defining characteristics. Definitions of political participation
explicitly exclude attitudes, even if the willingness to participate might be highly
correlated with political activity (Brady 1999: 737). In this sense, the following measure
of elite-challenging activities is limited to those activities where people report to have
participated (“have done”). 30
In order to conceptualize different forms of elite-challenging activities, Figure 4-1
displays thresholds between conventional and unconventional participation.
Figure 4-1:
Thresholds in Unconventional Participation
Thresholds
1 2 3 4
Conventional
Politics:
Petitions Boycotts Unofficial
strikes
Unlawful
demonstrations
Sabotage,
Guerilla
Voting
Warfare, War
Lobbying Slogans Occupations Hijacking
Formal
Assassination
Interest
Groups, etc.
Lawful
demonstrations
Rent strikes Damage Bombing,
Revolutions,
Violence
Kidnapping
Orthodox Political Behavior
Unorthodox political behavior
Direct action
Illegal action
Violence
Source: Dalton (2002: 61) after Marsh (1977: 42).
Originally introduced by Marsh (1977: 42) and further developed by Dalton (2002: 61),
the figure shows unconventional, or elite-challenging participation, as a one-dimensional
30 If one is interested in how far elite-challenging activities have gained acceptance among the publics
over the past three decades, one could, instead, rely on rejection figures (“would never do…”). Over time,
a decline in rejection rates should be noticeable, indicating a growing acceptance of elite-challenging
activities.
67

concept, ranging from the least (left) to the most extreme (right) form of activism. The
concept is characterized by four thresholds: the first one marks the transition from
conventional to unconventional participation, the second the transition to direct action,
the third the transition to illegal but nonviolent action, and the fourth the transition to
violent forms of activities (Dalton 2002: 61; Prados and Tejada 2003: 132).
For reasons of comparability, measurements of the dependent variable concentrate on
the items available in the largest comparative survey study, the World Values Surveys.
The WVS/EVS ask the respondents about their participation in five elite-challenging
activities. (1) Signing petitions and (3) attending lawful demonstrations are rather mild
forms of activity. More direct action is exercised through (2) joining in boycotts,
whereas (4) joining unofficial strikes and (5) occupying buildings tend to be illegal,
sometimes even violent forms of activity. Both rounds of the European Social Survey
include the first three activities.
Table 4-2:
Factor Analysis for Elite-Challenging Activities
Political
Action
(1974)
EVS/
WVS
(1981)
EVS/
WVS
(1990)
WVS
(1995)
EVS/
WVS
(1999)
WVS
(2005)
ESS
(2002)
ESS
(2004)
Signing petitions .65 .79 .77 .78 .78 .82 .79 .77
Joining in boycott .74 .77 .77 .76 .78 .84 .69 .74
Attending lawful .78 .75 .75 .75 .75 .83 .66 .79
demonstrations
Joining in unofficial .66 .71 .67 .69 .70 - - -
strikes
Occupying buildings .69 .61 .65 .62 .64 - - -
% of Variance 50% 53% 52% 52% 53% 68% 51% 59%
Pooled samples. The samples of the Political Action Study and WVS/EVS are weighted with equal weight
= 1.000. The ESS data were adjusted according to the population size.
Information about the countries included in the analysis can be obtained from Table 1.
A factor analysis (see Table 4-2) using the five elite-challenging activities supports
Marsh’s one-dimensional conception. In all surveys, the items load on one factor (see
Table 4-2). To test the internal validity, Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the Kaiser-
Mayer-Olkin measure were calculated, showing acceptable values for both tests. 31
31 Bartlett’s test of sphericity gave the following results: Political Action (1974) = 6690.313; EVS/WVS
(1981) = 23961.418; WVS/EVS (1990) = 55188.297; WVS (1995) = 72737.898; WVS/EVS (1999) =
91138.229; WVS (2005) = 35820.762; ESS (2002) = 6949.719; ESS (2004) = 24887.328. All values are
significant, so that a null-hypothesis can be rejected. It should be noted, however, that the sample sizes are
68

In a first step, the single items in each survey were dichotomized, coding answers of
respondents who report to have taken part in one activity against those who have not (1;
0). For examinations of single elite-challenging activities these items will be used.
In a second step, an additive index can be created from these dichotomies, resulting in a
scale that ranges from 0 (= for respondents who have not taken part in any of these
activities) to 5 (= respondents who have taken part in all of these activities). This
additive scale can be used to model cumulative aspects of elite-challenging activities. 32
However, the question to be examined here is not whether some individuals use a
multitude of different activities, such as petitioning or demonstrating. From research
questions’ point of view, the more relevant distinction is between participation and nonparticipation,
so between people who participate in elite-challenging activities and those
who abstain from it. Elite-challenging participation will therefore be calculated as a
dichotomous variable: Participated in any activity is coded 1, whereas non-participation
is coded 0. This procedure is applied because using the additive scale as a basis for
dichotomizing elite-challenging participation would lead to a removal of those
respondents from the sample who lack a valid answer in one of the components – even if
the respondent has reported to have participated in one or even all other activities.
quite large. For Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin’s measure the results are as follows: Political Action = .763;
WVS/EVS 1981 = .790; WVS/EVS 1990 = .787; WVS (1995) = 778; WVS/EVS (1999) = .788; WVS
(2005) = .700; ESS (2002) = .582; ESS (2004) = .652.
32 The reliability of the scale was tested for all four waves of the WVS/EVS. Appendix A4-2 reports
measures for internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) and inter-item correlations for pooled samples of the
surveys. The coefficients for all surveys are at the lower end of values of what can still be considered as
acceptable values for the internal consistency of the scale, conventionally values of 0.6 to 0.7.
69

C
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
5. “The Rise and Fall” of Elite-Challenging Political Participation?
Trends and Cross-Country Differences in Elite-Challenging Activities
This chapter presents the starting point for further empirical analyses. How do societies
differ in the levels and forms of elite-challenging activities, and how have these
activities changed during the past decades?
5.1 Cross-Country Differences in Levels and Forms of Elite-Challenging
Activities
Theoretical accounts of modernization attribute specific attitudinal and behavioral
consequences to socioeconomic development of a society. With respect to political
participation, this theory expects an expansion of people’s action repertoire. As societies
move towards postindustrialization, elite-challenging activities should become more
widespread and accepted as a ‘normal’ tool of political participation. At the same time,
differences between societies in the readiness with which people make use of these tools
should be attributed to different levels of socioeconomic developments. As people in
postindustrial democracies are becoming more critical towards authority, in particular
towards political authority, elite-challenging participation should be most pronounced in
these societies. To test this assumption in first, preliminary steps, the following figures
examine levels of elite-challenging activities in various groups of societies. 33
33 The data for the single elite-challenging activities included in the surveys for all societies at each point
in time are documented in Appendix B.
70

Figure 5-1: Participation in Elite-Challenging Activities, by Country in % (pooled WVS/EVS 2000-02/2005-07)
New Zealand
Swit zerland
Sweden
Aust ralia
Canada
Belgium
Norway
France
USA
Great Brit ain
Norway
Denmark
Greece
Japan
It aly
Slovakia
Andorra
Nort hern Ireland
Ireland
Luxembourg
Brazil
Aust ria
Iceland
East Germany
Finland
Czech Republic
Net herlands
West Germany
Israel
Spain
Albania
Malt a
Peru
India
Croat ia
Sout h Korea
Slovenia
Lat via
Armenia
Serbia
Cyprus
Tanzania
Mont enegro
Lit huania
Macedonia
Uruguay
Et hiopia
Uganda
Mexico
Trinidad & Tobago
Burkina Faso
Dom. Republic
Russia
Argent ina
Zambia
Est onia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Port ugal
Poland
Moldova
Georgia
Chile
Belarus
Colombia
Azerbajan
Nigeria
Morocco
Sout h Af rica
Ukraine
Bulgaria
Venezuela
Indonesia
Bangladesh
Hungary
Guat emala
Turkey
Taiwan
Philippines
Ghana
Romania
Jordan
Malaysia
Thailand
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Elite-challenging activities: measured as the percentage of respondents who “Have done” any of the following activities: Signing petition, joining
boycotts, attending lawful demonstration.
71

Based on pooled data from the World Values Survey/European Values Survey 1999-2001
and 2005-2007, Figure 5-1 shows for more than 80 societies how much experience
people have in signing petitions, attending demonstrations, joining boycotts, etc. The bars
indicate the share of people who have participated in at least one elite-challenging
activity, ranging from less than 10 percent in Jordan or Malaysia up to more than 80
percent of participants in New Zealand or Sweden. In general, the highest levels of elitechallenging
activities can be found among the English-speaking societies. New Zealand,
the United States, Great Britain, Australia and Canada make up five of the top ten most
active societies, with the Irish publics still being in the top quarter. Signing petitions has
been traditionally high in English-speaking societies as it requires little effort for the
signer, and it has reached participation levels comparable to voting (Parry, Moyser and
Day 1992: 46; Dalton 2002: 62). Most of the established Western democracies follow,
with at least half of the population engaging in elite-challenging activities. A continuous
exception to that are the democracies in Southern Europe, Spain and Portugal, displaying
lower levels (about 30 percent) of activism (see also Norris 2002: 199).
The lowest third of the figure is largely composed of three groups: Islamic societies
(Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Turkey, Morocco, Azerbaijan), postcommunist
societies (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Estonia, Belarus, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Georgia, Albania) and Latin-American societies (Mexico, Venezuela,
Colombia, Chile, Argentina). These groups are not inclusive. In particular among the
post-communist societies there are ‘deviant’ cases such as the Czech Republic or
Slovakia with relatively high activity levels. However, altogether elite-challenging
activities tend to be less pronounced outside well-developed societies.
This finding would support modernization theory in its suggestion that socio-economic
development has an important impact on people’s values and behavior. To examine this
in a second step Figure 5-2 groups the societies according to the World Bank’s
assessment of their economic performance. The World Bank uses the simple measure of
the gross national income (GNI) to generate four categories, ranging from low-income
societies (935 $) to high-income societies (11.456 $ and more). Even though the
limitation of a single indicator should be taken into consideration, a simple grouping of
this kind offers already interesting results. In general, levels of elite-challenging activities
72

increase as national income rises. People in high-income societies tend to use elitechallenging
activities twice as often as in other societies – more than 60 percent of the
population report to have signed a petition or attended a demonstration, etc., suggesting a
more critical attitude towards authorities. However, the differences between the first three
groups - low, lower-middle and middle-lower income societies - are almost nonexistent.
Between 27 and 30 percent indicate to have participated in at least one elite-challenging
activity.
Figure 5-2:
Elite-Challenging Activities in Various Societies, in %, pooled
WVS/EVS 1999-2001 and WVS 2005-07 34
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
low-income societies
lower-middle-income
societies
upper-middle-income
societies
high-income societies
All societies are weighted n = 1000. See Figure 5-1 for the measurement of elite-challening activities.
Classification of societies according to the World Bank’ country classification, based on the 2007 GNI per capita: low
income societies = $935 or less; lower-middle income societies = $936 to $3,705; upper-middle income societies = $3,706
- $11,455; high-income societies = $11,456 or more. See http://www.worldbank.org/data for more detail.
34 Low-income societies: Ghana, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Zambia (all 2005); Bangladesh, Nigeria, Uganda,
Tanzania (all 2000); Lower-middle income societies: Brazil, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Moldova, Thailand,
Indonesia, Jordan, Republic of Moldova, Colombia, Serbia, Guatemala (all 2005); Peru, Philippines,
Albania, Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina (all 2000); Belarus, Georgia, Dominican Republic
(all 1996), Armenia, Azerbaijan (all 1997). Upper-middle income societies: Argentina, Chile, Mexico,
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Uruguay, Malaysia (all 2005); Croatia, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Venezuela (all 2000). High-income societies:
Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain, United States, Cyprus, Andorra, Trinidad & Tobago
(all 2005); Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal,
Northern Ireland (all 2000); Norway (1996).
73

Although modernization theory would predict that societies with increasing economic
capacities show more distinct patterns in the spread of elite-challenging activities, the
figure largely supports that elite-challenging activities are most prevalent among those
societies where resources are abundant. It should also be noted that among the societies
that the World Bank classified as upper-middle income societies, more than half of them
are new democracies in former communist regimes. As will be shown later, most of these
societies have experienced a decline in elite-challenging activities after extraordinary
high levels of mass activities during the transition period, so this might explain why the
differences between societies in the two middle-income categories are not more
pronounced.
As a consequence of this differentiation, the next grouping of societies acknowledges that
societies are not only determined by their socioeconomic development. Rather, what
people think and how people act is also shaped by their cultural heritage that tends to
have a rather stable impact (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 19). As, in particular, “the
collapse of communism did not create a tabula rasa by erasing people’s prior experiences;
rather, those very experiences influence people’s current behavior” (Howard 2003: 105),
it makes sense to control for people’s exposure to communist rule during their
socialization phase. However, not only did the rigidity of the communist rule differ
among the countries of the former socialist bloc. Also traditions prior to the communist
regimes varied – some of the societies, in particular in Central Europe, are rooted in
Western Christian traditions (such as Hungary or Slovakia), while in others, in particular
in Southern Eastern Europe and among the post-soviet societies, people have been
closely connected to various Christian-Orthodox churches or to Islamic religion. The
Baltic states have been exceptional cases within the former Soviet Union, as they were
the only Soviet republics with a Western Christian tradition.
Figure 5-3, combining both socioeconomic and cultural factors, displays differences in
levels of elite-challenging activities between postindustrial democracies, four different
groups of post-communist societies, Latin American societies, other developing societies,
and low-income societies.
74

Once again, with almost two thirds of participants, postindustrial democracies show the
highest level of elite-challenging activities, and the distance to the next group of societies
is again larger than the distances between all other groups. Nevertheless, even though
elite-challenging activities are most pronounced in rich, established, mostly Western
democracies, this form of participation is more than a peripheral phenomenon to other
societies. Even in the group of societies where people engage the least, still more than 20
percent of the population is found to be active.
Figure 5-3:
Elite-Challenging Activities in Various Societies 35 , in % (WVS/EVS
1999-2002)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Postindustrial
societies
Excommunist
Western
societies
Latin
American
societies
Excommunist
Baltic
societies
Excommunist
Soviet
societies
Excommunist
Eastern
societies
Other
developing
societies
Low income
societies
Pooled sample. Data are weighted n = 1.000.
35 Postindustrial societies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, United States of America. Ex-communist Western societies:
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Croatia, Slovenia, East Germany. Ex-communist Eastern
societies: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and
Montenegro. Ex-communist soviet societies: Russian Federation, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Republic of Moldova. Ex-communist Baltic societies: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Latin
American societies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. Other developing
societies: South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, Taiwan. Low income societies: Bangladesh, Colombia,
Dominican Republic, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Uganda, Tanzania.
Data are weighted n = 1000.
75

In addition, the figure shows that it was useful to further differentiate between the
middle-income societies presented in Figure 5-2, in particular with respect to the new
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Those post-communist societies in Central
Europe that show the longest Western tradition (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland,
Slovenia, Croatia and East Germany) also show significantly higher levels of elitechallenging
activity. 36 By contrast, the former member states of the Soviet Union,
including the Baltic states despite their Western tradition, and the new democracies in
Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro) show only low participation rates in these activities.
More recent data from the European Social Survey support the finding that Western and
Eastern European publics differ significantly in the extent to which they participate in
elite-challenging activities. Table 5-1 documents the average levels of single elitechallenging
activities in Western and Eastern Europe for those countries that have been
included in both rounds of the ESS.
Looking at the levels of activity, small changes have occurred between the first and the
second round. Given the time reference that limits people’s activities to the “past 12
month”, these changes can probably be explained by variations in the importance of
(potential) mobilizing issues. Against this background, the changes between 2002 and
2004 can be considered as minor - the overall pattern is stability.
Table 5-1: Elite-Challenging Activities in %, ESS 2002, 2004
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
2002 2004 2002 2004
Signing petition 29,5 28,5 8,1 9,4
Joining in Boycotts 20,0 17,9 5,2 5,4
Attending demonstrations 8,7 10,8 2,3 1,9
Buying product for political reason 30,6 - 12,3 -
Participating in illegal protest activities 1,1 - 0,5 -
N 22.304 23.170 5.000 5.049
Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, United Kingdom,
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden; Eastern Europe: Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia. Data are weighted according to the population size.
36 As noted in Figure 5-1, Hungary is an exception – whereas about two thirds of the Czechs report to have
participated in elite-challenging activities, only one sixths of the Hungarian population has done so.
76

The societies in Europe show different levels of activity: In all elite-challenging forms of
participation, Western European publics are about three times as active as the ones in
Eastern European. However, the structure in both groups is rather similar. Participation in
illegal activities is absolutely a marginal phenomenon, in no society attracting more than
4 percent of participants (see Appendix A5-1). In all types of societies, political
consumerism (buying or boycotting products for political or ethical reasons) and signing
petitions are the most common form of elite-challenging activity. 37
Figure 5-4: Signed Petition during the past 12 Months, ESS 2004, in %
Sweden
Iceland
Norway
Switzerland
UK
Germany
France
Denmark
Finland
Slovakia
Spain
Austria
Netherlands
Ireland
Belgium
Luxembourg
Czech
Ukraine
Poland
Hungary
Slovenia
Portugal
Estonia
Greece
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Source: European Social Survey 2004, Round 2. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample
(design weight).
Question wordings: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going
wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of following? (...) Signed a petition”.
For almost all societies, signing a petition is the most simple and, therefore, frequently
used form of elite-challenging activity (Figure 5-4). Often directed to political or other
elites, it does not have a binding character, but the number of signatures emphasizes the
37 This also means that the European Social Survey, in its decision to reduce the battery of elite-challenging
forms of participation in 2004, does no longer cover the most significant and frequently used form of elitechallenging
actions, both in Western and Eastern Europe.
77

claim stated in the petition and potentially adds public pressure. Signing petitions is most
common to Scandinavian societies, whereas the post-communist and Southern European
societies rank at the bottom.
Figure 5-5 documents the participation in demonstrations as a public, collective display
of opinion. Also in this activity, more than a decade after the masses have been out in the
streets to protest against the communist regimes, most of the post-communist societies
show considerable low rates of participation in demonstrations.
Figure 5-5: Attended Demonstration during the past 12 Months, ESS 2004, in %
Spain
Ukraine
Iceland
Luxembourg
France
Norway
Switzerland
Germany
Sweden
Belgium
Austria
Ireland
Denmark
Greece
Netherlands
Slovakia
UK
Portugal
Czech
Estonia
Finland
Slovenia
Poland
Hungary
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Source: European Social Survey 2004, Round 2. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample
(design weight).
Question wordings: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going
wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of following? (...)” “Taken part in a lawful demonstration”.
However, Figure 5-5 also shows how single events or issues can mobilize people in
action, and how sensitive surveys are to these developments. In the case of Spain and the
Ukraine this is particularly interesting since both societies usually show low levels of
elite-challenging political action when compared to similar societies in Western and
Eastern Europe. In Spain, the responses documented in Figure 5-5 reflect the
demonstrations in many Spanish cities that started as a reaction to the Madrid train
bombings on March 11, 2004, and turned into protests against the former Prime Minister
José María Aznar, his government and their information policy with regard to the terrorist
78

attack. These massive demonstrations finally led to Aznar’s defeat in the national
elections. The time frame of these demonstrations was limited to only a few days, but it
mobilized a whole society – on March 12, 2004 alone, more than 11 million Spaniards
were out in the streets.
In the Ukraine, where the fieldwork of the ESS study was conducted in early 2005, the
high levels of demonstrations shown in Figure 5-5 mirror the incidents after the 2004
Ukrainian presidential elections, resulting in the so-called Orange Revolution that took
place between November 2004 and January 2005. These protests and massive
demonstrations against the incumbent-led electoral fraud led to new, free and fair
elections, for the first time in Ukrainian history, and brought the oppositional candidate,
Viktor Yushchenko, into presidential office.
As the examples of Spain and the Ukraine show, attending demonstrations is an activity
that is very sensitive to particular issues. Especially non-activists take part in
demonstrations not on a regular basis but when an issue is of particular importance to
them. So, the specific opportunity structure for this activity comes and goes, and the
activity remains sporadic and restricted to an event. This is different for political
consumerism, being a rather individual than collective form of elite-challenging activity
and maybe therefore easier incorporated into people’s everyday life and their shopping
routines.
Using the market as an arena for politics, boycotting and buy-cotting reflect the
“consumer choice of producers and products based on a variety of ethical and political
considerations” (Stolle, Hooghe and Micheletti 2003: 3). Figure 5-6 displays the
frequency of positive and negative political consumerism among European publics.
Political consumerism is a widespread elite-challenging activity, traditionally most
pronounced in Scandinavian and German-speaking societies and again lowest in Southern
and Eastern European societies.
79

Figure 5-6: Political Consumerism, ESS 2002, in %
Sweden
Switzerland
Finland
Germany
Denmark
UK
Austria
Norway
Luxembourg
Ireland
Israel
Belgium
Netherlands
Czech Republic
Spain
Italy
Hungary
Greece
Slovenia
Poland
Portugal
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Source: European Social Survey 2002, Round 1. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample
(design weight).
Dark grey column: Have participated in both forms of political consumerism: boycotting and buy-cotting.
Light grey column: Have participated in one form of political consumerism: boycotting or buy-cotting.
Question wordings: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going
wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of following? Boycotted certain products; Deliberately bought
certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons”.
An examination of levels and forms of elite-challenging activities identified already
important differences among various types of societies. Socioeconomic development is a
crucial determinant for activity, as publics in postindustrial societies are overall more
engaged in these activities than others. Within this group, Scandinavian countries and
English-speaking societies show the highest level of activism, in particular in signing
petitions, whereas the third-wave democracies in Southern Europe rank rather low, often
showing similar levels of activity as some of the post-communist societies. Among this
particular group of new democracies, those societies that are better off, not post-soviet
and traditionally more Western oriented tend to be the most active. The following section
will examine whether these patterns still hold when comparing the activity levels of
societies over time.
80

5.2 Trends in Elite-Challenging Activities
Survey-based studies on behavior or values that are interested in longitudinal, crosscultural
comparison are often confronted with very practical problems that arise from
inconsistencies and lacking continuity of topics, items or question formulation. Even
within a data set, changes in the phrasing of a question or an item occur. Fortunately,
batteries on elite-challenging activities have found their ways into large-scale, crossnational
survey projects such as the World Values Survey/European Values Survey.
Taking up substantial components of participation measures used in the Political Action
Studies, the Values Surveys offer continuing information on elite-challenging behavior.
Six out of eight nations that were originally covered by the first Political Action Study
have been participating in subsequent rounds of the WVS/EVS, that is Finland, Great
Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, the United States and West Germany. 38 Thanks to the fact
that both projects applied almost similar wording of their questions on these particular
forms of political action, Figure 5-7 displays a considerable time-series of almost 30
years available for elite-challenging activities in six post-industrial democracies 39 , a
rather rare phenomenon in survey research.
The overall picture of the trend in elite-challenging activities is clear and supports the
prognosis that participants of the Political Action project gave at the end of their study:
“We interpret this increase in potential for protest to be a lasting characteristic of
democratic mass publics and not just a sudden surge in political involvement bound to
fade away as time goes by” (Barnes and Kaase et al.: 1979: 524). As Figure 5-7 shows,
almost three decades later, this potential has turned into real participation. The rank order
of the single activities has remained the same, as petitioning has been the most common
form at all points in time, followed by participation in demonstrations and boycotts.
38 Austria was not part of the 1981 WVS/EVS survey. Switzerland, as the eighth country included in the
Political Action Study, did not participate in the 1981 and 1999 survey. Both countries were excluded from
succeeding examination.
39 It should be noted that despite similar wording of questions in the two surveys, the answer categories that
were offered to the respondents differed in one important aspect. Whereas the EVS/WVS asked the
respondents whether they had already participated, might participate or would never participate in a form of
activity, the earlier Political Action Study had a different focus on protest potential and, thus, distinguished
for theoretical reasons between respondents who “might do” and respondents who “would do” take part in
an activity. Although this difference should actually not affect the responses of those who had already taken
part, this should still be kept in mind while comparing the data.
81

Figure 5-7:
Elite-Challenging Activities 1974-1999 in Six Postindustrial
Democracies, in %
70
60
Signing petitions
50
40
30
20
10
0
Attending demonstration
Joining in boycott
Joining in strike
Occupying building
1974 1981 1990 1999
Source: Political Action Study (1974); WVS/EVS (1981, 1990, 1999). Pooled samples.
Societies included: Great Britain, West Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Finland, USA.
Data are weighted with n = 1.000.
Between 1974 and 1999 people’s engagement in these three of the five activities - signing
petitions joining boycotts and attending demonstrations – has doubled in the six societies.
Today, the majority of people engage in non-violent activities outside institutionalized
channels of participation. By sharp contrast, participation in potentially non-peaceful,
rather illegal activities like joining wild strikes and occupying buildings has been and
clearly remains a marginal phenomenon in Western societies.
Since the mid 1970ies, elite-challenging activities in these six postindustrial societies
have developed into widely accepted and common forms of people’s general
participation repertoire. This trend is not limited to this particular set of countries, as it
can also be observed in other postindustrial democracies. Expanding the number of
postindustrial societies under consideration to those where a time-series since the early
1980ies is available, Figures 5-8a and 5-8b document the increase in elite-challenging
political activities in 15 societies. To avoid an overload of the figure, the postindustrial
82

societies were split into English-speaking societies and Japan (Figure 5-8a) and Western
European societies (Figure 5-8b).
Figure 5-8a:
Elite-Challenging Activities in Postindustrial Democracies:
English-Speaking Societies and Japan, in %, WVS/EVS
100
90
80
70
60
50
USA
Great Britain
Canada
Ireland
Japan
40
30
20
10
0
1981 1990 1999
Figure 5-8b:
Elite-Challenging Activities in Postindustrial Democracies:
Western European Societies, in %, WVS/EVS
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Sweden
France
Belgium
Denmark
Netherlands
Italy
Iceland
West Germany
Finland
Spain
20
10
0
1981 1990 1999
83

At the turn of the century, more people than ever participate in elite-challenging
activities, in most countries reaching the level of participation in elections. With the
exception of Spain, the majority of citizens in all societies report to have participated in at
least one activity. West Germany and Canada between 1990 and 1999 are the only two
cases where the level of the 1990 activity exceeds the one that was measured 9 years
later.
Elite-challenging activities have been and still are most pronounced in Sweden and the
USA, and the high levels in all postindustrial societies suggest that they are not motivated
by objective economic or social hardship. In all postindustrial societies the most common
elite-challenging activity is petitioning as a “clearly a very mild form of unconventional
action” (Dalton 2002: 62). In the 1980ies and 1990ies, this form of participation has
increased from 40 to 60 percent on average. 40 On a lower level but likewise increasing
are participation in demonstration and joining in boycotts (see also Friedman 1999).
After looking at trends in elite-challenging activities in established postindustrial
democracies, the succeeding figures shift the focus to the new democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe. All these societies share a “postcommunist legacy”, a set of specific
experiences with socialist ideology that is distinct from other types of authoritarian
regimes, and that affects the values and behavior of people in these societies until today
(Howard 2003). 41
Inglehart and Catterberg (2003) have argued that the new democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe have witnessed a “post-honeymoon effect” in direct, elite-challenging
activities. After experiencing extraordinarily high levels of mass activities during the
transition period to democracy, it was considered as almost inevitable that these rates
should decline as the immediate reason for mass mobilizations disappeared and people
returned to their everyday life.
40 See Appendix A5-2 for an overview about trends (1981-1999) in the single elite-challenging activities in
15 postindustrial democracies.
41 More specifically, Howard (2003) argues that this postcommunist legacy is the reason why civil society
in these countries tends to so weak. Three factors - a general mistrust towards communist organizations (or
mass organizations in general), the persistence of friendship networks as well as post-communist
disappointment expectations towards the new regime have not been met - account for the weakness of civil
society in these new democracies.
84

However, Figure 5-9 reveals that this has not been the case for all post-communist
societies, in particular not for most of the new democracies in Central Europe. A decade
after the transition to democracy, in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland
even more people participate in demonstrations, join boycotts or sign petitions than in the
early 1990ies.
Figure 5-9: Elite-Challenging Activities in Ex-Communist Societies, in %,
WVS/EVS
70
60
Czech Republic
Slovakia
50
40
Slovenia
30
Poland
20
10
Hungary
Bulgaria
0
1990 1999
Elite-challenging participation in Hungary has slightly declined between 1990 and 1999
from an already low level. Among the ex-communist countries in Central and Eastern
Europe outside the Soviet Union, Bulgaria shows the largest drop in these activities (data
for Romania 1990 are not available).
Expanding the view to post-communist societies under Soviet rule, the expected posthoneymoon
decline in elite-challenging activities now becomes visible (see Figure 5-10).
The decline in the decade after the collapse of communist rule has most strongly affected
the new Baltic democracies, but also those countries that have not successfully
transformed into full-fledged democracies but that developed into a gray-zone democracy
with serious deficiencies (Russia) or that have replaced one authoritarian system with
another one (Belarus).
85

There are a number of plausible reasons why this decline in elite-challenging activities
has taken place in these societies. When the communist regimes in Central and Eastern
Europe collapsed in a kind of snowballing effect, many people put high hopes into the
transition to democracy. But as Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 119) have argued, support
for a regime change, also displayed in massive protests such as demonstrations, does not
necessarily have to be intrinsically motivated.
Figure 5-10: Elite-Challenging Activities in Ex-Communist Post-Soviet Societies, in
%, WVS/EVS
70
60
50
Lithuania
Latvia
40
Estonia
30
20
Belarus*
Russia
10
0
1990 1999
* Belarus: Survey from 1997 (see chapter on methods and data for country selection). The decline in elitechallenging
activities between the 1990 and the 2000 survey shows an even steeper decline.
In particular, when people support democracy not because of its procedures but because
they associate material benefits and prosperity with it, these economic expectations are
open to disillusionment when the new regime cannot deliver. In the first years after the
transition, socio-economic conditions have worsened in almost all post-communist
countries. But whereas the more Western-oriented, Central European countries could
recover, the post-soviet societies have suffered from economic and social hardship in an
almost unprecedented manner. As a consequence of deteriorating social and health
services, living standards dropped sharply in the early 1990ies, and fertility rate and life
86

expectancy declined (in particular in Russia where male life expectancy reached its alltime
low with 58 years in 2001). Considering, in addition, the lasting imprint of the
“post-communist legacy” that has shaped the post-soviet societies to a greater extent than
others (Howard 2003), the low levels and decline of elite-challenging activities have been
inevitable as people lack resources to become politically engaged.
Along similar lines, although to a more moderate extent, the decrease of these activities
in two Latin American societies, Mexico and Chile, can also be considered as a posthoneymoon
effect after transition to democracy (Inglehart and Catterberg 2003: 87).
Figure 5-11:
Elite-Challenging Activities in Other Societies, in %, WVS
70
60
50
40
30
20
Argentina
Nigeria
South Africa
India
Chile
Mexico
10
Turkey
0
1990 1999
Figure 5-11 also demonstrates that in those developing societies where democratic
change has either not occurred within the past 15 years or has been more modest, a much
more stable pattern can be observed. For South Africa, India, Turkey, Nigeria and
Argentina no changes in the level of elite-challenging activities have taken place in the
1990ies.
To summarize, participation in elite-challenging activities is less common for societies
outside the postindustrial world as they are bound to the availability of socioeconomic
87

esources in a society (see Figure 5-2). As an outcome of a long-term development, a
systematic increase in these activities can be observed in post-industrial democracies, on
average with two thirds of the population being politically engaged. Within this group,
some societies are considerably more active (Scandinavian and English-speaking
societies) than others (Southern European societies). Post-communist societies show
much lower participation figures than advanced industrial democracies, but there are
important differences within this group of societies. In those countries with a more
Western tradition, situated in Central Europe and since 2004 member states of the
European Union, people tend to actively challenge political elites in a way that is similar
to Western publics. The participation levels are not yet comparable to all postindustrial
societies, but in 2000 more Slovaks and Czechs have participated in at least one elitechallenging
activity than people in West Germany or Finland.
88

6. Common Patterns of Complement or Displacement?
Elite-Challenging Activities and Other Forms of Political Activism
Since the 1990ies there has been an ongoing debate whether democracies today really
face a “gradual but widespread process of civic disengagement” (Putnam and Goss 2002:
4) as some scholars suggest (Putnam 2000, 2002; Pharr and Putnam 2000) or not. The
previous chapter presented long-term evidence contradicting this claim of erosion: People
are becoming more and more inclined to make their voices heard through demonstrations
or petitions, and they have discovered the marketplace as a political arena where their
every-day decision in favor or against certain products has the potential to influence the
market practices and government regulations. So, people are not generally withdrawing
from politics as these elite-challenging activities are becoming more widespread and
normal for citizens in democracies, supplementing people’s traditional participation
repertoire. Even though these activities are most pronounced in postindustrial established
democracies, people in other societies use these means as well to intervene into the
political decision-making process and to make their voices heard. The question whether
we were celebrating the success of democracy by staying at home (Dalton 2002: 32),
deserves a negative answer: civic activism in general is not in decline.
This general trend, however, does not allow for hasty conclusions about the way different
forms of political participation are related to each other. Despite some early evidence
from the Political Action Study that unconventional and conventional participation were
not mutually exclusive (Kaase and Marsh 1979b: 152), some of the concern about
declining political engagement comes from the worry that elite-challenging activities
might go at the expense of more traditional forms of political participation. As people
tend to participate more in sporadic, issue-based and short-term activities, this rise of new
participation styles may lead to a gradual replacement of older forms of activity, if people
at the same time abstain from engagement through traditional channels. In order to
examine the decline thesis more thoroughly, this chapter turns to the question how elitechallenging
activities and other forms of political participation are interrelated. The focus
will be on three forms of participation: voting, conventional participation and activity in
political action groups.
89

The political participation literature offers a number of classifications of the various ways
people can participate in politics. Verba, Nie and Kim (1971, 1978), for example,
specified four ‘modes of democratic participation’: Campaigning, communal activity
(working with a group in the community), personalized contacts, and voting. Building on
this classification, Barnes and Kaase et al. (1979) described these modes as conventional
activities because these were considered to be more traditional and institutionalized forms
of political participation. As conceptually distinct, the authors identified more
spontaneous, less formally organized activities as unconventional forms of participation.
Within the traditional forms of political activity, participation in elections has been
considered to be of particular quality (and quantity) and therefore regarded as a separate
form of institutionalized activities (Verba and Nie 1972: 79). The special role that voting
plays in representative democracies has also been acknowledged in the Political Action
Study: “With reflection it becomes apparent that voting is a unique form of political
behavior in the sense that it occurs only rarely, is highly biased by strong mechanisms of
social control and social desirability enhanced by the rain-danced ritual of campaigning,
and does not involve the voter in major informational or other costs” (Marsh and Kaase
1979: 86). Following this differentiation, voting and conventional participation will be
considered as two distinct forms of political participation.
As a third form of institutionalized activity, people’s participation in voluntary
associations will be examined. In representative democracies, people’s effort to join with
others on an organizational basis is not restricted to political parties. Rather, today’s
political arena is characterized by a great variety of associations that appear as political
actors, trying to influence the political decision-making process and often specializing in
one particular issue. The emergence of new social movements brought these new
organizations to the fore, concerned for example with questions of peace, women’s
rights, social inequality, ecological sustainability, or human rights issues. Although not
every action in the context of these voluntary associations may have a distinct political
character, to disregard these activities as forms of political engagement would mean to
neglect a considerable dimension of people’s political action repertoire.
90

If it was true that elite-challenging activities went at the expense of other participation
forms and, in doing so, in the end contributed to an erosion of political activism, then at
least one of the three following propositions should be confirmed:
- Societies in which elite-challenging activities are widespread, other forms of political
participation should be low (negative relationship at the societal level).
- People who engage in elite-challenging activities should abstain from participating in
more institutionalized forms of activity (negative relationship at the individual level).
- As elite-challenging activities become more widespread over time, other forms of
civic engagement in these societies should, in return, decrease (diverging trends).
These propositions will be examined mainly on the basis of data from the European
Social Survey 2002. 42 It contains indicators for various forms of political participation,
and a factor analysis confirmed that voting and conventional participation are two distinct
modes of political activism (see Appendix A6-1). So, these forms of political
participation will be treated separately. Unfortunately, the ESS data do not allow for
comparisons over time. On the other hand, the World Values Survey/European Values
Survey does not contain comparable measures of participation in conventional activities,
such as attending political meetings, contacting politicians or campaigning, or a direct
account of electoral participation. However, the WVS/EVS asks their respondents about
institutionalized activism, measured by active membership in formal voluntary
associations. For some of these indicators a considerable time series of 20 years is
available.
6.1 Voting
In democracies, voting is by far the most common and frequently used form of political
participation. Still, there are differences between societies in the degree to which people
make use of their right to vote, among others depending on the frequency and variety of
42 The ESS 2002 includes the broadest range of questions on political and social participation, as it included
a module on “Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy”. For more information see the ESS website:
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ .
91

elections (Dalton 2002: 38). 43 It is well documented, for example, that the USA and
Switzerland show comparatively low levels of turnout, while at the same time offering
their citizens the broadest scope of other possibilities to take an active stand in political
decision-making. Research on electoral participation over the past two decades has been
characterized by a debate about declining voter turnout in postindustrial democracies.
Even though some scholars have argued that “the evidence indicates that over recent
years there was no general trend towards a decline in institutionalized participation”
(Klingemann and Fuchs 1995: 422), it can be considered as an established finding today
that voter turnout is falling in postindustrial democracies (Gray and Caul 2000: 1095;
Wattenberg 2000; Fox Piven and Cloward 2000; Mair 2001).
To test the first proposition of a negative linkage between voting and elite-challenging
activities 44 , Figure 6-1 relates levels of these two activities in 21 societies to each other.
As the analysis is based on ESS data, the proposition test is limited to core postindustrial
Western European and four postcommunist Central European societies.
Participation in elections is generally quite high, in all societies reaching levels between
50 and 90 percent. The societies under observation differ less in their turnout levels than
in the degree people are taking part in elite-challenging activities. As Figure 6-1 shows,
there is no relationship between elite-challenging activities and voting at the aggregate
level (r = -.05 n.s.). Among the 21 European democracies there are some societies with
high levels of elite-challenging action and comparatively low participation in elections
(Luxembourg, Switzerland); some where elite-challenging activities are low and voter
turnout is high (Greece, Italy, Hungary); and some where both forms of political
participation are high (Denmark, Sweden) or where both are low (Portugal). So, on the
aggregate level, general levels of participation in elections do not allow for any
conclusion about people’s activity outside traditional channels (and vice versa),
suggesting at least no trade-off between the two.
43 Among other factors, the institutional design plays a crucial role, such as compulsory voting (e.g. in
Belgium) or voter registration (e.g. in the USA).
44 Elite-challenging activities are measured as the share of people who have participated in at least one of
those activities during the past 12 months: Signed petition, taken part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted
certain products, deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons.
92

Figure 6-1: Elite-Challenging Activities and Voting (ESS 2002)
100
Voting, in %
90
80
70
60
50
40
Denmark
Greece Italy
Austria
Sweden
Norway
Hungary Netherlands
Belgium
Germany
Ireland
Portugal
Slovenia
Finland
Israel Spain
UK
Czech Republic
Poland
Luxembourg
Switzerland
30
20
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Elite-Challenging Activities, in %
Data Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design
weight). R = -0.05 n.s.
Elite-challenging activities (In the past 12 months: signed petition, taken part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted certain
products, deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons) and voting (“Did you vote in
the last national election?”) measure the percentages of respondents in each sample who have reported to have done any
of these activities.
Despite the fact that elite-challenging activities and voting did not show a negative
relationship at the aggregate level, in fact no relationship at all, it could still be the case
that these two forms of activities are negatively linked at the individual level, suggesting
that people who demonstrate, sign petitions or are active political consumers stay away
from the ballot box more often than others. To test this second proposition, Table 6-1
presents the linkage between elite-challenging activities and voting.
Also at the individual level, elite-challenging activities and voting are only weakly
correlated. In five of the 21 societies, the correlation coefficient is even insignificant, so
the linkages between elite-challenging activities and participating in elections vary from
nation to nation. The overall relationship is weak but positive which means that people
who participate in elections also modestly tend to become active outside institutionalized
channels of political participation. The high level of electoral participation in democratic
93

societies, but in particular reflected in survey responses 45 , might account for the weakness
of the relationship. Most of the societies show a turnout of more than 70 percent. It seems
very likely that this group of voters is simply too large and inclusive to differentiate
between participants and nonparticipants in elite-challenging activities.
Table 6-1:
Individual-Level Correlations between Elite-Challenging Activities
and Voting (ESS 2002)
Austria
Belgium
.03 n.s.
Switzerland .19 ***
Czech Republic .12 ***
Germany .16 ***
East .17 ***
West .15 ***
Denmark .07 **
Spain
.04 n.s.
Finland .09 ***
UK .17 ***
Greece
.02 n.s.
Hungary .11 ***
Ireland .07 **
Israel .12 ***
Italy
.06 n.s.
Luxembourg .11 ***
Netherlands .08 ***
Norway .09 ***
Poland .06 **
Portugal .12 ***
Sweden .10 ***
Slovenia .06 *
Elite-challenging participation and voting
.07 n.s.
Western Europe .08 ***
Eastern Europe .15 ***
Data Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each
sample (design weight). Data entries are Pearson’s r.
Elite-challenging activities: “Have done” any of the following activities in the past 12 month: Signed
petition, taken part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted certain products, or deliberately bought certain
products for political, ethical or environmental reasons.
Voting: “Did vote in the last national election”.
45 Electoral research has acknowledged the problem of overreporting when assessing electoral participation
in surveys, often caused by the desire of the respondent to engage in socially desirable behavior (Silver,
Anderson and Abramson 1986; Karp and Brockington 2005).
94

This conclusion is supported by the fact that the linkage (and so the discrimination
between these two groups) is strongest in those societies that show a low or modest
participation in elections (see Figure 6-1: Switzerland, UK, Czech Republic,
Luxembourg), suggesting that the smaller active parts in a society tend to engage using
multiple channels of political activism.
6.2 Conventional Participation
As Verba, Nie and Kim (1971, 1978) and Barnes and Kaase et al. (1979) have argued
there are three modes of political participation besides voting: Campaign activity,
communal activity (working with a group in the community) and contacting officials.
This differentiation is supported by a factor analysis based on the ESS data, revealing a
similar structure both in Western and Eastern Europe (see Appendix A6-1). Now, Figure
6-2 shifts the perspective to conventional forms of political participation, relating those
levels in a society to its levels of elite-challenging activities. Conventional participation is
displayed at the y-axis, indicating the percentage of people who have participated in at
least one of the four activities during the past 12 months:
- Contacted a politician, government or local official
- Worked in a political party or action group
- Donated money to a political organization or group
- Worked in another organization or association.
These four activities relate to Verba et al.’s modes of democratic participation as working
for a political party or action group as well as donating money can be considered as
campaign activities whereas working in other organizations is a form of communal
activity (see also Dalton 2002).
95

Figure 6-2: Elite-Challenging Activities and Conventional Participation (ESS 2002)
50
Finland
Norway
40
Belgium
Conventional Participation, in %
30
20
10
Poland
Greece
Portugal
Hungary
Czech Republic
Netherlands
Italy
Slovenia
Spain
Israel
Ireland
Austria
Switzerland Sweden
Luxembourg
Germany
UK
Denmark
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Elite-challenging Activities, in %
Data Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design
weight). R=.80 *** .
Elite-challenging activities (signed petition, taken part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted certain products, deliberately
bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons) and conventional participation (contacted a
politician, government or local official, worked in a political party or action group, donated money to a political organization
or group, or worked in another organization or association) measure the percentages of respondents in each sample who
have reported to have done any of these activities in the past 12 months.
In contrast to voting, Figure 6-2 reveals a visible linkage between levels of elitechallenging
activities and conventional participation. But it is not a negative one, as it
should be if these new activities were developing at the expense of the others. Rather, in
societies where elite-challenging activities are high, participation in conventional forms
also tends to be more pronounced: In Scandinavia and the German-speaking societies
both forms are widespread; in Southern Europe and in the new democracies of Central
Europe, both forms tend to be low. Considering the limited number of cases, the
correlation coefficient of r = .80 *** should be handled with care. However, the overall
impression of Figure 2 supports the assumption of a positive linkage at the societal level.
Table 6-2 shifts the focus to the relationship between elite-challenging activities and
conventional participation at the individual level. Do people who refuse to use traditional
ways to influence politics when they are use alternative ways of participation?
96

Table 6-2:
Individual-Level Correlations between Elite-Challenging Activities
and Conventional Participation (ESS 2002)
Austria .29 ***
Belgium .30 ***
Switzerland .31 ***
Czech Republic .26 ***
Germany .28 ***
East .28 ***
West .29 ***
Denmark .20 ***
Spain .46 ***
Finland .18 ***
UK .24 ***
Greece .31 ***
Hungary .26 ***
Ireland .32 ***
Israel .31 ***
Italy .36 ***
Luxembourg .29 ***
Netherlands .29 ***
Norway .26 ***
Poland .33 ***
Portugal .43 ***
Sweden .23 ***
Slovenia .24 ***
Western Europe .33 ***
Eastern Europe .31 ***
Elite-challenging participation and
conventional participation
Data Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each
sample (design weight). Data entries are Pearson’s r.
Elite-challenging activities: “Have done” any of the following in the past 12 months: signed petition, taken
part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted certain products, or deliberately bought certain products for
political, ethical or environmental reasons.
Conventional participation: “Have done” any of the following in the past 12 months: contacted a politician,
government or local official, worked in a political party or action group, donated money to a political
organization or group, or worked in another organization or association.
Whereas there was only a weak positive linkage between electoral participation and elitechallenging
activities at the individual level, elite-challenging activities and conventional
participation are more strongly linked with each other. In all societies, without exception,
the linkage is positive and significant, pointing to a considerable correlation of above .30,
barely higher in Western Europe (r = .33) than in Eastern Europe (r = .31). The general
97

level of conventional participation is noticeably lower than voting 46 , and the threshold to
become active seems to be more demanding as the distinction between those who
participate and those who do not is more pronounced. In contrast to the previous analysis,
no coherent pattern can be observed when comparing societies with high and low levels
of conventional participation: The linkage to elite-challenging participation is strongest in
Portugal, Poland and Italy (where conventional participation is low) but also in Spain
(medium level) as well as in Switzerland and Belgium (high level); the linkage is below
average in Finland and Sweden (where conventional participation is high) but also in
Hungary and in Slovenia (low level).
Despite all national differences, in all societies individuals who engage in conventional
activities are more likely to participate in elite-challenging activities than those
individuals who do not engage in the traditional activities. In short, the groups of
participants in elite-challenging and conventional activities overlap to a considerable
degree. Accordingly, there is also no obvious trade-off between conventional and elitechallenging
activities at the individual level, such that elite-challenging activities would
go at the expense of other political activities. Of all single conventional activities, active
involvement in a political party shows the weakest relationship with elite-challenging
activities (see Appendix A6-2). However, both forms of political participation are still
positively interrelated in all societies except one, so even for the form of political
participation that is conceptually most distinct from elite-challenging activities, no tradeoff
can be observed.
6.3 Civic Activism
Participation in voluntary associations is considered to be important for democracy, not
only because of what these organizations do but also because of the skills people acquire
during their interaction with others. Being active in a voluntary association makes
46 Conventional Participation varies between a low 16 to 18 percent (Portugal, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy,
Greece, Poland) and a high 45 percent in Finland and Norway. See Figure 6-2.
98

democracy alive at the very grassroots of a society. Moreover, these associations are
regarded as mobilizing agents, providing an organizational context for various kinds of
political activism (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Norris 2002). This mobilizing theory
would suggest a positive linkage between elite-challenging activities and activity in
voluntary associations. The thesis of erosion of political activism, however, proposes a
negative link.
Whereas these propositions rooted in the social capital approach will be tested in more
detail in the next chapter (Chapter 7), the focus now is on the question whether elitechallenging
activities have emerged at the expense of organizational membership. This
question can be examined on a broader empirical basis as the WVS/EVS includes
questions about institutionalized activism, measured by surveying active membership in
formal organizations. From the variety of voluntary associations, not all have a distinct
political character. Active members in sports associations, cultural organizations or
church groups, for example, contribute to communal life but their activities are less
motivated by an attempt to influence policy makers. By contrast, there are other
organizations where most of the goals are inherently of a political kind, or whose
activities and decisions have implications for the political process. Considering these
organizations, a factor analysis (see Appendix A6-3) showed two distinct types of
voluntary associations where people can be politically active: a first type is composed of
political parties, labor unions and professional associations as organizations of interest
representation. As a second type, civic action groups can be distinguished. These are
organizations that are issued-based, concerned with social welfare service, human rights,
youth work, women’s rights, peace movement, environmental issues as well as local
community action groups.
Figure 6-3 shows how elite-challenging activities and activity in interest organizations
are linked at the societal level, and the figure reveals a U-shaped pattern between these
two forms of political engagement.
99

Figure 6-3:
Elite-Challenging Activities and Activity in Interest Organizations
(WVS/EVS 1999-2001)
25
Activity in interest organizations, in %
20
15
10
5
0
Albania
USA
Sweden
India
Moldova
Slovakia
Macedonia
Greece Canada
South Africa
Great Britain
R omania Peru
Iceland
D enmark
Philippines
South Korea Netherlands
Bulgaria Croatia Malta Finland Italy
Czech Republic
Chile
Slovenia
Austria Belgium
Mexico Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ireland
Uk raineRussia
Luxembourg
Hungary
ArgentinaSerbia and Montenegro
Poland
Spain
Latvia Japan
Estonia Lithuania
Northern Ireland
France
East Germany
Portugal
W est Germany
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Elite-challenging activities, in %
Data Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey 1999-2001. R = .24 n.s.
Elite-challenging activities: Measured as percentage of respondents per sample who report to “Have done” any of the
following activities: signed a petition, joined in boycotts, attended lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, or
occupying buildings or factories.
Activity in interest organizations: Measured as percentage of respondents per sample who report to be currently doing
unpaid voluntary work for political parties, labor unions, or professional associations.
Even considering that the activity rates for organizational activity seem to be based on
over-reporting for Albania or India, high levels of elite-challenging activities in a society
are not generally associated with high levels of activity in interest organizations. The
latter is true for Sweden or the USA, but not for Germany, Japan and France where elitechallenging
activities are high but organizational activity in interest organizations is low.
So at large, the extent to which people are active in interest organizations in a society
only seems barely to contribute to mobilizing people into elite-challenging activities (r =
.24 n.s.).
The picture looks a little different for activity in citizen action groups. Figure 6-4
suggests that there is a rather positive linkage between elite-challenging activities and
100

participation in citizen action groups at the aggregate level. In societies where a lot of
people are engaged in citizen action groups, people tend to participate more in elitechallenging
activities (r = .41 ** ).
Figure 6-4:
Elite-Challenging Activities and Activity in Citizen Action Groups
(WVS/EVS 1999-2001)
50
45
Activity in citizen action groups, in %
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Philippines
Albania
South Africa
Greece
Canada
Slovakia
C hile
South Korea
Netherlands
Luxembourg
India Peru
Macedonia Finland Iceland
Belgium
Mexico Moldova Slovenia
Ireland
Denmark
Czech Republic
Malta Austria
Argentina
I taly
Japan
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Northern Ireland
Spain
France
Estonia
Hungary
Croatia
Poland
West Germany
Bulgaria Portugal Serbia and Montenegro
East Germany
Romania Ukraine
Lithuania Latvia
Russia
USA
Great Britain
Sweden
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Elite-challenging activities, in %
Data Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey 1999-2001. R = .41 ** .
Elite-challenging activities: Measured as percentage of respondents per sample who report to “Have done” any of the
following activities: signed a petition, joined in boycotts, attended lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, or
occupying buildings or factories.
Activity in citizen action groups: Measured as percentage of respondents per sample who report to be currently doing
unpaid voluntary work for social welfare service organizations, human rights organizations, youth work organizations, local
community action groups, women’s groups, peace movement, organizations for environment, conservation, or animal
rights.
This finding is quite logical: political engagement from below, as displayed through
demonstrations, petitions, etc., is by definition a grassroots activity. These forms of
political participation became widespread and normal for large parts of the populace in
postindustrial democracies as citizen action groups were rising in the context of a general
advent of new social movements, dealing with issues that were considered to be
101

insufficiently represented by traditional institutions of interest aggregation and
articulation such as political parties. In short, elite-challenging activities demonstrate the
ways citizen groups try to exercise political influence from below (Roller and Wessels
1996: 27). The positive relationship between these particular associations and elitechallenging
activities reflect, therefore, the distinct positive opportunity structure
prevalent in a society for people to participate in these activities. So, if elite-challenging
activities did not show a trade-off with other forms of political activism at the societal
level, this is all the more true for activism in civic action groups. This result is different
from the findings in Roller and Wessels (1996: 29) where ‘traditional organizational
memberships’ (corresponding to my interest organizations) turned out to be a better
predictor for levels of legal protests than ‘memberships in new organizations’
(corresponding to the citizen action groups considered here). 47
Whether the positive linkage at the societal level also holds at the individual level is
addressed in Table 6-3, complemented by a test of individual-level correlations between
elite-challenging activities and active participation in interest organizations.
Examining the question whether people tend to be active in one form or another, or in
both forms of political participation, Table 6-3 shows, in general, a weak positive
(however significant) linkage between elite-challenging activities on the one hand and the
two different forms of civic activism on the other hand, suggesting that people, if they
once surmounted the threshold of political activism, also tend to use multiple channels to
become politically engaged. However, an important qualification should be made with
regard to two groups of societies. Whereas one group shows overall a similar correlation
with both types of organizational engagement (that is in postindustrial societies and the
new member states of the European Union, meaning the more Western oriented new
democracies in Central Europe as well as the Baltic states), all other societies are
characterized by a linkage that is much stronger between elite-challenging activities and
47 The different result may be explained with three crucial differences in the design of the study. First,
Roller and Wessels (1996) base their conclusions on 16 postindustrial democracies, limiting their analyses
to societies within Western Europe and North America. Second, their measurement of activity in voluntary
associations includes passive membership whereas mine only takes active members into account, as I am
interested in political activism. Third, their ‘new organizations’ under consideration are limited to three
voluntary associations: environmental, peace and animal rights groups. Important other citizen action
groups like human rights organizations, organized women’s movements or social welfare groups remain
unconsidered.
102

interest organizations than the one between these activities and citizen action groups. In
other words, active members in political parties, labor unions and professional
associations are more likely to participate in elite-challenging activities than activists in
citizen action groups. Here in this group of societies, where elite-challenging activities
are in general less pronounced, people seem to be mobilized into demonstrations,
petitions, etc. rather through their active role in interest associations than through citizen
action groups. The closer linkage between citizen action groups concerned with human
rights, environmental issues or social questions, and activities outside traditional channels
of political participation seems to be largely a characteristic of postindustrial
democracies, as also the picture at the aggregate level suggested. The fact that the
individual-level correlation between the two forms of activity has become stronger in
these postindustrial societies supports this impression. 48
Table 6-3:
Individual-Level Correlation between Elite-Challenging Activities and
Civic Activism (WVS/EVS 1999-2001)
Elite-challenging activities and
citizen action groups
Elite-challenging activities and
interest organizations
Austria .07 ** .09 ***
Belgium .09 *** .08 **
Canada .15 *** .12 ***
Denmark .07 * .11 **
Finland .05 .12 ***
France .04 .07 **
Greece .07 * .12 ***
Germany .05 * .06 *
Iceland .08 * .12 ***
Ireland .10 ** .09 **
Italy .09 *** .14 ***
Japan .08 ** .05
Luxembourg .08 ** .06 *
Malta .07 * .15 ***
Netherlands .10 ** .10 **
Portugal .14 *** .10 **
Spain .11 *** .14 ***
Sweden .04 .04
48 The correlation coefficient for elite-challenging activities and activity in citizen action groups doubled in
these societies between 1981 and 1999 from r = .06 to r = .11. The coefficient for activity in interest
organizations remained the same: r = .11 in 1981, r = .12 in 1999. All correlation coefficients were
significant at the .00 level.
103

Continued:
Elite-challenging activities and
citizen action groups
Elite-challenging activities and
interest organizations
Great Britain .04 .02
USA .08 ** .08 **
Northern Ireland .13 *** .07 *
Postindustrial societies .13 *** .12 ***
Slovenia .03 .04
Croatia .17 *** .07 *
Czech Republic .04 .07 **
Hungary .12 *** .09 **
Poland .06 * .10 **
Slovakia .05 .15 ***
Ex-communist Western societies .12 *** .12 ***
Albania .01 .15 ***
Bosnia and Herzegovina .10 ** .11 ***
Bulgaria .15 *** .10 **
Romania .01 .31 ***
Republic of Macedonia .14 *** .21 ***
Serbia and Montenegro .03 .10 ***
Ex-communist Eastern societies .10 *** .17 ***
Republic of Moldova .09 ** .15 ***
Russia .06 ** .08 ***
Ukraine .05 .10 ***
Ex-communist soviet societies .07 *** .12 ***
Estonia .16 *** .12 ***
Latvia .10 ** .09 **
Lithuania .04 .10 **
Ex-communist Baltic societies .10 *** .10 ***
Argentina .08 ** .18 ***
Chile .11 *** .17 ***
Mexico .14 *** .15 ***
Peru .05 .13 ***
Latin American societies .09 *** .16 ***
South Africa .01 .19 ***
Other developing societies .01 .19 ***
Uganda .06 .19 ***
Philippines .10 ** .16 ***
India .14 *** .27 ***
Low-income societies .10 *** .24 ***
Average All .11 *** .12 ***
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey 1999-2001. Data are weighted (n = 1.000 for group
averages). Data entries are Pearson’s r.
Elite-challenging activities: “Have done” any of the following activities: signed a petition, joined in
boycotts, attended lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, or occupying buildings or factories.
Activity in interest organizations: Currently doing unpaid voluntary work for political parties, labor unions,
or professional associations.
Activity in citizen action groups: Currently doing unpaid voluntary work for social welfare service
organizations, human rights organizations, youth work organizations, local community action groups,
women’s groups, peace movement, organizations for environment, conservation, or animal rights.
104

Figure 6-5 takes up the trend depictions of the previous chapter, documenting how the
two forms of civic activism have developed over a time period of 20 years compared to
elite-challenging activities. Unfortunately, longitudinal data are not available for all
voluntary associations included so far. For a comparison over time, activity in citizen
action groups is limited to social welfare organizations, youth work groups and human
rights organizations. A factor analysis confirmed that the conceptual differentiation
between interest organizations and citizen action groups is still valid for the reduced
measure (see Appendix A6-4).
Figure 6-5 shows the rise of elite-challenging activities in established postindustrial
democracies, and this increase is even more impressive when displayed against the other
two forms of political activism. During the 1980ies and 1990ies participation in
demonstrations, petitions or boycotts increased by 20 percent points to a level where, on
average, two thirds of the populations use these forms of activity.
Figure 6-5: Elite-Challenging Activities and Civic Activism in Selected
Postindustrial Democracies 1981-1999 (WVS/EVS)
70
Elite-challenging activities
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1981 1990 1999
Citizen action groups
Interest organizations
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey. Data are weighted n = 1.000.
Societies included: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Great Britain, Northern Ireland, USA, West Germany.
By contrast, people’s engagement in voluntary associations showed only minor
fluctuation over time, largely staying at the same level: below 10 percent for active
membership in associations for interest representation, and a little above 10 percent for
105

unpaid voluntary work in citizen action groups. These results do not suggest that elitechallenging
activities became more widespread at the expense of other forms of political
activism.
This outcome can be generalized as no trade-off between elite-challenging and other
forms of political activism could be observed. At the aggregate level, the share of people
taking part in demonstrations, petitions, buy- or boycotts was not linked to voter turnout.
A positive relationship was found for conventional participation, suggesting that if a
society has generally a higher level of political participation, also participation outside
traditional channels is more pronounced. Finally, a positive linkage could be found
between the level of associational activity and elite-challenging activities, highlighting
the significance of a mobilizing context that provides opportunities for citizens to become
politically active. At the individual level, elite-challenging activities were only weakly
correlated with voting but positively linked with forms of conventional participation,
again suggesting that if people become active, they aim at influencing the political
decision-making process through multiple activities. This also applies to the personal
organizational context (although societal differences were pronounced) that mobilizes
people through direct contacts into elite-challenging activities, both in interest
organizations and citizens action groups. The following chapter examines this in more
detail, putting elite-challenging activities in the broader context of social capital research.
106

7. Down and Down We Go? Social Capital and Elite-Challenging Activities
The previous two chapters have provided little empirical evidence that could support the
thesis of widespread political disengagement: neither is civic activism in general going
down, nor have elite-challenging activities found their way into people’s action repertoire
only at the expense of other forms of political participation. This chapter now turns to the
question how participation in demonstrations, petitions, boy- and buy-cotts is linked with
forms of social participation. 49
Social participation is usually described as individual engagement on voluntary basis in
clubs, unions or voluntary associations. The socializing aspect and the frequent
interaction among members have made scholars celebrate the democratic benefits of
people’s social participation as it is supposed to promote values of cooperation, trust and
reciprocity (Stolle and Rochon 1998; Rossteutscher 1999; Putnam 2000; Stolle 2001;
Wollebeck and Selle 2002).
The linkage between social participation and elite-challenging activities is not necessarily
straightforward. Following Hirschman (1979), van Deth (1997: 10) has argued that
limited time resources may make people reconsider their initial decision to become
engaged in multiple ways - sooner or later, individuals opt for only one form of activity.
This could imply that both forms of community involvement, social participation and
elite-challenging activities, are not or even negatively correlated. There are, however,
good reasons to believe that quite the opposite is true. As examining the relationship
between elite-challenging activities and other forms of political participation has shown,
participation tends to breed participation, both on the individual and on the societal level.
This may also be true for social participation in associations: On the one hand, voluntary
associations can provide a ‘close mobilization context’: As people are embedded in social
networks, direct and indirect contacting of potential participants is facilitated (Rosenstone
and Hansen 1993; Roller and Wessels 1996). Similarly, the density of social networks at
the societal level can present a ‘wide participation context’ or ‘organizing capacity’
(Wessels 1997) of a society. As people also respond to the chances they are given,
49 The empirical analyses are based on the European Social Survey 2002. Their module on “Citizenship,
Involvement and Democracy” explicitly included questions on different aspects of social capital.
107

participation in elite-challenging activities should be higher in those societies where more
people are involved in voluntary associations. In these societies, the density of networks
creates more opportunities, thus contributing to favorable external conditions for
participation.
On both levels, the focus is on favorable conditions that mobilize people into collective
activities, i.e. demonstrations. Voluntary associations contribute to these conditions from
a networks perspective, but they are not the only factors. From a cultural perspective, by
contrast, it is the norms of reciprocity and social trust that are conducive to participation.
Both approaches are closely linked with (and often combined in) the concept of social
capital – as structural and cultural preconditions for cooperation among individuals.
The fuzzy concept of social capital
As democratic societies do not function without a minimum of social cohesion, social
capital has been considered to be precisely that glue that holds a society together. “It is a
social force that binds society together by transforming individuals from self-seeking and
egocentric calculators, with little social conscience or sense of mutual obligation, into
members of a community with shared interests, shared assumptions about social
relations, and a sense of the common good” (Newton 2001: 226). With its potential to
solve the collective action dilemma and to enable people to act together with others, the
concept of social capital has gained great significance among social scientists and policymakers
during the past 15 years.
Strangely, it seems that the constant attention paid to this concept has led to more
conceptual confusion than definitional clarity. Besides the question whether to locate
social capital on the individual or the societal level (or both), scholars have also
emphasized different elements when working with the concept. Whereas Bourdieu and
others (Bourdieu 1983; Coleman 1988, 1990) have argued in favor of a minimalist
definition of social capital that is limited to the structural component, the networks and
ties that enable people to engage in collective actions, others have expanded the concept.
Putnam, for example, has added a motivational or cultural component to the structures,
focusing on norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise within the networks
(Putnam 2000: 19). In this sense networks per se, no matter how dense they are, are not
108

enough to stimulate people into action if they lack the resources, that is the norms and
values, to do so (Norris 2002: 138). A third group has included an additional component
into the concept of social capital - civic engagement - as the first two “represent only
necessary not sufficient conditions” (Wollebaek and Selle 2002: 34). The problem
becomes immediately evident: The more characteristics are used to describe social
capital, the more the concept becomes overloaded, and the more difficult it is to
differentiate between what social capital needs (community ties), what it is (resourcebased
capabilities, institution-based incentives, and value-based motivators), and what it
does (producing collective action, that is all kinds of voluntary communal activities, see
Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch 2005: 141).
Since this is not a study about social capital per se but it is interested in that concept only
insofar as it has an impact on elite-challenging activities as a form of mass action, it
seems to be useful to disentangle the concept of social capital and examine its levels
(individual and societal level) and components separately. As the core social capital
literature distinguishes between the structural component and the motivational (or
cultural) component of social capital, the focus will be on the two 50 . The structural or
network approach to social capital is the least contested in the literature, so emphasis will
be on its capacities to mobilize people into elite-challenging activities.
7.1 The Structural Component: Voluntary Associations and Informal Networks
Both theoretically and empirically, it is one of the most widely held claims in social
science research that democracies cannot function without people taking part in political
decision-making processes. Beyond political engagement, the past 15 years have also
seen scholars re-emphasizing the importance of social participation as a core
50 Following Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch (2005), elite-challenging activities as a form of collective
action are considered as an indicator for the productivity of social capital, not as a measure of social capital
itself. So, elite-challenging mass action is the dependent variable, social capital the independent one. If one
follows Wollebaek and Selle (2002) in their presumption to consider civic engagement as a component of
social capital (and not as its consequence), then examining the relationship between social capital and elitechallenging
activities would take place within the limits of the social capital concept. More precisely, this
would mean to test the relationship between the structural and motivational component of social capital on
the one hand, and the civic engagement component on the other hand.
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characteristic of democratic societies (Putnam 2000; Edwards, Foley and Diani 2001;
Van Deth 2004). At the workplace, among families and friends, or in clubs and other
organizations people interact on a regular basis, building up feelings of belongingness
and identity, thus diminishing the distances between people and reducing social isolation
(van Deth 2004: 295).
With its particular importance for civil society, engagement in voluntary associations has
been at the very heart of social participation research. Edwards and Foley (2001: 5-6)
argue that voluntary associations fulfill three main functions in a democratic society (see
also Warren 2001 and Fung 2003). The first two are external functions: In one way or
another, many of the voluntary associations have objectives to help and support the weak,
the poor and other disadvantaged groups in a society, through which they carry out
‘public and quasi-public functions’. In addition, they are groups of interest articulation
and aggregation. Advocating different, sometimes diverging interests, voluntary
associations have a ‘representative or contestatory function’ (Edwards and Foley 2001: 5-
6). Van Deth describes this as the macro-perspective when examining voluntary
associations, as the organizations’ success in mediating between citizen groups, or
citizens and the state, contributes to system integration at large (van Deth 1997: 1-2).
Much more important from the social capital perspective is the internal function of
voluntary associations. From a micro-perspective, attention is paid to mobilization and
socialization aspects. Since de Tocqueville (2000 [1837/40]) voluntary associations have
been described as schools of democracy, underlining the importance of regular face-toface
meetings. People learn to argue, to deliberate and to reach compromises despite
differences of opinion; they develop a sense of responsibility, learn how to trust each
other and to form a stronger sense of community (Rossteutscher 1999: 3). So, voluntary
associations have an internal socialization and education function for their members
(Wollebeck and Selle 2002: 35), considered to be important for the creation and
transmission of social capital. Whether and under what conditions those skills acquired
through interaction with other members can transcend the boundaries of the association is
one of the core questions of social capital research.
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The European Social Survey (ESS 2002) asks the respondents about their membership
during the past 12 months in the following voluntary associations (see Appendix A7-1 for
question wording):
- sports club or club for outdoor activities,
- organization for cultural or hobby activities,
- trade union,
- business, professional or farmers’ organization,
- consumer or automobile organization,
- organization for humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities or immigrants,
- organization for environmental protection, peace or animal rights,
- religious or church organization,
- political party,
- organization for science, education, teachers or parents,
- social club, club for the young, the retired/elderly, women or friendly societies.
As virtually all scholars agree that social capital needs a structural basis to develop and to
be transmitted, people’s connectedness provides the structural precondition for
cooperation among individuals. On the aggregate level, organizational membership in a
society provides a good measure for the organizing capacity of a society (Wessels 1997:
199-200). So, membership in voluntary associations is calculated as the share of people
in a society organized in at least one association. Figure 7-1 shows how membership in
associations and elite-challenging activities are linked at the societal level.
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Figure 7-1: Elite-Challenging Activities and Membership in Associations (ESS 2002)
80
70
Sweden
Elite-challenging activities, in %
60
50
40
30
Spain
Israel
UK
Norway Denmark
Germany
Luxembourg
Finland
Belgium
Austria
Ireland
Netherlands
Italy
20
10
Poland
Greece
Hungary
Portugal
Slovenia
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Membership in any association, in %
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design
weight). R = .91 *** .
Elite-challenging activities: Percentage of respondents who “Have done” any of the following activities in the past 12
month: Signed petition, taken part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted certain products, or deliberately bought certain
products for political, ethical or environmental reasons.
Membership in any association: Percentage of respondents who are a member in any of the following organizations:
sports club or club for outdoor activities; organization for cultural or hobby activities; trade union; business, professional or
farmers’ organization; consumer or automobile organization; organization for humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities or
immigrants; organization for environmental protection, peace or animal rights; religious or church organization; political
party; organization for science, education, teachers or parents; social club, club for the young, the retired/elderly, women
or friendly societies.
As Figure 7-1 clearly reveals, in societies that are characterized by a vibrant associational
life, the level of elite-challenging activities is comparably high (r = .91 *** ). The
Scandinavian societies, for example, show both a great integration of the population into
organizations and the highest level of elite-challenging activities, whereas the new
democracies in Central Eastern Europe as well as the Southern European societies rank
low in both organizational membership and elite-challenging activities. Apparently, the
characteristics of societal networks shape the wider context of mass action (Roller and
Wessels 1996: 26). The density of such networks affects how easy (or hard) it is to
mobilize people into action. The closer the ties in a society, the lower the barrier to other
forms of participation, independently of individual attributes: “You don’t even have to be
112

a member of one single organization (…) in order to profit from the fact that in this
society the transaction cost are low” (van Deth 2001: 9). As a consequence, collective
action in form of elite-challenging activities is much more likely to occur in those
societies where low transaction costs provide the opportunity structure to do so.
That the sheer membership levels, irrespectively of the role that members hold within
these organizations, already show such a clear linkage with elite-challenging activities at
the societal level should not be considered as self-evident. Within the social capital
approach, one controversial issue is the question whether membership in voluntary
associations is already enough to create social capital. Putnam, for example, has argued
that membership without activity does not contribute to the emergence of social capital:
“What really matters from the point of view of social capital and civic engagement is not
merely nominal membership, but active and involved membership” (Putnam 2000: 58).
According to Putnam, social capital can only emerge and be conferred when people
directly interact. Where regular face-to-face encounters do not take place, for example
because the members of an association only meet sporadically, communicate through
email lists or limit their involvement to reading the organization’s newsletter, social
capital is not built. So, activity levels, not membership rates are the appropriate measure
for social capital. Others, however, have shown that empirically there is hardly any
difference between active and passive members of an association (Wollebaek and Selle
2002).
For the societal level, the Figures 7-2 and 7-3 demonstrate that the results of Wollebaek
and Selle’s Norwegian study can be more or less corroborated: Active membership in an
organization as well as social participation in general are also highly correlated with elitechallenging
activities – but the linkages are even weaker than for pure membership in the
previous measure of social capital.
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Figure 7-2: Elite-Challenging Activities and Active Membership in Associations
80
70
Sweden
Elite-challenging activities, in %
60
50
40
30
20
Finland
Israel
Italy
Poland
Spain
Hungary
Luxembourg
Austria
Ireland
Slovenia
Germany
Belgium
UK
Netherlands
Norway
Denmark
10
Portugal
Greece
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Active membership, in %
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design
weight). R = .72 ** .
Elite-challenging activities: Percentage of respondents who “Have done” any of the following activities in the past 12
month: Signed petition, taken part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted certain products, or deliberately bought certain
products for political, ethical or environmental reasons.
Active Membership: Percentage of respondents who are members and participated in activities of any of the following
organizations during the past 12 months: sports club or club for outdoor activities; organization for cultural or hobby
activities; trade union; business, professional or farmers’ organization; consumer or automobile organization; organization
for humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities or immigrants; organization for environmental protection, peace or animal
rights; religious or church organization; political party; organization for science, education, teachers or parents; social club,
club for the young, the retired/elderly, women or friendly societies.
Figure 7-2 shows that the level of organizational engagement drops considerably when
the focus is shifted from pure membership figures to active membership, limiting the
scope to those members who, during the past 12 months, have participated in
organizational activities or voluntarily worked for an association. 51 The linkage to elitechallenging
activities is weaker but remains positive, significant and considerably high (r
= .72 *** ). In Figure 7-3 the formal aspect of membership cards is entirely disregarded by
just looking at levels of activity (participation or voluntary work) in the context of
51 See Appendix A7-1 for a detailed overview about active membership in all voluntary associations.
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associations. Social activity in European societies is by far less pronounced than mere
membership rates 52 ; but it also becomes obvious that the various forms of organizational
activities are not only put into practice by members of an association. Again, elitechallenging
activities are most widespread in those societies that also show high levels of
organizational activities (r = .87 *** ).
Figure 7-3: Elite-Challenging Activities and Social Activity (ESS 2002)
80
70
Sweden
Elite-challenging activities
60
50
40
30
Germ any Denmark
UK Norway
Luxembourg Finland
Austria
Belgium
Ireland
Netherlands
Israel
Spain
Italy
20
10
Poland
Greece
Hungary
Portugal
Slovenia
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Social activity, in %
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design
weight). R = .87 *** .
Elite-challenging activities: Percentage of respondents who “Have done” any of the following activities in the past 12
month: Signed petition, taken part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted certain products, or deliberately bought certain
products for political, ethical or environmental reasons.
Social Activity: Percentage of respondents who participated in activities or did voluntary work in any of the following
organizations during the past 12 months: sports club or club for outdoor activities; organization for cultural or hobby
activities; trade union; business, professional or farmers’ organization; consumer or automobile organization; organization
for humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities or immigrants; organization for environmental protection, peace or animal
rights; religious or church organization; political party; organization for science, education, teachers or parents; social club,
club for the young, the retired/elderly, women or friendly societies.
So far, the focus has been on the diffusion of networks in a society, measured by a
society’s share of people involved in at least one organization. The idea was that societies
52 For an overview, see Appendix A7-2.
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differ in their capability to accumulate productive social capital because they differ in the
degree to which people can be educated, contacted and mobilized through formal
channels of associations (and people not being part of such networks).
Others, however, have argued that social capital has the potential to be more productive
when networks in a society are stronger and more diverse, meaning if the society is
steeped in a variety of different horizontal ties. Assuming that the productivity of social
capital in a society should increase the more its members are interconnected, Figure 7-4
looks at the average number of associational membership. Also this measure of the
structural aspect of social capital is highly correlated with elite-challenging activities (r =
.89 *** ).
Figure 7-4:
Elite-Challenging Activities and Average Membership in European
Societies (ESS 2002)
80
Elite-challenging activities, in %
70
60
50
40
30
Italy
Spain
UK
Germany
Finland
Belgium
Ireland
Israel
Sweden
Denmark
Luxembourg Norway
Austria
Netherlands
20
10
Poland
Greece
Hungary
Portugal
Slovenia
0
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00 2.20 2.40 2.60
Average number of memberships
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design
weight). R = .89 *** .
Elite-challenging activities: Percentage of respondents who “Have done” any of the following activities in the past 12
month: Signed petition, taken part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted certain products, or deliberately bought certain
products for political, ethical or environmental reasons.
Average number of membership: see previous figures for the different organizations.
The fact that the vast majority of the social capital literature has focused on voluntary
associations (be it active or passive membership) has not escaped criticism. It has a long
116

tradition to assume that organizations help to convey values and norms related to
interpersonal trust, reciprocity and compromises, thus enabling people to cooperate for
mutual benefit: “The associations are thought to play a major role, if not the major role,
in building citizenship skills and attitudes crucial for motivating citizens to use these
skills” (Edwards and Foley 2001: 5).
Others like Newton (1999: 185) have argued that the empirical test of this assumption has
not sufficiently corroborated the link between voluntary associations, social capital and
democracy. In particular the effect of voluntary associations on pro-democratic values is
found (if at all) to be rather modest (Hooghe 2003: 48). Whereas Hooghe (2003)
identified measurement problems on the part of associational membership as the main
reason for the weak linkage, Newton objected and held the almost exclusive focus on
voluntary associations as the main source for social capital responsible. Other forms of
social networks have often remained unconsidered, neglecting their potential to create
social capital: “The more informal networks, with horizontal linkages, may now be more
important for the creation of abstract trust in modern societies” (Newton 2001: 232).
Family, friends, the workplace and other communities are interpersonal networks which
essentially shape people’s values. There is good reason to believe that these networks are
more important than formal membership ties because people tend to spend more time in
these informal networks than in clubs or unions (besides the fact that large minorities are
not part of organizational networks at all), and they are usually emotionally more
attached (Newton 2001: 229).
The European Social Survey (ESS 2002) provides some indicators for informal networks,
assessing the scope of respondents’ social contacts:
(1) Frequency of social contacts: “Using this card, how often do you meet socially
with friends, relatives, or work colleagues?” Answers ranging from 1 (“never”) to
7 (“every day”).
(2) Level of social activities: “Compared to other people of your age, how often
would you say you take part in social activities? Please use this card.” Answers
ranging from 1 (“Much less than most”) to 5 (”Much more than most”).
117

(3) Having a friend to share personal matters: “Do you have anyone with whom you
can discuss intimate and personal matters?” The original answers “yes/no” were
recoded, so that the higher value indicates the availability of an intimate friend.
Table 7-1 summarizes the three items in separate factor analyses on aggregate and
individual level, showing for both levels a single-factor result. The factor scores on
aggregate level are used in Figure 7-5 to measure the strength of informal networks in a
society as a proxy for the structural component of social capital. Again, the linkage
between this aspect of social capital and elite-challenging activities is positive and
pronounced (r = .75 *** ), indicating that not only voluntary associations create productive
social capital but that other informal networks teach people how to coordinate their
activities for mutual benefit.
Table 7-1: Factor Analyses for Measures of Informal Networks (ESS 2002):
Aggregate
Individual level
level Western Europe Eastern Europe
Frequency of social contacts .77 .75 .79
Level of social activities .95 .73 .81
Having a friend to share personal matters .78 .57 .47
Explained variance 70% 47% 50%
KMO .48 .57 .54
Bartlett’s test of sphericity 24.798 *** 3516.989 *** 1075.140 ***
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for population size.
Societies included: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, UK, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden (all Western Europe). Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia (all Eastern Europe).
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Figure 7-5:
Informal Networks in European Societies and Elite-Challenging
Activities (ESS 2002)
80
70
Sweden
Elite-challenging activit ies, in %
60
50
40
30
Italy
Czech Republic
Luxembourg Finland
Belgium
Austria
Ireland
Israel
Spain
Switzerland
UK
Germany
Denmark
Norway
Netherlands
20
Poland
Slovenia
10
Hungary
Greece
Portugal
0
-2.40 -2.00 -1.60 -1.20 -0.80 -0.40 0.00 0.40 0.80 1.20 1.60 2.00
Strength of informal networks
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design
weight). R = .75 *** .
Elite-challenging activities: Percentage of respondents who “Have done” any of the following activities in the past 12
month: Signed petition, taken part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted certain products, or deliberately bought certain
products for political, ethical or environmental reasons.
Strength of informal networks: Factor scores (aggregate level), see Table 7-1.
The degree to which the members of a society are interconnected through horizontal ties
has a great impact on the productivity of social capital. Irrespective of the measures of the
structural aspect of social capital – formal membership in voluntary associations,
voluntary work or other forms of activity in the context of these organizations, or other
informal networks – the more a society is characterized through networks, the more
people are involved in elite-challenging forms of collective activities.
Table 7-2 turns to the question whether this linkage also holds at the individual level. The
idea is that a person has social capital at her/his disposal – similarly to other forms of
capital it is conceptualized as a kind of investment, here in social relations – that
promises an added value for personal benefit (Norris 2002: 138). Depending on the
objective of such an investment and on the structure, size and diversity of the network,
119

the individual payoff can vary. Some studies have shown, for example, that people who
are more connected with others participate more successfully in the labor market
(Granovetter 1995; Lin 1999), or tend to be happier, healthier and to live longer
(Kawachi et al. 1997; Pevalin and Rose 2002). 53 As social capital reduces the transaction
costs for cooperation, political engagement should be higher among those people who are
better integrated into horizontal networks. Contrasting this view, van Deth (1997: 10)
points to a quite different interpretation of this linkage. His main argument is that time
resources available to an individual are limited, and that people experience this limitation
when they become involved. So, they will use their resources carefully. Adopting
Hirschman’s thesis of shifting involvements (Hirschman 1979: 100-101), he argues that
people then tend to concentrate on one form of – private, social or political –
involvement, suggesting some kind of trade-off between the various forms of
engagement. Following this argument, individual-level social participation and
engagement in elite-challenging activities should be negatively correlated.
Table 7-2 shows that also at the individual level people’s embeddedness in social
networks is positively linked with people’s engagement in mass activities from below.
For almost all societies, the measures of the structural component of social capital show a
positive and significant correlation with elite-challenging activities. As on the societal
level, the strongest mobilizing factors are membership in voluntary associations and the
multiplicity of associational membership, the people who are part of multiple (and
different) horizontal networks are easier mobilized into elite-challenging activities than
people outside these networks.
53 See already Emile Durkheim’s early and groundbreaking study on the effect of social integration on
suicide rates in various groups of society (Durkheim [1897] 2002).
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Table 7-2:
Individual-Level Correlation: Measures of Social Capital’s Structural
Component and Elite-Challenging Activities (ESS 2002)
Membership in
Associations
Active
Membership in
Associations
Social Activity
Average Number
of Memberships
in Associations
Informal
Networks
Austria .17 *** .01 .15 *** .27 *** .11 ***
Belgium .16 *** .04 .19 *** .26 *** .15 ***
Switzerland - - - - .09 ***
Czech Republic - - - - .16 ***
Germany .19 *** .12 *** .17 *** .22 *** .13 ***
Denmark .13 *** .13 *** .16 *** .24 *** .16 ***
Spain .28 *** .17 *** .25 *** .30 *** .20 ***
Finland .09 *** .01 .17 *** .13 *** .13 ***
UK .24 *** .17 *** .24 *** .29 *** .11 ***
Greece .25 *** .14 *** .18 *** .32 *** .12 ***
Hungary .13 *** .09 *** .17 *** .18 *** .11 ***
Ireland .19 *** .12 *** .20 *** .26 *** .10 ***
Israel .26 *** .05 * .14 *** .30 *** .10 ***
Italy .21 *** -.03 .25 *** .23 *** .17 ***
Luxembourg .17 *** .12 *** .14 *** .25 *** .19 ***
Netherlands .14 *** .14 *** .15 *** .28 *** .10 ***
Norway .14 *** .17 *** .19 *** .23 *** .18 ***
Poland .20 *** .15 *** .23 *** .21 *** .08 ***
Portugal .24 *** .12 *** .12 *** .31 *** .08 **
Sweden .15 *** .12 *** .15 *** .21 *** .16 ***
Slovenia .15 *** .11 *** .17 *** .21 *** .15 ***
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample
(design weight). Data entries are Pearson’s r.
7.2 The Motivational or Cultural Component: Social Trust
Some scholars like Putnam have extended their definition of social capital, arguing that
structures are not sufficient in stimulating coordination and cooperation among the
members of a network if these ties are not accompanied by shared norms of reciprocity
and generalized horizontal trust. Inglehart (1997: 188), for example, talks about “a
culture of trust and tolerance” when referring to social capital. Along similar lines,
Fukuyama claims that social capital is “a capability that arises from the prevalence of
trust in a society or certain parts of it” (Fukuyama 1995: 26).
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The European Social Survey contains two questions on social trust, both measured on a
0-to-10 scale, with higher values indicating more trust towards other people. The question
formulations read as follows:
(1) “Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”, and:
(2) “Using this card, do you think that most people would try to take advantage
of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?”.
In Figure 7-6 the two items were combined, resulting in a scale that ranges from 0 to 20,
and an average trust value per society was calculated. 54 The values are displayed at the x-
axis (see Appendix A7-3 for the distribution of the scale per society).
As a societal characteristic, the motivational aspect of social capital has also been
conceptualized as networks of trust that help to sustain the social cohesion in a society. A
society can thus be imagined as a sum of single trust circles where people are willing to
accept cooperative norms (Fukuyama 1999: 3). In societies where these “radii of trust”
(p.2) are large (meaning that they involve a lot of people), more social capital is available
to all members of a society. As a consequence, in high-trust societies the prevailing social
capital should be more productive in stimulating collective activism than in low-trust
societies. 55
54 Cronbach’s alpha for the added scale: 0.742.
55 For the concept of “high-trust societies” and “low-trust societies” see Fukuyama (1995).
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Figure 7-6: Trust Level and Elite-Challenging Activities (ESS 2002)
80
70
Sweden
Elite-challenging activities, in %
60
50
40
30
Czech Republic
Germany
UK
Belgium
Austria
Israel
Spain
Luxembourg
Switzerland
Ireland
Netherlands
Norway
Finland
Denmark
Italy
20
10
Greece
Slovenia
Poland
Hungary Portugal
0
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Mean trust level (scale: 0 to 20)
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design
weight). R = .82 *** .
Elite-challenging activities: Percentage of respondents who “Have done” any of the following activities in the past 12
month: Signed petition, taken part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted certain products, or deliberately bought certain
products for political, ethical or environmental reasons.
Mean trust level: Mean score on added scale (0 to 20): High values indicate that respondents from a given country think
that most people can be trusted and that people try to be fair.
As Figure 7-6 confirms, the level of social trust in a society is considerably related to
elite-challenging activities (r = .82 *** ). Here, social trust was measured as the mean score
on the additive trust scale (ranging from 0 to 20; higher values indicate more trust in
other people) per society, but the relationship also holds, for example, when the
prevalence of high trust levels is considered instead (r = .75 *** , for the figure see
Appendix A7-4). On the societal level, social trust appears to provide an opportunity
structure that is in principle available to all members of a society and creates a positive
environment for mass activities. So, the prevalence of trust (like in the Scandinavian
societies) serves as a precondition for elite-challenging activities – in societies where
123

people tend to be rather distrustful (like in the former Ex-communist or Southern
European societies), less cooperative actions can be observed.
On the individual level, trust (as the motivational component of social capital) is
differently conceptualized from what Inglehart (1997: 188) called “culture of trust”. In
contrast to the societal attribute, it characterizes “an aspect of the relationship among
individuals to be found in networks” (van Deth 2001: 7). Coleman (1980, 1990) has
proposed a game-theoretical approach, arguing that trust is the outcome of a cost-benefit
analysis in a given situation. Taking into account all available information the
counterpart’s trustworthiness is estimated and weighed against the consequences if the
own trust is betrayed. In this understanding, trust is granted to a particular person as the
result of a rational decision in response to a concrete situational context. Coleman’s
approach that defines trust as person-specific, situational-specific and intentional refers to
interpersonal trust. This concept, however, largely disregards that trust can also be crosspersonal
and cross-situational, in other words: generalized (McKnight, Cummings and
Chervany 1995: 13). The two questions in the European Social Survey refer then to
generalized trust as a disposition or propensity to trust others, irrespectively of the
concrete situation, “a sense of basic trust, which is a pervasive attitude toward oneself
and the world” (Erikson 1968: 96). It refers to so-called thin trust between strangers and
acquaintances (Delhey and Newton 2005: 311) and is conceptually distinct from
personalized (or particularized) trust that is generated only in face-to-face meetings.
Here, voluntary associations and other forms of networks come into play again as
generalized trust can emerge from face-to-face interaction: “through mechanisms not yet
clearly understood the development of interpersonal trust and cooperative experience
between members tends to be generalized to the society as a whole” (Stolle 2001: 205).
For the social capital approach, this generalized trust is of particular importance for
cooperation among individuals. People who have the disposition to generally consider
others as trustworthy should also be more willing to participate with others in common
activities.
Table 7-3 looks at the individual-level linkage between social trust and elite-challenging
activities. The correlation is a positive one and, with one exception, significant in all
societies. Although the coefficients are not very high, the results in Table 7-3 suggest that
124

generalized horizontal trust also provides some kind of a personal opportunity structure
through which trusting individuals can be easier mobilized into collective activities than
those who do not trust others. As on the societal level, generalized trust tends to minimize
transaction costs, helping individuals to overcome the usual collective action dilemma
that occurs when people need to work together for a common goal: “Especially the
existence of mutual trust and norms of reciprocity reduces the risk that a co-operative
individual will be invited to pay the bill left behind by cheating partners” (van Deth 2001:
7).
Table 7-3:
Individual-Level Correlation: Social Trust and Elite-Challenging
Activities (ESS 2002)
Austria .08 ***
Belgium .07 **
Switzerland .12 ***
Czech Republic .10 ***
Germany .14 ***
Denmark .09 **
Spain .12 ***
Finland .06 **
UK .10 ***
Greece .08 ***
Hungary .09 ***
Ireland .06 *
Israel .13 ***
Italy .17 ***
Luxembourg .12 ***
Netherlands .12 ***
Norway .04
Poland .12 ***
Portugal .06 *
Sweden .10 **
Slovenia .09 **
Trust and elite-challenging activities
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample
(design weight). Data entries are Pearson’s r.
125

7.3 Networks or Trust: Which Component of Social Capital Generates Elite-
Challenging Activities?
The motivational and the structural aspect of social capital are closely linked with each
other as associations and other forms of networks help to facilitate generalized trust and
norms of reciprocity. The question may arise which of these two components is more
successful in generating productive social capital. Table 7-4 displays the results of a
binary logistic regression analysis at the individual level, with participation in elitechallenging
activities as the dependent variable. The motivational component of social
capital as one of the explanatory factors is captured with a grouped trust variable, derived
from the 21-point trust scale described above. The measure of the structural component
of social capital is based on the previous analyses, but adds one important aspect for
connectedness: the degree to which people are embedded in virtual networks such as
online networks. Whereas Wellmann et al. (1996) have argued that computer (or virtual)
networks are in fact real social networks, others have argued quite differently: contacts
via Internet in fact do not create social capital as people do not interact on a face-to-face
basis but often anonymously and without a social context, thus encouraging “’easy in,
easy out,’, ‘drive-by’ relationships” (Putnam 2000: 177). In his understanding, “the
poverty of social cues in computer-mediated communication inhibits interpersonal
collaboration and trust” (Putnam 2000: 176). The frequent use of email and Internet for
personal communication should be a good indicator for embeddedness in (virtual)
networks. In Putnam’s view, virtual networks should be not at all or even negatively
linked with elite-challenging activities. By contrast, if virtual networks are real networks,
they should have the capacity to mobilize people into participation (Hampton and
Wellman 2003: 305).
The structural aspect of social capital is measured with three sets of variables: (1) Formal
membership in voluntary associations; (2) the three single items that entered the factor
analysis on informal networks: frequency of social contacts, level of social activities,
having a friend to share personal matters; and (3) the frequency of personal Internet and
email usage (question formulation: “Now, using this card, how often do you use the
internet, the World Wide Web or e-mail – whether at home or at work – for your personal
use?”).
126

Table 7-4 presents two separate regression models for Western and Eastern Europe, with
the first one showing the impact of structural and motivational factors on the participation
in elite-challenging activities. The second model includes control factors: sex, age,
education and TV consumption.
Table 7-4: Individual-Level, Binary Logistic Regression (ESS 2002)
Dependent Variable: Elite-Challenging Activities
Model I
Model II
Western Europe Eastern Europe
Western Europe Eastern Europe
Structural component:
Member in any association 2.68 *** (.99) 2.30 *** (.83) 2.51 *** (.92) 2.14 *** (.76)
Frequency of social contacts 1.00 (.01) .99 (-.02) 1.01 (.02) 1.05 (.05)
Level of social activities 1.24 *** (.22) 1.08 (.07) 1.22 *** (.20) 1.01 (.01)
Having a friend to discuss personal 1.54 *** (.43) 1.55 * (.44) 1.37 *** (.32) 1.36 (.31)
matters
Personal internet and email usage 1.16 *** (.15) 1.21 *** (.19) 1.09 *** (.09) 1.10 *** (.10)
Motivational component:
Interpersonal Trust
Reference category: low trust level
Medium trust level
High trust level
1.42 *** (.35)
1.66 *** (.51)
1.11 (.11)
1.58 ** (.46)
1.34 *** (.30)
1.50 *** (.41)
1.02 (.02)
1.43 * (.36)
Control variables:
Sex - 1.35 *** (.30) 1.16 (.15)
Age - 1.00 (.00) 1.00 (.00)
Education - 1.37 *** (.31) 1.45 *** (.37)
TV consumption - 1.00 (.00) 0.99 (-.01)
Explained variance (Nagelkerke’s R 2 ) .20 .12 .24 .18
N 25.148 4.911 25.148 4.911
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for population size.
Data entries are odds ratios with beta coefficients in parentheses.
Significance level: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p = .00
Membership in a voluntary association appears to be the strongest explanatory factor in
both regions, and its impact hardly diminishes when controlling for sociodemographic
characteristics. The effect of Internet use and e-mailing is also positive and significant in
all cases. So, people’s embeddedness in these networks increases their chance to become
active, simply because they are more exposed to information and attempts for
127

mobilization. The result for the single informal network variables is rather mixed. The
effect of frequency of social contacts is consistently insignificant, whereas the other two
have an independent effect on community activism throughout Western Europe but not in
the former communist societies. The picture looks similar for generalized trust as it has
an independent effect on elite-challenging activities even when controlled for
associational membership and the strength of personal informal networks. Ex post, this
also corroborates the differentiation between networks and ties on the one hand, and trust
on the other hand as conceptually distinct components of social capital.
The level of TV consumption as well as age, both introduced into the model as a control
factors, do not play any role for activity in elite-challenging participation. At least for the
first variable this is in fact a little surprising. Ironically, just at the time as social capital
had been (re)discovered and defended in its potential democratic benefits for a society, in
particular by its strongest advocates, the communitarian school, concerns were raised that
this valuable resource was already about to diminish. A last ‘long civic generation’
(Putnam 1995b: 674-677) was discovered, born between 1910 and 1940, “a broad group
of people substantially more engaged in community affairs and substantially more
trusting than those younger than they” (Putnam, 1995b: 675). When the subsequent ‘postcivic
generations’, more couch potatoes than community activists, gradually replaced the
actively involved generation, decades of “a national deterioration in social capital”
(Putnam 1995b: 677) followed. Following this argument, older generations should have
more social capital, as they are more connected and trustful, and this should also become
visible in the productivity of social capital. On the other hand, there is no good reason to
assume why older people should participate in these particular forms of community
activism. A number of empirical studies have shown that participation in elitechallenging
activities is often tied to a particular set of values prevailing among the
younger, not the older, generations. Putnam made a strong claim linking decreasing
social capital to the recreational habits of the younger generations. “The culprit is
television” (Putnam 1995b: 667), he argued, but in particular the multitude of processes
of individualization have been blamed for undermining the role membership-based
organizations.
128

Summarizing the results so far, elite-challenging activities as forms of community
involvement depend both on networks and trust, in short: they are an outcome of social
capital. Social capital was examined in its effect on collective activities on two levels: as
an individual characteristic (embeddedness in a network and social trust) and a societal
condition (organizing capacity of a society) for participation. However, as the two-level
characteristics have not been included in one and the same analysis, it is not possible to
determine whether social capital has the greater impact on participating in elitechallenging
activities as an individual or as a societal characteristic. This will be done
now in a final step: social capital variables on the individual and on the societal level will
be incorporated into one multilevel model explaining people’s participation in elitechallenging
activities.
As understanding the logic of multilevel models is necessary to follow the interpretation
of the results, this final empirical test is presented in more detail. A multilevel analysis
allows singling out independent effects of the variables on each level on a dependent
variable (measured on the lowest possible level), but also interaction effects between
level-1 (individual level) and level-2 (societal level) factors that might explain why
people participate. As the dependent variable, participation in elite-challenging activities,
is measured as a dichotomous variable, a hierarchical nonlinear regression model must be
applied. A nonlinear model (also: generalized linear model) is in many ways similar to a
linear model, except that the level-1 model follows a logistic function instead of a linear
one. In general, a multilevel model follows a three-step logic. In the first model, only
individual-level predictors are included; the second model introduces the direct effects of
societal-factors; the third model is the full model that finally incorporates the interaction
effects.
As a first step, a baseline model is calculated, taking into account individual-level
variables only (Model 1). For the social capital model explaining elite-challenging
activities, these are (1) membership in voluntary associations, (2) embeddedness in
informal networks, and (3) social trust. It is assumed that group differences can be
observed, meaning that the individual-level variables have different effects across
societies. The first model looks like this:
129

Model 1:
Prob (Yij) = (1/ β j ) = P
η ij = log [P/(1-P)] = β 0j + β 1j (Membership) ij + β 2j (Informal networks) ij + β 3j (Trust) ij + r ij
The model is similar to a logistic regression model, except that the parameters are not
fixed but vary across societies (level-2 units, see Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 221). η ij is
the dependent variable (participation in elite-challenging activities) for a level-1 unit
(individual i), nested in a level-2 unit (society j), more precisely: the logit of the odds that
someone will participate in elite-challenging activities. These odds (or chances) are
defined as P/(1-P), i.e. the probability (that someone participates, so ‘an event will
occur’) divided by one minus the probability (that someone does not participate, so ‘an
event will not occur’). The β 0i coefficient is the individual-level intercept, the other beta
coefficients in the model are the individual-level effects (slopes). Finally, r ij represents
the error term in this model.
The main goal of a multilevel analysis is “to account for variance in a dependent variable
that is measured at the lowest level of analysis by considering information from all levels
of analysis” (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219). The information from the superior level,
the societal level, is taken into account in the next two steps. Here, it is assumed that
level-2 variables can have direct effects (Model 2) but may also shape the effects of
level-1 variables (Model 3).
So, in the second step of analyzing multilevel data, level-2 variables are introduced to
assess their independent effects on the individual-level intercept β 0j . In the social capital
model, level-2 variables are (1) membership level, (2) level of informal networks, and (3)
the trust level in a society:
Model 2:
β 0j = γ 00 + γ 01 (Membership level j ) + γ 02 (Level of informal networks j ) + γ 03 (Trust level j )
+ u ij .
In the equation, γ 00 is the societal level intercept, the other γ coefficients are level-2
effects on the level-1 intercept β 0j . The level-2 error term is summarized in u ij .
Finally, level-2 variables have to be considered in their interaction with level-1 variables.
Model 3 summarizes the level-2 effects on the other level-1 regression parameters:
130

Model 3:
β 1j = γ 10 + γ 11 (Membership level) + γ 12 (Level of informal networks) + γ 13 (Trust level)
+ u 1j .
β 2j = γ 20 + γ 21 (Membership level) + γ 22 (Level of informal networks) + γ 23 (Trust level)
+ u 2j .
β 3j = γ 30 + γ 31 (Membership level) + γ 32 (Level of informal networks) + γ 33 (Trust level)
+ u 3j .
γ 10 , γ 20 and γ 30 are the intercepts for the respective membership, informal networks and
trust slopes. γ 11 , γ 12 and γ 13 are the effects of the level-2 factors membership level, level
of informal networks, and trust level in a society on individual membership in a voluntary
association. γ 21 , γ 22 and γ 23 are the effects of the same level-2 factors on individual
embeddedness in informal networks, γ 31 , γ 32 and γ 33 represent the level-2 effects on trust.
After introducing the model equations, Table 6-5 presents the results of the multi-level
model. For an easier interpretation, odds ratios (instead of log odds coefficients) are
documented. The data entries show how the odds ratios are changing when a one-unit
increase in the independent variable occurs (odds with increase compared to odds without
an increase in the predictor). Does social capital as an individual or as a societal attribute
(or as an interplay of both) make people participate in elite-challenging activities? 56
The results in Table 7-5 are straightforward. All three social-capital related, individuallevel
predictors in Model 1 have a positive and significant effect on participation in elitechallenging
activities. Members in voluntary associations join demonstrations, petitions,
and activities of political consumerism twice as often as nonmembers. Compared to
membership, the other social capital characteristics, embeddedness in informal networks
and trust, do not play such an important role. Contrasting the lowest with the highest
possible trust score (21-point scale), for example, the odds ratio to participate in elitechallenging
activities improves not even by factor two (1.8). Looking at the sociodemographic
control factors, females are slightly more likely to take part in elitechallenging
activities than men (1.2). Participation decreases with age, and, corroborating
several participation studies, the level of education has a positive effect on people’s
56 For the detailed stepwise multi-level model (HGLM) please see Appendix A7-5.
131

inclination to become engaged: Comparing the lowest with the highest educational
degree (7-point scale), the odd ratio for participation increases to 10.8. 57
The effects of individual-level socio-demographic characteristics as well as social capital
factors also remain robust after introducing societal-level effects in Model 2. Of the three
societal condition factors, only the membership level in a society plays a role,
contributing remarkably to a favorable opportunity structure for people to become active.
The other societal-level effects of social capital, the levels of informal networks and trust
in a society, are of no relevance for individual participation in elite-challenging activities.
As the last box at the bottom of Table 7-5 shows, the introduction of societal
characteristics (foremost: level of organizational membership) improves the fit of the
model intercept substantially (almost 75 percent compared to the baseline model). The
variance components documented here show how much of the variation across societies
can be explained by including level-2 variables into the model. In fact, the coefficients
display how much of the variance remains still unexplained. From these components, the
reduction in error variance can be calculated (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998: 118). 58
57 About the interpretation of odds ratios for continuous variables: If a change of two or more units in the
independent variable occurs, the odds ratios are multiplied (not added!). Example: Education is measured
on a 7-point scale, the odds ratio for a one-unit increase in the independent variable is 1.405 (see Table 7-
5). The odds ratio for the lowest compared with the highest educational degree is, therefore, 1.405 7 = 10.8
in favor of the highest educational degree.
58 As there is no ‘true’ R 2 in HLM, there are a number of suggestions on how to calculate the explained
variance in a multilevel model. In one way or another, all of them refer to a comparison of the error terms
in an unrestricted and a restricted model. Kreft and de Leeuw (1998) suggest for the between society
)
variance: 2
u
0
− u1
R between
= , with u0 being the error term in the “random intercept, random slope” model
u
0
(unrestricted model), and u 1 being the error term in the “full model with interaction effects” (restricted
)
model). Accordingly, the within society variance is 2 v0
− v1
R within
= , with v 0 being the error term in the
v0
“random intercept only” model (null model or unrestricted model), and v 1 being the error term in the
“random intercept, random slope” model (restricted model). Appendix 5 shows the stepwise multi-level
model – here, the within-society variance is reported.
In both cases, the variance of the new model is subtracted from the variance of the restricted model: “The
difference is compared to the original variance (the null model variance) as a proportion reduction in that
variance” (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998: 188). As the authors point out, this simple approach has its drawbacks
(as other approaches have as well): Negative results might occur when the variance of the unrestricted
model is larger than the variance of the restricted model (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998: 118).
132

Table 7-5: Multi-Level (Hierarchical Generalized Linear) Model of Social Capital
and Elite-Challenging Activities (ESS 2002)
Dependent variable: Participation in Elite-Challenging Activities (dichotomous, individual-level measure)
Model 1:
Individual-level
predictors
(Random intercept,
random slope)
Model 2:
Societal-level
effects on intercept
Model 3:
Full model
with interaction
effects
Intercept 0.439*** (-4.344) 0.029** (-3.670) 0.061** (-3.321)
Individual-level effects (slopes):
Membership in voluntary association 2.020*** (14.686) 2.014*** (24.108) 5.104** (4.083)
Embeddedness in informal networks 1.158*** (8.905) 1.163*** (11.536) 0.881 (-0.753)
Trust
1.028*** (7.463) 1.028*** (8.601) 1.035 (0.832)
Control Factors
Gender
1.200** (3.510) 1.239*** (8.700) 1.209** (3.712)
Age
0.990*** (-9.936) 0.990*** (-14.43) 0.990*** (-8.834)
Education
1.405*** (19.377) 1.396*** (36.088) 1.405*** (19.187)
Societal-level effects (intercepts):
Membership level
Level of informal networks
Trust level
Cross-level interaction effects (slopes):
Individual-level membership in voluntary
associations
* Societal membership level
* Level of informal networks
* Trust level
Individual-level embeddedness in informal
networks
* Societal membership level
* Level of informal networks
* Trust level
Individual-level trust
* Societal membership level
* Level of informal networks
* Trust level
Remaining between-society variance:
Intercept (Contribution to variance)
Membership in voluntary association
Informal networks
Trust
Gender
Age
Education
0.6486***
0.0262***
0.0018
0.0001
0.0389***
0.0000**
0.0041***
30.251** (4.003)
0.963 (-0.202)
1.061 (0.542)
19.603** (3,994)
1.0334 (0.201)
1.016 (0.168)
0.437* (-2.304)
1.194* (2.239)
0.959 (-0.922)
1.062 (0.390)
0.931 (-2.015)
1.023 (1.228)
0.972 (-0.779)
1.002 (0.269)
1.001 (0.225)
0.1656*** (74.5%) 0.1323*** (79.6%)
0.0146 (44.3%)
0.0021 (-16.7%)
0.0001 (0%)
0.0369*** (5.1%)
0.0000** (0%)
0.0042*** (-2.4%)
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. N (individual level) = 35.303. N (societal level) = 19.
Data entries are odds ratios with T-values in parentheses. Hierarchical generalized linear model calculated
with HLM 6.03. Significance level: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p = .00
Individual-level variables: Membership in any voluntary association (0/1), Embeddedness in informal
networks (factor scores, see Table 1), Trust (scale 0 to 20), Gender (1=male, 2=female), Age (low to high),
Education (7-point scale, 0=not completed primary education, 6=second stage or tertiary level).
Societal-level variables: Level of Membership in vol. associations (in % per society), Level of informal
networks (average factor score, see Table 7-1), Trust level (average societal score on trust scale 0 to 20).
133

Comparing the Models 2 and 3, including cross-level interaction effects does not
substantially improve the model. The interaction coefficients are barely significant, and
the overall unexplained variance in Model 3 is only marginally reduced (the variance
components show an additional reduction from 75 to 80 percent compared to Model 1).
Considering the vast improvement after introducing the direct impact of societal factors
to the previous model, Model 3 can only modestly contribute to further explain
participation in elite-challenging activities. In addition, the already weak (but positive)
effect of embeddedness in informal networks and trust on people’s participation in elitechallenging
activities vanishes. By contrast, the impact of individual membership in
voluntary associations increases (from 2.01 to 5.10).
To summarize the results of the multilevel model, it is the structural aspect of social
capital, in particular the voluntary associations, that mobilizes people into elitechallenging
activities. This mechanism works both on the individual as on the societal
level: Membership in voluntary associations creates a close mobilization context, giving
members better chances to also participate in other forms of collective activities. Along
similar lines, an individual living in a society that is characterized by a high membership
level is much more likely to be a demonstrator, a petitioner or a political consumerist than
the one living in a society where only a minority of the people joins voluntary
associations. So, societies with a high density of voluntary associations indeed
demonstrate their organizing capacity.
In addition to the social capital factors, the multi-level models also revealed a linkage
between sociodemographic characteristics and individual participation in elitechallenging
activities. Originally introduced as control factors, the impact of these
characteristics (e.g. education) proved to be quite robust. Picking up these linkages, the
next chapter will, among others, discuss the impact of individual-level resources and
motivation on elite-challenging participation, in particular with regard to the question of
political equality. Building up on the results of networks as favorable context factors, the
following chapter will, furthermore, address other societal resources and opportunity
structures for participation in elite-challenging activities.
134

8. Individual Characteristics or Context Factors:
What Matters for Elite-Challenging Participation?
This chapter, building on the results of the previous analyses, is dedicated to the question
whether participation in elite-challenging activities is determined more by individual
characteristics or rather an outcome of contextual conditions. The analysis follows a
three-fold strategy:
In a first step, the chapter examines individual-level characteristics and how they shape
the eagerness of people to become engaged in politics. This question is closely linked
with the problem of participation and inequality, as the spread of elite-challenging
activities has been blamed to go at the expense of political equality. Individual-level
analyses for six societies are presented, comparing the impact of resources and
motivation on elite-challenging participation over a period of 30 years. The analyses are
based on data from the Political Action Study (1974) and the European Social Survey
(2004). The results for elite-challenging participation are then contrasted with other forms
of political action – conventional participation and voting – in order to determine whether
and to what extent elite-challenging activities contribute to the inequality gap in political
participation, and whether this has changed over time.
In a second step, the impact of different context factors on elite-challenging activities is
tested. It is widely acknowledged that, in addition to individual-level resources and
motivation, opportunity structures and societal resources matter for participation as well.
The data for the dependent variable come from the World Values Survey 2000-2005. The
78 societies included in the analysis differ significantly in their political, economic and
social characteristics and are therefore well suited to examine the role of national
affluence, democratic quality or other system characteristics in mobilizing people into
collective action.
Finally, the relative impact of the context factors and individual-level characteristics will
be determined in a multi-level analysis. Such an analysis does not only allow us to test
the impact of the two levels simultaneously and under mutual control, but also to
investigate whether individual characteristics differ in their impact on elite-challenging
participation across contexts.
135

8.1 Elite-Challenging Participation and Individual-Level Resources and
Motivation: The Question of Inequality
For the past decades, inequality in participation has been an important topic in
participation research. Political equality and political participation are both basic
democratic premises, in principle compatible, but in reality hard to achieve
simultaneously (Lijphart 1997: 1). It is one of the best established findings in political
science that resources matter for political participation, and that resources are not equally
distributed among citizens of a society. The more intensive a form of political
participation is, the fewer people participate, and the greater the chances that those
participants come from more privileged parts of the citizenry. Elite-challenging forms of
participation have been blamed for increasing political inequality, widening the gap
between those who participate and those who don’t (Skocpol 2003, 2004). “Because of
their upwardly biased social composition, direct action groups do not even out, but in fact
accelerate, differences in socio-political resources” (Kaase and Barnes 1979: 526). Elitechallenging
activities are often said to be more demanding in terms of required resources
than other forms of political participation, pointing to pronounced unequal opportunities
to take part in public life (Dalton 2000: 929-930). These individual opportunity structures
are shaped by factors such as education or income, but also age or gender.
Recent studies on particular forms of elite-challenging activities, however, suggest that
those – unequal – participation patterns are changing. An exploratory study on political
consumerism in Canada, Belgium and Sweden, for example, could show that the gender
gap is reversing, with more and more women using this form of civic and political
activism (Stolle and Micheletti 2003). Another empirical study on participants in
demonstrations in Belgium documents that demonstrators have become similar to the
Belgium population (Norris, Walgrave and van Aelst 2005).
The following chapter examines whether elite-challenging participation reinforces social
inequality. If this was the case, socio-demographic characteristics should have a stronger
impact on participation in elite-challenging activities than on participation in
conventional forms of political participation or on voting. Given that elite-challenging
activities are more demanding than other forms of participation, the spread of these
136

activities over the past decades should also have led to a greater social gap between
participants and non-participants. These assumptions will be tested with data from the
Political Action Study (1974) and the European Social Survey (2004). Social
characteristics will include gender, age, education and income.
In addition, a factor controlling for status inconsistency is introduced. The concept goes
back to Lenski (1954) who argued that not only the status of an individual matters for
political orientations, but also his position at different status dimensions, i.e. low on
education and high on income. The concept was then taken up by Beck (1973) and is,
because of its implications for social inequality, often considered to be at the heart of the
individualization thesis: 59 individualization leads to a decrease of status crystallization,
or: an increase of status inconsistency. Along similar lines, Coleman (1990: 477) has
argued that times of rapid change produce status inconsistencies for many people.
According to Kohler (2005: 231) this growing inconsistency on the vertical dimension of
inequality has an impact for the horizontal dimension as well, in the sense that it leads to
a diversification (or: de-structuralization) of status groups, where the individual position
on the vertical dimension matters less for the prediction of favorable or unfavorable
living conditions. Status inconsistency is operationalized as the result of a pair-wise
comparison between the respondent’s position on an education and an income scale.
Status consistency is achieved when the position on education corresponds to the position
on income. An individual is characterized by a positive status inconsistency when the
income is higher than the education would predict. A negative status inconsistency can be
found when income is lower than an individual’s education level would suggest.
Table 8-1 presents results of a first logistic regression. The three models have different
dependent variables: Participation in elite-challenging activities (Model 1), in
conventional forms of participation (Model 2), and in voting (Model 3). Each model
contrasts the impact of socio-economic resources on participation between 1974 and
2004. To be sure, two points in time do not constitute a time-series, but a comparison
over 30 years allows us to draw at least some preliminary conclusions about the relative
strengths of socio-economic factors for individual participation.
137

Table 8-1:
Binary-Logistic Regression: Resources and Participation
(Political Action Study 1974 and European Social Survey 2004)
Dependent variable:
Elite-Challenging
participation
Political
Action
(1974)
ESS
(2004)
Conventional
Participation
Political
Action
(1974)
ESS
(2004)
Political
Action
(1974)
Voting
Gender (0=male) .70 *** 1.20 ** 0.37 *** 0.68 *** 0.94 0.91
Age
reference: 65+ years
25 and younger
26 to 35 years
36 to 45 years
46 to 55 years
56 to 65 years
Education
reference: com. level
middle level
higher level
Income
reference: low level
middle level
high level
Status inconsistency:
reference: positive
no inconsistency
1.22
1.54 **
1.59 **
1.48 **
1.11
ESS
(2004)
2.37 ***
1.89 ***
1.88 ***
1.81 ***
1.56 *** 0.89
1.33 *
1.47 **
1.45 **
1.44 ** 0.88
1.05
1.45 *
2.16 ***
1.74 *** 0.11 ***
0.71 *
1.24
1.32
1.45 * 0.36 ***
0.36 ***
0.54 ***
0.83
1.14
1.65 *** 2.32 ** 1.73 *** 1.17
1.91 * 4.04 * 3.29 *** 1.85
1.57 * 0.95
2.20 ** 1.14
1.10
1.45
1.02
1.34
1.09 1.45 *
3.58 ** 4.40
0.87
0.84
1.05
1.12
negative inconsistency
1.24
1.89 * 0.83
0.83
.97
.96
1.01
1.12
0.74
0.62
0.94
0.76
Constant 0.32 0.15 1.15 0.20 7.97 3.87
N 6.539 7.636 7.126 7.662 7.077 7.071
Pseudo R sq. .09 .08 .13 .06 .24 .08
Countries included: Great Britain, West Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Finland.
Samples equally weighted n = 1.000. Coding of the variables:
(1) Elite-challenging participation
Political Action Study: “Please place the cards on this scale to show me first whether 1) you have actually
done any of these things on the cards using the past ten years; 2) you would do any of these things if it were
important to you; 3) you might do it in a particular situation or 4) you would never do it under any
circumstances.”
- Signing a petition?
- Joining in boycotts?
- Attending lawful demonstrations?
Recoded into 0=have not done anything, 1=have done at least one of the activities.
ESS: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in (country) or help prevent things from going
wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?“
- signed a petition?
- taken part in a lawful demonstration?
- boycotted certain products?
Recoded into 0=have not done anything, 1=have done at least one of the activities.
59 Kohler (2005: 230) refers to Friedrich (1998) who identified four different aspects of individualization: a
broadened action repertoire; a decreasing importance of legitimized rules of behavior; an emergence of new
inequalities; and an increase of the share of people who view themselves as individuals.
138

(2) Conventional Participation
Political Action Study: “How often do you contact public officials or politicians?” and “How often do you
spend time working for a political party or a candidate?” Original answers 1=often, 2=sometimes,
3=seldom, 4=never were recoded (0=have not done; 1=have done) and combined into 0=have not done
anything, 1=have done at least one of these activities.
ESS: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in (country) or help prevent things from going
wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?“
- worked in a political party or action group?
- contacted a politician, government or local government official?
Recoded into 0=have not done anything, 1=have done at least one of these activities.
(3) Voting
Political Action Study: “Did you vote in the last general election?” Recoded into 0=no, 1=yes.
ESS: “Some people don’t vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last national
election?” Recoded into 0=no, 1=yes.
(4) Education
Political Action Study: Compulsory level, middle level, higher level.
ESS: 7-point scale recoded into compulsory level, middle level, higher level.
(5) Income
Political Action Study: Different scales (all: low to high) used in the samples. Britain and Austria: 12-point
scale. Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland: 10-point scale. Finland: 18-point scale. Recoded into 1=low,
2=middle, 3=high.
ESS: 12-point scale from low to high. Recoded into 1=low, 2=middle, 3=high.
(6) Status Inconsistency
Political Action Study and ESS: Pair-wise comparison of recoded education and income scale. No status
inconsistency: low education and low income, middle education and middle income, high education and
high income. Positive status inconsistency: low or middle education and high income, low education and
middle income. Negative status inconsistency: middle or high education and low income, high education
and middle income.
Recoded into -1=positive status inconsistency, 0=no status inconsistency, 1=status inconsistency.
A first thing that becomes obvious is that the explanatory power of socio-economic
factors for all three forms of participation is weaker in 2004 than in 1974. Nagelkerke’s
R 2 was cut in half for conventional participation (from .13 in 1974 to .06 in 2004) and has
dropped by two thirds for voting (from .24 in 1974 to .08 in 2004). This is less true for
elite-challenging activities where the general model fit (Nagelkerke’s R 2 ) has been
continuously low (from .09 in 1974 to .08 in 2004). Over the past three decades, the
overall relevance of socio-economic factors for participation has weakened.
As for the predictive power of the single variables, education has become more important
for elite-challenging activities (not so for conventional participation and voting), whereas
the impact of income has diminished. The latter finding is true for all three modes of
participation. Negative status inconsistency – when income is lower than education
would predict – should have a mobilizing impact on participation in elite-challenging
activities. However, the significant effect that could be observed in 1974 disappeared in
139

2004. A comparison with regression models run without status inconsistency as an
independent variable suggests slightly stronger effects for income, whereas the effects for
education remain largely unaffected or even underestimated. 60
The most important change affects the relationship between gender and participation in
elite-challenging activities. Within a 30-years time, the gender gap that used to
characterize political participation has reversed: Today women rather than men
participate in elite-challenging activities. It should be noted that the dependent variable in
Model 1 contains only one item for political consumerism – boycotting certain products.
A closer inspection of a combined measure for political consumerism (buy-cotting and
boycotting) in the 2004 ESS data reveals that the changing gender relations are even
more pronounced: political consumerism is female (see also Stolle and Hooghe 2005).
But also the gender gap in conventional participation has become smaller, although this
mode of participation is still a domain of men (see Model 2), whereas the results of
Model 3 confirm findings of the participation literature: there is no more a gender gap in
voting.
To summarize the analysis, gender, education and age are the main resources that affect
participation in elite-challenging action. Do the results change when motivation
components are added to the analysis?
Table 8-2 presents the results of a second logistic regression that uses in addition to
socio-economic resources also motivational components to predict participation. From
the broad range of variables presented in the participation literature, the following factors
are included: political interest, political efficacy, life satisfaction, and the respondent’s
position on the left-right scale. Postmaterialism is also known as a main motivation factor
for elite-challenging activities, but the ESS 2004 does unfortunately not include any item
from Inglehart’s postmaterialism scale. An inspection of a Political Action Study model
(1974) that includes postmaterialism as a predictor confirms a positive and significant
relationship (table not shown). The multi-level model based on data from the World
Values Survey data will take this into account and include it as a predictor.
60 The results are robust: Alternative ways of operationalizing status inconsistency yielded similar results:
(a) 5 types of status inconsistency (instead of 3); (b) a dichotomy with 1= positive status inconsistency; (c)
standardized residuals from a regression of education on income, and (d) status inconsistency squared
(based on (c)).
140

Table 8-2:
Binary-Logistic Regressions: Resources, Motivation and Participation
(Political Action Study 1974 and European Social Survey 2004)
Dependent variable:
Elite-Challenging
participation
Political
Action
(1974)
ESS
(2004)
Conventional
Participation
Political
Action
(1974)
ESS
(2004)
Political
Action
(1974)
Voting
Gender .78 ** 1.34 *** .48 *** .83 * 1.26 * 1.20
Age
reference: 65+ years
25 and younger
26 to 35 years
36 to 45 years
46 to 55 years
56 to 65 years
Education
reference: com. level
middle level
higher level
Income
reference: low level
middle level
high level
Status inconsistency
reference: positive inc.
no inconsistency
negative inconsistency
Politically interested
Reference: not at all
not much
somewhat
very
Internal efficacy *
reference: low
middle to low
middle to high
high
Life satisfaction
reference: low
middle
high
Left-right positioning
reference: right
left
1.37 *
1.52 **
1.59 **
1.46 *
1.13
1.42 **
1.34
2.62 *** 1.01
2.17 *** 1.31
1.99 *** 1.54 **
1.76 *** 1.39 *
1.52 **
1.96 *** 1.24
2.88 *** 1.79
1.62 * 0.96 1.05
2.34 ** 1.12 * 1.28
1.29 .87
2.44 ** .87
1.37 * 1.16
1.01
1.00
0.08 ***
1.37 0.60 **
1.82 *** 1.19
2.47 *** 1.17
1.83 *** 1.28
1.21
1.92
0.84
0.78
.81
.73
0.89
2.26
0.75
0.62
0.72
0.55
ESS
(2004)
0.35 ***
0.40 ***
0.58 **
0.79
1.05
1.14
2.79
0.74
0.58
.86
.56
1.54 ** 1.37 2.07 *** 1.34 1.74 *** 2.41 ***
3.49 *** 3.63 *** 7.28 *** 5.20 *** 5.58 ***
2.09 *** 2.54 *** 4.12 *** 2.58 *** 4.15 *** 5.59 ***
1.02 1.10
1.05 1.18
1.43 * 1.13
0.90
1.23
1.08
0.91
0.99
1.24 * 0.91
1.80 *** 0.80
1.98 *** 0.93
1.11
0.94
1.05
0.63
0.81
1.15
1.22
1.08
1.46
1.54
11.76 ***
1.12
1.27
1.76 **
1.49
1.18
1.98 **
center
1.90 ***
1.49 *** 1.89 ***
1.10
1.12
0.97
0.84
0.76 * 0.87
0.72 * 0.87
0.79 *
Constant 0.09 .057 0.24 .15 2.77 0.87
N 5.715 7.126 6.092 7.150 6.062 6.645
Pseudo R sq. .14 .13 .22 .11 .31 .20
Societies included: Great Britain, West Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Finland. Samples
equally weighted n = 1.000.
* Different categories in the ESS data set. Coding of the variables:
141

(1) Political Interest
Political Action Study: “How interested would you say you are in politics – are you very interested,
somewhat interested, not much interested or not at all interested?”
ESS: “How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you very interested, quite interested, hardly
interested, or not at all interested?”
(2) Internal efficacy
Political Action Study: “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me
cannot really understand what is going on.” Agree strongly, agree, disagree, disagree strongly.
ESS: How often does politics seem so complicated that you can’t really understand what’s going on?
Never, seldom, occasionally, regularly, frequently.
(3) Life satisfaction
Political Action Study: “Now, let’s think about your life as a whole. All things considered, how satisfied or
dissatisfied are you with your life these days? Where do you put yourself on the scale?” 0=completely
dissatisfied to 10=completely satisfied.
ESS: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? Please answer
using this card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied.”
Recoded into 1=low (0 to 3), 2=middle (4 to 6), 3=high (7to 10).
(4) Left-Right-Positioning
Political Action Study: “Many people think of political attitudes as being on the “left” or the “right”. This is
a scale stretching from the “left” to the “right”. When you think of your own political attitudes, where
would you put yourself?” 1=left to 10=right. Recoded into 1=left (1 to 3), 2=center (4 to 7), 3=right (8 to
10).
ESS: “In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Using this card, where would you place
yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” 0=left to 10=right. Recoded into
1=left (0 to 3), 2=center (4 to 6), 3=right (7 to 10).
For the coding of all other variables, please see Table 8-1.
The results in Table 8-2 confirm the results of the first regression analysis. Even when
controlling for motivational factors, resources such as age, education and gender still
remain significant determinants of elite-challenging participation. Looking at the impact
of the motivational determinants, interest in politics stands out as the most important
predictors for participation in elite-challenging activities, both in 1974 and 2004. In 2004,
those with high political interest have show a chance to participate in demonstrations,
petitions and boycotts that is 3.6 times higher than those who are not interested in
politics. From the inequality perspective, however, it is interesting to note that the gap
between participants and nonparticipants in terms of political interest is much higher in
the other forms of political participation: conventional participation (odd = 5.2) and
voting (odd = 11.7). Internal efficacy as well as life satisfaction matter modestly only for
voting, whereas it is insignificant for elite-challenging participation. Self-positioning on
the political scale, however, works in the expected direction: being left-oriented doubles
142

the chances to participate in elite-challenging activities, compared to those who position
themselves more to the center and the right.
These results for resources and motivation are not necessarily universal, as Appendix A-1
and A-2 show. The tables list the correlations of the individual characteristics and elitechallenging
action for more than 70 societies from the WVS/EVS 2000-2005. Some
effects hold across almost all societies (e.g., political interest or self expression values),
whereas others show noticeable differences in the strength and the direction of the effects
(e.g., gender or age). Whether there is a systematic pattern in the context variation and
how it can be explained will be tested later on in a multilevel model.
This section has looked at individual-level factors – resources and motivation – to predict
elite-challenging activities. Besides the characteristics of an individual and in order to
account for a complete picture on the question why people participate in these activities,
contextual factors must be taken into account. Contextual factors provide opportunity
structures that determine how successfully – or not – activists can mobilize supporters
into action (Meyer 2004: 126).
8.2 Elite-Challenging Activities and Context Factors
Context matters for participation. The previous chapter addressed the importance of
personal organizational opportunity structure, or, what Roller and Wessels (1996: 2) have
coined the ‘close context’ for participation. This section will now deal with the ‘wider
context’ for political participation, specifically with political and socioeconomic
characteristics of a society, which shape the conditions and opportunities for
participation. A number of different indicators will be considered:
In order for people to effectively participate, the political opportunity structure must be
shaped in such a way that low barriers for participation exist, for example by granting
several freedom rights (Dahl 1975: 125). This form of opportunity structure will be
measured by two indicators: the World Bank’s Voice and Accountability, and Democracy
Stock as suggested by Gerring et al. (2005). In addition to political factors,
143

socioeconomic conditions shape the participation context in a society as well:
Modernization and postindustrialization processes make resources such as education
available to the wider public, and technologically new ways of communicating allow
people to activate these resources and translate them into action. GDP per capita
measures the general affluence of a country, whereas the level of Tertiarization is
operationalized using the employment structure of a society. As an unequal distribution
of resources in a society is likely to create a barrier for people to participate, a third
measure for socioeconomic conditions is introduced: the Gini coefficient assesses how
wealth is distributed among the members of a society. An additional factor to assess the
distribution of resources in a society is the Happiness Level. The happiness level is a
subjective assessment of how widespread feelings of deprivation are among the members
of a society. Finally, two types of institutional set-up are introduced in order to examine
how they shape the political opportunity structure for people to participate outside
institutionalized forms of political engagement: A measure for the type of electoral
system and a measure for the regime type assess how the institutional context affects the
success of mobilization processes.
In a first step, the impact of each single context factor on the societal level of elitechallenging
activities is tested. In a second step, the context factors will enter a multilevel
analysis. The model will examine the impact of context factors and individual-level
determinants on individual participation. To cover the largest possible variety of
societies, the measure of elite-challenging activities does not only include the most recent
wave of the WVS (2005). For societies not included in the fifth wave, data from the
fourth wave (2000) are supplemented (for an overview of the societies and surveys used,
see Appendix A8-1).
Voice and Accountability
Voice and Accountability is one of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
provided by the World Bank. It ranks more than 210 countries along six dimensions of
governance. 61 It measures “perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are
61 The other indicators are: Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness,
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.
144

able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression,
freedom of association, and a free media” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2008: 7).
Sources of the indicator come from various institutions 62 and cover elements that do not
only refer to the electoral process but also to freedom of speech, of association, assembly
and demonstration. Societies scoring high on the Voice and Accountability indicator
should have lower barriers for citizens to participate, thus providing an opportunity
structure that is conducive for people to participate in elite-challenging activities.
Figure 8-1: Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005) and Voice &
Accountability
1.0
0.9
NZ
Elite-challenging activities, in %
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
Braz
Switz
Swe
Aus
Can
Fra
Bel
USA
Nor
GB
Gre
Den
Czech Jap
N-Ire
Slovak Italy Ire
Aut Lux
E-Ger
Ice
Neth
W-Ger Fin
Alba
Isr
Spain
Malt
Mali
Peru Croa S-Kor Slov
Serb
Monte
Tanz
Ind
Lat
Lith
Cyp
Eth
Maced
Uru
Bu-Fa
Tr & To
Ugan
Rus
Mex
Zam Bos Arg
Est Por
Pol
Colom
Mold
Chi
Nig
Mor
Ven
Bul S-Afr
Ukr Indon
Bang
Hun
Guat
Tur
Gha
Tai
Rom
Jord
Malay
Singa
Thai
0.0
-2.00 -1.60 -1.20 -0.80 -0.40 0.00 0.40 0.80 1.20 1.60 2.00
Voice and Accountability
N=78, R = 0.67 *** . Voice and Accountability measured in 2000.
62
For example: Economist Intelligence Unit; Freedom House; World Economic Forum Global
Competitiveness Report; Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators; Gallup World Poll;
Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide; Bertelsmann Transformation Index; Institutional
Profiles Database; Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and Political Terror Scale. See Kaufmann,
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008: 72) for a more detailed description.
145

Figure 8-1 displays the relationship between the governance indicator and a society’s
level of elite-challenging activism. There is a positive link between Voice and
Accountability and the level of elite-challenging activism in a society (r = 0.67 *** ), with
convergence at higher values of the governance indicator. Whereas at lower to medium
levels of a democratic opportunity structure, only a marginal effect with respect to the
spread of political activism can be observed, high scores on Voice and Accountability are
closely associated with high levels of participation in petitions, boycotts and strikes. This
suggests that improvements at lower levels of democratic freedom rights do not
immediately translate into widespread non-institutionalized mass action. Rather, high
levels of elite-challenging participation can be found in societies that provide stable and
conducive conditions to associate, assemble and articulate opinions.
Democracy Stock
For political opportunity structures to become effective it is not only important how much
freedom rights are granted to the citizens today, but also for how long these have been in
place. The longer citizens experience a democratic rule, the more occasions are created
for political participation, and the more time citizens have to experiment with various
forms of participation (Roller and Wessels 1996: 28). “The core insight is that
institutional effects unfold over time, sometimes a great deal of time, and that these
temporal effects are cumulative.” (Gerring et al. 2005: 325). The measure of Democracy
Stock takes this accumulation process of democratic experience into account, as
democracy is considered as a stock – not level – variable (Gerring et al. 2005: 324).
Polity 2 scores are added, beginning in 1900, with a 1 percent depreciation rate per year.
Figure 8-2 shows how Democracy Stock and elite-challenging activities are linked: There
is a positive, almost linear relationship (r = .73 *** ), meaning that societies with a longstanding
‘democratic memory’ tend to have a more active citizenry. The length of
democratic experience is crucial when it comes to creating political opportunity
structures for elite-challenging activities, but there are also clear ‘over-achievers’, most
of them post-communist societies. Their level of elite-challenging action still reflects the
legacy of a citizen-driven transition to democracy, whereas their actual democratic
experience falls short in predicting this form of mass participation.
146

Figure 8-2:
1.0
Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005) and Democracy Stock
0.9
NZ
Elite-challenging activities, in %
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
Swe Switz
Aus
Can
Fra
Bel Nor
USA
GB
Den
Gre
Jap
Czech
Italy
Slovak
Ire N-Ire
Braz
Aut
Lux
Ice
E-Ger
W-Ger Fin Neth
Alba
Spain
Isr
Malt
Croa
Mali
Peru
Lat
Slov
S-Kor
Ind
Lith Monte Tanz
Cyp
Serb
Eth Maced
Uru
Ugan
Rus
Mex Bu-Fa
Tr & To
Bos
Arg Por
Est Zam
Pol
Mold
Chi
Mor
Nig
Colom
Ukr Bul Indon
Ven
S-Afr
Hun
Bang
Guat
Tur
Gha
Tai
Rom
Jord
Singa
Malay
Thai
0.0
-600.00 -400.00 -200.00 0.00 200.00 400.00 600.00
Democracy Stock (1900 - 1995)
N=78, R = 0.73 *** . Democracy Stock is measured between 1900 and 1995.
National Affluence: GDP per capita
Socioeconomic development is at the core of modernization theory, and it should be
positively linked with elite-challenging activities. For one, modernization leads to a
growing number and greater variety of interest groups and other associations, forming
denser networks of activists and supporters. Such associational networks are conducive to
mobilization and, as chapter 6 has shown, positively linked with elite-challenging
activities. Another important factor is that socioeconomic development promotes an
expansion of education (“educational revolution”). Information and knowledge become
available to the wider public, making people more interested and aware about what is
happening in their neighborhoods, cities or countries. At the same time, citizens who
acquire these skills become also more confident about using their resources to articulate
and promote their interests. As a result, the knowledge and information gap between
elites and citizens is slowly closing.
147

Figure 8-3:
1.0
Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005) and National Affluence
0.9
NZ
Elite-challenging activities, in %
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
Mali
Malt
Peru
Ind
Croa
S-Kor
Monte Lat
Tanz
Lith
Serb
Slov
Eth
Maced
Uru
Cyp
Ugan
Mex
Bu-Fa
Tr & To
Rus
Zam Bos Arg Est
Pol Por
Mold
Colom Chi
Nig
Mor Ukr S-Afr
Bul
Indon Ven
Bang
Hun
Guat Tur
Tai
Gha Rom
Jord
Alba
Slovak
Thai
Braz
Malay
Czech
Gre
Isr
N-Ire
Den
Ice
Bel
Italy Jap
Ire
Aut
E-Ger
Fin
W-Ger
Spain
Fra
GB
Swe
Aus
Singa
Can
Neth
Switz
USA
Nor
Lux
0.0
0.00 10000.00 20000.00 30000.00 40000.00 50000.00
GDP per capita, ppp
N=78, R = 0.69 *** . GDP per capita, ppp is measured in the respective survey year (2000 or 2005).
National Affluence is measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita,
adjusted for purchasing power parity. Data were taken for the survey year of each society
(2000 or 2005) and come from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database from the
International Monetary Fund. 63 Figure 8-3 shows the relationship between national
affluence and the level of elite-challenging activities. The overall trend is a positive link,
but we can also see that the relationship is more diffuse at the lower end of economic
development, whereas the trend becomes more linear as we move to higher levels of
GDP. Luxembourg, Taiwan and Singapore are clear low-performers when it comes to
mass participation: Their economic position would predict a much more active citizenry.
63 Website: http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28 .
148

Inequality: Gini coefficient
The inequality measure has a correcting function to the measure of economic
development. GDP per capita can only grasp the overall level of national wealth, but not
whether the resources are in principle available to all members of the society. This issue
addresses the question whether wealth is unequally distributed in the society. Inequality
is measured by the Gini coefficient, taken from the Human Development Report
2007/2008. The time of measurement varies between 1998 and 2003 for the majority of
the countries. 64 The Gini coefficient ranges between 0 (absolute equality) and 100
(absolute inequality).
Figure 8-4:
1.0
Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005) and Inequality in a
Society
0.9
NZ
Elite-challenging activities, in %
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
Swe
Nor
Bel
Fra
GB
Den
Gre
Jap
Czech
It aly
Slovak
Lux
N-Ire
Ire
Ice Aut
E-Ger
Fin
W-Ger
Malt
Alba
Can
Swit z
Aus
Spain
Net h
Isr
USA
Croa
Ind
S-Kor
Mali
Peru
Slov
Tanz
Serb
Lat
Lit h
Uru
Cyp
Mont e Maced
Ugan
Et h
Tr & To
Bu-Fa
Zam
Bos
Est
Mex
Pol Rus
Arg
Por
Mold
Nig
Chi
Ukr
Bul
Mor
Ven
Indon
Hun
Bang
Tur
Tai
Gha
Guat
Rom
Singa
Jord
Malay
Thai
Braz
Colom
S-Af r
0.0
20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00
Inequality: Gini coefficient
N=78, R = -.40 *** . The Gini coefficient is measured in 2000.
64 Missing data have been supplemented by previous HDR reports and the World Income Inequality
Database (V2.0c May 2008) provided by World Institute for Development Economics Research of the
United Nations University (UNU-WIDER): http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/ .
149

Figure 8-4 displays the relationship between inequality in a society and its level of elitechallenging
activism – both are only weakly linked (r = -.40 *** ), its distribution resembles
more an exponential than a linear function. There is a modest trend that more equal
societies are also more active, for example all postindustrial democracies in the upper left
of the figure, but most postcommunist societies with a similar score on the inequality
measure (here: low) show significantly lower levels of elite-challenging participation.
Tertiarization
As a third indicator for socioeconomic opportunity structures, the level of tertiarization is
introduced. The shift of the major workforce from the industrial to the service sector did
not only change the modes of production, but most importantly the communication
structures in a society. Information and knowledge formation have gained tremendous
importance, creating new demands for people at the workplace: “Service and knowledge
workers deal with people and concepts, operating in a world where innovation and the
freedom to exercise individual judgements are essential. Creativity, imagination, and
intellectual independence become central” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 28-29). The
experience of these activities does not leave people’s value orientations unaltered: They
show an increasing emphasis on autonomy, choice, creativity and self-expression, which
should be positively linked with elite-challenging activities.
Tertiarization is measured by subtracting the share of labor force working in industry
from the share of the labor force employed in the service sector of a society. Data come
from the International Labour Organization, more specifically from their Key Indicators
of the Labour Market (KILM, fifth edition, 2007). Most of the data refer to the year
2000. 65 Figure 8-5 shows how tertiarization and mass participation in a society are linked:
there is a positive relationship (r=.54 *** ), but with quite some deviation from the trend.
65 Missing or questionable data have been cross-checked with other data sources and then either replaced by
an alternative year of the ILO measure, or supplemented with data from the CIA Factbook (Nigeria 1999,
India 2003, Mali 2005) or from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE, Bosnia
Herzegovina 2006, Serbia and Montenegro 2000).
150

Figure 8-5:
1.0
Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005) and Tertiarization
0.9
NZ
Elite-challenging activities, in %
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
Swe
Switz Aus
Fra Can
Bel Nor
GB USA
Gre Den
Czech
Italy Jap
Ire
N-Ire
Slovak
Lux
Aut Braz
Ice
E-Ger
W-Ger Fin
Neth
Alba
Spain
Isr
Malt
Mali Ind
Croa
Serb S-Kor
Maced
Eth
Slov Monte Lith
Cyp
Tanz
Lat
Uru
Ugan
Mex
Zam
Bos
Bu-Fa
Por
Rus
Pol Est
Chi
Mold
Nig Mor
Colom
Bul
Ukr
Ven
Indon
S-Afr
Bang
Tai
Hun
Tur
Gha
Guat
Rom
Jord
Malay
Singa
Thai
Peru
Tr & To
Arg
0.0
0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00
Postindustrialization (% employed in service minus % industry sector)
N = 78. R = 0.54 ***
Happiness
The link between happiness and the level of elite-challenging action in a society is not
necessarily straightforward. One the one hand, the level of happiness can be taken as a
proxy for the prevalence (or absence) of relative deprivation in a society. As we know
from happiness research, people’s happiness tends to reflect how they perceive their
position relative to others. In that sense, the societal happiness level can be considered as
a supplement to the inequality measure, for the first represents a subjective assessment,
the latter an objective assessment of how resources are distributed in the society. On the
other hand, levels of happiness are closely linked with trust, tolerance and self expression
values, and with democracy and economic prosperity (Inglehart 1990, 2006). As the
previous analyses have confirmed, these characteristics themselves are conducive for
elite-challenging activities. The measure for the level of happiness in a society comes
151

from the World Values Survey (2000-2005). The x-axis in Figure 8-6 indicates how a
society scores on average on the 10-point scale question of life satisfaction.
Figure 8-6:
1.0
Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005) and the Happiness
Level in a Society
0.9
NZ
Elite-challenging activities, in %
Swe
Aus Switz
Can
Fra Bel
Nor
USA GB
Gre
Jap
Den
N-Ire
Slovak Italy Czech
Lux Ire
Aut
E-Ger Braz
Ice
Fin
W-Ger Neth
Isr
Alba
Spain
Malt
Ind Mali Croa
Lat
Peru
Lith
Tanz
Monte S-Kor
Slov
Serb
Cyp
Maced Ugan
Uru
Eth
Bos
Tr & To Mex
Bu-Fa Zam
Por
Rus
Mold Est
Pol Arg
Nig Chi
Colom
Mor
Ukr
S-Afr Ven
Bul
Bang
Indon
Hun
Tur
Guat
Gha
Tai
Rom
Singa
Jord
Malay
Thai
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00
Happiness level, country mean, scale 1 to 10
N=78, R = 0.43 *** .
The results in Figure 8-6 modestly support the latter assumption: higher levels of
happiness reflect the prevalence of societal resources that enable people to participate in
elite-challenging activities (r=.43 *** ). The positive link, however, is mainly attributed to
societies with a higher happiness level, as the link breaks down among the less happy
societies.
Electoral System and Political System
The way how authorities are selected and political power is exercised are the two main
functions of liberal democracies (Sartori 1994). Fuchs (2000) has therefore suggested to
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assess the formal structure of a democratic regime by looking at a country’s electoral
system and the system of governance. As the main typologies within these structures,
electoral systems are characterized by proportional vs. majoritarian modes of translating
electoral votes into parliament seats. The system of governance is most often identified
by the interplay between the main democratic institutions: parliament and government,
leading to a typology of systems that is often transferred into a dichotomy of presidential
vs. parliamentary democracies. Data for the electoral system and system of governance
come from the Database of Political Institutions provided by the World Bank (2000-
2005). 66 The measure for proportional representation was already coded as a dichotomous
variable. The measure for system of governance has been recoded into a dichotomy as
well, so that now proportional representation and parliamentary system have a value of 1,
whereas other system indicators have been coded 0. 67
The choice of electoral system and system of governance should have an impact on the
opportunity structure for mass action in a society, as both shape the number and character
of relevant political actors and determine the chances for citizen action groups to gain
political influence. To address the question whether a proportional electoral system or a
parliamentary democracy provides a particular opportunity structure that is conducive for
the mobilization of people into collective action, Table 8-3 shows the result of a T-Test.
The tables show, first of all, the mean score of elite-challenging activities per group
(majoritarian vs. proportional system; presidential vs. parliamentary system) and, second,
whether the mean difference found between the two groups is actually significant.
66 The two indicators are taken from Jan Teorell, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothenstein (2008): The Quality
of Government Dataset, version 15 May/08, University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government
Institute. http://www.qog.pol.gu.se .
67 Regime type was originally coded: 0 = direct presidential, 1 = strong president elected by assembly, 2 =
parliamentary. The first two categories have been coded as presidential system. The original coding of
electoral system was already dichotomous, based on the question whether proportional representation was
used as an electoral rule to select any candidate in any house (see the Codebook of the Quality of
Government Dataset, p. 73).
153

Table 8-3a-b: T-Test for System Indicators
Table 8-3a: T-Test for Electoral System and Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS
2000-2005):
N
Mean
(Standard deviation)
Majoritarian or mixed 21 0.34 (0.236)
system
Proportional system 57 0.43 (0.204)
T (df)
P
(two-tailed)
-1.653 (76) .102
Levene test for homogeneity of variance was insignificant: F=.127, p=.723, so equal variances are assumed.
Table 8-3b:
T-Test for System of Governance and Elite-Challenging Activities
(WVS 2000-2005):
N
Mean
(Standard deviation)
Presidential system 37 0.31 (0.127)
Parliamentary system 41 0.51 (0.237)
T (df)
P
(two-tailed)
-4.591 (62.5) .000
Levene test for homogeneity of variance was significant: F=22.601, p=.000, so equal variances are not
assumed.
The results in Table 8-3a-b are straightforward: The level of elite-challenging activities is
slightly higher in proportional (43% on average) than in majority or mixed electoral
systems (34%), but the difference is not significant (p=.102). There is, however, a
significant effect of the regime type: In parliamentary systems we find more active
publics (51% participate on average), whereas in presidential systems people participate
less (31%; significance level p=.000).
To summarize: Higher levels of economic development (GDP per capita, tertiarization),
pronounced democratic structures and experiences as well as rising happiness levels
provide societal resources and create opportunity structures that are conducive for mass
participation. An unequal distribution of resources in a society works against it, as it
raises the entry barrier for participation and therefore tends to exclude large parts of a
society. Living in a parliamentary system is favorable for elite-challenging activities,
whereas the choice of the electoral system has no effect for the societies under
consideration. In a next step the significant level-2 factors will enter a multi-level model
analysis to investigate whether the effects still hold when we control for individual-level
characteristics.
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8.3 The Multilevel Model: What Determines Elite-Challenging Activities?
As stated in the previous chapter, a multilevel analysis allows to examine independent
effects of individual- und societal-level predictors on a dependent variable (measured on
the lowest possible level), and at the same time modeling interaction effects between
level-1 (individual level) and level-2 (societal level) factors to explain why people
participate in elite-challenging activities. Again, due to the dichotomous character of the
dependent variable, a hierarchical nonlinear regression model is used. 68
As a first step, a baseline model is calculated, taking into account only the individuallevel
variables (Model 1). There are two types of predictors. For one, motivation is
operationalized with (1) life satisfaction, (2) left-right self positioning (inversely
measured), (3) political interest, and (4) self expression values. Postmaterialism is part of
the self expression measure and not considered separately: As the correlations in
Appendix A8-2 showed, self expression values are the stronger predictor for participation
in elite-challenging activities. Resources are measured by (5) gender, (6) age, (7)
education and (8) income. Status inconsistency is not considered here, as it did not show
any significant effect in the resource model.
It is assumed that group differences can be observed (see Appendix A8-1 and A8-2),
meaning that the individual-level variables have different effects across societies. The
first model looks like this:
Model 1:
Prob (Yij) = (1/ β j ) = P
η ij = log [P/(1-P)] = β 0j + β 1j (life satisfaction) ij + β 2j (left-right self positioning) ij +
β 3j (political interest) ij + β 4j (self expression values) ij + β 5j (gender) ij + β 6j (age) ij +
β 7j (education) ij + β 8j (income) ij + r ij.
η ij is the dependent variable (participation in elite-challenging activities) for a level-1 unit
(individual i), nested in a level-2 unit (society j), or more precisely: the logit of the odds
68 For a more detailed outline of the model assumptions, please see chapter 6.
155

that someone will participate in elite-challenging activities. These odds (or chances) are
defined as P/(1-P), i.e. the probability (that someone participates, so ‘an event will
occur’) divided by one minus the probability (that someone does not participate, so ‘an
event will not occur’). The β 0i coefficient is the individual-level intercept, the other beta
coefficients in the model are the individual-level effects (slopes). Finally, r ij represents
the error term in this model.
The main goal of a multilevel analysis is “to account for variance in a dependent variable
that is measured at the lowest level of analysis by considering information from all levels
of analysis” (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219). The information from the subordinate
level, the societal level, is taken into account in the next two steps. Here, it is assumed
that level-2 variables can have direct effects (Model 2) but may also mediate the effects
of level-1 predictors (Model 3).
In the second step of analyzing multilevel data, level-2 variables are introduced to
estimate their independent effects on the individual-level intercept β 0j . In Model 2, the
level-2 variables are (1) Voice and Accountability, (2) Democracy Stock, (3) GDP per
capita, (4) Tertiarization, (5) Inequality, (6) Happiness level, and (7) Parliamentary
system. The variable Electoral system (Proportional system) was excluded from analysis,
as the predictor did not have a significant effect on the level of elite-challenging
participation (see T-test in Table 8-3a) and was insignificant even when introduced as the
only predictor for individual-level participation in the multilevel model. The model for
the context factors looks as follows:
Model 2:
β 0j = γ 00 + γ 01 (Voice and Accountability j ) + γ 02 (Democracy Stock j ) +
γ 03 (GDP per capita j ) + γ 04 (Tertiarization j ) + γ 05 (Inequality j ) + γ 06 (Happiness level j) +
γ 07 (Parliamentary system j ) + u ij .
In the equation, γ 00 is the societal level intercept, the other γ coefficients are level-2
effects on the level-1 intercept β 0j . The level-2 error term is summarized in u ij .
With eight individual-level and seven context factors, the problem of multicollinearity
must be addressed before we begin with the statistical analysis. Multicollinearity is a
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well-known phenomenon in regression analysis, and it also poses a serious challenge
when applying multi-level models. In short, it refers to a considerable correlation among
the independent variables, which leads most likely to an unreliable estimation of effects.
In a multilevel analysis, multicollinearity can occur among predictors of the same level,
or between an interaction effect and a level-1 and/or level-2 predictor. Looking at the
variables in the Models 1 and 2, collinearity among variables seems to be unavoidable: a
central finding in participation research, for example, is the correlation between
education and political interest. At the aggregate level, Seymour Martin Lipset’s central
claim of modernization theory – “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances
that it will sustain democracy.” (Lipset 1959: 75) – suggests a strong correlation between
the World Bank’s governance indicators and a country’s economic development. Table 8-
4 documents the correlation coefficients among the level-2 predictors, suggesting a
multicollinearity problem also at the aggregate level. Correlations are most pronounced
between the level-2 variables and economic development (GDP per capita) as well as the
democracy measures:
Table 8-4:
Correlation Effects Among Level-2 Variables
V & A
Dem.
Stock
GDP per
capita
Happiness
Parliamenta.
Proportional
Inequality
Tertiarization
Voice and
Accountability -- .71 *** .59 *** .55 *** .27 * .81 *** -.41 *** .56 ***
Democracy
Stock .71 *** -- .72 *** .52 *** .01 .78 *** -.12 .69 ***
Happiness Level .59 *** .72 *** -- .31 ** .17 .63 *** .10 .61 ***
Regime Type:
Parliamentarism .55 *** .52 *** .31 ** -- .00 .55 *** -.46 *** .11
Proportional
System .27 * .01 .17 .00 -- .17 .26 * .09
GDP per capita .81 *** .78 *** .63 *** .55 *** .17 -- -.39 *** .61 ***
Inequality
(Gini coefficient) -.41 *** -.12 *** .10 -.46 *** -.26 * -.39 *** -- .07
Tertiarization .56 *** .69 *** .61 *** .14 .09 .61 *** .07 --
N=78. Data entries are Pearson’s r.
The problem of multicollinearity in the multilevel model becomes evident when
introducing the level-2 predictors to the multilevel model: When each factor is entered
157

separately and without controlling for any other level-2 factor, each predictor has a
significant and positive impact (exception: the impact of inequality is negative, but also
significant). When entering all level-2 factors simultaneously (mutually controlling for
each other), all factors – with the exception of tertiarization and Democracy stock –
become insignificant, hence pointing to a multicollinearity problem.
But how to deal with that problem? To be sure, deleting one of the highly correlated
variables is often suggested, but the level-2 factors are theoretically distinct and represent
different notions of societal opportunity structures, so that this statistics-driven approach
is not very satisfying. Another option is to reduce the number of correlated level-2 factors
in the model by entering only two factors simultaneously to the model. As Table 8-4
suggested, GDP per capita is the strongest correlative of all level-2 predictors, so all other
level-2 factors could enter the analysis under the control of a nation’s economic
development. The step-wise modified Model 2a could look as follows:
Modified Model 2a (separate models):
β 0j = γ 00 + γ 01 (Democracy Stock j ) + γ 02 (GDP per capita j) + u ij .
β 0j = γ 00 + γ 01 (Voice and Accountability j ) + γ 02 (GDP per capita j) + u ij .
β 0j = γ 00 + γ 01 (Tertiarization j ) + γ 02 (GDP per capita j) + u ij .
β 0j = γ 00 + γ 01 (Inequality j ) + γ 02 (GDP per capita j) + u ij .
β 0j = γ 00 + γ 01 (Happiness level j) + γ 02 (GDP per capita j) + u ij .
β 0j = γ 00 + γ 01 (Parliamentary system j ) + γ 02 (GDP per capita j) + u ij .
It could be argued, however, that examining the single explanatory power of strongly
correlated phenomena in a statistical model is not only a pointless endeavor, but also
doesn’t make much sense from a more conceptual point of view. Some of the level-2
factors seem rather to represent a common syndrome than separate effects: GDP per
capita, Tertiarization, Voice and Accountability, Democracy Stock, and the Level of
Happiness represent the political, social and economic changes associated with processes
of modernization. As a consequence, the highly correlated variables can be summarized
in one factor, which could also solve the multicollinearity problem. A factor analysis with
the five most strongly correlated level-2 factors supports this argument, so it is possible
158

to replace the five single predictors by a common factor (see Appendix A8-3 for the
result of the factor analysis). In addition, the variable “Parliamentarism” was eliminated.
The system of government is highly correlated with the variables composing the factor
score, but not conceptually related to the modernization syndrome, so that adding it to the
analysis does not have any additional value. This leads to a modified Model 2b:
Modified Model 2b:
β 0j = γ 00 + γ 01 (Modernization j ) + γ 02 (Inequality j ) + u ij .
The downside, however, of introducing a syndrome as a main predictor is that it does not
allow us anymore to attribute the effects to a single factor, or to determine the relative
strength of a single factor in predicting elite-challenging activities on the individual level.
Besides deletion or recoding of variables, HLM offers additional ways to tackle the
problem of multicollinearity. A first solution is centering, in particular of the level-1
variables. For the subsequent analysis, the level-1 variables were centered around their
group mean (except for gender which was not centered because it is a dichotomous
variable): “When group mean centering is used, the correlation between second-level
variables and both first-level variables and cross-level interactions are equal to zero, so
that only the correlations between cross-level interactions and level-1 variables remain as
a potential source of estimation problems” (SSI 2008: 84). 69 The level-2 predictors were
centered around their grand mean (exception: regime type as a dichotomous variable).
The main idea of centering is to assign a meaningful zero point to each variable
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 32). 70
A second solution to detect and eliminate multicollinearity, if HLM posts a warning
message about multicollinearity, is to inspect the Tau Matrix in the output, as correlations
close to 1 or -1 (excluding the diagonal, of course) can be an indication of
69 Please see the website of Scientific Software International, Inc., the provider of the HLM software:
http://www.ssicentral.com/hlm/help6/faq/Multicollinearity.pdf .
70 Centering is central to the interpretation of any intercept β 0j, as it is the expected outcome for a person
who scores 0 in all other variables. Therefore, it is crucial that any predictor variable has a meaningful zero
point: Centering assigns the zero point to the group (or grand) mean score.
159

multicollinearity. In none of the models, however, a multicollinearity warning occurred,
and the Tau correlations were in no case close to perfect.
The four-fold strategy of (1) summarizing highly correlated level-2 predictors in one
factor, (2) entering the level-2 predictors pair-wise to the model, (3) centering the level-1
and level-2 variables, and (4) a close inspection of the output file with regard to
multicollinearity indications should alleviate the effects of multicollinearity.
In a last step, level-2 variables should be considered in their interaction effects with level-
1 variables on the dependent variable. Again, with so many variables and interaction
effects possible, instability of the model might evolve. As there is no clear assumption
from the participation literature which societal characteristics should have an effect on
which individual-level predictors for elite-challenging action – and which should not – a
more inductive procedure is applied (see also Weldon 2006: 341). In order not to exclude
any potential cross-level effect, a full model was calculated and then a method of
backwards elimination of effects applied, based on a significance level of p ≤ 0.05 and a
contribution to explained variance (as also suggested in Duncan et al. 2003: 249). Model
3 summarizes only those level-2 interaction effects on level-1 regression parameters that
turned out to be significant:
Model 3:
β 2j = γ 20 + γ 21 (Modernization) + u 2j
β 5j = γ 50 + γ 51 (Modernization) + γ 52 (Inequality) + u 5j
β 6j = γ 60 + γ 61 (Inequality) + u 6j
β kj = γ k .
γ 20 , γ 50 and γ 60 are the intercepts for the respective life satisfaction, gender and age slopes,
γ 21 , γ 51 , γ 52 , and γ 61 are the effects of the context factors on the level-1 slopes. The term
β kj =γ k captures all other level-1 predictors that did not vary across contexts.
Before introducing the results, we should first have a look how the variance is
distributed: Does elite-challenging participation vary more within or between societies?
160

The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) usually suggest whether it is worthwhile
doing a multilevel analysis, as it informs how much of the overall variance can be
attributed to group-specific differences. The ICC is calculated as p = T 00 / (T 00 + σ 2 ), with
T 00 as the level-2 variance and σ 2 as the level-1 variance. In cases where the level-1
equation is a logit link (because of the nonlinear dependent variable), no level-1 variance
is given (see the equation of Model 1: there is no error term for the logit link function).
Snijders and Bosker (1999) have suggested an alternative way of calculating the ICC for
binomial models, treating the dependent variable as a latent continuous variable. In the
logistic regression models, the error variance for the level-1 random effects is fixed to σ 2
= Π 2 / 3. Thus, the ICC for logistic regression models is calculated as p = T 00 / (T 00 + Π 2
/ 3) .
In our model, the ICC represents the proportion of variance in elite-challenging
participation between societies. Substituting the variance components for their respective
parameters (T 00 = 0.72507 in the empty model, p = .000) results in an ICC of 0.18:
p = T 00 / (T 00 + Π 2 / 3) = 0.72507/ (0.72507 + 3.28987) = 0.18059.
In total, 18 percent of the variance in participation in elite-challenging activities is
between societies. 82 percent lies within the level-2 units:
Level-1 variance = (Π 2 /3) / (T 00 + (Π 2 / 3)) = 3.28987 / (0.72507 + 3.28987) = 0.81941.
The distribution of variance already suggests that variation in elite-challenging activities
is mainly determined by differences between individuals within a society, rather than by
differences between societies. With a multilevel model we can now test how much of the
variance within and between societies can be explained by introducing individual-level
characteristics and context factors. Table 8-5 presents the results of the multi-level model.
As in the previous chapter, odds ratios (instead of log odds coefficients) are documented,
as they are easier to interpret. 71 The data entries show how the odds ratios are changing
71 Odds are calculated from log odds as exp(x), the inverse function of the natural logarithm:
161

when a one-unit increase in the independent variable occurs (odds with increase
compared to odds without an increase in the predictor).
The results in Table 8-5 show that all resource and motivation predictors in Model 1 have
a significant effect on participation in elite-challenging activities. Across all 70 societies,
people who are rather left-oriented, slightly dissatisfied, more interested in politics and
who score higher on self expression values are more likely to join demonstrations,
petitions, and boycotts than others. In addition, participants can more likely be found
among male and higher educated persons. Age and income have a modest but still
significantly positive effect.
odds
⎛
=
⎜
⎝ 1 −
p
p
⎞
⎟ = e
⎠
⎛ p
ln
⎜
⎝ 1−
p
⎞
⎟
⎠
162

Table 8-5:
Multi-Level Model (HGLM): Individual-Level and Contextual
Determinants of Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005)
Model 1:
Individual-level only
(random intercept,
random slope)
Individual- and societal-level predictors
Model 2:
Societal-level effects
on intercept
Alternative Model 3:
Full model with
significant interaction
effects
Intercept 0.919 (-0.780) 0.912 (-1.017) 0.919 (-1.004)
Individual-level effects (slopes):
Life Satisfaction
0.973*** (-3.882) 0.975*** (-5.063) 0.975*** (-5.024)
Left-Right Positioning (reversed) 1.045*** (4.215) 1.043*** (9.469) 1.012 (0.938)
Interest in Politics
1.544*** (22.127) 1.530*** (37.100) 1.532*** (36.628)
Self Expression Values
3.441*** (13.312) 3.812*** (21.189) 3.430*** (19.161)
Control Factors:
Gender
0.858** (-3.758) 0.869*** (-6.980) 0.859*** (-4.701)
Age
1.004* (2.415) 1.003*** (4.925) 1.003* (2.141)
Education
1.154*** (14.658) 1.157*** (27.428) 1.158*** (27.098)
Income
1.030** (2.937) 1.027*** (5.494) 1.027*** (5.408)
Societal-level effects (intercepts):
Modernization (factor score)
Inequality: Gini coefficient
Cross-level interaction effects
(slopes):
Left-Right Positioning (reversed)
* Postmodernization
Gender
* Inequality
* Postmodernization
Age
* Inequality
Remaining between-society
variance:
Intercept
(Contribution to variance)
Left-Right Positioning (reversed)
Gender
Age
0.7439***
0.0060***
0.0834***
0.0002***
2.112*** (8.806)
0.973*** (-2.714)
0.5076***
(31,8%)
1.677*** (6.175)
0.986 (-1.449)
1.052*** (6.295)
0.991* (-2.474)
1.181*** (5.233)
1.001** (3.993)
0.4239***
(43,0%)
0.0033*** (45,0%)
0.0405*** (51,4%)
0.0001*** (50.0%)
Source: World Values Survey 2000-2005. N (individual level) = 56.284. N (societal level) = 70.
Significance level: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p = .00. Data entries are odds ratios with T-values in
parentheses. Hierarchical generalized linear model calculated with HLM 6.06.
Individual-level variables: WVS 2000-2005. Gender (1=male, 2=female), Age (low to high), Education (8-
point scale), Income (10-point scale).
Societal-level variables:
Modernization is measured as the factor score (factor analysis with GDP per capita, tertiarization, Voice
and Accountability, Democracy stock, and happiness level). For the coding of the variables, please see
Appendix A8-4.
Inequality: Gini coefficient: Data taken from the Human Development Report (HDR) 2007/08. Note that
the survey years vary. Missing data have been supplemented by previous HDR reports and the World
Income Inequality Database (V2.0c May 2008) provided by World Institute for Development Economics
Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER): http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database
/en_GB/wiid/ .
163

Model 2 enters the societal-level variables to the analysis. To account for the
mulicollinearity problem, five of the seven level-2 predictors are summarized in a factor
score. The alternative model (Modified Model 2a), entering the predictors separately
while using GDP per capita as the reference predictor, is documented in Appendix A8-4.
Modernization (factor score) increases participation in elite-challenging activities
significantly: Holding other predictors constant, an increase in one standard deviation in
the independent variables increases the odds ratio by 2.11, meaning that the chances for
participation in elite-challenging activities are more than doubled. Inequality, by contrast,
decreases the chances for participation. An unequal distribution of resources in a society,
measured by the Gini coefficient on a scale between 0 and 100, lowers the odds ratio for
participation to 0.97, when the independent variables is increased by one unit.
Respectively, two otherwise similar societies that differ on the inequality scale by 10
points show a difference in the odds of elite-challenging activities of 1 to 0.74.
The alternative multilevel model based on a pair-wise comparison of level-2 effects (see
Appendix A8-4) supports the result that modernization matters as a context factor: GDP
per capita has a significant effect on elite-challenging activities 72 , the same is true for the
variable Democracy Stock. The level of tertiarization is the only other, however weakly,
significant level-2 effect on the intercept (odds ratio = 1.02), suggesting that a change of
the composition of the workforce in favor of the service sector by 30 percent leads to an
increase in the odds ratio to 1.81. All other level-2 predictors are insignificant.
Model 3 adds the significant cross-level interaction effects to the model. The most
important result can be found with respect to the gender gap in participation: Whereas
elite-challenging activities across all societies under consideration are mainly exercised
by men (Model 1: 0.86), women do not only close the gap but take the lead in these forms
of political participation when modernization comes in (Model 3: 1.18). These results
support the earlier findings in the chapter that were based on a selected number of
72 The odds ratio of 1.00 seems to suggest that there is no substantial contribution of the predictor.
However, that would mean jumping to conclusions: The rounding of the reported odds ratio conceals the
real effect (=1.000032). As GDP per capita is measured in US-Dollars, the odds ration for participation
increases to within a 1.000 US-Dollars difference in GDP to 1.03, within a difference of 10.000 US-Dollars
to 1.38, and within 30.000 to 2.61. Remember that the interpretation of odds ratios for a continuous
variable differs: If a change of two or more units in the independent variable occurs, the odds ratios are
multiplied (not added!).
164

European societies only. The effect of being left on elite-challenging participation is
mediated by modernization, too. A left-wing political orientation matters more in
economically developed and democratic societies (Table 8-2 suggests that this hasn’t
changed much over the past three decades). The overall effect of modernization remains
significant but becomes smaller (Model 2: 2.11, Model 3: 1.68), as some of its
explanatory power is taken up by the mediating effects via individual-level predictors
(gender and left-right positioning).
The alternative model (see Appendix A8-4) based on a pair-wise comparison largely
confirms the findings: As a general opportunity structure, the cumulative democratic
experience of enjoying participation rights and occasions is the most important context
factor. For the participation of women, however, the re-distribution and increasing
availability of economic resources is most crucial: Rising GDP per capita closes the
gender gap in elite-challenging participation.
The information at the bottom of Table 8-5 indicates in how far the introduction of level-
2 factors has improved the fit of the model intercept (32 percent when Modernization and
Inequality are introduced). The variance components documented here show how much
of the variation between societies (level-2 variance) can be explained by including level-2
variables into the model. In fact, the coefficients display how much of the variance
remains still unexplained. From these components, the reduction in error variance can be
calculated (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998: 118). 73 Comparing the Models 2 and 3, including
cross-level interaction effects improved the model as well: the overall unexplained
variance in Model 3 could be reduced by including the interaction effects (the variance
components show an additional reduction from 32 to 43 percent compared to Model 1
73 As there is no ‘true’ R 2 in HLM, there are a number of suggestions on how to calculate the explained
variance in a multilevel model. In one way or another, all of them refer to a comparison of the error terms
in an unrestricted and a restricted model. Kreft and de Leeuw (1998) suggest for the between society
)
variance: 2
u
0
− u1
R between
= , with u0 being the error term in the “random intercept, random slope” model
u
0
(unrestricted model), and u 1 being the error term in the “full model with interaction effects” (restricted
model). The variance of the new model is subtracted from the variance of the restricted model: “The
difference is compared to the original variance (the null model variance) as a proportion reduction in that
variance” (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998: 188). As the authors point out, this simple approach has its drawbacks
(as other approaches have as well): Negative results might occur when the variance of the unrestricted
model is larger than the variance of the restricted model (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998: 118).
165

and 2). The reduction of unexplained variance, however, is more modest compared to the
introduction of level-2 factors.
To summarize the results: Participation in elite-challenging activities is mainly driven by
individual-level resources (mainly gender, education and income) and motivation
(foremost political interest and self expression values). At the aggregate level, processes
of modernization change the political, economic and social conditions, creating an
opportunity structure that is conducive for elite-challenging participation. In particular,
development yields a redistribution and accessibility of resources that enables women to
become politically engaged.
166

9. Elite-Challenging Activities and Democracy
The spread of elite-challenging activities over the past decades has added a new facet to
the debate about the link between participation and democracy. In particular in the 1970s,
student protests have been regarded as a threat to the democratic order and stability, as
these citizens increasingly questioned authority and demanded, among others, an
expansion of participation rights (Huntington 2000). Croizier, Huntington and Watanuki
(1975) claimed in their “crisis of democracy” study that democracies are in danger of
being overloaded by these rising public demands (see Chapter 2.5), posing a threat to
governability. More recently, Putnam’s work on declining social capital has shown that
people tend to abstain from traditional organizations and engage in individualized
activities instead, claiming that this development has severe negative consequences for
communities and democracies at large, as the social basis of communities is eroding
(Putnam 1995, 2000, 2002). But is there empirical evidence that the spread of elitechallenging
activities poses a threat to democracies?
This chapter distinguishes between two levels of effects: In the interpretation of Croizier
et al. high levels of mass participation outside institutionalized channels should have a
paralyzing impact on the democratic process. This affects the aggregate level of
democratic governance. A second interpretation of the participation-democracy link takes
a more indirect perspective: Individual participation in elite-challenging activities might
be driven by non-democratic orientations (or more moderately, attitudes that are not
conducive to democracy). Given that mass attitudes matter for the design and efficacy of
political institutions, individual participation that is motivated by de-stabilizing attitudes
can pose a problem for democratic governance. This scenario relates to the individual
level. Let’s first have a look at the aggregate level.
9.1 The Societal Level: Elite-Challenging Activities and Democracy
Does participation in elite-challenging activities really jeopardize democracy? The main
idea of the authors of the “Crisis of Democracy” study was not only that demands
167

ought forward by the masses are usually in danger of following populistic tendencies.
More important for the question of governability is that high levels of elite-challenging
participation in a society tend to pressure elites, in particular political ones, and that his
pressure creates constraints for autonomous decision-making among these elites. By
contrast, adherents of a more emancipative approach would argue that it is exactly that
kind of mass pressure that keeps elites responsive and accountable, making the
democratic process more effective (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel, Inglehart and
Deutsch 2005; Dalton 2008). To test these two assumptions empirically, data on
democratic quality and elite-challenging activities are needed. The measure for
participation in elite-challenging activities comes from the WVS/EVS 1999-2001 and
precedes the democracy measures. To assess the quality of democracy a number of
indicators is available in the social science literature. None of these is encompassing.
Each measurement has its strengths and drawbacks, as the single measurements focus on
different aspects of democracy. The following analyses use data from the Polity I-IV
project, Freedom House, Transparency International and the World Bank. Average scores
of several years are used to account for short-term fluctuation. 74
9.1.1 Measures of Democracy
The Polity Scale (Jaggers and Gurr)
The Polity Scale presented by the Polity project is a combined measure, consisting of the
Democracy and Autocracy Scales. The scales reflect the institutional component of
democracy, thereby measuring constitutional democracy (Jaggers & Gurr 1995). The data
set derived from the Polity (I-IV) project comprises historical data reaching back until
1800. 75
The authors consider three major dimensions to be inevitable for institutionalized
democracy: a) competitiveness of political participation; b) openness of executive
recruitment; and c) constraints on the chief executive. From these dimensions, indicators
74 It should be noted that non-democracies were excluded from analysis from the very beginning (see case
selection in Chapter 4), based on their Freedom House ratings in the year before, during or after the survey
was conducted. This way a bias in the selection of countries occurs, but non-democracies are still in the
sample, for example Belarus (survey data taken from 1996).
168

for both scales are derived. According to these indicators, each country is assessed on an
11-point scale, ranging from 0 to 10. For the Democracy Scale, 0 is indicating the
absence of democratic elements, whereas 10 means the full presence of institutionalized
democracy (the Autocracy Scale is composed respectively). The Polity Scale is calculated
by subtracting the Autocracy Scale from the Democracy Scale. The Polity data have been
criticized for their focus on the purely formal institutionalization of democracy and,
respectively, their neglect of democracy in actual practice.
Figure 9-1:
Elite-Challenging Activities and Institutional Democracy
(POLITY I-IV, 2001-2004)
Lux, Ice, Jap, Aut, NIre, Ire, Ita, Czech,
Swi, EGer, Neth, Den, Gre, Bel
POLITY Scale 2001-2004
10
8
6
4
2
0
Hun
Lith
Spa Uru
Slove
W Ger
Port
Malt Isr Fin
Tai
Pol Chil
Bul
India
Peru
S Afr
Rom
Lat
Mold
Slovak
Phil Mex Arg
Mace
Dom
S Kor Braz
Tur Col Alb Croa
Indo
Rus
Serb
Bang
Ven
Est
Ukr
Geor
Arm
Nig
Tan
Can
Fran
Aus
GB
Swe
N Zea
USA
-2
Jord
-4
Uga
-6
-8
Pak
Mor
Aze
Bela
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Elite-challenging activities, in %
POLITY SCALE: Source: Polity (I-IV) Project. Mean score on Polity Scale 2001-2004. Polity Scale (-10 to +10):
Democracy Scale (0 to 10) minus Autocracy Scale (0 to 10). R=0.48 *** .
Elite-challenging activities: measured as percentage of respondents per sample who report to “Have done” any of the
following activities: signed a petition, joined in boycotts, attended lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, or
occupying buildings or factories. Data taken from WVS/EVS 1999-2001 (wave IV), except for Armenia (1997), Australia
75 Information about the Polity I-IV projects and the respective data sets can be found on the following
website: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/. Registration and acquisition of the data sets are also
possible from this website.
169

(1995), Azerbaijan (1997), Belarus (1996), Brazil (1997), Dominican Republic (1996) and Georgia (1996), New Zealand
(1998), Norway (1996), Pakistan (1997), South Korea (1996) and Switzerland (1996).
Figure 9-1 displays the relationship between a society’s level of participation in elite
challenging activities, measured around 2000, and the degree of institutional democracy,
measured as the average Polity score 2001 to 2004. 76 The link between the two is modest
(r = .48 *** ) but positive, disconfirming the claim that elite-challenging activities
undermine democracy.
Except for six cases (Belarus, Azerbaidjan, Pakistan, Morocco, Uganda and Jordan) all
countries under consideration have a positive Polity score, indicating that democratic
rather than authoritarian constitutional elements dominate the political system. In fact, the
majority of countries scores between 8 and 10 on the Polity scale (10 being the
maximum), and the weak relationship between the participation level in a society and the
country’s institutional arrangement reflects the fact that the given country sample shows
little variation in the formal institutionalization of democracy.
Freedom House scores
A more encompassing measure of democracy comes from the Freedom House
Organization. By its own account, Freedom House does not assess quality of democracy
but ordinary people’s freedoms in terms of political rights and civil liberties (Gastil 1991;
Karatnycky 1999). However, these two scales cover central elements of any conception
of liberal democracy, including freedom of religions, movement and speech, or rights to
vote, run for office and sue officials (Lauth 2003: 4). Moreover, the scales are designed to
evaluate not only constitutional requirements but also how these given rights and rules
work in reality on a day-to-day basis (Schmidt 2000: 409; Karatnycky 2003: 102).
The yearly “Freedom in the World” report has two components, political rights and civil
liberties. The report presents two scales to assess each country’s degree of freedom, each
scale ranging between 1 (=highest level of freedom) and 7 (=lowest level of freedom).
The scores are based on expert surveys. Political rights are assessed by evaluating the
electoral process (free and fair elections), presence or absence of political pluralism and
participation opportunities, functioning of government and protection of minority rights
76 2004 is the most recent year available.
170

in a country. Civil liberties are rated by evaluating freedom of expression and belief, the
right to form an association and organization, compliance with the rule of law as well as
the guarantee of personal autonomy and individual rights (for a detailed overview see
also Chapter 4).
Figure 9-2:
Elite-Challenging Activities and Democracy: Freedom House
(2000-2006)
Freedom House 2000-2006 (in per cent)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Port
Slove
Uru W Ger
LuxIce
Aut
IreE GerSwi
Neth
FranCan
Aus N Zea
Spa Malt
N Ire
Ita
USA
Swe
Hun
Chil
Den
Pol
Slovak
Bel GB
Est
Fin
Lat
Czech
Tai
Lith
Bul
S Afr S Kor
Jap
Gre
Isr
Dom
Mex
Croa
Rom
Arg India
Braz
Peru Serb
Phil
Alb
Indo
Mace
Tur
Ukr
Mold
Col Geor
Tan
Bang Ven Bosn
Nig
Arm
Jord Mor
Uga
Rus
Pak
Aze
20
Bela
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Elite-challenging activities, in %
Freedom House: Source: “Freedom in the World” Report. The scales for Political Rights (1 to 7) and Civil Liberties (1 to 7)
were transformed, so that higher scores indicate more freedom, and added. Mean Score 2000-2006, in per cent of the
highest possible score. R=0.62 *** .
Elite-challenging activities: measured as percentage of respondents per sample who report to “Have done” any of the
following activities: signed a petition, joined in boycotts, attended lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, or
occupying buildings or factories. Data taken from WVS/EVS 1999-2001 (wave IV), except for Armenia (1997), Australia
(1995), Azerbaijan (1997), Belarus (1996), Brazil (1997), Dominican Republic (1996) and Georgia (1996), New Zealand
(1998), Norway (1996), Pakistan (1997), South Korea (1996) and Switzerland (1996).
Figure 9-2 links the level of elite-challenging activities and liberal democracy, measured
by the transformed mean score (highest possible score equals 100 percent) of Freedom
171

House between 2000 and 2006. 77 The relationship between participation and democracy
is considerably stronger than the one using the Polity Scale as a measure of democracy (r
= .62 *** ). Figure 9-2 also shows that the Freedom House measure is more demanding in
its criteria, discriminating more carefully between countries with low levels of freedom
(Belarus, 18 percent), mediocre levels of freedom (Moldova, 62 percent) and high levels
of freedom Sweden (100 percent). Having a greater variance on the y-axis produces a
closer link between the level of elite-challenging activities in a society and the presence
and implementation of political rights and civil liberties: Elite-challenging participation
and liberal democracy are systematically linked – again in a positive manner, such that
higher levels of elite-challenging action go together with higher levels of democracy.
Once more, there is no evidence of a corrosive effect of elite-challenging masses with
respect to democracy.
Closely related to the debate about the quality of democracy, another concept has gained
considerable political and academic significance: the concept of corruption. There is a
close link between the absence of democracy and corruption as the latter undermines a
significant element of democratic governance: “Corruption is the abuse of entrusted
power for private gain. It hurts everyone whose life, livelihood or happiness depends on
the integrity of people in a position of authority” (Transparency International) 78 . If formal
democratic rights are established but elites do not show law-abiding behavior, the
effectiveness of democracy is considerably restricted. To avoid misunderstandings, lawabiding
behavior on the part of power holders, or what Welzel et al. (2003) have called
“elite integrity,” does not by itself make a country democratic. But it does indicate to
which extent a given democracy level becomes effective in the daily practice of state
power. There is a number of corruption measures available, the following two figures use
the most prominent ones, provided by Transparency International and the World Bank.
77 See Appendix A9-1 for a figure that includes the Freedom House score for 2007.
78 This is the working definition of corruption that Transparency International is using. See also:
http://www.transparency.org/about_us. This definition also provides the basis for their Global Corruption
Reports that are published yearly. See for example the 2008 Global Corruption Report on water and
corruption, here: Plummer (2008: 6).
172

9.1.2 Measures of Elite Integrity
a) Transparency International
Figure 9-3:
Elite-Challenging Activities and Perception of Corruption
(Transparency International, 2001-2006)
10
Fin
Ice
Den
N Zea
9
Lux
Swi
Neth
Aut
Can Aus
GB
Swe
Corruption Perception Index 2001-2006
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
Tai
Jord Hun
Chil
Spa
Malt
Port
Slove
Est
Uru
Lith
S Afr
Lat
Bul
Pol
Mex Col
Peru Croa
Tur
Bela
Mor
Bosn Dom
Arm
Alb India
Rom
Tan
Phil
Mold
Arg
Serb
Ven Ukr Mace
Pak
Geor Rus
Indo Aze Uga
Isr
W Ger
S Kor
N Ire
E Ger
Bel
Ire
Jap
Fran
Ita
Slovak Czech Gre
Braz
USA
1
Bang
Nig
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Elite-challenging activities, in %
CPI: Corruption Perception Index (0=highly corrupt to 10=highly clean). Source: Transparency International. Mean score
2001 and 2006. R= 0.76 *** .
Elite-challenging activities: measured as percentage of respondents per sample who report to “Have done” any of the
following activities: signed a petition, joined in boycotts, attended lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, or
occupying buildings or factories. Data taken from WVS/EVS 1999-2001 (wave IV), except for Armenia (1997), Australia
(1995), Azerbaijan (1997), Belarus (1996), Brazil (1997), Dominican Republic (1996) and Georgia (1996), New Zealand
(1998), Norway (1996), Pakistan (1997), South Korea (1996) and Switzerland (1996).
Transparency International, founded in 1993, is a non-profit organization that aims at
publicizing and fighting corruption. Among others, it provides an assessment for the level
of corruption in a given country: the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The index is
based on a number of single indicators from various sources (for a detailed overview see
Appendix A9-2), relying on estimations by business administrators and country analysts.
CPI ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (highly clean). By now, Transparency
173

International ranks the perceived level of corruption in about 180 countries. Figure 9-3
plots societies according to their participation level and their score on the Corruption
Perception Index (average score 2001 to 2006).
The link between elite-challenging activities and the absence of corruption in a country is
stronger than using Freedom House as a measure of democracy (r = .76 *** ). Societies in
which only few people participate in elite-challenging activities show high levels of
corruption (e.g. Bangladesh or Azerbaijan), whereas strongly elite-challenging societies
are characterized by a minimum of corruption (e.g. New Zealand or Sweden).
b) World Bank: Control of Corruption
The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) rank more than 210
countries along six dimensions of governance: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political
stability and absence of violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5)
rule of law, and (6) control of corruption. Similar to the concept used by Transparency
International, corruption is measured as the “extent to which public power is exercised
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’
of the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007: 4). As
the other governance indicators, control of corruption is a combined measure using
sources from various institutions (e.g. World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness
Report; Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators; Gallup World Poll;
Economist Intelligence Unit; Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide;
Merchant International Group Gray Area Dynamics; Business Environment Risk
Intelligence Financial Ethics Index). Some of the corruption measures are based on
expert ratings, but most information comes from citizen surveys and surveys from
companies operating in these countries (for a more detailed overview, see Kaufmann,
Kraay and Mastruzzi 2004, 2006, 2007).
Figure 9-4 uses Control of Corruption as a measure of the extent to which people in
authority positions misuse their entrusted power (Control of Corruption averaged 2002 to
2006). Of all measures considered, the relationship between the level of participation in
elite-challenging activities and the absence of corruption comes closest to a linear
relationship (r = .76 *** ).
174

Figure 9-4:
Elite-Challenging Activities and Control of Corruption
(World Bank, 2002-2006)
2.5
2.0
Fin
W Ger
Ice Den
Aut
Swi
Neth
E Ger
Can Aus
Lux N Ire
GB
N Zea
Swe
1.5
Chil
Spa
Ire
Fran
Bel
USA
Control of Corruption 2002-2006
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
Malt
Port
Aze
Slove
Uru Isr
Est
Tai
Hun
Lat S Afr
Jord
Pol Lith
S Kor
Bul
Croa
Mor
Tur
Bela
Col India
Rom Bosn
Peru
Mex
Phil
Arg Mace
Dom
Serb
Arm
Indo
Tan
Pak
Ven
Braz
Jap
Slovak
Ita
Czech
Gre
-1.5
Bang
Nig
-2.0
Ukr, Geor, Alb, Mold, Rus, Uga
-2.5
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Elite-challenging activities, in %
CC: Control of Corruption (-2.5 to +2.5). Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators. Mean score 2002-2006.
R=0.76 *** .
Elite-challenging activities: measured as percentage of respondents per sample who report to “Have done” any of the
following activities: signed a petition, joined in boycotts, attended lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, or
occupying buildings or factories. Data taken from WVS/EVS 1999-2001 (wave IV), except for Armenia (1997), Australia
(1995), Azerbaijan (1997), Belarus (1996), Brazil (1997), Dominican Republic (1996) and Georgia (1996), New Zealand
(1998), Norway (1996), Pakistan (1997), South Korea (1996) and Switzerland (1996).
Also the previous figures suggest that high levels of mass participation create an
environment that puts constraints on elite behavior. Self-assertive, elite challenging
publics seem to produce democratic elites who tend to use their entrusted power for the
benefit of the community. In societies in which people push less for transparent and
accountable elite behavior, elites are under weaker domestic pressures and so they re
freer to abuse entrusted power, and corruption is high. Perhaps, however, the positive
relationship operates in the opposite direction as well: higher levels of democracy and
more accountable and transparent elites encourage elite-challenging activities. This
175

possibility is less easily reconcilable with the temporal order of our variables but it is not
entirely foreclosed.
So far, we have seen bivariate correlations between elite-challenging activities in around
2000 and measures of the level as well as the quality of democracy after 2001. In a final
step, empirical evidence will be provided showing that the causal direction in this
relationship is primarily operating from higher levels of elite-challenging activities on
more democratic and responsive elite behavior. In order to do so, survey data on elitechallenging
participation are measured at an even earlier point in time, now coming from
the earliest available survey, i.e. from the second and third wave of the World Value
Survey (1990-97). So the temporal order is controlled for more strictly, making sure that
the measurement of activism really precedes the measurement of democracy.
Now one could argue that, despite controlling for the temporal order of the two variables,
the impact of participation levels still reflects an artificial construct since these levels of
participation strongly depend on prior levels of democracy. Anticipating this objection,
Table 9-1 demonstrates that the relationship still holds after controlling for prior levels of
democracy as well, so after introducing some kind of a lagged dependent variable. 79 This
procedure partials out that part of elite-challenging actions that is generated by prior
democracy; it then looks at whether this independent part still has an effect on subsequent
democracy.
Table 9-1 includes two democracy measurements: the scale measuring Political Rights
and Civil Liberties by Freedom House, and the Control of Corruption measure from the
World Bank. The Polity Scale was not included as the zero-order correlation was already
rather weak. Transparency International’s CPI has a problem with data availability – as
for the World Bank indicator, measures are only available since the mid 1990ies, but for
CPI the number of countries covered in the early years was limited. The problem can,
however, be neglected as the two anti-corruption indicators show a correlation of r ≥
.90 *** .
79 Note that this is still the level of correlation analysis, even if one direction of the linkage is more
plausible than the other.
176

Table 9-1:
Zero-Order and Partial Correlation: Elite-Challenging Activities and
Democracy
Level of participation in elitechallenging
activities (earliest available
survey, WVS II-III, 1990-1997)
1 controlled for Freedom House 1982-87
2 controlled for Control of Corruption 1996-98
Zero-Order
Correlation
Freedom House
2001-2006
Partial
Correlation 1
Control of Corruption
Zero-Order
Correlation
2002-2006
Partial
Correlation 2
.50*** .34*** .70*** .34**
N = 59 N = 59
Table 9-1 contrasts the (zero-order) correlation effects with the partial correlation effects.
Zero-order effects mean that the level of participation precedes the measures from
Freedom House and the World Bank. The partial correlation does not only account for
the temporal order of the two variables, but also controls for previous stages of
democracy or absence of corruption.
As one would expect when assuming the relation between participation and democracy to
be circular, the impact of elite-challenging activities on democracy decreases once one
accounts for the temporal autocorrelation of the democracy and corruption measure. The
correlation drops because elite-challenging actions are themselves partially depending on
prior measures of democracy and corruption and when one takes this partial dependence
into account, the remaining independent part of elite-challenging actions shows a
considerably weaker effect on subsequent democracy and corruption. However, the effect
remains fully significant and continues to show a considerable magnitude. In part elitechallenging
actions depend on prior democracy to be high and prior corruption to be low
but to a larger part they help making subsequent democracy high and subsequent
corruption low. Elite-challenging activities do exactly what the name says: they challenge
elites, demand responsible and transparent elite-behavior, and limit the abuse of entrusted
power.
177

9.2 The Individual Level: Elite-Challenging Activities and Democratic Orientations
How are democratic orientations linked to participation in elite-challenging activities?
Ever since Eckstein’s famous congruence theory (1966) and Almond and Verba’s Civic
Culture Study (1963) the core assumption of political culture research is that, for a
political system to be stable, people’s authority orientations (or summarized: political
culture) should be in congruence with authority patterns (or: political structure). As a
consequence, democratic institutions can only function properly and in the long-run if the
prevailing orientations among the population are also favorable to democracy. What these
orientations are and how they are composed has for decades been subject to debate
among scholars.
9.2.1 Support for Democracy
The concept of political support by David Easton (1965) is widely used in the analysis of
democratic orientations. According to Easton, people can orient themselves towards
three, hierarchically ordered objects of support: political authorities, political regime, and
political community. The premise of the political support approach is that people are able
to make this differentiation, meaning that they can, for example, distinguish between
current incumbents and the regime or the performance of the regime and its underlying
norms, in which case they should also be able to distinguish a given regime from its
alternatives (Klingemann 1999: 35). Nevertheless, the objects of political support are
interdependent. Dissatisfaction on one level can have spill-over effects on other levels,
such as that accumulating negative orientations on a lower level (e.g. with political
authorities) can, in the long run, diminish more general levels of support for democracy.
It could be that people who participate in elite-challenging activities do this for
instrumental reasons because they are dissatisfied with concrete policies and politicians
or, more general, with the way democracy is developing in the country. In case this is so,
the question is whether these concrete forms of dissatisfaction translate into antidemocratic
orientations by sifting the blame from the concrete situation to the abstract
idea of democracy. Alternatively, people might be attracted to elite-challenging actions
for normative reasons as they have internalized a participatory citizenship model in which
178

the ideal citizen voices his or her concerns. In this case elite-challenging actions might
indicate dissatisfaction with concrete situations but would nevertheless go together with
support of democratic regime norms.
Table 9-2 documents individual-level correlations between people’s support for
democracy and their participation in elite-challenging activities. The data again come
from the World Values Survey, allowing for the broadest possible coverage of the world
population. The WVS/EVS 1999-2001 offers two questions assessing people’s support
for democracy. 80 For one, people are asked to rate on a four-point scale how they like
“Having a democratic political system” as a way of governing their country (first column
in Table 9-2). A second question asks respondents if they agree (or not, again on a fourpoint
scale) with the statement that “Democracy may have its problems but it’s better
than any other form of government” (second column in Table 9-2). The third column in
Table 9-2 uses a combined measure of the two single items. In Column 4 a net-support
for democracy was calculated by subtracting support for authoritarian alternatives (added
scale of the items “Having a strong leader.” and “Having the army rule.”) from support
for democracy (for a detailed description see the annotation below the table).
Table 9-2:
Individual-Level Correlation: Elite-Challenging Activities and
Support for Democracy (WVS/EVS 1999-2001)
“Having democratic
rule”
(Percent valid)
“Democracy may have
its problems but it’s
better than others”
(Percent valid)
Both items added:
Dem_Support
(Percent valid)
Net Support (Dem_
Support minus
authorit.)
(Percent valid)
Eastern Europe
Serbia .18*** (79) .15*** (75) .17*** (72) .20*** (67)
Bulgaria .16*** (64) .11** (65) .13** (60) .12** (50)
Montenegro .12** (65) .08* (64) .14*** (62) .11* (55)
Bosnia .12** (86) .18*** (86) .18*** (85) .14*** (79)
Romania .11** (70) .10** (71) .11** (67) .11** (58)
Albania .04 (57) .03 (58) .05 (56) -.04 (51)
Macedonia .00 (83) -.02 (82) -.02 (79) .04 (74)
80 The WVS 2005-2007 includes only one of the two batteries measuring support for democracy (and its
alternatives).
179

“Having democratic
rule”
(Percent valid)
“Democracy may have
its problems but it’s
better than others”
(Percent valid)
Both items added:
Dem_Support
(Percent valid)
Net Support (Dem_
Support minus
authorit.)
(Percent valid)
Central Eastern Europe
Slovenia .17*** (85) .15*** (86) .20*** (84) .25*** (82)
Croatia .14*** (84) .14*** (82) .18*** (81) .20*** (79)
Poland .13*** (86) .13*** (86) .16*** (81) .18*** (76)
Czech Republic .10*** (90) .10*** (90) .12*** (88) .14*** (84)
Slovakia .07* (81) .03 (82) .06* (77) .04 (73)
Hungary .04 (86) .11** (82) .09* (79) .17*** (76)
Post-soviet societies
Belarus -.01 (69) -.04 (69) -.03 (64) .00 (59)
Kyrgyzstan .04 (94) .06 (94) .06 (92) .08* (91)
Moldova .06 (65) -.07 (62) .01 (55) .10* (81)
Ukraine .04 (66) .06 (69) .05 (59) .06 (52)
Russia .04 (69) -.02 (69) .00 (61) .00 (54)
Baltic states
Latvia .15*** (76) .14*** (78) .15*** (72) .19*** (67)
Lithuania .15** (55) .19*** (54) .16*** (47) .20*** (43)
Estonia .10** (69) .11** (71) .12** (65) .12** (62)
Western Europe
East Germany .20*** (87) .06 (85) .16*** (83) .03 (80)
Netherlands .18*** (99) .12*** (98) .17*** (98) .21*** (97)
Iceland .18*** (97) .21*** (96) .22*** (95) .28*** (94)
Belgium .15*** (90) .08** (91) .12*** (88) .16*** (85)
Spain .15*** (77) .10*** (79) .14*** (75) .19*** (68)
Ireland .12*** (90) .11** (87) .14*** (85) .19*** (80)
Italy .12*** (89) .13*** (89) .15*** (87) .18*** (85)
Finland .12** (87) .08* (87) .11** (85) .14*** (83)
France .10*** (88) .08** (89) .12*** (86) .14*** (83)
Sweden .10** (97) .05 (98) .08* (96) .12*** (92)
Denmark .09** (92) .06 (92) .08* (90) .11** (88)
Malta .08* (94) .09** (93) .09** (92) .06 (90)
Austria .08** (94) .08** (94) .09* (92) .14*** (89)
West Germany .07* (90) .03 (91) .06 (89) .07* (87)
Greece .05 (95) .08** (95) .08** (94) .15*** (93)
Luxembourg .03 (81) -.01 (81) .01 (77) .00 (72)
Portugal .01 (85 ) -.04 (86) -.02 (83) .05 (68)
Anglo-Saxon societies
USA .20*** (95) .20*** (96) .25*** (93) .23*** (92)
Canada .14*** (91) .10*** (91) .15*** (88) .20*** (86)
Northern Ireland .05 (82) -.02 (82) .02 (78) .10* (69)
Great Britain .03 (84) .11** (93) .06 (82) .04 (76)
Central & Southern America
Argentina .17*** (85) .13*** (85) .17*** (82) .23*** (72)
Chile .06* (86) .04 (87) .05 (84) .04 (78)
Peru .06* (86) .06* (85) .07** (83) .02 (77)
Puerto Rico .07 (93) .00 (93) .04 (92) .10* (89)
Mexico .03 (71) .06 (67) .05 (64) .01 (58)
Venezuela .02 (93) .04 (93) .03 (92) -.03 (86)
180

Continued:
“Having democratic
rule”
(Percent valid)
“Democracy may have
its problems but it’s
better than others”
(Percent valid)
Both items added:
Dem_Support
(Percent valid)
Net Support (Dem_
Support minus
authorit.)
(Percent valid)
Africa
Algeria -.06 (79) -.04 (75) -.07* (72) .02 (67)
Jordan .02 (86) .10** (83) .09** (79) .10** (76)
Morocco .08** (59) .04 (53) .06* (51) .08* (42)
Egypt .01 (95) .00 (93) .01 (92) - -
South Africa .14*** (82) .11*** (82) .16*** (78) .16*** (72)
Zimbabwe .14*** (81) .02 (78) .09* (74) .07 (70)
Uganda .10* (60) -.02 (57) .04 (57) .05 (56)
Nigeria .07** (88) .01 (88) .05* (87) .03 (85)
Tanzania -.04 (96) -.07* (94) -.07* (93) -.15*** (90)
Confucian societies
Japan .14*** (73) .09** (62) .13*** (61) .10** (57)
Southern Asia
Bangladesh .10** (79) .02 (79) .07* (78) -.16*** (73)
Turkey .09*** (89) .07*** (88) .09*** (86) .18*** (82)
Indonesia .07 (82) .07* (77) .08* (75) .06 (73)
Philippines .04 (97) .00 (97) .02 (96) .05 (95)
Vietnam -.03 (77) -.03 (67) -.05 (67) .02 (66)
Pakistan -.02 (83) .03 (90) -.01 (82) -.01 (72)
India -.01 (67) -.08** (64 ) -.07* (62) -.02 (58)
Source: WVS/EVS 1999-2001. The variables are coded:
(1) Having democratic rule (recoded: 1= very bad to 4= very good): “I'm going to describe various types of
political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one,
would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? (…)
Having a democratic political system.”
(2) “Democracy may have its problems but it’s better than others” (recoded: 1= strongly disagree to
4=agree strongly): “I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic
political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly? (…)
Democracy may have its problems but it’s better than any other form of government.”
(3) Dem_Support (1= no support to 7= high level of support). Added scale: “Having democratic rule” and
“Democracy may have its problems”. Transformed (1 to 7).
(4) Net Support: Dem_Support minus Auth_Support. Auth_Support (1= no support to 7= high level of
support): Added scale: “Having a strong leader” and “Having the army rule”. Transformed (1 to 7). Having
a strong leader (recoded: 1= very bad to 4= very good): “I'm going to describe various types of political
systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you
say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? (…) Having a
strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.” Having the army rule (recoded:
1= very bad to 4= very good): “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you
think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly
good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? (…) Having the army rule.”
The majority of the correlations is significant, and almost all significant correlations
show a positive sign, indicating that those individuals who participate in demonstrations
or sign petitions also support democracy as a form of governance. 81 In roughly half the
81 There are three exceptions: Bangladesh, India and Tanzania.
181

societies, but almost all societies in Western Europe and Central Eastern Europe, the
correlation with elite-challenging participation is strongest for the net-support variable. In
these societies, people who participate in these activities do not only show lip-service
support for democracy, but at the same time also reject non-democratic alternatives that
favor governance by a small a group of non-elected officials.
This interpretation is also supported when one looks at another aspect of political support
in a democracy. Within the framework of Easton’s concept of political support (Easton
1965, 1975) confidence in political institutions is an important evaluative orientation of
the regime’s performance (Klingemann 1999). Appendix A9-3 shows that elitechallenging
activities and confidence in government, parties and parliament are only
weakly correlated, whereas the link between non-institutionalized participation and the
importance that people attach to living in a democracy is more pronounced. Again, this
suggests that elite-challenging activities in democracies are predominantly systemsupporting
participation.
This conclusion is seconded by looking at the question what people think what a
democracy is. In the most recent wave of the World Values Survey (2005-07)
respondents where asked which characteristics they considered as essential elements of a
democratic political order. Among these characteristics, four items resemble a processoriented
understanding of democracy: that people choose their leaders in free elections
and civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression; that people can change laws in
referendums and women have the same rights as men.
Another four elements reflect an output-oriented understanding of democracy: that
governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor and people receive state aid for
unemployment; that the economy is prospering and criminals are severely punished. A
factor analysis with the four statements shows that these characteristics are not only
theoretically meaningful but also empirically relevant (see Appendix A9-4). The question
now is whether people who participate in elite-challenging activities tend to have a
process- or an output-oriented understanding of democracy. In general, a democratic
system needs the intrinsic support from those citizens with a process-oriented
understanding of democracy in order to avoid a sudden loss of support if there is a
temporary weakness in the system’s output.
182

Table 9-3:
Individual-Level Correlation: Elite-Challenging Activities and
Understanding of Democracy (WVS/EVS 2005-07)
Process-oriented
understanding
183
Output-oriented
understanding
Eastern Europe
Serbia .01 .03 (911)
Bulgaria .08* .07 (630)
Romania .10*** -.06* (1.335)
Central Eastern Europe
Slovenia .13*** -.01 (806)
Poland .14*** -.03 (784)
Post-soviet societies
Moldova .04 .05 (897)
Ukraine .01 -.06 (734)
Russia -.02 -.02 (1.582)
Western Europe
Netherlands .16*** .03 (858)
Finland .13*** -.13*** (924)
France .12*** -.01 (948)
Sweden .14*** -.07* (939)
Germany .18*** -.09*** (1.818)
Anglo-Saxon societies
USA .29*** -.03 (1.177)
Canada .17*** -.06** (1.736)
Great Britain .24*** .03 (863)
Australia .16*** -.01 (1.330)
Central & Southern America
Argentina .16*** -.04 (662)
Brazil .09** -.04 (1.282)
Chile .17*** -.07 (787)
Mexico .13*** .00 (1.248)
Uruguay .11** .04 (908)
Africa
Zambia .01 .01 (1.232)
Ethiopia .17*** -.09** (939)
Ghana .01 .02 (1.262)
Mali -.14*** -.16*** (892)
Rwanda -.03 -.11*** (1.118)
Burkina Faso .02 -.03 (966)
Confucian societies
Japan .09* -.01 (690)
South Korea .10*** -.05 (1.198)
Taiwan .06* -.04 (1.200)
South & Southern Asia
Indonesia -.09*** .07** (1.521)
Vietnam -.03 -.06* (1.295)
India .05 -.06 (996)
Malaysia -.08** -.14*** (1.195)
Source: World Values Survey 2005-07. The coding of the variables:
“Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell
me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this
N

scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an
essential characteristic of democracy”.” The two variables on people’s understanding of democracy are the
result of a factor analysis (see Appendix 4) where the following items loaded on:
(1) Process-oriented understanding of democracy:
- People choose their leaders in free elections.
- Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression.
- People can change laws in referendums.
- Women have the same rights as men.
(2) Output-oriented understanding of democracy:
- Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.
- People receive state aid for unemployment.
- The economy is prospering.
- Criminals are severely punished.
Table 9-3 documents quite some differences between the societies included: Whereas the
post-soviet societies, Serbia and some African countries do not show any significant
correlation (meaning that in these societies, participants do not have a particular
understanding of democracy that is distinct from non-participants), the picture looks
different for all EU member states, Anglo-Saxon societies, Central and Latin America
and the Confucian societies. Here we find that elite-challenging participation goes pretty
well together with a process-oriented understanding of democracy. By contrast,
participation and output-orientation are not or even negatively correlated: In the majority
of industrial or postindustrial societies, people are driven into participation by an intrinsic
democratic motivation, not because they expect the democratic system to deliver certain
material goods. This is a theoretically important finding. It indicates that elite-challenging
actions in advanced postindustrial societies, but less so in developing and struggling
societies, is primarily normatively and not instrumentally motivated.
9.2.2 Political Involvement
Political involvement is another core democratic orientation – if citizens do not have at
least a basic interest in political affairs, if they do not know about their participation
possibilities, their rights and responsibilities as a citizen, then democracy is at danger: “It
is (...) the prerequisite of showing some degree of political interest and concern that
establishes the line of demarcation between democratic and non-democratic citizenship”
(van Deth and Elff 2000: 1). This does not mean that political involvement always
translates into political participation, or that each political act is motivated by a high level
of political interest. However, it is one of the most established research findings that
184

political interest is a dominant factor in explaining all kinds of political participation, in
particular in forms of conventional participation. With respect to participation in elitechallenging
activities, however, Croizier et al. were warning against an uninformed,
uncritical public going on the streets and demand more than the government can deliver.
In their closing chapter of “Political Action,” Kaase and Barnes (1979: 527-534) have
also argued that the balance between emotional and rational participation is highly
relevant for the political system. Emotional participation means action without political
interest or understanding and is described as “highly disruptive” (Kaase and Branes 1979:
528), whereas rational participation is driven by high political involvement. Using the
data from the WVS/EVS it is possible to test whether individual-level participation in
these activities is indeed driven by low or high levels of political involvement, so whether
elite-challenging participation is (in the terminology of the Political Action Study)
emotional or rational. The WVS/EVS includes two items that are available for the
majority of societies: people’s interest in politics and the importance of politics in
people’s life (both four-point scales).
Table 9-4 shows – against the “crisis of democracy” assumption – that it is not a
momentarily mobilized, otherwise uninterested, citizenry that is demonstrating,
petitioning or boycotting products. Quite the contrary, elites are challenged by citizens
for whom politics is important: in almost all societies participation in elite-challenging
activities is positively linked with political involvement. This is not a Western
phenomenon: Individual-level participation in elite-challenging activities in African,
Asian and Eastern European societies is similarly driven by high political involvement.
185

Table 9-4:
Individual-Correlation: Elite-Challenging Activities and Political
Involvement, WVS/EVS 1999-2001
Interest in Politics
(Percent valid)
Importance of Politics in Life
(Percent valid)
Eastern Europe
Serbia .31*** (88) .24*** (87)
Bulgaria .23*** (77) .17*** (75)
Montenegro .40*** (70) .28*** (70)
Bosnia .18*** (90) .12** (90)
Romania .12*** (78)
Albania .24*** (59) .16*** (58)
Macedonia .15*** (89) .04 (89)
Central Eastern Europe
Slovenia .15*** (90) .06 (90)
Croatia .02 (95)
Poland .24*** (98) .19*** (97)
Czech Republic .20*** (92) .12*** (92)
Slovakia .17*** (88)
Hungary .12*** (93)
Post-soviet societies
Belarus .20*** (89) .12*** (88)
Kyrgyzstan .17*** (98) .08* (97)
Moldova .14*** (82) .14*** (80)
Ukraine .20*** (84) .15*** (81)
Russia .18*** (90) .11*** (89)
Baltic states
Latvia .12** (87)
Lithuania .25*** (71) .16*** (70)
Estonia .09** (82)
Western Europe
East Germany .21*** (94) .10** (94)
Netherlands .24*** (100) .16*** (100)
Iceland .23*** (98) .12*** (98)
Belgium .23*** (95) .18*** (96)
Spain .27*** (84) .18*** (84)
Ireland .19*** (95) .13*** (93)
Italy .27*** (92) .16*** (92)
Finland .23*** (91) .16*** (91)
France .22*** (96) .19*** (95)
Sweden .03 (99)
Denmark .15*** (95) .13*** (95)
Malta .20*** (97)
Austria .27*** (97) .17*** (97)
West Germany .25*** (92) .21*** (91)
Greece .21*** (95) .16*** (95)
Luxembourg .16*** (89) .09** (90)
Portugal .32*** (92) .19*** (92)
Anglo-Saxon societies
USA .15*** (98) .10** (98)
Canada .19*** (98) .11*** (98)
Northern Ireland .12*** (94) .08* (93)
Great Britain .20*** (96) .15*** (97)
186

Continued:
Interest in Politics
(Percent valid)
Importance of Politics in Life
(Percent valid)
Central & Southern America
Argentina .28*** (89) .18*** (90)
Chile .26*** (92) .20*** (90)
Peru .18*** (89) .07* (88)
Puerto Rico .26*** (95) .07 (95)
Mexico .21*** (80) .11*** (80)
Venezuela .20*** (94) .04 (94)
Africa
Algeria .25*** (86) .14*** (84)
Jordan .16*** (98) .14*** (97)
Morocco .28*** (80) .24*** (80)
Egypt .00 (99) .00 (97)
South Africa .29*** (87) .22*** (87)
Zimbabwe .12*** (88) .06 (86)
Uganda .23*** (63) .16*** (62)
Nigeria .20*** (89) .12*** (89)
Tanzania .06 (96) .09** (84)
Confucian societies
Japan .21*** (80) .21*** (75)
Southern Asia
Bangladesh .25*** (79) .14*** (80)
Turkey .26*** (72) .20*** (96)
Indonesia .21*** (85) .08* (81)
Philippines .12*** (98) .08** (98)
Vietnam .14*** (81) .03 (80)
Pakistan .30*** (91) .32*** (90)
India .32*** (77) .23*** (77)
Israel .11* (89) .00 (89)
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2001. The coding of the variables:
(1) Interest in politics: “How interested would you say are you in politics?” Very interested, somewhat
interested, not very interested, not at all interested. The variable was recoded: 4 = very interested in politics,
(...) 1 = not at all interested in politics.
(2) Importance of politics in life: “For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life.
Would you say it is: very important, rather important, not very important, not at all important? (...)
Politics”. The variable was recoded: 4 = politics is very important, (...) 1 = politics is not at all important.
9.2.3 Liberal Orientations
The concept of political support, and hereby the traditional political culture school, has
focused on specific political attitudes when it comes to orientations that are conducive for
democracy. By contrast, early concepts from psychology have focused on non-political
orientations instead, arguing that these more general predispositions matter for people’s
everyday life, and in the end also for a political system (for an overview see Welzel
187

2006). 82 Lasswell’s “democratic character” (1951), for example, champions freedom
from anxiety, self-esteem, humanism and an open ego as pro-democratic orientations.
Rokeach (1960) argues that liberal and altruistic orientations, going together in an “open
belief system,” are most appropriate for a democratic system. In general, all these
psychological approaches (see also Adorno et al. 1950; Maslow 1954) identify a certain
form of physical security as the basis for trust in oneself and in others, which are
considered as core democratic orientations.
According to the social psychological approach people with a high self-esteem do not
only trust others more, they are also less scared of people who might be different – be it
by religion, race, or attitudes. Rather, difference is seen as something beneficial. The
World Values Survey also includes questions on tolerance to test whether participation in
elite-challenging activities is driven by tolerant or intolerant orientations. Table 9-5,
column 1 documents the correlation between participation and tolerance towards
foreigners. (In)Tolerance towards foreigners is measured with the “least liked neighbor”
question, asking respondents if there was any group that they would not like to live in
their neighborhood. Foreigners summarize people with a different race as well as
immigrants or foreign workers (correlations with the single items can be found in
Appendix A9-5). Overall, the link between tolerance and participation is only modest. In
about half of the societies included the correlation is not even significant. Where the
individual-level correlation is significant, with the exception of Bangladesh, the
correlation is positive, but exceeds only in eight societies .10.
In addition to the tolerance towards foreigners, the WVS/EVS also includes questions
about how respondents see themselves as masters of their own lives, and whether they
accept that other people make autonomous choices about their own way of living. In the
first case, the respondents were asked on a ten-point scale whether they felt that they have
free choice and control over their lives. The second question is measured on a ten-point
scale as well. Here, people were asked whether they considered homosexuality and
divorce as justifiable. In Table 9-5 the columns 2 (tolerance of other lifestyles) and 3
(own choice and control over life) show the individual-level correlations with
82 For a critical view on linking non-political orientations and democracy see already Almond and Verba
1963: 10.
188

participation in elite-challenging activities. Surprisingly, the perception of having control
over one’s life is only in few societies linked with elite-challenging activities. The picture
changes when it comes to granting this freedom to others: for the majority of societies a
significant and positive correlation between people’s tolerance towards other lifestyles
and participation in elite-challenging activities can be observed. However, there are
noticeable differences among the societies under consideration: While in societies in
Central and Western Europe, Anglo-Saxon societies and Latin America people who
demonstrate, sign petitions and participate in buy- and boycotts are tolerant towards
people’s lifestyles, most of the African and Asian societies do not show this link. 83
Table 9-5:
Individual-Level Correlation: Elite-Challenging Activities and Liberal
Orientations (WVS/EVS 1999-2001)
Tolerance
towards
foreigners
(Percent valid)
Tolerance of
different
lifestyles
(Percent valid)
Own choice
and control
over life
(Percent valid)
Gender
Equality
(Percent valid)
Trust in others
(Percent valid)
Eastern Europe
Serbia .07* (88) .23*** (80) .12*** (85) .13*** (75) -.05 (86)
Bulgaria .08* (78) .15*** (69) .19*** (73) .09* (73)
Montenegro .13*** (70) .19*** (61) -.01 (64) .04 (61) .11** (69)
Bosnia -.03 (90) .05 (89) .02 (89) .02 (88) .07 (89)
Romania .10** (79) .11** (73) .04 (74) -.01 (78)
Albania .08 (59) .05 (57) .08* (59) .00 (55) -.03 (58)
Macedonia .07* (90) .05 (88) .03 (88) .06 (87) .02 (88)
Serbia .07* (88) .23*** (80) .13*** (75) -.05 (86)
Central Eastern Europe
Slovenia .11** (90) .24*** (87) .03 (90) .08* (89)
Croatia .04 (86) .08* (84) .09** (85) .02 (84)
Poland .07* (99) .13*** (90) .01 (95) .03 (96)
Czech Rep. .08*** (92) .12*** (88) .09*** (92) .08** (91)
Slovakia .03 (89) .04 (79) .10** (87) .05 (86)
Hungary .16*** (87) .02 (91) .11** (92)
Post-soviet societies
Belarus .09** (90) .08* (81) .07* (84) .00 (83)
Kyrgyzstan .04 (98) .13*** (97) -.01 (97) -.02 (96) .00 (97)
Moldova .03 (82) -.06 (71) .05 (77) .05 (72) .07 (79)
Ukraine .07* (84) .02 (74) .09** (77) .01 (80)
Russia -.02 (90) .01 (77) .02 (87) .06** (88)
Baltic states
Latvia .00 (88) .09* (81) -.02 (84) .04 (86)
Lithuania .10** (72) .05 (64) -.02 (69) .13** (69)
Estonia .08* (83) .06 (71) .08* (81) .09* (81)
83 There are noticeable exceptions: South Africa and Zimbabwe, Turkey, Bangladesh and Indonesia.
189

Continued:
Tolerance
towards
foreigners
(Percent valid)
Tolerance of
different
lifestyles
(Percent valid)
Own choice
and control
over life
(Percent valid)
Gender
Equality
(Percent valid)
Trust in others
(Percent valid)
Baltic states
Latvia .00 (88) .09* (81) -.02 (84) .04 (86)
Lithuania .10** (72) .05 (64) -.02 (69) .13** (69)
Estonia .08* (83) .06 (71) .08* (81) .09* (81)
Western Europe
East Germany .02 (86) .13*** (85) -.03 (94) .10** (91)
Netherlands .15*** (100) .26*** (99) .05 (100) .17*** (99)
Iceland .08* (98) .21*** (92) .06 (97) .09** (94)
Belgium .18*** (97) .22*** (93) .03 (95) .08** (93)
Spain .10*** (84) .29*** (79) .04 (81) .16*** (40) .09*** (81)
Italy .11*** (93) .26*** (88) .11*** (90) .15*** (91)
Finland .09** (91) .20*** (87) .12*** (90) .10** (89)
France .02 (96) .13*** (89) -.02 (95) .07** (92)
Sweden -.01 (99) .12*** (95) .03 (99) .10** (94) .11** (95)
Denmark .10** (95) .22*** (89) .08* (94) .14*** (92)
Malta .05 (97) .17*** (98) -.05 (97) .05 (96)
Austria .13*** (97) .23*** (93) -.05 (96) .15*** (90)
W. Germany .00 (82) .18*** (88) .01 (91) .00 (88)
Greece .10** (96) .24*** (89) .01 (95) .15*** (83)
Luxembourg .09 (91) .19*** (87) .01 (90) .06* (88)
Portugal .01 (92) .17*** (87) .00 (90) .16*** (90)
Anglo-Saxon societies
USA .06 (98) .10*** (96) .06* (98) .11*** (92) .14*** (97)
Canada -.01 (98) .24*** (93) .06* (98) .16*** (94) .09*** (97)
Ireland .10** (95) .28*** (87) .01 (94) .12*** (93)
North. Ireland .08* (94) .16*** (84) -.15*** (92) .01 (92)
Great Britain -.04 (98) .10** (95) -.08* (97) .01 (94)
Central & Southern America
Argentina .07* (90) .15*** (81) -.02 (87) .10** (81) .15*** (88)
Chile -.11 (92) .17*** (87) .12*** (91) .13*** (89) .10** (90)
Peru -.03 (89) .08** (87) .02 (88) -.01 (85) .04 (88)
Puerto Rico .08* (96) .18*** (93) .03 (95) .08 (92) .15*** (95)
Mexico -.02 (81) .07* (74) -.03 (76) -.03 (76) .04 (79)
Venezuela -.03 (94) .04 (93) -.04 (94) -.02 (90) .03 (94)
Africa
Algeria .06* (87) .10** (84) .07* (82) .01 (82) .03 (85)
Jordan .01 (98) .09** (96) .05 (97) .04 (97) .05 (96)
Morocco .08** (82) .10*** (80) .15*** (68) -.08*** (80)
Egypt .01 (100) -.01 (100) .03 (99) .00 (99) -.02 (99)
South Africa .11*** (88) .12*** (85) .22*** (87) .07** (82) .02 (87)
Zimbabwe .06 (90) .14*** (88) -.07* (89) .00 (85) -.04 (88)
Uganda -.02 (63) -.02 (63) .25*** (62) .01 (62) .05 (63)
Nigeria .00 (89) .04 (89) .05* (89) -.04 (87) .00 (89)
Tanzania -.04 (97) .03 (95) -.02 (96) -.10** (95) .15*** (93)
Confucian societies
Japan -.03 (71) .00 (77) .06 (54) .11*** (75)
190

Continued:
Tolerance
towards
foreigners
(Percent valid)
Tolerance of
different
lifestyles
(Percent valid)
Own choice
and control
over life
(Percent valid)
Gender
Equality
(Percent valid)
Trust in others
(Percent valid)
Southern Asia
Bangladesh -.07* (82) .18*** (81) .04 (72) .14*** (80) -.01 (81)
Turkey .14*** (97) .29*** (25) .14*** (97) .14*** (70) .02 (96)
Indonesia -.01 (87) .17*** (87) -.05 (83) -.02 (83) -.08* (77)
Philippines -.01 (98) .01 (97) .01 (98) .01 (97) .04 (97)
Vietnam .01 (81) -.01 (76) -.11* (81) .07 (77) .06 (77)
Pakistan -.04 (92) .01 (88) -.08** (69) -.02 (85) .07** (84)
India .01 (78) .05 (61) .07* (72) .08** (71) -.01 (76)
Israel .29*** (90) .19*** (92)
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2001. The coding of the variables:
(1) Tolerance towards foreigners: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any
that you would not like to have as neighbors?”
- People with a different race
- Immigrants/foreign workers
Respondents who have mentioned any of the two = -1. None of the groups mentioned = 0.
(2) Tolerance of different lifestyles: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think
it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card.”
- Homosexuality
- Divorce
Never justifiable = 1. Always justifiable = 10. The two scales were added.
(3) Gender Equality: Two items added (each coded from 1 = agree strongly to 4 = strongly disagree):
“On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.”
“A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.”
(4) Trust in Others: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to
be very careful in dealing with people?” Recoded: Need to be very careful = 0. Most people can be trusted
= 1.
The third and fourth column of Table 9-5 complements the analysis of the link between
elite-challenging activities and liberal orientations. Questions on gender equality are
available only in a limited number of countries and show a positive link only in relatively
modern societies (exception: Bangladesh). More important is the influence of social trust:
trust, an important resource for cooperation with others, and elite-challenging activities
are positively linked at the individual level (as demonstrated in Chapter 7).
For a final overview, Table 9-6 summarizes the most relevant factors of the three
approaches in a regression, testing which of these predictors has the strongest effect on
why people participate in elite-challenging activities. The regression analyses are
191

conducted separately for different country groups, the results are controlled for sex, age
and education effects.
Table 9-6: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis, WVS/EVS 1999-2001
(dependent variable: Elite-Challenging Activities)
Eastern
Europe
Central
Eastern
Europe
Post-soviet
societies
Baltic states
Western
Europe
Political culture approach:
Net_support for democracy 1.09*** 1.14*** 1.02 1.14*** 1.07***
Political involvement: Politics
important
Ref: not at all
not very
rather
very important
Liberal orientation:
Tolerance of different lifestyles
Ref: low
medium
high
Constant
Nagelkerke R sq.
N
1.38***
1.82***
2.17***
1.19*
1.80***
.325
.07
4.523
1.42***
1.94***
1.75***
1.47***
2.44***
.178
.12
5.483
1.50**
1.86***
1.68**
1.32**
1.55**
.068
.05
3.367
0.75*
1.27
1.80*
.81
.88
.138
.10
1.610
1.34***
1.88***
2.20***
1.60***
2.56***
.398
.14
15.709
Anglo-Saxon
societies
Central &
Southern
America
Africa
Southern
Asia
Political culture approach:
Net_support for democracy 1.12*** 1.01 1.04** 1.09*** 1.10
Political involvement: Politics
important
Ref: not at all
not very
rather
very important
Liberal orientation:
Tolerance of different lifestyles
Ref: low
medium
high
Constant
Nagelkerke R sq.
N
1.45**
1.88***
1.85***
1.76***
2.84***
.607
.12
4.668
1.06
1.56***
1.59***
1.42***
2.09***
.154
.07
5.381
1.27*
1.53***
2.00***
1.91***
2.28***
.163
.09
7.578
.97
1.25
1.71***
1.85***
3.28***
.144
.11
6.733
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2001, pooled sample. Samples equally weighted with n = 1.000.
The results are controlled for sex, age and education.
Data entries: Odds ratios.
1.01
1.64
1.66
Japan
1.20
1.21
.065
.14
659
192

The results in Table 9-6 show that all three approaches can, to a certain degree, explain
what motivates people into participating, and that these factors still come through after
controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and mutual influences. Of the three
factors, however, support for democracy shows the weakest impact (note that an odds
ratio = 1.00 means that there is no difference between groups in the probability for an
event to happen (i.e. to participate) and for an event not to happen (i.e. not to
participate)). Participation in elite-challenging activities is more driven by people’s
political involvement and their liberal orientation: Whereas in most of the postcommunist
European societies (with the exception of Central Eastern Europe) the
importance of politics has a greatest impact on participation, in all other country groups
(and strongest in Western Europe, Anglo-Saxon societies and Southern Asia) it is a
liberal view on human emancipation that motivates people into elite-challenging
activities.
The previous analyses could find no evidence – neither at the individual nor at the
aggregate level – that elite-challenging participation poses a threat to democracy.
Participants show high support for the idea of democracy and at the same time reject
authoritarian alternatives; they are motivated by a process-oriented understanding of
democracy; they show high levels of political involvement and emancipative values. It
should be noted, however, that several of these characteristics are most pronounced in
postindustrial societies. A similar link can be found at the aggregate level: In societies
with higher levels of elite-challenging activities political processes are more democratic
and elites less corrupt. The rise of elite-challenging publics gives therefore no reason to
worry about democracy.
193

Conclusion
As one consequence of the collapse of communist regimes about 20 years ago, the
scholarly focus in political science has shifted from more ideological debates to an
analysis of the current state of contemporary democracies. The vanishing of the system
alternative in the wake of the third wave of democratization has led some to celebrate the
victory of democracy (Fukuyama 1992): Never in history have so many people all over
the world enjoyed political freedoms and civil rights. At the same time, however, the
thorough examination of the conditions and challenges has increased the awareness of the
functional weaknesses of today’s representative democracies. “Paradoxically it seems
that democracy at the beginning of a new millennium is at one and the same time
triumphant and in crisis” (Blaug and Schwarzmantel 2001: 1). This applies especially to
the relationship between the citizen and the state which has recently regained scholarly
attention: Contemporary democracies are faced with a citizenry that shows increasing
skepticism towards the main institutions of representative democracies. Examples are
declining voter turnout, low confidence in the core institutions of representative
democracies, or the diminishing role of traditional mass organizations such as political
parties. Dalton (2002: 32) has summarized these developments in the provocative
question: “Are we celebrating the success of democracy by staying at home”?
The results presented in this thesis come to a different conclusion. Civic engagement is
not in decline, quite the contrary. Around the globe we observe a consistent enlargement
of the citizen action repertoire and an increase in non-institutionalized forms of political
activities, corroborating the main claim of the early Political Action Study: the lasting
existence of protest potential and activities.
The aim of this thesis was to systematically test hypotheses about dynamics, causes and
consequences in elite-challenging activities in contemporary representative democracies,
thereby contributing to closing a gap in participation research: Whereas there is a broad
consensus that the action repertoire has expanded, “the research agenda has often failed
to innovate sufficiently to capture the broader range of activities which have now become
more common” (Norris 2007: 644). Based on the broadest empirical basis available, the
study focused on citizens participating in demonstrations, political consumerism, or
194

signing petitions. Major accounts of political participation were used to derive hypotheses
about how participation in non-institutionalized forms has changed over time, how these
activities can be explained and what implication they have for contemporary
democracies. Table C-1 provides a summarizing overview of the hypotheses testing:
some propositions found support in the analyses, while others did not. The main findings
of the five empirical chapters are:
Dynamics of elite-challenging activities
Over the past 30 years, participation in demonstrations, petitions and political
consumerism has increased in almost all regions of the world. There are pronounced
cross-country differences, most of which can be explained by the societies’ socioeconomic
development. Elite-challenging activities are particularly widespread in
postindustrial democracies – on average two thirds of the population have participated in
these activities. However, even in low income societies this form of participation is more
than a marginal phenomenon. The cultural variant of modernization theory suggested this
increase of elite-challenging activities whereas the social capital account, represented by
Putnam, claimed a general decrease of civic activism that expanded to noninstitutionalized
participation. No empirical evidence could be found for the latter
proposition: Rather, people are becoming increasingly active through demonstrations and
petitions, and they have discovered the marketplace as a political arena to pressure elites
by altering their own day-to-day consumption behavior. Citizens in contemporary
democracies have not withdrawn from participation in general but supplemented their
traditional action repertoire, using diversified channels to make their voices heard.
195

Table C-1:
Results of Hypotheses Testing
Theoretical
Approach
Dimension
Dynamics
in elite-challenging
activities
Causes/determinants
of elite-challenging
activities
Consequences
of elite-challenging
activities
Modernization and
Value Change
Increase
(1) Self expression
values, prodemocratic
orientations, youth
(positive)
(2) Postindustrialization
(positive)
Positive impact on
democracy
Organizational Changes
and Social Capital
Decrease/
Increase
(1) Social capital:
networks and trust
(positive);
(2) Traditional
forms of political
participation
(negative)
Negative impact
on democracy
Resources and
Motivation
--
(1) Resources:
young and highskilled
citizens
(positive)
(2) Motivation:
political interest,
dissatisfaction,
efficacy (positive)
Increasing
political inequality /
Opportunity Structures
--
(1) Close context
for mobilization:
organizational
membership
(positive)
(2) Wider context
for mobilization:
political and
economic
conditions
(positive)
--
Crisis of Democracy/
Government Overload
--
Non-democratic
orientations
Crisis of
democracy
Empirical findings support the hypothesis.
Empirical findings do not support the hypothesis.
196

Causes of elite-challenging activities
In fact, the social capital/organizational change account did not take a unified position on
the decrease debate, as several other authors in the social capital literature accept the
increase thesis, but think that this development goes at the expense of traditional forms of
participation. The data also did not provide empirical support for this hypothesis: Neither
on the individual nor on the societal level nor in analyses over time did the results
substantiate a negative relationship between elite-challenging participation and voting,
conventional participation, or membership in interest organizations and citizen action
groups. Quite the contrary: On the aggregate level, the participation levels are either not
linked at all or show a positive relationship; on the individual level demonstrators,
petitioners and political consumers still vote and enroll in organizations.
The study also examined other individual-level and contextual determinants,
acknowledging that political mobilization does not happen in a vacuum but is always the
result of an interplay between personal characteristics and environmental factors.
Empirical evidence could be found for most of the theoretically assumed determinants:
On the individual level, resources such as being young, highly educated and having a
higher income are positively linked with elite-challenging participation. Motivations such
as emancipative and pro-democratic values, political interest, political efficacy, trust and
being politically left-wing are favorable characteristics as well. In addition,
organizational membership and embeddedness into informal networks provide an
individual mobilization context for non-institutionalized participation. On the aggregate
level, the organizing capacity of a society, density of informal networks, a climate of
interpersonal trust, democracy and economic development provide a favorable wider
context that facilitates participation in elite-challenging activities. Multi-level tests could
show that both influences – determinants on the individual and on the aggregate level –
also hold under mutual control. In the case of gender, the analyses yielded a reverse in the
gender gap when controlling for socio-economic development: As resource are
redistributed and become more accessible for women, they become the dominant actors
of elite-challenging participation.
197

Consequences of elite-challenging activities
Finally, the study addressed the consequences of rising levels of elite-challenging
activities for the democratic process. The results for political inequality are mixed. Still
today, participation in elite-challenging activities requires more resources than for
example voting. However, the differences appear much smaller when contrasting elitechallenging
and conventional participation; this is particularly true for the gender gap.
Moreover, some of the differences in resources and motivation have become smaller over
the past 30 years, suggesting that resource discrepancies between participants and nonparticipants
of elite-challenging actions are leveling out in the long run.
Turning the attention to the debate about democratic governability, the empirical findings
did not support the hypothesis that elite-challenging activities pose a threat to
democracies. On the individual level, participation in demonstrations, petitions and
political consumerism is largely linked with pro-democratic orientations such as support
for democracy (and at the same time rejecting authoritarian alternatives), a processoriented
understanding of democracy, political involvement and, most importantly,
liberal orientations such as tolerance towards foreigners and other people’s lifestyle,
gender equality and trust. It should be noted however, that these findings are most
pronounced – although not limited to – postindustrial democracies.
On the aggregate level, the results were even more straightforward: high levels of elitechallenging
activities are linked with several indicators that measure an effective
democratic process. In particular elite behavior is impacted by a critical citizenry: In
societies where elites are pressured with demands from below, elite behavior appears to
be less corrupt and more transparent and accountable, limiting the abuse of entrusted
power.
What are the implications of the results for further research?
First, from a theoretical point of view, a new conceptualization of the citizen action
repertoire is needed. Elite-challenging activities have become a widely used participation
tool, ranging from sporadic participation in demonstrations to a modified consumption
behavior as a day-to-day activity. The issues around which non-institutionalized activities
evolve often blur the traditional distinction between political and nonpolitical, private and
198

public behavior. The elite-challenging character of these activities – pressuring elites with
demands from below – expands to targets beyond the (mostly national) governmental
system. Thus, any conceptualization of political participation that neglects the new
qualities of targets, issues, network structures and mobilization tactics of these
individualized activities falls short of estimating the actual action repertoire and
participation level in contemporary democracies.
Second, from a methodological point of view, it is clear that survey questions have their
limits in the study of elite-challenging participation. 84 Overreporting due to social
desirability bias (Brady 1999: 789), a well-known phenomenon in studies on electoral
participation, is probably less of a problem for elite-challenging activities. A bigger
problem is that the standardized format of questionnaires is rather insensitive to issues
around which people are mobilized into demonstrations, petitions and political
consumerism. In addition, the large surveys do not capture how much time people are
dedicating to these activities. More information on these issues would help to better
understand the motivation for participating and shed light on the ‘in and out’ option that
characterizes elite-challenging activities.
Third, whereas this study is a first step, more comparative studies are needed, in
particular with a focus on sporadic forms of political participation. Obviously, every
country has its own participation profile, but Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) found similar
modes of participation in a number of democracies they examined. The empirical results
presented here support the idea that non-institutionalized activities can be compared
across countries in a meaningful way. Despite the efforts of large comparative survey
projects such as the Worlds Values Survey or other organizations summarized in the
Global Barometers, the major limitation remains data availability for countries outside
the postindustrial world.
Beyond the comparison aspect, the study also suggests that more attention should be
given to the linkage and interaction between individual characteristics and contextual
factors determining whether, through what channels and around which issues people are
84 Brady (1999: 795) suggests five rules to improve survey items on participation: “Aim for concreteness
through detailed description of the act. Ask about a short and definite time interval (e.g., one year). Ask for
details of the activity to help the respondent remember it. Ask for amounts of time or money, if possible.
Design questions to discourage overreporting and social desirability bias”.
199

mobilized into elite-challenging activities. This aspect also poses the biggest challenge to
the future study of non-institutionalized participation. Early studies have almost
exclusively focused on personal resources and motivation, whereas social movement and
activists studies have rather examined network structures and mobilization effects. The
main objective of future studies should be to bring those two approaches together.
Finally, the consequence dimension of elite-challenging activities deserves further
attention. Almost all theoretical approaches to political participation make implicit (a
few: explicit) claims about the consequences of an increase or decrease, or a specific
composition of determinants of non-institutionalized actions – be it for democracy,
political inequality, social cohesion, or democratic accountability. A systematic empirical
testing of these propositions, however, is rather scarce. Instead, anecdotal evidence is
presented, or individual-level findings are the basis for drawing conclusions on the
societal level. 85 Without systematically testing the proposed relationships at the adequate
level of analysis, the conclusions made must remain speculative. In my point of view, this
is especially true for the recuring crisis scenarios in the relationship between the citizen
and the state.
Looking at the long-term implications of rising elite-challenging activities for
contemporary representative democracies, the consequences largely depend on the ability
of democratic institutions to adapt to those changes in the citizen participation repertoire.
The direction and speed of social change and individualization processes make it very
unlikely that the withdrawal from traditional – largely hierarchical – mass organizations
that we could observe over the past decades is trend that can be reversed. This study has
shown that citizens are not turning their back on politics per se, but that they get involved
on their own terms when they are concerned about specific political or social issues. In
the past, democracies have proved to be astonishingly flexible and adaptive in meeting
challenges. The great challenge for contemporary democracies today – which is at the
same time a tremendous potential – is to reform the democratic process to meet these
participation demands by its citizens.
85 This means committing an individualistic fallacy (Inglehart and Welzel 2003: 62).
200

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Appendix A4-1: Criteria for an Electoral Democracy according to Freedom House:
(1) Competitive, multiparty political system.
(2) Universal adult suffrage for all citizens.
(3) Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy,
reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud that yields
results that are unrepresentative of the public will.
(4) Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through
media and through generally open political campaigning.
Source: www.freedomhouse.org
Appendix A4-2: Ratings for Political Rights and Civil Liberties according to
Freedom House
For each of the following checklist questions, a separate score between 0 and 4 is given
to a country, with 0 being the least prevailing rights and liberties and 4 being the most.
For each scale, the points are added. The raw scores is then transformed into a scale
according to the following scheme:
Political Rights
Civil Liberties
Total Raw Scores PR Rating Total Raw Scores CL Rating
36-40 1 53-60 1
30-35 2 44-52 2
24-29 3 35-43 3
18-23 4 26-34 4
12-17 5 17-25 5
6-11 6 8-16 6
0-5 7 0-7 7
226

Checklist 1: Criteria for evaluating Political Rights according to Freedom House:
A) Electoral Process
1) Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through
free and fair elections?
2) Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
3) Are there fair electoral rules, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and
honest tabulation of ballots?
B) Political Pluralism and Participation
1) Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other political
competitive groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of
these competing parties or groupings?
2) Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic
possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
3) Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign
powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other
powerful group?
4) Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable selfdetermination,
self-government. autonomy, or participation through informal
consensus in the decision-making process?
C) Functioning of Government
1) Do freely elected representatives determine the policies of the government?
2) Is the government free from pervasive corruption?
3) Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate
with openness and transparency?
227

Checklist 2: Criteria for evaluating Civil Liberties according to Freedom House:
D) Freedom of Expression and Belief
1) Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note:
in cases where the media are state-controlled but offers pluralistic points of view, the
survey gives the system credit.)
2) Are there free religious institutions, and is there free private and public religious
expression?
3) Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political
indoctrination?
4) Is there open and free private discussion?
E) Associational and Organizational Rights
1) Is there freedom of assembly, demonstrations, and open public discussion?
2) Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this includes
political parties, civic organizations, ad hoc discussion groups, etc.)
3) Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there
effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private
organizations?
F) Rule of Law
1) Is there an independent judiciary?
2) Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct
civilian control?
3) Is there protection from police terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture,
whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and
insurgencies?
4) Is the population treated equally under law?
228

G) Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights
1) Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or
choice of employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive
dependency on the state?
2) Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private
business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or
organized crime?
3) Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage
partners, and size of family?
4) Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?
229

Appendix A4-3: Overview: Political Rights and Civil Liberties according to Freedom House: 1981-2008
1981 1982 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL
Albania 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 4 4 4 3 2 4
Algeria 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 7 6 7 6
Andorra 2 1
Argentina 6 5 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 3 2 3
Armenia 5 5 4 3 3 4
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Azerbaijan 5 5 5 5 6 6
Bangladesh 3 4 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 2 3 2 3 2 4
Belarus 4 4 4 3 5 4
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bosnia Herzeg. 6 6 6 6
Brazil 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 4
Bulgaria 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 4 2 3 2 3 2 2
Burkina Faso 6 5 6 5 6 5 7 5 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 4
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chile 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
China 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Colombia 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 4 3 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
Croatia 3 4 4 4 4 4
Cyprus (Greek) 3 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Czech Republic 1 2
Czechoslovakia 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 2
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Dom. Republic 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 3
Egypt 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 6 6 6
El Salvador 5 5 5 5 4 5 3 5 2 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 3
Estonia 2 3 3 3 3 2
Ethiopia 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 6 4 6 5 6 5
230

1981 1982 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
France 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Georgia 6 5 4 5 5 5
Germany 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Germany East 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 6 6
Germany West 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
Ghana 2 3 6 5 6 5 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 6 6 6 5 6 5 6 6 5 5 5 4
Great Britain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Greece 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 3
Guatemala 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 5 4 5 4 5
Hungary 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 4 3 4 4 4
Indonesia 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 7 6
Iran 5 5 6 6 6 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 6 5 6 5 6 6 6 7
Iraq 6 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Israel 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 3
Italy 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2
Jordan 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 4 4
Korea, South 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2
Latvia 2 3 3 3 3 3
Lithuania 2 3 2 3 1 3
Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Macedonia 3 4 3 3
Malaysia 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5
Mali 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 4 2 3 2 3
Malta 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
231

1981 1982 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL
Mexico 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4
Moldova 5 4 5 5 5 5
Montenegro 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 6 5 6 5 6 6
Morocco 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 5 5 5
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
New Zealand 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nigeria 2 3 2 3 2 3 7 5 7 5 7 5 6 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 7 5
Northern Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pakistan 7 5 7 5 7 5 7 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 5 3 5
Peru 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 4 3 4 3 5 6 5 5 5
Philippines 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4
Poland 6 4 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Portugal 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Romania 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 4
Russian Fed. 3 3 3 4 3 4
Rwanda 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 5
Serbia 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 6 5 6 5 6 6
Singapore 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
Slovakia 3 4
Slovenia 2 3 2 2 1 2
South Africa 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 6 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4
Soviet Union 6 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 6 5 5 4 4 4
Spain 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Taiwan 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 3 4 3 3 3 5 5 3 3 4 4
Tanzania 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5
Thailand 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 6 4 3 4 3 5
232

1981 1982 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993- 94
PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL
Trinidad & Tob. 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Turkey 6 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 3 5 3 4 2 4 2 4 3 3 2 4 2 4 2 4 4 4
Uganda 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 6 4 6 5 6 6 6 5 6 5
Ukraine 3 3 3 3 4 4
United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Uruguay 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2
Venezuela 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 3 1 3 3 3 3 3
Vietnam 7 7 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zambia 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 2 3 2 3 3 4
Table continued:
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998- 1999- 2000-01 2001-02 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1999 2000
PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL
Albania 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Algeria 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5
Andorra 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Argentina 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 1 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Armenia 3 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Azerbaijan 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 4 6 4 6 4 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5
Bangladesh 2 4 3 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4
Belarus 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bosnia H. 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3
Brazil 2 4 2 4 2 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
Bulgaria 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Burkina Fa. 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 3 5 3 5 3
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chile 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
233

China 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6
Colombia 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3
Croatia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Cyprus (Gr) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Czech Rep. 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Dom.Rep. 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Egypt 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5
El Salvador 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3
Estonia 3 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ethiopia 6 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
France 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Georgia 5 5 4 5 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 4
Germany 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ghana 5 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
GBritain 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Greece 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Guatemala 4 5 4 5 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4
Hungary 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3
Indonesia 7 6 7 6 7 5 7 5 6 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 2 3 2 3 2 3
Iran 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Iraq 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 7 5 6 5 6 6 6 6
Ireland 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Israel 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 2
Italy 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Jordan 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 5 5 5 6 5 5 4 5 4 5 4
Korea,
South
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
234

1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999- 2000-01 2001-02 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2000
PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL
Latvia 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
Lithuania 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Macedonia 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Malaysia 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Mali 2 4 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3
Malta 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mexico 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3
Moldova 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
Montenegro 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3
Morocco 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
N. Zealand 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nigeria 7 6 7 7 7 6 7 6 6 4 4 3 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
N. Ireland 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pakistan 3 5 3 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 7 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5
Peru 5 4 5 4 4 3 5 4 5 4 5 4 3 3 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3
Philippines 3 4 2 4 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3
Poland 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Romania 4 3 4 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Russian Fed. 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5
Rwanda 7 7 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5
Serbia 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2
Singapore 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4
Slovakia 2 3 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Slovenia 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
South Africa 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
Spain 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tanzania 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3
Thailand 3 5 3 4 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 7 4 6 4
235

1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998- 1999- 2000-01 2001- 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1999 2000
2002
PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Taiwan 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1
Trin. & Tob. 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
Turkey 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Uganda 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 5 6 5 6 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4
Ukraine 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 3 2 3 2
USA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Uruguay 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Venezuela 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 4 4 3 5 3 5 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Vietnam 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 5 7 5 7 5
Zambia 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4
For the countries of the former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia: Scores are given for the countries after independence. For scores before independence, please
refer to the formerly unified states.
For the countries of the former Yugoslavian Republic: Scores are given for the countries after independence. For scores before the country’s independence,
please refer to the Serbia Montenegro.
1 The Freedom House scores for Great Britain and Northern Ireland are based on the scores for the United Kingdom. The WVS/EVS conducts separate surveys in
both part parts of the UK.
2 The Freedom House scores for Montenegro and Serbia are based on the scores for Serbia and Montenegro. The WVS conducts separate surveys in both parts of
the country.
Freedom House Ratings:
Free
Partly Free
Not Free
236

Appendix A4-4:
Internal Consistency and Inter-Item Correlations of the Additive
Scale for Elite-Challenging Participation
Political
Action
(1974)
WVS/
EVS
(1981)
WVS/
EVS
(1990)
WVS
(1995)
WVS/
EVS
(1999)
WVS
(2005)
ESS
(2002)
ESS
(2004)
Signing petitions .31 .33 .36 .37 .40 .42 .41 .38
Joining in boycott .34 .43 .43 .46 .45 .44 .32 .31
Attending lawful .36 .47 .47 .46 .49 .44 .30 .26
demonstrations
Joining in unofficial .15 .34 .35 .36 .36 - - -
strikes
Occupying buildings .23 .30 .27 .24 .26 - - -
Cronbach’s Alpha .46 .58 .59 .59 .61 .61 .52 .49
Pooled samples. The samples of the Political Action Study and WVS/EVS are weighted with equal weight
= 1.000. The ESS data were adjusted according to the population size.
Data entries are corrected item-total correlations.
Information about the countries included in the analysis can be obtained from Table 1.
237

Appendix A5-1:
Participated in Illegal Protests during the past 12 Months, in
% (ESS 2002)
Luxembourg
France
Belgium
Switzerland
Italy
Spain
Greece
Israel
Czech Republic
Austria
Denmark
Germany
Slovenia
Sweden
Ireland
Hungary
UK
Norway
Netherlands
Portugal
Finland
Poland
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Source: European Social Survey 2002, Round 1. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample
(design weight).
Question wording: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going
wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of following? (...) Participated in illegal protest activities.”
238

Appendix A5-2: Elite-Challenging Activities in 15 postindustrial societies, 1981-
1999, in % (WVS/EVS)
70
Signing petition
60
50
40
30
Attending demonstration
20
Joining boycott
10
0
1981 1990 1999
Joining strike
Occupying building
Source: WVS/EVS 1981-1999.
15 societies were included: West Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Iceland, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, Great
Britain, Northern Ireland, Ireland, USA, Canada, Japan. The results are weighted with n=1000 for each samples society.
Because Spain was represented with two samples both in the second and fourth wave, the results are only based on one
1990 and the 1999 sample.
239

Appendix A6-1: Factor Analysis: Conventional Participation and Voting (ESS 2002)
Worked in political party or
action group
Contacted politician,
government or local
government official
Worked in another
organization or association
Donated money to a
political organization or
group
Conventional
Participation
All Western Europe Eastern Europe
Voting
Conventional
Participation
Voting
Conventional
Participation
Voting
.73 .02 .74 .02 .69 -.08
.65 -.14 .65 -.15 .64 -.15
.64 -.18 .64 -.19 .66 -.05
.62 .11 .63 .11 .60 .12
Voted in last election -.05 .98 -.05 .97 -.05 .98
Explained Variance 36% 19% 36% 20% 35% 19%
K-M-O measure .69 .69 .68
Bartlett’s test of sphericity 12931.268 *** 100058.179 *** 1947.495 ***
Data Source: European Social Survey, 2002.
Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design weight).
Question formulation for conventional participation: “There are different ways to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During
the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?”
Question formulation for voting: “Some people don’t vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election in
[month/year]?” Respondents who have not been eligible to vote have been excluded from analysis.
240

Appendix A6-2: Individual-Level Correlation between Elite-Challenging
Activities and Forms of Conventional Participation
Elite-
Challenging
Activities and...
Contacted
politician
Worked in a
party
Donated
money
Worked in
another
organization
Austria .18 *** .13 *** .22 *** .22 ***
Belgium .16 *** .15 *** .16 *** .23 ***
Switzerland .21 *** .13 *** .23 *** .21 ***
Czech Republic .18 *** .10 *** .18 *** .18 ***
Germany .18 *** .11 *** .20 *** .22 ***
East .23 *** .13 *** .14 *** .24 ***
West .16 *** .10 *** .22 *** .22 ***
Denmark .14 *** .09 *** .14 *** .14 ***
Spain .29 *** .28 *** .28 *** .41 ***
Finland .16 *** .02 .09 *** .15 ***
UK .19 *** .12 *** .17 *** .18 ***
Greece .26 *** .18 *** .25 *** .31 ***
Hungary .21 *** .18 *** .28 *** .24 ***
Ireland .21 *** .17 *** .19 *** .27 ***
Israel .19 *** .18 *** .20 *** .23 ***
Italy .28 *** .27 *** .22 *** .31 ***
Luxembourg .19 *** .13 *** .22 *** .24 ***
Netherlands .21 *** .13 *** .20 *** .21 ***
Norway .16 *** .14 *** .15 *** .21 ***
Poland .23 *** .16 *** .29 *** .19 ***
Portugal .32 *** .37 *** .33 *** .33 ***
Sweden .14 *** .10 *** .11 *** .18 ***
Slovenia .16 *** .13 *** .19 *** .12 ***
Western Europe .22 *** .17 *** .22 *** .26 ***
Eastern Europe .21 *** .13 *** .19 *** .28 ***
Data Source: European Social Survey, 2002.
Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design weight).
241

Appendix A6-3: Factor Analysis: Unpaid Work in Various Voluntary Associations (WVS/EVS 1999-2001)
Factor I:
Citizen action groups
Factor II:
Interest organizations
Labor unions .03 .73
Professional associations .19 .56
Political parties .11 .64
Social welfare service organizations .50 .06
Human rights organizations .64 .04
Youth work organizations .40 .16
Local community action groups .55 .18
Women’s groups .43 .08
Peace movement .61 .06
Environment, conservation, animal rights .59 .10
Explained variance 24% 11%
KMO .805
Bartlett’s test of sphericity 33064.449 ***
Data Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey 1999-2001.
Societies included: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Republic of Moldova,
Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Uganda, Ukraine, Republic of Macedonia,
Great Britain, Northern Ireland, USA, Serbia and Montenegro.
Data are weighted n=1.000.
Question formulation: “Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say for which, if any, are you currently doing
unpaid voluntary work?”
242

Appendix A6-4: Factor Analysis: Unpaid Work in Various Voluntary Associations (WVS/EVS)
FI:
Interest
organizations
1981 1990 1999
FII:
Citizen
action groups
FI:
Interest
organizations
FII:
Citizen
action groups
FI:
Interest
organizations
FII:
Citizen
action groups
Political parties .61 .10 .63 .17 .59 .15
Labor unions .69 -.08 .74 -.03 .78 -.12
Professional associations .61 .05 .63 .11 .56 .24
Social welfare service organizations .06 .70 -.06 .73 .09 .62
Human rights organizations .41 .34 .13 .64 .04 .67
Youth work organizations -.01 .71 .16 .56 .11 .60
Explained variance 25% 17% 27% 18% 26% 17%
KMO .639 .657 .651
Bartlett’s test of sphericity 1926.186 *** 3166.438 *** 2739.591 ***
Data Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey.
Societies included: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain, Northern
Ireland, USA.
Data are weighted n = 1.000.
243

Appendix A7-1: Social activities in % (ESS 2002)
Sports club or club for outdoor activities
Organization for cultural or hobby
activities
Trade union
Member Participated Voluntary
work
Member Participated Voluntary
work
Member Participated Voluntary
work
Austria 26,4 13,3 3,1 17,5 13,4 3,2 21,5 3,2 0,5
Belgium 28,9 22,7 8,1 22,3 18,9 6,6 27,6 4,8 0,9
Germany 31,7 20,5 11,1 16,5 14,1 7,3 14,0 3,3 1,4
Denmark 36,1 23,7 13,1 25,8 17,9 7,2 64,5 10,6 2,0
Spain 12,4 10,2 1,3 11,0 7,5 3,3 5,5 1,8 0,5
Finland 22,4 12,4 4,0 13,4 10,2 2,0 45,9 3,5 0,4
UK 27,4 22,5 6,2 16,1 16,0 4,8 15,7 2,7 0,5
Greece 4,3 2,7 1,0 5,7 3,3 1,7 5,3 2,4 0,8
Hungary 5,4 6,1 2,1 4,5 5,8 2,6 6,0 2,6 0,8
Ireland 33,9 17,7 5,6 18,4 10,5 3,2 19,0 3,5 0,8
Israel 16,9 10,5 0,7 13,1 10,0 1,3 14,1 2,8 0,5
Italy 8,4 9,5 0,9 7,2 6,1 0,7 8,8 4,7 0,3
Luxembourg 25,5 12,6 5,4 21,3 10,0 4,9 22,2 2,6 0,8
Netherlands 46,2 25,1 13,4 19,0 11,1 6,3 21,6 2,3 0,7
Norway 32,0 20,6 19,9 22,0 17,0 12,5 47,3 9,6 5,2
Poland 4,2 2,2 1,0 3,3 2,8 1,3 6,1 1,6 0,5
Portugal 8,3 6,4 1,4 3,6 3,1 0,8 5,2 1,4 0,3
Sweden 38,5 23,3 17,0 24,6 16,4 9,5 55,6 6,9 2,1
Slovenia 16,1 10,2 7,6 8,1 5,1 4,9 19,3 3,0 1,6
No results for Switzerland and the Czech Republic.
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design weight)
Question: “For each of the voluntary organizations I will now mention, please use this card to tell me whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last
12 months, and, if so, which.” Answers included: “Member”, “Participated”, and “Voluntary Work”.
244

Continued (1)…
Social activities in % (ESS 2002)
Business, professional, or farmers’
organization
Consumer or automobile organization
Organization for humanitarian aid,
human rights, minorities, or immigrants
Member Participated Voluntary
work
Member Participated Voluntary
work
Member Participated Voluntary
work
Austria 9,8 3,3 0,6 32,5 2,6 0,1 8,3 4,5 1,5
Belgium 9,0 4,7 2,1 9,2 1,4 0,7 6,5 4,4 2,9
Germany 8,6 3,4 1,4 28,1 1,1 0,3 5,8 2,9 2,0
Denmark 14,3 5,8 1,6 17,5 1,0 0,3 11,4 2,7 3,4
Spain 4,7 1,9 0,1 3,7 1,4 0,0 4,0 4,0 1,4
Finland 11,8 3,1 0,6 4,6 0,9 0,1 3,8 2,6 1,8
UK 13,1 5,4 1,4 32,2 2,4 0,2 3,5 2,9 2,1
Greece 5,5 2,2 0,7 0,4 0,3 0,1 1,0 0,7 0,7
Hungary 3,3 3,1 1,1 2,8 0,7 0,1 0,7 0,8 0,8
Ireland 15,6 5,6 1,4 8,9 1,2 0,2 4,7 3,4 1,6
Israel 7,7 1,3 0,3 24,5 1,6 0,1 2,8 2,1 1,2
Italy 9,1 2,9 0,2 6,3 0,9 0,0 4,4 2,1 1,1
Luxembourg 11,4 2,6 1,4 45,8 0,3 0,0 9,3 2,2 1,7
Netherlands 12,8 5,0 1,2 31,6 1,9 0,4 7,9 1,4 2,8
Norway 14,7 4,8 1,8 33,1 1,2 0,6 16,9 3,3 3,5
Poland 1,1 0,9 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,5 0,8 0,4
Portugal 3,0 0,7 0,4 1,5 0,5 0,1 1,9 1,8 0,4
Sweden 8,6 3,8 1,8 37,3 1,9 0,8 13,5 4,1 3,9
Slovenia 7,6 2,9 2,0 8,8 0,9 0,5 5,4 1,9 2,1
No results for Switzerland and the Czech Republic.
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design weight)
Question: “For each of the voluntary organizations I will now mention, please use this card to tell me whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last
12 months, and, if so, which.” Answers included: “Member”, “Participated”, and “Voluntary Work”.
245

Continued (2)…
Social activities in % (ESS 2002)
Organization for environmental
protection, peace or animal rights
Religious or church organization
Political party
Member Participated Voluntary
work
Member Participated Voluntary
work
Member Participated Voluntary
work
Austria 13,1 5,5 1,0 31,7 9,3 3,1 11,4 5,2 2,2
Belgium 7,7 4,5 2,1 6,7 5,4 2,7 6,4 3,2 2,0
Germany 6,2 3,5 1,6 18,9 9,0 5,2 3,3 3,5 2,1
Denmark 12,4 1,9 1,0 26,7 7,6 2,3 6,2 2,6 1,3
Spain 1,8 2,1 0,3 6,0 4,4 1,3 2,8 1,8 0,8
Finland 2,2 2,1 0,6 24,8 7,1 2,4 6,2 1,7 0,5
UK 5,9 3,1 1,4 13,5 12,3 5,8 2,7 0,8 0,5
Greece 1,4 0,8 0,3 1,4 0,7 0,5 4,0 1,9 1,2
Hungary 0,4 1,1 0,5 5,9 4,6 1,9 1,5 1,4 0,8
Ireland 4,3 3,2 1,1 24,8 11,2 4,7 3,8 1,5 1,2
Israel 3,5 2,2 0,9 5,4 2,2 0,7 8,4 1,6 0,6
Italy 2,8 1,8 0,8 5,0 3,5 1,3 3,2 1,7 0,5
Luxembourg 14,2 1,9 1,1 4,9 2,0 1,1 6,3 1,2 0,6
Netherlands 20,1 1,9 1,0 26,2 10,1 6,8 4,6 1,7 0,9
Norway 5,0 1,1 0,6 15,2 7,3 6,1 9,2 3,5 2,4
Poland 1,0 0,7 0,4 3,0 2,2 0,9 1,7 0,7 0,3
Portugal 1,0 1,5 0,7 5,5 7,9 1,6 4,0 1,9 0,7
Sweden 6,9 1,7 1,1 15,2 6,8 4,3 8,4 3,5 2,1
Slovenia 1,2 0,5 0,7 8,1 1,6 2,7 4,0 1,8 1,4
No results for Switzerland and the Czech Republic.
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design weight)
Question: “For each of the voluntary organizations I will now mention, please use this card to tell me whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last
12 months, and, if so, which.” Answers included: “Member”, “Participated”, and “Voluntary Work”.
246

Continued (3)…
Social activities in % (ESS 2002)
Organization for science, education, or teacher
and parents
Social club, club for the young, the
retired/elderly, women, of friendly societies
Member Participated Voluntary
work
Member Participated Voluntary
work
Austria 10,3 5,2 2,4 18,7 6,0 2,7
Belgium 8,3 7,5 3,3 19,5 15,9 7,7
Germany 6,0 4,6 2,8 13,3 10,2 4,6
Denmark 7,3 3,5 1,3 17,8 9,3 3,7
Spain 7,5 3,9 1,3 7,0 5,4 1,4
Finland 4,9 4,8 1,0 8,6 3,7 1,1
UK 6,6 7,4 3,9 15,9 11,4 4,4
Greece 4,0 1,6 0,8 3,2 1,9 1,0
Hungary 3,1 2,6 1,4 5,3 4,6 1,0
Ireland 7,7 4,3 2,1 15,7 8,0 4,5
Israel 8,8 5,0 0,8 10,5 6,5 1,8
Italy 2,2 1,2 0,2 4,6 2,2 0,5
Luxembourg 11,0 2,8 1,6 16,9 5,1 3,0
Netherlands 9,7 5,0 3,9 9,5 4,9 3,5
Norway 8,2 5,0 4,5 22,4 13,3 8,9
Poland 1,8 1,3 0,5 2,0 1,5 0,4
Portugal 1,3 1,8 0,3 4,6 2,2 0,2
Sweden 10,9 5,6 3,2 19,3 10,9 6,0
Slovenia 5,2 2,0 0,8 0 4,9 3,6
No results for Switzerland and the Czech Republic.
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design weight).
Question: “For each of the voluntary organizations I will now mention, please use this card to tell me whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last
12 months, and, if so, which.” Answers included: “Member”, “Participated”, and “Voluntary Work”.
247

Appendix A7-2: General Activity Level in European Societies, in % (ESS 2002)
Member
in any association
Active member
in any association
Activity
in any association
Austria 75,2 17,5 37,7
Belgium 71,2 28,1 51,8
Germany 71,1 33,4 46,0
Denmark 92,0 45,8 51,7
Spain 36,3 12,0 26,2
Finland 76,4 4,8 41,0
UK 70,0 35,8 50,6
Greece 24,8 11,4 13,4
Hungary 27,1 10,7 20,8
Ireland 68,1 21,5 38,0
Israel 55,0 5,1 28,8
Italy 34,9 0,7 24,8
Luxembourg 77,6 17,5 31,1
Netherlands 83,8 35,5 48,6
Norway 84,0 41,4 51,7
Poland 20,7 5,9 11,8
Portugal 28,9 8,9 17,8
Sweden 90,2 42,5 51,4
Slovenia 52,3 16,9 31,2
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample
(design weight).
Associations included: sports club, cultural/hobby organization, trade union, business/professional/farmer
association, consumer/automobile organization, humanitarian organization, environmental/peace/animal
organization, religious/church organization, political party, science/education/teacher organization, social
club.
Active member in any association: Members in any association who participated or did voluntary work.
Activity in any association: People who participated or did voluntary work, independently from
membership in any association.
248

Appendix A7-3: Social Trust in European Societies, in % (ESS 2002)
Low trust level
Medium trust
level
High trust level
Mean trust level (0-20)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Austria 15,7 55,3 27,1 10,75 4.297
Belgium 16,3 57,9 24,6 10,43 3.943
Switzerland 7,4 55,9 36,4 11,84 3.606
Czech Republic 24,0 55,3 17,5 9,44 4.183
Germany 14,9 63,5 21,3 10,44 3.781
Denmark 2,5 31,6 64,9 14,32 3.341
Spain 19,0 59,0 20,3 10,11 4.015
Finland 4,0 40,0 55,7 13,34 3.326
UK 14,1 62,8 22,7 10,61 3.724
Greece 45,5 45,0 8,7 7,33 4.389
Hungary 28,5 56,9 12,9 8,72 4.242
Ireland 13,5 50,9 34,5 11,47 4.193
Israel 22,4 48,7 27,2 10,26 4.621
Italy 25,8 59,4 13,7 9,11 4.150
Luxembourg 15,1 56,7 25,5 10,67 4.131
Netherlands 8,0 54,9 36,7 11,90 3.499
Norway 3,2 38,1 58,5 13,65 3.351
Poland 32,1 56,7 8,3 8,24 4.023
Portugal 22,4 61,4 15,4 9,42 3.992
Sweden 6,3 43,4 49,4 12,76 3.634
Slovenia 32,1 52,1 14,4 8,67 4.424
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample
(design weight).
Question formulation:
(1) “Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t
be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be
too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.”
(2) “Using this card, do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the
chance, or would they try to be fair?” (0=Most people try to take advantage of me; 10= Most people try
to be fair).
Based on the two items, an additive scale was created:
Low trust level: Score 0 to 6 on the additive scale.
Medium trust level: Score 7 to 13 on the additive scale.
High trust level: Score 14 to 20 on the additive scale.
249

Appendix A7-4:Elite-Challenging Activities and High Trust Levels, in % (ESS 2002)
70
Denmark
60
Norway
Finland
High trust level, in %
50
40
30
Netherlands
Ireland
Austria
Israel
Sweden
Switzerland
Luxembourg
20
10
Portugal
Slovenia
Italy
Hungary
Poland
Greece
Belgium
Spain
Czech Republic
UK
Germany
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Elite-challenging activities, in %
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. Data are weighted to correct for a sampling bias within each sample (design
weight). R = .75 *** .
Elite-challenging activities: Percentage of respondents who “Have done” any of the following activities in the past 12
month: Signed petition, taken part in a lawful demonstration, boycotted certain products, or deliberately bought certain
products for political, ethical or environmental reasons.
High trust level: Percentage of respondents who show high trust levels (scoring 14 to 20 on an additive scale raging from
0 to 20).
250

Appendix A7-5:
Stepwise Multi-Level Model (Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model) of Social Capital and Elite-
Challenging Activities
Dependent variable: Participation in Elite-Challenging Activities (dichotomous, individual-level measure)
Part 1:
Individual-level predictors only
Model 1a:
Random intercept
only (“null model”)
Model 1b:
Intercept as outcome
Model 1c:
Slope as outcome
Model 1d:
Random intercept,
random slope
Intercept 0.625* (-2.387) 0.423** (-3.832) 0.525*** (-16.604) 0.439*** (-4.344)
Individual-level effects (slopes):
Membership in voluntary association
Embeddedness in informal networks
Trust
Control Factors
Gender
Age
Education
2.014*** (24.109)
1.163*** (11.534)
1.028*** (8.599)
1.239*** (8.699)
0.990*** (-14.427)
1.396*** (36.082)
1.985*** (14.763)
1.143*** (8.323)
1.027*** (7.133)
1.085 (0.584)
0.990*** (-8.528)
1.400*** (19.288)
2.020*** (14.686)
1.158*** (8.905)
1.028*** (7.463)
1.200** (3.510)
0.990*** (-9.936)
1.405*** (19.377)
Remaining within-society variance:
Intercept (Contribution to variance)
Membership in voluntary association
Embeddedness in informal networks
Trust
Gender
Age
Education
0.7331*** 0.9284*** (-26.6%)
0.0236**
0.0017
0.0001
0.3577***
0.0000***
0.0040***
0.6486*** (11.5%)
0.0262***
0.0018
0.0001
0.0389***
0.0000**
0.0041***
251

Continued (1)….
Part 2:
Individual- and societal-level predictors
Model 1d:
Random intercept,
random slope
Model 2:
Societal-level effects on
intercept
Model 3:
Full model with
interaction effects
Alternative Model 3:
Full model with
interaction effects
Intercept 0.439*** (-4.344) 0.029** (-3.670) 0.061** (-3.321) 0.100* (-2.426)
Individual-level effects (slopes):
Membership in voluntary association
Embeddedness in informal networks
Trust
2.020*** (14.686)
1.158*** (8.905)
1.028*** (7.463)
2.014*** (24.108)
1.163*** (11.536)
1.028*** (8.601)
5.104** (4.083)
0.881 (-0.753)
1.035 (0.832)
5.557** (4.133)
0.845 (-0.951)
1.040 (0.950)
Control Factors
Gender
Age
Education
Societal-level effects (intercepts):
Membership level
Level of informal networks
Trust level
Cross-level interaction effects (slopes):
Individual-level membership in voluntary
associations
* Societal membership level
* Level of informal networks
* Trust level
Individual-level embeddedness in informal
networks
* Societal membership level
* Level of informal networks
* Trust level
Individual-level trust
* Societal membership level
* Level of informal networks
* Trust level
1.200** (3.510)
0.990*** (-9.936)
1.405*** (19.377)
1.239*** (8.700)
0.990*** (-14.433)
1.396*** (36.088)
30.251** (4.003)
0.963 (-0.202)
1.061 (0.542)
1.209** (3.712)
0.990*** (-8.834)
1.405*** (19.187)
19.603** (3,994)
1.0334 (0.201)
1.016 (0.168)
0.437* (-2.304)
1.194* (2.239)
0.959 (-0.922)
1.062 (0.390)
0.931 (-2.015)
1.023 (1.228)
0.972 (-0.779)
1.002 (0.269)
1.001 (0.225)
0.532 (-1.289)
0.997 (-0.238)
1.368 (1.684)
20.393** (3.557)
1.084 (0.432)
0.969 (-0.289)
0.567 (-1.527)
1.173 (1.949)
0.937 (-1.367)
1.165 (0.939)
0.924* (-2.147)
1.022 (1.092)
0.977 (-0.638)
1.002 (0.248)
1.000 (0.063)
252

Continued (2)….
Gender
* Societal membership level
* Level of informal networks
* Trust level
Age
* Societal membership level
* Level of informal networks
* Trust level
Education
* Societal membership level
* Level of informal networks
* Trust level
Remaining between-society variance:
Intercept (Contribution to variance)
Membership in voluntary association
Informal networks
Trust
Gender
Age
Education
0.6486***
0.0262***
0.0018
0.0001
0.0389***
0.0000**
0.0041***
0.1656*** (74.5%) 0.1323*** (79.6%)
0.0146 (44.3%)
0.0021 (-16.7%)
0.0001 (0%)
0.0369*** (5.1%)
0.0000** (0%)
0.0042*** (-2.4%)
1.429 (0.813)
0.919 (-0.868)
1.058 (1.020)
1.016 (1.561)
0.998 (-0.974)
0.998 (-1.268)
0.764 (-1.667)
1.014 (0.369)
1.018 (0.842)
0.1298*** (80,0%)
0.0139 (47.0%)
0.0020 (-11.1%)
0.0001 (0%)
0.0302*** (22.4%)
0.0000** (0%)
0.0042*** (-2.4%)
Source: European Social Survey, 2002. N (individual level) = 35.303. N (societal level) = 19.
Data entries are odds ratios with T-values in parentheses. Hierarchical generalized linear model calculated with HLM 6.03.
Significance level: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p = .00
Individual-level variables: Membership in any voluntary association (0/1), Embeddedness in informal networks (factor scores, see Table 1), Trust (scale 0 to 20).
Societal-level variables: Level of Membership in voluntary associations (members in % in a society), Level of informal networks (average factor score, see Table
1), Trust level (average societal score on trust scale 0 to 20).
253

Appendix A8-1:
Individual-Level Correlations: Elite-Challenging Activities and
Resources, pooled WVS/EVS 2000-05
Gender
(percent valid)
Age
(percent valid)
Age sq.
(percent valid)
Education
(percent valid)
Income
(percent valid)
Eastern Europe
Serbia -.05 (92) -.10 *** (92) -.11 *** (92) .22 *** (92) .03 (90)
Bulgaria -.08 ** (82) -.03 (82) -.05 (82) .14 *** (82) .18 *** (78)
Montenegro -.17 *** (81) -.02 (81) -.03 (81) .15 *** (81) .02 (64)
Bosnia -.06 * (93) .04 (93) .03 (93) .09 ** (93) .12 *** (92)
Romania -.08 ** (92) .01 (92) .00 (92) .17 *** (90) .17 *** (84)
Albania -.19 *** (62) -.03 (62) -.04 (62) .12 *** (62) .14 *** (61)
Macedonia -.07 ** (92) -.01 (92) -.03 (92) .12 *** (92) .10 *** (90)
Central Eastern Europe
Slovenia -.07 * (92) -.15 *** (92) -.15 *** (92) .33 *** (92) .20 *** (89)
Croatia -.03 (92) -.09 ** (92) -.09 ** (92) .09 *** (92) .07 * (90)
Poland -.09 ** (93) -.12 *** (93) -.13 *** (93) .21 *** (93) .15 *** (88)
Czech Republic -.04 (93) .00 (93) -.02 (93) .14 *** (93) .08 ** (85)
Slovakia -.01 (92) -.07 * (92) -.08 ** (92) .13 *** (92) .06 * -85
Hungary -.01 (94) -.07 * (94) -.09 ** (94) .28 *** (94) .07 * (91)
Post-soviet societies
Moldova -.01 (96) -.02 (96) -.04 (96) .11 *** (96) .11 *** (95)
Ukraine -.10 *** (93) -.03 (93) -.03 (93) .10 *** (92) .09 ** (90)
Russia -.01 (92) .15 *** (92) .15 *** (92) .06 * (91 .01 (77)
Baltic states
Latvia -.05 (90) .07 * (90) .05 (90) .21 *** (89) .08 ** (85)
Lithuania -.01 (77) .06 * (77) .05 (77) .13 *** (77) .02 (65)
Estonia -.03 (85) .05 (85) .04 (85) .19 *** (85) .13 *** (76)
Western Europe
East Germany -.01 (94) -.05 (94) -.07 ** (94) .31 *** (94) .05 (85)
Netherlands .01 (88) .00 (88) -.04 (88) .18 *** (88) .04 (70)
Iceland -.05 * (98) -.16 *** (98) -.18 *** (98) .25 *** (97) .14 *** (92)
Belgium -.09 ** (97) -.22 *** (97) -.23 *** (97) .27 *** (96) .26 *** (80)
Spain -.08 ** (91) -.17 *** (91) -.19 *** (91) .26 *** (90) .17 *** (85)
Italy -.05 (94) -.09 ** (94) -.09 *** (94) .24 *** (93) .15 *** (63)
Finland .10 *** (95) -.14 *** (95) -.17 *** (95) .27 *** (95) .10 *** (88)
France -.03 (99) -.06 * (99) -.08 ** (99) .16 *** (99) .09 ** (87)
Sweden .08 ** (98) -.17 *** (98) -.19 *** (98) .19 *** (98) .07 * (93)
Denmark .04 (96) -.10 *** (96) -.12 *** (96) .22 *** (90) .11 *** (86)
Norway .07 ** (100) -.08 * (100) -.11 *** (100) .18 *** (99) .15 *** (92)
Malta -.11 *** (98) -.05 * (98) -.06 * (98) .17 *** (98) .13 *** (70)
Austria -.05 (98) -.15 *** (98) -.17 *** (98) .27 *** (98) .17 *** (79)
West Germany .06 * (96) -.08 ** (96) -.11 *** (96) .20 *** (95) .11 *** (86)
Greece -.08 ** (96) -.07 ** (94) -.08 ** (94) .23 *** (96) .16 *** (82)
Cyprus -.11 *** (100) -.09 ** (100) -.10 *** (100) .24 *** (99) .10 *** (99)
Luxembourg .02 (93) -.09 *** (93) -.10 *** (93) .21 *** (91) .09 * (51)
Portugal -.07 ** (94) -.11 *** (94) -.12 *** (94) .32 *** (94) .22 *** (66)
Switzerland .00 (99) -.02 (99) -.05 (99) .14 *** (98) .03 (89)
Andorra .06 * (98) -.10 *** (98) -.12 *** (98) .28 *** (98) .10 *** (93)
254

Gender
(percent valid)
Age
(percent valid)
Age sq.
(percent valid)
Education
(percent valid)
Income
(percent valid)
Anglo-Saxon societies
USA .04 (98) .23 *** (98) .21 *** (98) .14 *** (98) -.01 (92)
Canada -.01 (96) -.04 (96) -.07 ** (96) .20 *** (96) .17 *** (82)
Northern Ireland -.07 * (95) -.08 ** (91) -.10 *** (91) .12 *** (94) .08 ** (67)
Ireland 2000 -.07 * (95) -.17 *** (93) -.19 *** (93) .29 *** (95) .25 *** (81)
Great Britain .06 * (95) .10 *** (95) .07 * (95) .10 *** (94) .08 * (76)
Australia .98 ** (98) -.06 * (98) -.08 ** (98) .14 *** (97) .14 *** (91)
New Zealand .05 (93) .07 * (93) .05 (93) .05 (93) .12 *** (85)
Central & Southern America
Argentina .03 (89) -.06 * (89) -.07 * (89) .34 *** (89) .13 *** (82)
Chile -.07 ** (98) -.13 *** (98) -.12 *** (98) .28 *** (98) .11 *** (92)
Peru -.07 ** (94) .07 * (94) .05 (94) .23 *** (94) .22 *** (87)
Mexico -.05 * (89) .11 *** (89) .10 *** (89) .15 *** (89) .12 *** (83)
Venezuela -.09 ** (95) .13 *** (95) .12 *** (95) .03 (95) .04 (80)
Brazil -.04 (98) -.08 ** (98) -.09 *** (98) .25 *** (98) .05 (97)
Uruguay -.07 ** (99) .02 (99) -.01 (99) .27 *** (99) .15 *** (97)
Colombia -.08 ** (99) .05 (99) .04 (99) .17 *** (99) .14 *** (91)
Guatemala -.04 (95) .09 ** (95) .08 * (95) .13 *** (95) .09 ** (90)
Trinidad & Tobago -.03 (96) -.04 (96) -.05 * (96) .18 *** (96) .06 * (94)
Africa
Algeria -.13 *** (87) .07 * (87) .07 * (87) .11 *** (87) .06 (87)
Jordan -.15 *** (99) -.02 (99) -.03 (99) .18 *** (99) .14 *** (91)
Morocco -.09 ** (87) -.08 ** (87) -.08 ** (87) .37 *** (87) .25 *** (86)
Egypt -.15 *** (99) - - - - - - - -
South Africa -.08 ** (92) .08 ** (92) .05 (92) .16 *** (92) .02 (87)
Uganda -.23 *** (75) -.07 * (75) -.07 * (75) .15 *** (74) .09 * (44)
Tanzania -.01 (97) .01 (96) .01 (96) .05 (96) -.06 * (89)
Ghana -.14 *** (90) -.01 (90) -.01 (90) .21 *** (90) .13 *** (84)
Nigeria -.21 *** (93) .07 * (93) .06 * (93) .20 *** (93) .11 *** (90)
Burkina Faso -.15 *** (76) .01 (74) .00 (74) .33 *** (76) .20 *** (66)
Ethiopia -.05 (72) .01 (72) .02 (72) .00 (72) -.26 *** (70)
Mali -.05 (73) .01 (69) .-01 (69) .10 ** (68) .05 (58)
Zambia -.11 *** (94) .12 *** (94) .10 *** (94) .22 *** (92) .08 ** (81)
Confucian societies
Japan .06 * (85) .26 *** (85) .22 *** (85) -.03 (83) -.10 ** (79)
South Korea -.03 (100) -.02 (100) -.03 (100) .06 * (100) .02 (100)
Southern Asia
Bangladesh -.17 *** (84) .02 (84) .04 (84) .23 *** (83) .08 ** (83)
Malaysia -.05 (100) .06 * (100) .05 * (100) .03 (100) .06 * (100)
Turkey -.09 *** (98) -.04 (98) -.07 *** (97) .32 *** (95) .10 *** (97)
Indonesia -.12 *** (87) -.13 *** (87) -.13 *** (87) .17 *** (87) .01 (80)
Philippines -.13 *** (98) .01 (98) .01 (98) .12 *** (98) .07 ** (98)
Thailand -.06 * (99) -.08 ** (99) -.07 ** (99) .13 *** (99) .06 * (98)
India -.18 *** (77) .09 ** (77) .08 ** (77) .16 *** (76) .08 ** (77)
Taiwan .01 (100) .01 (100) -.01 (100) .16 *** (100) .06 * (100)
Israel -.02 (96) -.13 *** (95) -.15 *** (95) .26 *** (95) .33 *** (78)
Singapore -.09 ** (98) -.09 ** (98) -.09 ** (98) .10 *** (98) .06 * (90)
Data entries are Pearson’s r. In case of gender Cramer’s V was used.
For the dates of the respective surveys, see Appendix A8-2.
255

Appendix A8-2:
Individual-Level Correlations: Elite-Challenging Activities and
Motivation, pooled WVS 2000-05
Political interest
(percent valid)
Life Satisfaction
(percent valid)
Left-Right Scale
(percent valid)
Postmaterialism
(percent valid)
Self expression
(percent valid)
Eastern Europe
Serbia .19 *** (87) .02 (89) .14 *** (68) .03 (71) -.05 (84)
Bulgaria .16 *** (80) .07 * (79) .18 *** (60) .14 *** (80) .16 *** (79)
Montenegro .34 *** (81) .01 (79) .20 *** (57) .09 ** (78) .20 *** (79)
Bosnia .17 *** (93) .04 (93) .01 (84) .01 (91) .08 ** (93)
Romania .16 *** (91) .08 ** (86) .04 (48) .09 ** (85) .11 *** (86)
Albania .21 *** (62) -.08 * (62) .15 *** (60) .09 * (58) .10 ** (60)
Macedonia .12 *** (92) .01 (92) .01 (75) .04 (89) .04 (91)
Central Eastern Europe
Slovenia .21 *** (92) .10 *** (92) -.13 *** (59) .20 *** (87) .03 (90)
Croatia - - .02 (91) .03 (71) .14 *** (89) .15 *** (86)
Poland .21 *** (93) .02 (92) -.08 * (67) .17 *** (88) .17 *** (89)
Czech Republic .19 *** (93) .00 (93) .07 * (87) .11 *** (90) .16 *** (88)
Slovakia - - .03 (91) .07 * (78) .15 *** (85) .13 *** (79)
Hungary - - .02 (94) -.13 *** (75) .19 *** (90) .17 *** (87)
Post-soviet societies
Moldova .21 *** (96) .05 (96) .04 (75) .14 *** (95) .12 *** (95)
Ukraine .20 *** (90) .14 *** (93) .16 *** (56) .14 *** (91) .05 (89)
Russia .11 *** (90) -.05 (91) - - .03 (90) -.03 (89)
Baltic states
Latvia - - .02 (90) .00 (62) .04 (88) .04 (80)
Lithuania .20 *** (76) -.07 * (75) .11 ** (51) .06 (72) .09 ** (65)
Estonia - - .07 * (85) .07 * (61) .08 * (81) .10 ** (72)
Western Europe
East Germany .26 *** (94) .09 ** (94) -.18 *** (86) .20 *** (93) .16 *** (92)
Netherlands .19 *** (88) -.05 (88) -.20 *** (79) .09 ** (86) .15 *** (87)
Iceland .21 *** (98) -.02 (98) -.09 ** (90) .21 *** (97) .25 *** (88)
Belgium .22 *** (96) -.05 (96) -.13 *** (80) .23 *** (92) .23 *** (90)
Spain .22 *** (91) .08 ** (91) -.12 *** (80) .13 *** (89) .18 *** (89)
Italy .27 *** (94) .05 (93) -.15 *** (71) .23 *** (91) .29 *** (91)
Finland .24 *** (95) .04 (95) -.05 (85) .23 *** (93) .27 *** (94)
France .23 *** (99) .04 (99) -.14 *** (93) .16 *** (98) .20 *** (98)
Sweden .16 *** (97) -.02 (98) -.10 *** (95) .19 *** (97) .21 *** (98)
Denmark .17 *** (96) .03 (96) -.15 *** (87) .19 *** (89) .26 *** (87)
Norway .15 *** (100) -.01 (99) -.18 *** (97) .09 ** (98) .11 *** (99)
Malta - - -.02 (98) -.07 ** (95) .13 *** (98) .15 *** (97)
Austria .25 *** (97) -.03 (97) -.11 *** (80) .14 *** (94) .27 *** (87)
West Germany .25 *** (96) .05 * (95) -.19 *** (85) .29 *** (92) .26 *** (91)
Greece .23 *** (95) .05 * (96) -.20 *** (86) .08 * (91) .24 *** (78)
Cyprus .16 *** (99) -.03 (100) -.06 * (94) .07 * (99) .14 *** (100)
Luxembourg .14 *** (90) .06 * (92) -.12 *** (72) .14 *** (83) .20 *** (84)
Portugal .27 *** (94) .09 ** (93) -.10 ** (72) .15 *** (90) .17 *** (84)
Switzerland .16 *** (99) -.02 (99) -.09 ** (90) .12 *** (97) .16 *** (96)
Andorra .18 *** (98) .00 (98) -.20 *** (90) .10 ** (98) .23 *** (98)
256

Political interest
(percent valid)
Life Satisfaction
(percent valid)
257
Left-Right Scale
(percent valid)
Postmaterialism
(percent valid)
Self expression
(percent valid)
Anglo-Saxon societies
USA .27 *** (98) .00 (97) -.02 (95) .05 (97) .13 *** (98)
Canada .18 *** (96) .06 * (96) -.12 *** (77) .09 ** (96) .27 *** (98)
Northern Ireland .13 *** (94) -.06 * (94) -.03 (75) .12 *** (89) .12 *** (83)
Ireland 2000 .19 *** (95) .00 (95) -.16 *** (80) .12 *** (92) .24 *** (86)
Great Britain .23 *** (95) -.01 (95) -.07 *** (81) .11 *** (91) .19 *** (93)
Australia .17 *** (99) .01 (98) -.14 *** (94) .14 *** (96) .11 *** (99)
New Zealand .15 *** (95) .07 ** (93) -.09 ** (65) .03 (78) .10 *** (88)
Central & Southern America
Argentina .19 *** (88) -.14 *** (88) -.20 *** (65) .21 *** (84) .20 *** (84)
Chile .24 *** (98) .06 * (98) -.13 *** (68) .14 *** (96) .11 *** (67)
Peru .24 *** (94) .02 (94) -.02 (72) .12 *** (90) .18 *** (86)
Mexico .25 *** (89) -.02 (88) -.04 (77) .06 (87) .11 *** (87)
Venezuela .16 *** (95) -.01 (95) -.06 * (78) .04 (94) .04 (95)
Brazil .14 *** (97) -.03 (98) -.04 (90) .17 *** (94) .08 ** (97)
Uruguay .33 *** (98) .04 (99) -.26 *** (86) .22 *** (89) .25 *** (93)
Colombia .18 *** (99) -.01 (99) -.04 (74) .09 ** (95) .09 ** (97)
Guatemala .12 *** (94) .02 (95) -.04 (77) .06 (94) .04 (95)
Trinidad & Tobago .04 (96) .04 (96) -.02 (61) .06 (95) .08 ** (96)
Africa
Algeria
Jordan .18 *** (98) .04 (98) .09 (28) .06 (97) .06 * (99)
Morocco .27 *** (84) .26 *** (86) .26 *** (41) .17 *** (84) .25 *** (79)
South Africa .13 *** (91) -.01 (92) -.07 * (76) .03 (88) .07 * (91)
Uganda .19 *** (75) -.02 (75) .03 (68) .02 (75) .08 ** (75)
Tanzania .05 * (96) .01 (96) -.01 (68) .07 * (92) .03 (95)
Ghana .11 *** (89) .03 (90) .03 (47) .07 * (90) .01 (90)
Nigeria .18 *** (93) .06 * (93) .10 *** (91) .12 *** (93) .08 ** (93)
Burkina Faso .11 *** (75) .05 (76) -.02 (61) .14 *** (75) .02 (74)
Ethiopia .07 ** (69) -.13 *** (72) -.12 *** (63) .04 (68) -.02 (70)
Mali .15 *** (70) .00 (68) .00 (62) .02 (70) .03 (69)
Zambia .14 *** (91) .02 (92) -.01 (62) .10 ** (92) .06 * (93)
Confucian societies
Japan .19 *** (84) .00 (84) -.04 (69) .07 (74) .02 (79)
South Korea .22 *** (100) -.08 ** (100) -.02 (100) .05 (100) -.04 (100)
Southern Asia
Bangladesh .22 *** (82) .14 *** (83) -.15 *** (67) .13 *** (82) .06 * (83)
Malaysia .12 *** (99) -.05 * (100) - - .03 (99) .13 *** (100)
Turkey .18 *** (98) -.08 ** (98) -.15 *** (84) .06 (96) .06 * (98)
Indonesia .14 *** (87) .00 (84) -.04 (64) .12 *** (83) .05 (98)
Philippines .10 *** (98) -.02 (98) -.05 (94) .10 ** (98) .08 ** (83)
Thailand .07 ** (100) .09 *** (100) .05 (100) .02 (96) .00 (99)
India .31 *** (73) -.01 (75) .07 (42) .14 *** (67) .11 *** (67)
Taiwan .24 *** (100) .02 (100) -.03 (99) .05 (100) .11 *** (100)
Israel .11 *** (96) .13 *** (96) -.01 (89) .14 *** (89) .30 *** (82)
Singapore .07 ** (98) .05 (98) - - .08 ** (97) .16 *** (98)
Source: WVS 2000 and 2005. Data entries are Pearson’s r.
Data taken from WVS 2005 for France, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, USA,
Canada, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, Australia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Argentina, South Korea,
Poland, Switzerland, Brazil, Chile, India, East Germany, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey,
Ukraine, Russia, Peru, Uruguay, Ghana, Moldova, Thailand, Indonesia, Colombia, Serbia, New Zealand,
Morocco, Jordan, Cyprus, Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago, Andorra, Malaysia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia,
Mali, Zambia.

Appendix A8-3:
Factor Analysis of Level-2 Predictors
Modernization
Democracy stock .913
GDP per capita, adjusted for ppp .897
Voice and Accountability .858
Happiness level .822
Level of tertiarization .799
Eigenvalue 3.689
N=78. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure: .857. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity: 264.036 ***
258

Appendix A8-4:
Alternative Multi-Level Model (Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model):
Individual- and Contextual Determinants of Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS 2000-2005)
Model 1:
Individual-level
only
(random
intercept, random
slope)
Model 2:
Societal-level effects on intercept
Intercept 0.92 (-0.780) 0.91 (-0.969) 0.91 (-1.058) 0.91 (-0.972) 0.91 (-0.986) 0.91 (-0.963) 0.91 (-0.963)
Individual-level effects
(slopes):
Life Satisfaction
Left-Right Positioning (rev.)
Interest in Politics
Self Expression Values
Control Factors:
Gender
Age
Education
Income
Societal-level effects
(intercepts):
GDP per capita, ppp
Democracy Stock
Voice & Accountability
Tertiarization
Inequality: Gini coefficient
Happiness level
Remaining between-society
variance:
Intercept
(Contribution to variance)
Left-Right Positioning (rev.)
Gender
Age
0.97 *** (-3.882)
1.05 *** (4.215)
1.54 *** (22.127)
3.44 *** (13.312)
0.86 ** (-3.758)
1.00 * (2.415)
1.15 *** (14.658)
1.03 ** (2.937)
1.00 *** (8.941)
--
--
--
--
--
0.7439 ***
0.5697 ***
(23.4%)
0.0060 ***
0.0834 ***
0.0002 ***
1.00 ** (2.790)
1.00 *** (3.877)
--
--
--
--
0.4713 ***
(36,6%)
1.00 *** (3.448)
--
1.36 (1.404)
--
--
--
0.5619 ***
(24.5%)
1.00 *** (6.014)
--
--
1.02 * (1.971)
--
--
0.5461 ***
(26.6%)
0.98 *** (-5.063)
1.04 *** (9.469)
1.53 *** (37.100)
3.81 *** (21.189)
0.87 *** (-6.980)
1.00 *** (4.925)
1.16 *** (27.428)
1.03 *** (5.494)
1.00 *** (7.778)
--
--
--
0.99 (-0.466)
--
0.5765 ***
(22.5%)
1.00 *** (7.087)
--
--
--
--
0.96 (-0.327)
0.5774 ***
(22.4%)
259

Intercept 0.92 (-0.940)
Individual-level effects (slopes):
Life Satisfaction
0.98 *** (-5.027)
Left-Right Positioning (reversed)
1.05 (6.511)
Interest in Politics
1.53 *** (36.665)
Self Expression Values
3.43 *** (19.168)
Control Factors:
Gender
0.86 *** (-5.047)
Age
1.00 * (2.168)
Education
1.16 *** (27.074)
Income
1.03 *** (5.388)
Societal-level effects (intercepts):
GDP per capita, ppp
Democracy Stock
Cross-level interaction effects (slopes)
Left-Right Positioning (reversed)
* Democracy Stock
Gender
* GDP per capita, ppp
Age
* Inequality
Remaining between-society variance:
Intercept (Contribution to variance)
Left-Right Positioning (reversed)
Gender
Age
Model 3:
Full model with significant interaction effects
1.00 (0.713)
1.00 *** (4.086)
1.00 *** (6.511)
1.00 *** (7.310)
1.00 *** (4.020)
0.3843 *** (48,3%)
0.0032 *** (46,7%)
0.0299 *** (64.2%)
0.0001 *** (50.0%)
Source: World Values Survey 2000-2005. N (individual level) = 56.284. N (societal level) = 70.
Significance level: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p = .00.
Data entries are odds ratios with T-values in parentheses. Hierarchical generalized linear model calculated
with HLM 6.06.
Individual-level variables: WVS 2000-2005. Gender (1=male, 2=female), Age (low to high), Education (8-
point scale), Income (10-point scale).
Societal-level variables:
Voice & Accountability: Government Indicators, World Bank 2000.
Democracy Stock: Gering et al. (2005).
GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, International Monetary Fund (IMF). Data were taken
for the survey year (2000 or 2005).
Inequality: Gini coefficient: Human Development Report (HDR) 2007/08. Note that the survey years vary.
Missing data have been supplemented by previous HDR reports and the World Income Inequality
Database (V2.0c May 2008) provided by World Institute for Development Economics Research of the
United Nations University (UNU-WIDER): http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/ .
Happiness level: Country mean score of Life Satisfaction (10-point scale), WVS 2000-2005.
Parliamentary system: 0/1, Database of Political Institutions, World Bank, 2000-2005. The indicator is
taken from Jan Teorell, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothenstein (2008): The Quality of Government Dataset,
version 15 May/08, University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute.
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.
260

Appendix A9-1: Elite-Challenging Activities (WVS/EVS 1999-2001) and
Democracy: Freedom House (2007)
Lux, Slovak, Ice, Czech, Aut,
Ire, Ita, East Ger, Swi, Den,
Neth, Fran, Bel, Can
100
Tai
Hun
Chil
Lat Slove Uru
Lith
Est
Pol Port Spa Malt
W Ger
Fin
Aus
GB
USA
N Zea
Swe
90
80
Mex
Bul
Rom
Arg
Dom
S Afr
Croa
Isr
S Kor
Braz
Jap
Gre
Freedom House 2007
70
60
50
Indo
Phil
Bang
India
Serb
Ukr Peru
Tur
Col Alb
Geor
Mace
Bosn Mold Tan
Ven Nig
40
Jord
Mor
Uga
Arm
30
20
Pak
Aze
Rus
10
Bela
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Elite-challenging activities, in %
Freedom House: Source: “Freedom in the World” Report. The scales for Political Rights (1 to 7) and Civil Liberties (1 to 7)
were transformed, so that higher scores indicate more freedom, and added. Mean Score 2000-2006, in per cent of the
highest possible score. R=0.57 *** .
Elite-challenging activities: in percent.
Data taken from WVS/EVS 1999-2001 (wave IV), except for Armenia (1997), Australia (1995), Azerbaijan (1997), Belarus
(1996), Brazil (1997), Dominican Republic (1996) and Georgia (1996), New Zealand (1998), Norway (1996), Pakistan
(1997), South Korea (1996) and Switzerland (1996).
261

Appendix A9-2: Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is composed of several indices that are based on
surveys of business people and assessments by country analysts. The yearly composition
of the index can vary. As an example, partial rates of the CPI 2006 come from nine
different institutions (Lambsdorff 2006: 2):
- CPIA, the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment by the IDA and IBRD (World
Bank, 2005); surveys country teams, experts inside and outside the bank; coverage:
76 countries
- EIU, the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006; expert staff ratings; coverage: 157
countries
- FH, Freedom House Nations in Transit, 2006; expert staff assessments (originating or
resident in respective countries); coverage: 29 countries/territories
- IMD, the International Institute for Management Development, World
Competitiveness Center, Lausanne (two annual publications from 2005-2006);
- MIG, Grey Area Dynamics Ratings by the Merchant International Group, 2006
- PERC, the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Hong Kong (two annual
publications from 2005-2006)
- UNECA, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Governance
Report 2005
- WEF, the World Economic Forum (two annual publications from 2005-2006)
- WRMC, the World Markets Research Centre, 2006.
262

Appendix A9-3:
Individual-level Correlation: Elite-Challenging Activities and
Confidence in Political Institutions (WVS/EVS 2005)
“Confidence in
government”
(Percent valid)
“Confidence in
political
parties”
(Percent valid)
“Confidence in
parliament”
(Percent valid)
“Importance of
democracy”
(Percent valid)
“Evaluation of
democraticness
in own country”
(Percent valid)
Eastern Europe
Serbia -.09 ** (90) .00 (90) -.06 (90) .05 (90) .01 (89)
Bulgaria -.03 (81) -.04 (80) .00 (80) .09 * (80) -.03 (80)
Romania .04 (89) .07 ** (89) .04 (89) .11 *** (87) .03 (84)
Central Eastern Europe
Slovenia .00 (89) .01 (88) .04 (88) .18 *** (89) .03 (86)
Poland .03 (87) .04 (87) .09 ** (87) .12 *** (88) .05 (85)
Post-soviet societies
Moldova .02 (95) .07 (95) .04 (95) .16 *** (93) .01 (91)
Ukraine -.05 (73) .01 (81) .04 (83) .12 *** (88) -.04 (88)
Russia -.03 (87) .01 (85) .02 (83) -.02 (86) -.06 * (82)
Western Europe
Netherlands -.04 (87) .00 (85) .02 (85) .10 ** (87) -.03 (86)
Finland .00 (94) .02 (94) .04 (94) .08 * (94) .01 (94)
France -.05 (98) .07 * (98) -.01 (97) .14 *** (98) .04 (98)
Sweden .02 (97) .05 (97) .06 (96) .06 (98) .05 (97)
Norway .23 *** (99) .18 *** (99) .24 *** (99) .07 * (99) -.06 (99)
Italy .01 (92) .12 *** (92) .12 *** (91) .09 ** (93) -.03 (91)
Spain .01 (90) -.01 (89) .01 (89) .05 (90) .07 * (90)
Cyprus -.11 *** (100) -.09 ** (100) -.10 ** (100) .04 (100) -.04 (100)
Andorra -.09 ** (97) -.02 (98) - - .06 * (98) -.04 (97)
Switzerland .06 * (96) .06 * (95) .05 (95) .08 ** (98) .09 ** (98)
W. Germany -.07 * (93) -.09 ** (93) -.03 (93) .19 *** (95) .09 ** (95)
East Germany .05 (93) .06 (92) .09 ** (92) .09 ** (93) .04 (93)
Anglo-Saxon societies
USA -.01 (96) .01 (96) .05 (94) .29 *** (96) .02 (95)
Canada -.08 *** (91) -.02 (92) -.03 (91) .14 *** (95) .01 (93)
Great Britain -.04 (92) .07 * (89) .03 (90) .23 *** (92) .09 ** (91)
Australia -.08 ** (97) .00 (97) -.04 (97) .07 ** (97) -.03 (97)
New Zealand .02 (88) .03 (87) .05 (89) - - - -
Central & Southern America
Argentina -.10 ** (87) -.09 * (87) -.10 ** (85) .16 *** (88) -.19 *** (86)
Colombia .03 (98) .04 (98) .06 ** (95) .10 *** (94) -.04 * (93)
Brazil .02 (97) -.02 (97) -.02 (97) .13 *** (96) .01 (95)
Chile .08 * (96) .07 * (96) .08 * (95) .19 *** (94) .06 (93)
Peru .10 *** (93) .09 ** (93) .03 (93) .12 *** (92) .06 * (91)
Mexico .04 (88) .05 * (88) .03 (88) .01 (88) -.04 (87)
Uruguay .17 *** (98) .12 *** (98) .09 ** (97) .13 *** (97) .07 * (97)
Guatemala .06 (94) -.01 (94) .01 (94) - - - -
Tri. & Tobago -.01 -94 .02 (94) .03 (95) .12 *** (95) -.03 (94)
263

“Confidence in
government”
(Percent valid)
“Confidence in
political
parties”
(Percent valid)
“Confidence in
parliament”
(Percent valid)
“Importance of
democracy”
(Percent valid)
“Evaluation of
democraticness
in own country”
(Percent valid)
Africa
Zambia .03 (92) .05 (90) .09 ** (89) .03 (92) .01 (91)
South Africa -.10 *** (91) -.05 * (89) -.08 *** (90) .05 * (90) -.04 * (89)
Burkina Faso -.11 *** (72) -.12 *** (71) -.06 * (70) .01 (73) -.15 *** (70)
Morocco .00 (84) -.01 (80 .05 (82) .12 *** (77) .09 ** (72)
Jordan -.12 *** (94) -.05 (77) -.15 *** (86) -.03 (94) -.07 * (88)
Ethiopia -.13 *** (66) .10 ** (68) -.12 *** (67) .12 *** (71) -.16 *** (70)
Ghana .01 (89) .03 (89) .07 ** (88) .01 (89) -.07 ** (89)
Mali .00 (69) .05 (68) -.05 (66) .00 (70) .00 (70)
Confucian societies
Japan .02 (81) .01 (80) .02 (80) .19 *** (81) .09 ** (79)
South Korea -.05 (100) .03 (100) .04 (100) -.06 * (100) -.05 (100)
Taiwan -.05 (100) .03 (99) -.09 ** (99) .07 ** (100) .02 (99)
South & Southern Asia
Indonesia -.09 *** (95) .01 (85) -.05 (84) .00 (84) -.09 *** (82)
Thailand .08 ** (100) .11 *** (99) .06 * (100) .12 *** (100) .05 * (100)
India -.11 *** (66) -.01 (66) -.08 ** (63) .00 (66) -.03 (61)
Malaysia -.11 *** (100) -.04 (100) -.12 *** (100) -.10 *** (100) -.13 *** (100)
Turkey -.21 *** (95) -.09 ** (94) -.15 *** (93) .04 (96) -.15 *** (94)
Source: World Values Survey 2005-07. Data entries are Pearson’s r. The coding of the variables:
(1) Confidence in political institutions:
“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you
have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at
all?
- the government (in your nation’s capital)
- political parties
- parliament
(2) Importance of democracy:
“How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1
means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?”
(3) Evaluation of democraticness in own country:
“And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1
means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position
would you choose?”
264

Appendix A9-4:
Factor Analysis: Essential Characteristics of Democracy,
World Values Survey 2005-07
Procedural
Understanding
Output-
Oriented
Understanding
People choose their leaders in free elections. .686 .216
Civil rights protect people’s liberty against
oppression.
.643 .307
People can change laws in referendums. .715 .149
Women have the same rights as men. .766 .090
Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. -.056 .767
People receive state aid for unemployment. .261 .572
The economy is prospering .334 .652
Criminals are severely punished. .268 .605
Eigenvalue 3.080 1.034
Varimax rotation.
Source: WVS 2005-2007. Countries included in analysis (weight n=1.000): France, Britain, Italy,
Netherlands, USA, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Mexico, Australia, Sweden, Germany, Argentina,
Finland, South Korea, Poland, Brazil, Chile, India, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Taiwan, Ukraine, Russia,
Uruguay, Ghana, Moldova, Indonesia, Vietnam, Serbia, Malaysia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda,
Zambia.
Question formulation:
“Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell
me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this
scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an
essential characteristic of democracy”.”
265

Appendix A9-5:
Individual-level Correlation: Elite-Challenging Activities and
Tolerance, single items (WVS/EVS 1999-2001)
People with a
different race
(Percent valid)
Immigrants/ foreign
workers
(Percent valid)
People who have
AIDS
(Percent valid)
Homosexuals
(Percent valid)
Eastern Europe
Serbia .11*** (88) .02 (88) .16*** (88) .12*** (88)
Bulgaria .03 (78) .03 (78) .06 (78) .13*** (78)
Montenegro .13** (70) .14*** (70) .16*** (70) .24*** (70)
Bosnia .08 (89) .15** (89) .11* (89) .05 (89)
Romania .12*** (79) .08* (79) .14*** (79) .03 (79)
Albania .09* (59) .11** (59) .12** (59) .06 (59)
Macedonia .08* (90) .08* (90) .08* (90) .04 (90)
Central Eastern Europe
Slovenia .07* (90) .12*** (90) .11** (90) .14*** (90)
Croatia .08* (86) .03 (86) .04 (86) .11** (86)
Poland .07* (99) .05 (99) .09** (99) .08* (99)
Czech Republic .07** (92) .06* (92) .05* (92) .06* (92)
Slovakia .03 (89) .01 (89) -.04 (89) -.02 (89)
Hungary
Post-soviet societies
Belarus .04 (90) .11** (90) .05 (90) -.01 (90)
Kyrgyzstan .04 (98) .06 (98) .05 (98) .01 (98)
Moldova .07 (82) -.02 (82) .05 (82) .03 (82)
Ukraine .03 (84) .06 (84) .08** (84) -.07* (84)
Russia .00 (90) -.03 (90) .01 (90) -.04 (90)
Baltic states
Latvia .01 (88) -.01 (88) .04 (88) -.05 (88)
Lithuania .07 (72) .07 (72) .05 (72) -.05 (72)
Estonia .10** (83) .07 (83) .11** (83) .00 (83)
Western Europe
East Germany -.02 (86) .03 (86) -.04 (86) -.03 (86)
Netherlands .10** (100) .11*** (100) .15*** (100) .11*** (100)
Iceland .05 (98) .06 (98) .07* (98) .10** (98)
Belgium .14*** (97) .17*** (97) .12*** (97) .11*** (97)
Spain .08*** (84) .08*** (84) .09*** (84) .08** (84)
Ireland .12*** (95) .05 (95) .14*** (95) .12*** (95)
Italy .09*** (93) .09*** (93) .17*** (93) .15*** (93)
Finland .08* (91) .09** (91) .15*** (91) .12*** (91)
France .03 (96) .01 (96) .05* (96) .07** (96)
Sweden .01 (99) -.02 (99) .00 (99) .04 (99)
Denmark .11*** (95) .10** (95) .16*** (95) .18*** (95)
Malta .05 (97) -.01 (97) .06* (97) .11** (97)
Austria .07** (97) .12*** (97) .19*** (97) .15*** (97)
West Germany .00 (82) .04 (82) .11** (82) .06 (82)
Greece .09** (96) .09** (96) .16*** (96) .13*** (96)
Luxembourg .05 (91) .07* (91) .11*** (91) .14*** (91)
Portugal .02 (92) -.02 (92) .12*** (92) .03 (92)
266

Continued:
People with a
different race
(Percent valid)
Immigrants/ foreign
workers
(Percent valid)
People who have
AIDS
(Percent valid)
Homosexuals
(Percent valid)
Anglo-Saxon societies
USA .07* (98) .04 (98) .06* (98) .08** (98)
Canada .00 (98) .00 (98) .09*** (98) .15*** (98)
Northern Ireland .08* (94) .07* (94) .03 (94) .08* (94)
Great Britain -.04 (98) -.04 (98) -.02 (98) .01 (98)
Central & Southern America
Argentina .08** (90) .06* (90) .08** (90) .06 (90)
Chile -.15*** (92) -.10*** (92) -.04 (92) .08 (92)
Peru .00 (89) -.01 (89) .00 (89) .06* (89)
Puerto Rico .01 (96) .09* (96) .03 (96) .03 (96)
Mexico -.01 (81) .00 (81) .03 (81) .05 (81)
Venezuela .03 (94) .04 (94) .07* (94) .06* (94)
Africa
Algeria .04 (87) .08** (87) .05 (87) -.01 (87)
Jordan .02 (98) -.01 (98) -.02 (98) -.04 (98)
Morocco .09*** (82) .06* (82) .18*** (82) .03 (82)
Egypt .02 (100) .00 (100) -.03 (100) -.02 (100)
South Africa .02 (88) .12*** (88) .03 (88) .03 (88)
Zimbabwe .06 (90) .07* (90) .05 (90) -.07* (90)
Uganda -.06 (63) -.01 (63) -.06 (63) -.01 (63)
Nigeria .01 (89) .00 (89) -.03 (89) .01 (89)
Tanzania -.01 (97) -.05 (97) .03 (97) .06* (97)
Confucian societies
Japan
Southern Asia
Bangladesh -.06* (82) -.07* (82) -.03 (82) -.06* (82)
Turkey .14*** (97) .12*** (97) .17*** (97) .18*** (97)
Indonesia -.00 (87) -.02 (87) -.01 (87) -.05 (87)
Philippines .03 (98) -.03 (98) .13*** (98) .05 (98)
Vietnam .01 (81) -.03 (81) .03 (81) -.02 (81)
Pakistan -.03 (92) -.03 (92) -.04 (92) - (92)
India .00 (78) .02 (78) .02 (78) -.07** (78)
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2001. Data entries are Phi. The coding of the variables:
Tolerance Items:
“On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as
neighbors?”
- People with a different race
- Immigrants/foreign workers
- People who have AIDS
- Homosexuals
Group mentioned = -1. Group not mentioned = 0.
267

Appendix B:
Documentation of Survey Results
Political Action Study I
Signing a Petition Have done Would do Might do Would never do
Great Britain (n=1483) 22,2 31,0 21,8 21,1
West Germany (n=2307) 30,5 39,8 13,3 14,3
Netherlands (n=1201) 20,9 54,2 12,9 8,6
Austria (n=1585) 34,2 30,6 9,5 14,0
USA (n=1719) 57,6 20,0 13,1 5,5
Italy (n=1779) 9,9 26,8 12,6 10,2
Switzerland (n=1290) 44,3 31,1 13,6 8,4
Finland (n=1224) 18,7 26,5 26,7 22,7
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values,
Question wording: “We would like to know how you feel about these things, Please place each of the little
cards you have there on one of the parts of this card to show me, (…) Whether you have actually done any
of these things on the cards during the past ten years, If not, the extent to which you feel you might do each
of these things [“would do” or “might do”] or whether you would never, under any circumstances, do each
of these things, (…) Signing a petition,”
Boycotts Have done Would do Might do Would never do
Great Britain (n=1483) 5,3 17,4 23,1 47,3
West Germany (n=2307) 4,3 23,8 22,6 44,5
Netherlands (n=1201) 5,2 26,5 21,6 41,1
Austria (n=1585) 2,1 11,6 14,8 46,3
USA (n=1719) 14,5 19,5 27,1 31,4
Italy (n=1779) 0,8 4,0 7,1 44,7
Switzerland (n=1290) 4,4 16,1 23,2 40,9
268

Finland (n=1224) 1,1 11,9 28,1 51,3
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values,
Question wording: “We would like to know how you feel about these things, Please place each of the little
cards you have there on one of the parts of this card to show me, (…) Whether you have actually done any
of these things on the cards during the past ten years, If not, the extent to which you feel you might do each
of these things [“would do” or “might do”] or whether you would never, under any circumstances, do each
of these things, (…) Boycotts,”
Lawful Demonstrations Have done Would do Might do Would never do
Great Britain (n=1483) 5,6 24,7 24,2 41,7
West Germany (n=2307) 8,5 32,6 23,6 32,9
Netherlands (n=1201) 7,0 39,2 22,1 29,1
Austria (n=1585) 6,2 21,3 17,3 42,7
USA (n=1719) 11,4 27,5 28,7 27,7
Italy (n=1779) 16,7 34,4 18,7 18,9
Switzerland (n=1290) 8,0 28,8 28,3 30,4
Finland (n=1224) 5,7 22,1 29,0 39,8
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values,
Question wording: “We would like to know how you feel about these things, Please place each of the little
cards you have there on one of the parts of this card to show me, (…) Whether you have actually done any
of these things on the cards during the past ten years, If not, the extent to which you feel you might do each
of these things [“would do” or “might do”] or whether you would never, under any circumstances, do each
of these things, (…) Lawful demonstrations,”
269

Joining strike Have done Would do Might do Would never do
Great Britain (n=1483) 4,6 7,1 15,4 69,4
West Germany (n=2307) 0,9 5,7 15,7 74,9
Netherlands (n=1201) 1,5 13,7 16,7 64,0
Austria (n=1585) 0,7 3,1 10,6 70,7
USA (n=1719) 1,6 4,8 20,2 59,4
Italy (n=1779) 1,1 3,1 6,1 76,0
Switzerland (n=1290) 0,2 3,9 13,5 73,5
Finland (n=1224) 4,2 6,7 18,4 65,7
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values,
Question wording: “We would like to know how you feel about these things, Please place each of the little
cards you have there on one of the parts of this card to show me, (…) Whether you have actually done any
of these things on the cards during the past ten years, If not, the extent to which you feel you might do each
of these things [“would do” or “might do”] or whether you would never, under any circumstances, do each
of these things, (…) Joining strike,”
Occupying Buildings Have done Would do Might do Would never do
Great Britain (n=1483) 0,8 6,2 12,5 77,0
West Germany (n=2307) 0,2 3,6 13,0 80,3
Netherlands (n=1201) 1,5 22,6 19,0 54,1
Austria (n=1585) 0,3 2,1 8,1 72,1
USA (n=1719) 1,5 4,9 16,6 71,4
Italy (n=1779) 4,3 15,2 15,4 59,0
Switzerland (n=1290) 0,2 3,9 30,2 53,8
Finland (n=1224) 4,2 11,8 77,9 94,0
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values,
Question wording: “We would like to know how you feel about these things, Please place each of the little
cards you have there on one of the parts of this card to show me, (…) Whether you have actually done any
of these things on the cards during the past ten years, If not, the extent to which you feel you might do each
of these things [“would do” or “might do”] or whether you would never, under any circumstances, do each
of these things, (…) Occupying Buildings”.
270

World Values Survey/European Values Survey
Signing a Petition
1981 1990 1999-2000 2005-2007
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never do
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never do
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never do
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never do
Albania (n= 999) 23,0 28,2 33,0 (n= 1000) 15,2 29,0 23,8
Algeria (n= 1282) 13,7 26,0 50,7
Andorra (n= 1003) 55,1 35,9 8,3
Argentina (n= 1005) 29,4 31,7 22,7 (n= 1002) 21,4 31,0 43,0 (n= 1280) 21,5 29,7 43,4 (n= 1002) 25,2 35,7 30,1
Armenia (n= 2000) 17,3 38,0 41,8
Australia (n= 1228) 68,6 24,9 5,1 (n= 2048) 78,0 16,1 5,4 (n= 1421) 78,6 16,2 4,5
Austria (n= 1460) 44,8 29,3 21,6 (n= 1522) 55,9 23,6 19,1
Azerbaijan (n= 2002) 9,4 14,9 69,4
Bangladesh (n= 1500) 13,0 38,1 39,2
Belarus (n= 2092) 9,1 26,9 59,2
Belgium (n= 1145) 21,7 33,6 33,4 (n= 2792) 47,4 25,7 21,5 (n= 1912) 67,5 19,7 11,4
Bosnia-Herz. (n= 1200) 20,7 46,6 26,8
Brazil (n= 1782) 49,8 30,6 18,6 (n= 1149) 46,6 34,2 18,1 (n= 1500) 55,5 27,3 16,8
Bulgaria (n= 1034) 18,7 34,0 33,8 (n= 1000) 9,2 30,6 42,4 (n= 1001) 10,2 24,7 50,5
271

Burkina Faso (n= 1534) 11,9 46,9 17,9
Canada (n= 1254) 60,6 25,6 11,2 (n= 1730) 75,9 14,7 8,2 (n= 1931) 72,7 18,5 8,0 (n= 2148) 71,4 17,8 8,3
Chile (n= 1500) 22,1 32,4 42,0 (n= 1200) 18,6 25,4 49,6 (n= 1000) 16,8 20,1 61,9
Colombia (n= 6025) 18,1 46,5 31,1 (n= 3025) 15,1 51,2 33,3
Croatia (n= 1003) 33,5 56,9 5,3
Cyprus (n= 1050) 24,5 37,3 38,2
Czech Republic (n*=2109) 44,5 29,8 18,2 (n= 1908) 56,4 25,7 14,0
Denmark (n= 1182) 41,0 27,6 25,7 (n= 1030) 50,3 25,0 23,0 (n= 1023) 55,2 26,4 15,6
Dom. Republic (n= 417) 13,7 53,7 24,5
East Germany (n= 1336) 66,1 25,1 6,2 (n= 999) 58,5 28,9 8,3 (n= 1076) 47,7 27,3 21,3
Egypt (n= 3000) 19,8 37,3 42,9 (n= 3051) 6,9 14,6 78,5
Estonia (n= 1008) 36,0 35,5 20,8 (n= 1005) 18,7 29,6 42,3
Ethiopia (n= 1500) 15,3 31,7 25,5
Finland (n= 1003) 29,0 40,0 28,4 (n= 588) 34,0 38,1 11,6 (n= 1038) 46,8 34,8 12,9 (n= 1014) 49 31,1 16,9
France (n= 1200) 43,2 30,5 23,2 (n= 1002) 51,4 27,7 16,6 (n= 1615) 67,4 22,1 9,1 (n= 1001) 66,4 22,8 10,3
Georgia (n= 2008) 13,5 14,2 69,5
Ghana (n= 1534) 3,8 35,9 52,4
Great Britain (n= 1167) 62,3 26,7 9,7 (n= 1484) 74,7 16,7 7,6 (n= 1000) 78,1 14,9 5,5 (n= 1041) 65,9 22,5 8,3
272

Greece (n= 1142) 48,4 37,5 11,7
Guatemala (n= 1000) 12,3 40,1 45,9
Hungary (n= 999) 17,2 28,6 50,1 (n= 1000) 14,1 30,9 50,8
Iceland (n= 927) 36,9 45,7 15,5 (n= 702) 46,6 36,0 16,0 (n= 968) 52,5 36,8 9,7
India (n= 2500) 22,4 40,8 27,1 (n= 2002) 23,8 23,5 35,0 (n= 2001) 22,6 20,1 35,4
Indonesia (n= 1004) 4,8 18,3 65,1 (n= 2015) 5,4 22,5 59,4
Iraq (n= 2701) 8,1 25,6 48,2
Ireland (n= 1217) 27,4 44,4 23,0 (n= 1000) 41,4 39,2 17,9 (n= 1012) 58,3 25,2 14,4
Israel (n= 1199) 37,9 29,0 30,3
Italy (n= 1348) 36,4 28,5 24,1 (n= 2018) 42,1 31,4 17,2 (n= 2000) 52,4 29,2 14,4 (n= 1012) 52,1 30,9 13,4
Japan (n= 1204) 42,4 28,5 13,4 (n= 1011) 52,0 21,4 11,2 (n= 1362) 56,8 26,6 6,5 (n= 1096) 54,9 25,5 11,3
Jordan (n= 1223) 7,9 8,9 81,8 (n= 1200) 3,6 6,8 88,1
Latvia (n= 903) 59,4 21,5 11,1 (n= 1013) 17,7 30,4 44,5
Lithuania (n= 1000) 55,4 27,2 12,4 (n= 1018) 22,2 31,4 27,6
Luxembourg (n= 1211) 50,2 30,4 13,7
Macedonia (n= 1055) 24,7 37,5 31,2
Malaysia (n= 1201) 6,4 25,9 67,7
Mali (n= 1534) 14,2 30,7 31,9
273

Malta (n= 467) 14,8 27,0 37,0 (n= 393) 28,1 21,3 34,0 (n= 1002) 32,8 35,2 30,8
Mexico (n= 1837) 8,5 33,4 43,6 (n= 1531) 31,4 40,1 19,1 (n= 1535) 14,8 33,8 39,7 (n= 1560) 19,7 38,5 37,1
Moldova (n= 1008) 15,2 18,6 50,6 (n= 1046) 10,3 31,1 57,5
Montenegro (n= 1060) 20,4 43,5 21,2
Morocco (n= 2264) 13,0 29,0 44,0 (n= 1200) 8,8 28,3 50,9
Netherlands (n= 1221) 32,7 37,9 23,4 (n= 1017) 49,3 30,9 18,3 (n= 1003) 59,0 29,6 11,2 (n= 1050) 42,1 34,7 15,1
New Zealand (n= 1201) 88,1 7,7 1,5 (n= 954) 84,1 10,8 1,8
N. Ireland (n= 312) 32,6 40,9 20,6 (n=304) 57,9 26,3 12,8 (n= 1000) 58,4 20,2 18,1
Norway (n= 1051) 53,2 26,2 18,1 (n= 1239) 59,4 27,0 10,8 (n=1127) 64,5 25,9 9,3 (n= 1025) 69,2 20,8 9,7
Peru (n= 1501) 21,0 54,9 17,8 (n= 1500) 23,9 36,8 36
Philippines (n= 1200) 9,2 22,8 66,7
Poland (n= 1929) 15,4 36,4 34,0 (n= 1095) 22,3 28,1 48,4 (n= 1000) 22,5 28,7 44,8
Portugal (n= 1185) 26,9 42,2 23,0 (n= 1000) 21,7 37,5 37,0
Romania (n= 1146) 9,0 30,1 44,8 (n= 1776) 5,8 26,7 62,4
Russia (n= 1961) 26,5 39,5 23,6 (n= 2500) 10,9 29,7 53,0 (n= 2033) 7,7 21 63,9
Rwanda (n= 1507) 8,1 19,3 61,4
Serbia (n= 1200) 27,3 34,3 32,9 (n= 1220) 28,4 31,4 33,9
Singapore (n= 1512) 7,2 39,0 52,3
274

Slovakia (n*=1136) 34,8 31,9 18,1 (n= 1331) 57,0 21,7 17,4
Slovenia (n= 1035) 22,2 27,1 31,1 (n= 1006) 30,7 41,3 22,8 (n= 1037) 29,3 33,7 32,1
South Africa (n= 1595) 17,1 34,1 33,5 (n= 2736) 31,5 40,3 20,1 (n= 3000) 20,6 40,5 32,5 (n= 2988) 10,8 32,4 49,3
South Korea (n= 970) 15,7 39,9 23,1 (n= 1251) 40,6 40,4 15,7 (n= 1200) 47,3 33,5 9,6 (n= 1200) 33,9 43,2 22,7
Spain (n= 2303) 20,4 37,8 27,9 (n= 4147) 16,9 31,3 33,6 (n= 2409) 24,1 32,4 31,0 (n= 1200) 22,2 44,3 28,5
Sweden (n= 954) 53,0 36,6 8,3 (n= 1047) 69,9 23,2 4,4 (n= 1015) 87,2 10,2 2,5 (n= 1003) 77,6 16,6 5
Switzerland (n= 1212) 62,3 17,4 18,3 (n= 1241) 77,2 13,9 8,3
Tanzania (n= 1171) 10,2 45,8 41,7
Thailand (n= 1534) 3,2 15,6 81,1
Trinidad and
Tobago
(n= 1002) 22,3 51,2 24,4
Turkey (n= 1030) 12,8 38,4 42,9 (n= 4607) 13,7 41,5 43,3 (n= 1346) 11,7 35 52
Uganda (n= 1002) 15,9 32,5 27,6
Ukraine (n= 1195) 12,8 31,6 45,3 (n= 1000) 6,6 24,9 62,3
Uruguay (n= 1000) 33,5 27,9 33 (n= 1000) 29,6 26,6 43
USA (n= 2325) 60,5 22,6 12,3 (n= 1839) 69,6 19,2 8,2 (n= 1200) 80,7 15,8 3,0 (n= 1249) 68,9 23,6 5,4
Venezuela (n= 1200) 14,4 65,9 16,3
Vietnam (n= 1000) 5,3 43,5 45,2 (n= 1495) 5,4 19,5 73,4
275

West Germany (n= 1305) 43,8 35,2 16,8 (n= 2101) 54,6 30,3 11,7 (n= 1037) 45,5 34,5 14,8 (n= 988) 49,2 31 17,5
Zambia (n= 1500) 11,6 38,8 43,6
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values.
Question wording: “Now I’d like you to look at this card, I’m going to read out some different form of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to
tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it, (…) Signing a
petition”.
* Czech Republic and Slovakia: During the third WVS wave two surveys were conducted, one in 1990, another one in 1991, With the exception of “Attending
lawful demonstrations”, the results are based on the 1991 surveys with 2109 Czech respondents and 1136 Slovak respondents, respectively.
Azerbaijan, Australia, Armenia, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, New Zealand, Norway, Dominican Republic, Switzerland, Georgia, Belarus: Data from 1995-97
WVS.
276

Joining in Boycotts
1981 1990 1999-2000 2005-2007
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never do
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never do
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never do
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never do
Albania (n= 999) 9,1 14,5 54,8 (n= 1000) 3,7 15,4 47,2
Algeria (n= 1282) 7,0 26,3 55,3
Andorra (n= 1003) 10,5 25,2 62,8
Argentina (n= 1005) 2,1 16,3 62,9 (n= 1002) 3,2 8,7 82,8 (n= 1280) 1,8 6,6 83,1 (n= 1002) 2,7 13,8 73,7
Armenia (n= 2000) 11,6 20,8 63,4
Australia (n= 1228) 4,7 38,2 54,2 (n=2048) 21,1 42,2 34,9 (n= 1421) 15,1 47,9 34,7
Austria (n= 1460) 4,8 23,3 64,2 (n= 1522) 9,4 32,8 54,1
Azerbaijan (n= 2002) 2,5 11,5 80,3
Bangladesh (n= 1500) 5,3 35,0 47,1
Belarus (n= 2092) 3,3 17,9 73,3
Belgium (n= 1145) 2,6 20,2 62,7 (n= 2792) 9,2 25,1 55,2 (n= 1912) 9,8 28,0 57,1
Bosnia Herz. (n= 1200) 6,3 42,1 44,3
Brazil (n= 1782) 9,9 34,8 51,2 (n= 1149) 6,2 28,0 62,4 (n= 1500) 7,8 24,9 64,5
Bulgaria (n= 1034) 2,9 27,5 54,1 (n= 1000) 2,9 21,6 55,2 (n= 1001) 1,9 15,3 68,8
Burkina Faso (n= 1534) 11,1 35,5 32,8
277

Canada (n= 1254) 14,4 42,1 39,5 (n= 1730) 21,6 41,9 33,3 (n= 1931) 20,1 41,0 36,6 (n= 2148) 21,6 36 37,6
Chile (n= 1500) 3,9 11,1 81,9 (n= 1200) 4,9 12,3 76,4 (n= 1000) 2,7 11,2 85
Colombia (n= 6025) 7,2 26,9 59,3 (n= 3025) 2,4 18,9 78,1
Croatia (n= 1003) 5,9 52,7 33,9
Cyprus (n= 1050) 10,4 30,4 59
Czech Republic (n*=2109) 8,1 24,8 51,3 (n= 1908) 8,3 27,3 54,8
Denmark (n= 1182) 6,9 24,3 55,2 (n= 1030) 10,2 30,4 55,4 (n= 1023) 23,9 35,3 36,8
Dom. Republic (n= 417) 4,8 22,3 58,8
East Germany (n= 1336) 2,7 26,6 57,4 (n= 999) 5,1 36,8 49,9 (n= 1076) 5,7 35 52,8
Egypt (n= 3000) 36,9 30,0 33,1 (n= 3051) 1,3 7,5 91,1
Estonia (n= 1008) 2,9 34,8 48,6 (n= 1005) 2,6 24,0 62,3
Ethiopia (n= 1500) 7,8 29 33,5
Finland (n= 1003) 8,2 41,7 46,3 (n= 588) 11,6 59,0 15,1 (n= 1038) 13,5 50,1 30,0 (n= 1014) 15,3 45,2 34,7
France (n= 1200 ) 9,7 32,9 50,7 (n= 1002) 11,3 36,3 42,8 (n= 1615) 12,1 39,4 40,1 (n= 1001) 13,9 41,7 42,6
Georgia (n= 2008) 5,6 9,2 82,3
Ghana (n= 1534) 1,8 27,9 63
Great Britain (n= 1167) 6,4 28,7 60,3 (n= 1484) 14,3 33,5 49,6 (n= 1000) 16,2 42,9 37,8 (n= 1041) 16,2 35,7 42,3
Greece (n= 1142) 4,3 19,9 68,0
278

Guatemala (n= 1000) 1,2 8,8 85,5
Hungary (n= 999) 2,0 13,2 77,6 (n= 1000) 2,6 17,4 74,2
Iceland (n= 927) 7,6 55,7 34,1 (n= 702) 21,1 52,0 25,5 (n= 968) 17,6 58,4 22,5
India (n= 2500) 15,2 40,5 35,3 (n= 2002) 10,5 21,6 47,3 (n= 2001) 11,7 22,9 43,2
Indonesia (n= 1004) 2,7 18,8 72,0 (n= 2015) 3,1 17,8 68,3
Iraq (n= 2701) 13,2 20,4 51
Ireland (n= 1217) 6,3 30,9 55,2 (n= 1000) 7,2 32,4 57,6 (n= 1012) 8,6 34,3 52,5
Israel (n= 1199) 7,4 30,3 58,0
Italy (n= 1348) 5,2 25,4 60,3 (n= 2018) 8,6 41,6 41,3 (n= 2000) 9,7 40,8 43,1 (n= 1012) 18,6 47 28,6
Japan (n= 1204) 2,4 40,4 31,6 (n= 1011) 2,7 37,1 30,7 (n= 1362) 6,6 50,4 21,5 (n= 1096) 5,6 41 32,6
Jordan (n= 1223) 2,3 6,0 90,3 (n= 1200) 2,9 6 89,8
Latvia (n= 903) 2,9 26,0 41,5 (n= 1013) 3,7 24,6 64,0
Lithuania (n= 1000) 6,5 53,2 28,9 (n= 1018) 3,6 28,8 44,6
Luxembourg (n= 1211) 8,2 36,2 47,2
Macedonia (n= 1055) 12,5 37,2 43,7
Malaysia (n= 1201) 3,1 16,5 80,4
Mali (n= 1534) 7 25 44,5
Malta (n= 467) 10,1 13,1 54,0 (n= 393) 12,2 17,6 52,0 (n= 1002) 10,0 27,5 59,7
279

Mexico (n= 1837) 1,1 15,5 69,1 (n= 1531) 6,0 30,4 50,1 (n= 1535) 1,7 14,4 65,8 (n= 1560) 2,7 12,9 72,4
Moldova (n= 1008) 3,4 10,6 68,3 (n= 1046) 4,8 20,2 72,2
Montenegro (n= 1060) 13,6 48,2 23,6
Morocco (n= 2264) 5,5 24,0 56,9 (n= 1200) 7 29,7 50,8
Netherlands (n= 1221) 5,6 26,4 60,3 (n=1017) 8,2 32,4 57,3 (n= 1003) 21,3 38,4 40,1 (n= 1050) 11,9 36,9 38,7
New Zealand (n= 1201) 16,2 48,3 20,6 (n= 954 15,4 48,1 22,9
N. Ireland (n= 312) 4,9 34,0 56,2 (n=304) 8,9 28,3 58,9 (n= 1000) 13,0 24,8 57,4
Norway (n= 1051) 6,4 35,8 52,0 (n= 1239) 11,1 48,1 33,8 (n=1127) 17,9 55,8 25,5 (n= 1025) 24 42,1 33,4
Peru (n= 1501) 7,2 38,5 47,2 (n= 1500) 4,6 24 66
Philippines (n= 1200) 4,4 12,1 82,5
Poland (n= 1920) 5,3 24,3 56,0 (n= 1095) 4,1 23,5 71,1 (n= 1000) 4,7 18,5 71,9
Portugal (n= 1185) 4,1 28,0 57,5 (n= 1000) 4,4 31,6 59,2
Romania (n= 1146) 1,5 13,1 64,0 (n= 1776) 1 12,8 78,7
Russia (n= 1961) 3,8 30,8 50,5 (n= 2500) 2,4 20,8 69,9 (n= 2033) 2,4 16,7 73,6
Rwanda (n= 1507) 3,6 8,5 80,7
Serbia (n= 1200) 17,8 30,1 44,8 (n= 1220) 15,2 35 42
Singapore (n= 1512) 1,3 17,6 79,9
Slovakia (n*=1136) 3,3 27,7 44,1 (n= 1331) 3,5 24,0 55,3
280

Slovenia (n= 1035) 6,4 37,ß 36,8 (n= 1006) 7,7 50,6 35,2 (n= 1037) 5,9 42 45,4
South Africa (n= 1596) 7,9 19,1 57,1 (n= 2736) 14,1 32,6 45,2 (n= 3000) 20,1 27,8 47,6 (n= 2988) 9,4 23 61,5
South Korea (n= 970) 1,8 36,6 38,2 (n= 1251) 10,5 46,1 36,2 (n= 1200) 7,3 44,7 20,3 (n= 1200) 6 52,2 41,7
Spain (n= 2303) 7,7 24,2 54,4 (n= 4147) 4,5 20,8 56,5 (n= 2409) 4,9 20,1 60,8 (n= 1200) 6,3 31,6 52
Sweden (n= 954) 8,0 48,8 37,2 (n= 1047) 15,8 58,9 20,9 (n= 1015) 32,4 53,9 12,0 (n= 1003) 27,5 47,3 22,2
Switzerland (n= 1212) 11,5 32,5 50,8 (n= 1241) 18,8 35,9 43,1
Tanzania (n= 1171) 4,6 21,9 70,8
Thailand (n= 1534) 2,5 15,1 82,2
Trinidad and
Tobago
(n= 1002) 8,1 47,8 40,7
Turkey (n= 1039) 5,2 21,4 66,7 (n= 4607) 5,5 28,1 65,0 (n= 1346) 5,3 29,5 63,9
Uganda (n= 1002) 10,4 29,5 39,8
Ukraine (n= 1195) 4,5 22,2 62,2 (n= 1000) 4,2 15,9 74,1
Uruguay (n= 1000) 3,6 16,2 71 (n= 1000) 1,9 8,3 88,7
USA (n= 2325) 14,7 32,2 46,5 (n= 1839) 18,0 42,5 34,4 (n= 1200) 25,2 50,2 22,8 (n= 1249) 19,2 52 26,4
Venezuela (n= 1200) 1,5 5,8 88,9
Vietnam (n= 1000) 0,5 14,7 75,8 (n= 1495) 0,5 12,6 85,2
West Germany (n= 1305) 5,8 28,4 56,6 (n= 2101) 8,9 32,7 47,2 (n= 1037) 10,4 38,9 42,9 (n= 988) 12,3 41,6 41,4
281

Zambia (n= 1500) 12,9 32,2 50,1
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values.
Question wording: “Now I’d like you to look at this card, I’m going to read out some different form of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to
tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it, (…) Joining in
boycotts”.
*
Czech Republic and Slovakia: During the third WVS wave two surveys were conducted, one in 1990, another one in 1991, With the exception of “Attending
lawful demonstrations”, the results are based on the 1991 surveys with 2109 Czech respondents and 1136 Slovak respondents, respectively.
Azerbaijan, Australia, Armenia, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, New Zealand, Norway, Dominican Republic, Switzerland, Georgia, Belarus: Data from 1995-97
WVS.
282

Attending Lawful Demonstrations
1981 1990 1999-2000 2005-2007
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never do
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never do
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never do
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never do
Albania (n= 999) 16,1 50,8 17,8 (n= 1000) 19,3 40,8 18,5
Algeria (n= 1282) 18,5 28,2 45,9
Andorra (n= 1003) 39,9 40,2 19,1
Argentina (n= 1005) 19,1 27,2 37,3 (n= 1002) 14,6 20,5 62,1 (n= 1280) 12,7 22,1 61,4 (n= 1002) 16,3 37,3 39,3
Armenia (n= 2000) 27,5 27,4 42,4
Australia (n= 1228) 12,0 33,6 52,5 (n=2048) 17,6 41,5 39,5 (n= 1421) 19,8 46 32,7
Austria (n= 1460) 9,7 31,9 52,5 (n= 1522) 16,3 35,2 46,6
Azerbaijan (n= 2002) 19,5 21,1 54,6
Bangladesh (n=1500) 6,3 34,9 45,5
Belarus (n= 2092) 19,4 29,9 47,4
Belgium (n= 1145) 12,6 28,8 48,4 (n= 2792) 23,7 27,5 42,4 (n=1912) 34,7 29,7 32,7
Bosnia-Herz. (n= 1200) 8,6 45,5 39,6
Brazil (n= 1782) 18,5 39,3 40,9 (n= 1149) 24,7 37,9 37,0 (n= 1500) 18,2 39,6 41,3
Bulgaria (n= 1034) 12,9 42,8 32,8 (n= 1000) 12,6 32,5 40,0 (n= 1001) 10,9 30,8 46,3
283

Burkina Faso (n= 1534) 18,1 41 22,2
Canada (n= 1254) 13,1 42,7 41,5 (n= 1730) 20,2 41,5 35,2 (n= 1931) 19,2 40,2 39,0 (n= 2148) 24,3 41,6 30,5
Chile (n= 1500) 29,5 23,3 45,3 (n= 1200) 15,1 21,8 58,1 (n= 1000) 16,7 18,7 63,5
Colombia (n= 6025) 11 40,7 44,3 (n= 3025) 13,7 38,6 47,6
Croatia (n= 1003) 6,6 61,1 27,0
Cyprus (n= 1050) 27,7 34,7 37,5
Czech Republic (n*=3033) 30,3 42,9 19,5 (n= 1908) 26,1 39,2 28,7
Denmark (n= 1182) 15,6 32,8 45,8 (n= 1030) 27,0 31,4 40,1 (n=1023) 28,4 38,1 30,4
Dom. Republic (n= 417) 24,0 48,0 18,7
East Germany (n= 1336) 48,3 33,9 14,2 (n= 999) 43,3 31,0 20,2 (n= 1076) 35,1 35,2 25,4
Egypt (n= 3000) 2,5 15,0 82,5 (n= 3051) 1,5 7,2 91,3
Estonia (n= 1008) 23,9 39,0 29,3 (n= 1005) 10,1 27,9 52,2
Ethiopia (n= 1500) 19,2 31,9 21,7
Finland (n= 1003) 14,2 35,8 48,1 (n= 588) 11,9 44,9 27,2 (n= 1038) 13,7 41,2 39,0 (n= 1014) 9,9 37 48,5
France (n= 1200 ) 24,5 27,4 45,1 (n= 1002 ) 31,2 30,9 33,2 (n= 1615) 38,5 32,9 25,6 (n= 1001) 37,2 31,6 30,4
Georgia (n= 2008) 18,9 14,5 64,7
Ghana (n= 1534) 8 41,1 45,6
Great Britain (n= 1167) 8,7 31,6 57,2 (n= 1484) 13,4 34,0 51,0 (n= 1000) 13,0 37,3 46,3 (n= 1041) 15,9 43 37
284

Greece (n= 1142) 46,1 37,1 13,7
Guatemala (n= 1000) 2,1 8,5 88,8
Hungary (n= 999) 4,2 25,9 65,9 (n= 1000) 4,3 28,1 63,3
Iceland (n= 927) 14,3 62,2 21,7 (n= 702) 23,4 51,7 23,5 (n= 968) 20,5 58,7 19,7
India (n= 2500) 15,3 39,1 36,0 (n= 2002) 18,8 24,1 39,0 (n= 2001) 15 20,8 41,4
Indonesia (n= 1004) 10,9 24,1 60,1 (n= 2015) 12,9 31,4 47,8
Iraq (n= 2701) 16,5 25,6 44,1
Ireland (n= 1217) 12,6 37,4 43,7 (n= 1000) 16,3 40,9 41,3 (n= 1012) 20,3 44,0 32,6
Israel (n= 1199) 23,9 30,2 43,2
Italy (n= 1348) 22,1 20,5 50,5 (n= 2018) 32,1 35,1 27,5 (n= 2000) 33,0 37,3 24,5 (n= 1012) 34,3 31,5 29,5
Japan (n= 1204) 7,0 20,9 47,6 (n= 1011) 9,4 18,1 43,7 (n= 1362) 9,6 27,5 37,5 (n= 1096) 8 25 45,9
Jordan (n= 1223) 3,0 6,1 89,4 (n= 1200) 3,7 7,6 87,4
Latvia (n= 903) 30,5 36,0 19,9 (n= 1013) 23,7 34,8 35,9
Lithuania (n= 1000) 32,5 48,5 14,5 (n= 1018) 9,6 40,2 33,4
Luxembourg (n= 1211) 26,7 40,3 27,4
Macedonia (n= 1055) 16,5 40,2 37,0
Malaysia (n= 1201) 2,7 25,5 71,9
Mali (n= 1534) 19,2 33,8 26,3
285

Malta (n= 467) 9,6 16,1 54,8 (n= 393) 17,0 13,7 52,3 (n= 1002) 24,7 21,8 51,9
Mexico (n= 1837) 7,6 31,5 47,2 (n= 1531) 20,2 39,7 31,9 (n= 1535) 3,4 9,4 77,5 (n= 1560) 15,7 41,6 39,3
Moldova (n= 1008) 15,8 23,2 48,5 (n= 1046) 18,2 32,1 48,2
Montenegro (n= 1060) 16,6 38,6 27,7
Morocco (n= 2264) 9,6 25,8 54,3 (n= 1200) 16,3 25,1 47,3
Netherlands (n= 1221) 11,8 30,1 52,2 (n= 1017) 24,5 38,3 36,0 (n= 1003) 31,2 36,8 32,0 (n= 1050) 18,5 33,7 39,6
New Zealand (n= 1201) 18,6 45,6 22,6 (n= 954) 18,2 44,1 25,6
N. Ireland (n= 312) 17,7 26,6 52,5 (n=304) 17,8 29,3 46,7 (n= 1000) 20,8 28,7 45,4
Norway (n= 1051) 18,3 43,4 36,2 (n= 1239) 19,0 54,2 24,4 (n=1127) 26,1 52,3 21,5 (n= 1025) 29,1 45,1 25,6
Peru (n= 1501) 16,1 48,3 29,8 (n= 1500) 23,5 39 35,2
Philippines (n= 1200) 5,8 13,8 79,8
Poland (n= 1920) 14,1 38,9 37,0 (n= 1095) 10,0 31,0 58,4 (n= 1000) 9,6 28,8 56,4
Portugal (n= 1185) 23,0 45,4 24,5 (n= 1000) 14,2 37,2 44,1
Romania (n= 1146) 13,4 37,5 39,7 (n= 1776) 6 27,4 61,4
Russia (n= 1961) 30,5 39,0 23,0 (n= 2500) 22,5 31,5 42,3 (n= 2033) 15 26,8 52,3
Rwanda (n= 1507) 13,5 16,2 64,5
Serbia (n= 1200) 22,6 30,3 41,2 (n= 1220) 20,6 33 38,9
Singapore (n= 1512) 1,2 22,5 75,0
286

Slovakia (n*=1602) 19,3 47,0 21,1 (n= 1331) 13,0 39,5 38,7
Slovenia (n= 1035) 8,5 42,2 33,5 (n= 1006) 9,2 54,7 30,2 (n= 1037) 12 47 36,5
South Africa (n= 1595) 6,4 25,3 51,4 (n= 2736) 13,3 37,6 40,2 (n= 3000) 21,8 30,6 42,4 (n= 2988) 12,2 33,3 50
South Korea (n= 970) 5,4 27,4 42,7 (n= 1251) 18,9 31,5 44,8 (n= 1200) 18,7 36,7 27,0 (n= 1200) 11,4 45 43,5
Spain (n= 2303) 21,0 31,7 35,2 (n= 4147) 20,3 32,8 34,1 (n= 2409) 24,3 34,2 32,9 (n= 1200) 34,4 38 23,5
Sweden (n= 954) 15,1 49,8 33,3 (n= 1047) 21,8 56,8 18,0 (n= 1015) 34,7 51,9 11,8 (n= 1003) 30,9 46,5 21
Switzerland (n= 1212) 16,1 31,5 48 (n= 1241) 27,8 37,9 33,2
Tanzania (n= 1171) 28,1 54,8 15,5
Thailand (n= 1534) 2,3 12,8 84,6
Trinidad and
Tobago
(n= 1002) 15,1 58,5 24,3
Turkey (n= 1030) 5,3 29,5 58,5 (n= 4607) 6,8 34,2 57,4 (n= 1346) 5,8 30,6 62,4
Uganda (n= 1002) 11,9 28,7 39,2
Ukraine (n= 1195) 17,3 31,2 43,1 (n= 1000) 15,8 26,1 53,6
Uruguay (n= 1000) 18 22 59,1
USA (n= 2325) 11,9 35,8 45,6 (n= 1839) 14,8 41,7 38,9 (n= 1200) 21,1 53,5 24,0 (n= 1249) 14,7 53,3 29,4
Venezuela (n= 1200) 7,6 33,5 56,2
Vietnam (n= 1000) 1,8 35,4 56,5 (n= 1495) 0,9 19 78,2
287

West Germany (n= 1305) 11,9 31,9 49,9 (n= 2101) 19,1 38,9 34,9 (n= 1037) 21,2 40,8 31,6 (n= 988) 23,3 39,7 32,7
Zambia (n= 1500) 20,3 41,1 34,4
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values.
Question wording: “Now I’d like you to look at this card, I’m going to read out some different form of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to
tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it, (…) Attending
lawful demonstrations”.
* Czech Republic: During the third WVS wave two surveys were conducted, one in 1990, another one in 1991, The results for “Attending lawful
demonstrations” are based on a combined survey with 3033 Czech respondents and 1602 Slovak respondents, respectively.
Azerbaijan, Australia, Armenia, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, New Zealand, Norway, Dominican Republic, Switzerland, Georgia, Belarus: Data from 1995-97
WVS.
288

Joining Unofficial Strikes
1981 1990 1999-2000
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never
do
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never
do
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never
do
Albania (n= 999) 0,3 2,9 87,9 (n= 1000) 1,8 4,0 79,8
Algeria (n= 1282) 8,0 7,2 76,0
Argentina (n= 1005) 7,7 12,3 61,3 (n= 1002) 7,0 10,5 78,0 (n= 1280) 5,1 9,7 80,7
Armenia (n= 2000) 14,4 17,8 63,9
Australia (n= 1228) 5,0 22,2 70,2 (n=2048) 7,9 31,9 58,0
Austria (n= 1460) 0,8 8,6 85,4 (n= 1522) 2,1 17,0 77,1
Azerbaijan (n=2002) 8,5 10,6 76,2
Belgium (n= 1145) 3,2 12,0 73,2 (n= 2792) 6,5 16,2 67,7 (n=1912) 8,0 18,1 69,4
Bosnia-Herzegovina (n= 1200) 3,3 28,2 59,9
Brazil (n= 1782) 7,6 18,6 73,0 (n= 1149) 6,4 14,8 78,1
Bulgaria (n= 1034) 2,7 21,4 60,8 (n= 1000) 4,0 17,0 61,0
Canada (n=1254) 4,5 15,8 75,6 (n= 1730) 6,7 26,7 61,8 (n= 1931) 6,9 25,7 65,1
Chile (n= 1500) 8,0 15,9 73,5 (n= 1200) 8,4 14,7 71,6
Colombia (n= 6025) 4,7 17,8 74,3
289

Croatia (n= 1003) 2,6 33,4 55,3
Czech Republic (n*=2109) 12,7 27,5 46,1 (n= 1908) 9,1 25,7 54,3
Denmark (n= 1182) 8,4 21,4 62,3 (n= 1030) 16,7 22,4 57,1 (n=1023) 21,3 29,5 45,1
Dominican Republic (n= 417) 7,4 10,6 71,0
East Germany (n= 1336) 1,3 12,4 75,0 (n= 999) 1,5 14,7 75,8
Egypt (n= 3000) 0,1 2,6 97,3
Estonia (n= 1008) 3,7 16,6 68,1 (n= 1005) 1,2 10,6 77,8
Finland (n= 1003) 5,5 14,8 76,1 (n= 588) 6,6 28,6 46,9 (n= 1038) 2,4 23,2 67,2
France (n= 1200) 9,5 21,8 63,5 (n=1002 ) 9,4 23,2 60,6 (n= 1615) 11,7 29,9 51,9
Georgia (n= 2008) 9,6 5,7 82,3
Great Britain (n= 1167) 7,5 15,3 73,9 (n= 1484) 8,3 18,3 71,0 (n= 1000) 9,1 26,8 58,5
Greece (n= 1142) 9,1 30,5 53,8
Hungary (n= 999) 2,7 25,7 65,8 (n= 1000) 0,8 9,1 85,0
Iceland (n= 927) 3,0 24,1 70,5 (n= 702) 4,8 19,8 72,5 (n= 968) 3,3 28,9 65,6
India (n= 2500) 5,4 14,6 69,4 (n= 2002) 7,8 14,1 57,1
Indonesia (n= 1004) 1,9 6,0 85,5
Ireland (n= 1217) 4,9 20,6 65,7 (n= 1000) 3,6 22,5 70,2 (n= 1012) 5,9 29,5 59,4
Israel (n= 1199) 6,8 23,2 65,6
290

Italy (n= 1348) 2,3 8,0 83,4 (n= 2018) 5,1 16,2 69,9 (n= 2000) 5,0 14,5 73,6
Japan (n= 1204) 2,2 10,8 64,0 (n= 1011) 2,2 9,4 59,5 (n= 1362) 2,0 14,4 57,9
Jordan (n= 1223) 1,4 2,8 94,4
Latvia (n= 903) 4,4 21,7 46,7 (n= 1013) 1,0 13,2 77,3
Lithuania (n= 1000) 2,3 43,5 41,2 (n= 1018) 1,7 18,5 56,2
Luxembourg (n= 1211) 6,0 21,0 65,0
Macedonia (n= 1055) 4,5 25,8 61,4
Malta (n= 467) 3,9 10,1 66,2 (n= 393) 4,8 11,3 64,5 (n= 1002 4,5 15,7 76,1
Mexico (n= 1837) 1,6 8,9 76,7 (n= 1531) 6,6 32,3 50,9 (n= 1535) 2,3 10,7 78,3
Moldova (n= 1008) 10,8 19,6 55,6
Montenegro (n= 1060) 3,4 22,6 47,0
Morocco (n= 2264) 1,5 2,2 87,8
Netherlands (n= 1221) 1,6 12,2 80,5 (n= 1017) 2,6 20,3 75,0 (n= 1003) 4,3 28,1 67,5
New Zealand (n= 1201) 4,2 28,4 49,1
Northern Ireland (n= 312) 5,6 19,6 71,9 (n=304) 9,9 16,8 69,7 (n= 1000) 9,0 19,1 66,3
Norway (n= 1051) 3,3 10,6 83,1 (n= 1239) ** 23,7 56,3 17,0 (n=1127) 5,1 27,5 65,9
Peru (n= 1501) 3,7 13,9 76,1
Philippines (n= 1200) 2,2 6,3 91,1
291

Poland (n= 1929) 5,4 16,4 64,6 (n= 1095) 4,7 15,8 78,6
Portugal (n= 1185) 3,3 17,8 71,2 (n= 1000) 2,9 19,6 73,0
Romania (n= 1146) 1,0 7,4 81,5
Russia (n= 1961) 2,2 25,3 57,5 (n= 2500) 1,5 15,1 76,5
Serbia (n= 1200) 6,8 26,8 57,3
Singapore (n= 1512) - - -
Slovakia (n*= 1136) 5,6 29,8 43,8 (n= 1331) 1,9 17,1 62,4
Slovenia (n= 1035) 1,3 6,6 74,8 (n= 1006) 3,4 30,3 58,9
South Africa (n= 1595) 2,6 12,0 68,0 (n= 2736) 5,0 16,5 67,7 (n= 3000) 11,8 12,8 67,4
South Korea (n= 970) 1,1 10,6 61,0 n,a, (n= 1200) 7,6 43,8 28,8
Spain (n= 2303) 6,2 17,6 64,3 (n= 4147) 5,6 16,3 62,8 (n= 2409) 7,3 18,3 63,0
Sweden (n= 954) 1,5 23,5 69,1 (n= 1047) 2,9 38,3 52,4 (n= 1015) 4,4 45,8 46,2
Switzerland (n= 1212) 1,8 15,1 76,2
Turkey (n= 1030) 1,4 6,0 86,2 (n= 4607) 1,8 12,5 83,8
Uganda (n= 1002) 4,7 17,1 55,1
Ukraine (n= 1195) 2,4 14,2 71,4
Uruguay (n= 1000) 9,4 18,1 64,4
USA (n= 2325) 3,0 15,3 75,1 (n= 1839) 4,6 28,5 61,9 (n= 1200) 5,8 37,2 53,9
292

Venezuela (n= 1200) 2,4 6,1 87,9
Vietnam (n= 1000) 0,3 9,6 82,3
West Germany (n= 1305) 1,6 11,1 80,8 (n= 2101) 2,1 12,1 75,2 (n= 1037) 1,8 15,4 76,1
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values.
Question wording: “Now I’d like you to look at this card, I’m going to read out some different form of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to
tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it, (…) Joining
unofficial strikes”.
* Czech Republic and Slovakia: During the third WVS wave two surveys were conducted, one in 1990, another one in 1991, With the exception of “Attending
lawful demonstrations”, the results are based on the 1991 surveys with 2109 Czech respondents and 1136 Slovak respondents, respectively,
** Please note that in the1990 Norwegian sample the question aimed at “official” and not “unofficial” strikes. The unusually high participation rates are therefore
due to the question wording.
Azerbaijan, Australia, Armenia, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, New Zealand, Norway, Dominican Republic, Switzerland, Georgia : Data from 1995-97 WVS.
293

Occupying Buildings
1981 1990 1999-2000
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never
do
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never
do
Have
done
Might
do
Would
never
do
Albania (n= 999) 0,3 2,0 92,1 (n= 1000) 0,4 1,4 82,2
Algeria (n= 1282) 1,4 3,5 85,3
Argentina (n= 1005) 3,0 7,2 71,6 (n= 1002) 2,6 7,8 84,7 (n= 1280) 1,8 8,7 85,1
Armenia (n= 2000) 1,1 11,8 82,3
Australia (n= 1228) 2,0 14,3 81,7 - - - - (n=2048) 1,9 17,0 78,7
Austria (n= 1460) 0,7 6,3 88,1 (n= 1522) 0,6 9,3 86,5
Azerbaijan (n= 2002) 0,1 3 91,7
Belgium (n= 1145) 2,4 14,6 70,0 (n= 2792) 3,9 18,8 68,2 (n=1912) 5,5 24,6 65,3
Bosnia-Herzegovina (n= 1200) 0,5 11,0 80,6
Brazil (n= 1782) 1,9 12,3 83,5 (n= 1149) 2,7 15,8 79,7
Bulgaria (n= 1034) 1,3 11,9 72,0 (n= 1000) 2,5 11,5 67,5
Canada (n=1254) 2,4 14,1 79,2 (n= 1730) 2,9 19,6 72,4 (n= 1931) 3,0 17,6 76,7
Chile (n= 1500) 4,1 10,6 82,9 (n= 1200) 4,0 9,1 81,2
Colombia (n= 6025) 1,3 10,7 85,1
294

Croatia (n= 1003) 0,7 16,6 73,3
Czech Republic (n*=2109) 1,3 13,8 67,9 (n= 1908) 0,9 9,1 79,9
Denmark (n= 1182) 2,2 8,2 83,9 (n= 1030) 2,0 6,5 89,1 (n=1023) 2,7 11,7 82,6
Dominican Republic (n= 417) 4,1 24,2 59,5
East Germany (n= 1336) 0,8 12,0 76,4 (n= 999) 0,8 13,1 78,4
Egypt (n= 3000) 2,4 2,4 95,1
Estonia (n= 1008) 0,7 6,3 82,5 (n= 1005) 0,1 4,6 88,0
Finland (n= 1003) 0,7 9,1 87,0 (n= 588) 1,4 17,0 67,7 (n= 1038) 0,1 14,0 79,2
France (n=1200 ) 6,7 20,8 67,2 (n=1002 ) 7,2 22,7 61,7 (n= 1615) 8,4 32,9 51,8
Georgia (n=2008) 0,7 2 95
Great Britain (n= 1167) 2,2 10,1 85,4 (n= 1484) 2,3 9,8 86,1 (n= 1000) 2,1 15,3 77,9
Greece (n= 1142) 26,0 25,2 43,7
Hungary (n= 999) 0,1 3,7 91,1 (n= 1000) 0,5 4,1 90,4
Iceland (n= 927) 0,4 8,3 89,2 (n= 702) 1,3 9,1 86,9 (n= 968) 0,7 12,0 85,4
India (n= 2500) 0,7 5,2 84,3 (n= 2002) 3,5 9,7 64,0
Indonesia (n= 1004) 3,7 8,8 79,4
Ireland (n= 1217) 1,9 13,7 78,4 (n= 1000) 1,9 18,4 75,6 (n= 1012) 2,2 15,3 78,4
Israel (n= 1199) 0,9 6,4 88,4
295

Italy (n= 1348) 4,2 10,5 77,6 (n= 2018) 6,1 17,9 67,6 (n= 2000) 7,5 16,4 69,0
Japan (n= 1204) 0,5 4,5 73,9 (n= 1011) 0,3 5,2 70,1 (n= 1362) 0,1 6,2 73,8
Jordan (n= 1223) 0,0 0,5 98,0
Latvia (n= 903) 0,9 4,2 72,8 (n= 1013) 0,3 3,8 90,5
Lithuania (n= 1000) 0,2 17,9 67,9 (n= 1018) 1,1 9,1 65,2
Luxembourg (n= 393) 2,2 8,2 66,2 (n= 1211) 1,4 16,6 72,0
Macedonia (n= 1055) 1,0 14,1 75,6
Malta (n= 467) 1,5 4,9 73,7 (n= 1002 1,2 12,8 82,3
Mexico (n= 1837) 1,4 10,6 74,9 (n= 1531) 4,6 25,3 58,6 (n= 1535) 1,8 6,5 82,0
Moldova (n= 1008) 1,8 9,5 73,4
Montenegro (n= 1060) 0,8 12,4 62,2
Morocco (n= 2264) 0,4 4,1 84,3
Netherlands (n= 1221) 2,0 18,3 73,5 (n= 1017) 3,0 21,3 73,3 (n= 1003) 4,9 23,3 71,7
New Zealand (n= 1201) 1,0 16,0 65,0
Nigeria (n= 1001) (n= 2022)
Northern Ireland (n= 312) 1,0 7,9 86,2 (n= 304) 1,0 7,6 87,2 (n= 1000) 2,3 9,7 82,4
Norway (n= 1051) 0,9 3,8 93,6 (n= 1239) 1,0 9,7 84,5 (n=1127) 1,8 10,3 87,5
Pakistan (n= 2000)
296

Peru (n= 1501) 1,6 11,5 80,7
Philippines (n= 1200) 0,6 6,4 92,2
Poland (n= 1920) 3,4 12,8 70,1 (n= 1095) 2,8 15,6 80,6
Portugal (n= 1185) 1,3 10,2 80,6 (n= 1000) 1,1 20,9 72,8
Puerto Rico (n= 720)
Romania (n= 1146) 0,4 5,0 84,3
Russia (n= 1961) 0,7 10,1 72,9 (n= 2500) 0,6 7,8 83,9
Serbia (n= 1200) 1,8 15,0 74,0
Singapore (n= 1512) - - -
Slovakia (n*= 1136) 0,5 14,1 62,4 (n= 1331) 0,7 11,9 69,3
Slovenia (n= 1035) 0,7 10,0 72,5 (n= 1006) 1,5 22,1 68,8
South Africa (n= 1596) 1,3 7,2 72,9 (n= 2736) 1,9 16,0 64,5 (n= 3000) 4,8 17,9 66,8
South Korea (n= 970) 1,3 7,1 64,4 (n= 1251) 10,1 34,7 49,4 - - - -
Spain (n= 2303) 2,6 11,6 74,6 (n= 4147) 2,4 16,1 64,9 (n= 2409) 2,4 13,9 71,8
Sweden (n= 954) 0,3 11,0 84,6 (n= 1047) 0,2 18,3 76,2 (n= 1015) 2,5 18,5 76,1
Switzerland (n= 1212) 1 12,3 80,6
Turkey (n= 1030) 1,2 2,5 89,6 (n= 4607) 0,5 4,5 92,8
Uganda (n= 1002) 5,3 25,7 25,5
297

Ukraine (n= 1195) 0,8 4,7 84,7
Uruguay (n= 1000) 7 15,2 69,9
USA (n= 2325) 1,4 8,4 83,8 (n= 1839) 1,4 16,5 77,4 (n= 1200) 3,9 23,7 67,1
Venezuela (n= 1200) 1,7 8,0 87,3
Vietnam (n= 1000) 1,0 18,7 65,0
West Germany (n= 1305) 1,0 9,9 83,2 (n= 2101) 1,0 9,0 82,1 (n= 1037) 0,7 13,0 80,8
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values.
Question wording: “Now I’d like you to look at this card, I’m going to read out some different form of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to
tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it, (…)
Occupying buildings or factories”.
* Czech Republic and Slovakia: During the third WVS wave two surveys were conducted, one in 1990, another one in 1991, With the exception of “Attending
lawful demonstrations”, the results are based on the 1991 surveys with 2109 Czech respondents and 1136 Slovak respondents, respectively,
Azerbaijan, Australia, Armenia, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, New Zealand, Norway, Dominican Republic, Switzerland, Georgia: Data from 1995-97 WVS.
298

European Social Survey
2002 and 2004 (Round 1 and 2)
Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker
2002 (Round 1) 2004 (Round 2)
Yes No Yes No
France (n=1503) 11,4 88,4 12,9 87,1 France (n=1806)
Norway (n=2036) 22,8 77,2 23,2 76,6 Norway (n=1760)
Austria (n=2257) 7,8 91,0 8,6 89,7 Austria (n=2256)
Belgium (n=1899) 7,4 92,3 5,2 94,7 Belgium (n=1778)
Switzerland (n=2039) 9,4 90,5 8,5 91,5 Switzerland (n=2141)
Czech Republic (n=1360) 4,9 92,9 4,6 93,5 Czech Republic (n=3026)
Germany (n=2919) 5,8 94,2 4,4 95,6 Germany (n=2870)
Denmark (n=1506) 5,1 94,6 8,0 91,8 Denmark (n=1487)
Spain (n=1729) 9,7 89,1 11,5 87,7 Spain (n=1663)
Finland (n=2000) 15,7 84,3 14,1 85,8 Finland (n=2022)
UK (n=2052) 9,8 90,1 7,5 92,3 UK (n=1897)
Greece (n=2566) 2,7 96,2 2,6 97,2 Greece (n=2406)
Hungary (n=1685) 3,2 96,6 1,4 98,2 Hungary (n=1498)
Ireland (n=2046) 9,2 88,4 7,5 90,0 Ireland (n=2286)
Israel (n=2499) 11,8 87,6
Italy (n=1207) 7,3 92,0
Luxembourg (n=1552) 5,2 94,4 5,6 94,1 Luxembourg (n=1635)
Netherlands (n=2364) 3,8 96,1 5,4 94,5 Netherlands (n=1881)
Poland (n=2110) 2,9 96,5 3,8 95,9 Poland (n=1716)
Portugal (n=1511) 6,5 92,8 2,5 97,0 Portugal (n=2052)
Sweden (n=1999) 10,7 89,1 12,7 87,1 Sweden (n=1948)
Slovenia (n=1519) 2,1 96,6 1,9 97,3 Slovenia (n=1442)

2,7 96,8 Estonia (n=1989)
33,5 63,9 Iceland (n=579)
5,2 93,8 Slovakia (n=1512)
13,3 85,8 Ukraine (n=2031)
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values,
Question wording: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent
things from going wrong, During the last 12 months, have you done any of following? (,,,) Worn or
displayed a campaign badge/sticker,”
Signed Petition
2002 (Round 1) 2004 (Round 2)
Yes No Yes No
France (n=1503) 34,7 65,0 31,8 67,8 France (n=1806)
Norway (n=2036) 37,2 62,6 38,5 61,1 Norway (n=1760)
Austria (n=2257) 27,0 71,9 24,3 73,9 Austria (n=2256)
Belgium (n=1899) 33,6 65,5 21,9 77,8 Belgium (n=1778)
Switzerland (n=2039) 39,0 60,2 37,9 61,2 Switzerland (n=2141)
Czech Republic (n=1360) 15,8 82,5 13,3 84,7 Czech Republic (n=3026)
Germany (n=2919) 30,4 69,4 32,4 67,5 Germany (n=2870)
Denmark (n=1506) 28,1 71,5 28,8 70,3 Denmark (n=1487)
Spain (n=1729) 23,9 74,8 24,7 75,1 Spain (n=1663)
Finland (n=2000) 24,0 75,9 25,5 74,2 Finland (n=2022)
UK (n=2052) 40,0 59,8 35,4 64,1 UK (n=1897)
Greece (n=2566) 4,7 94,7 3,0 96,9 Greece (n=2406)
Hungary (n=1685) 4,2 95,6 6,3 93,3 Hungary (n=1498)
Ireland (n=2046) 27,0 70,7 22,3 75,3 Ireland (n=2286)
Israel (n=2499) 18,2 80,6
Italy (n=1207) 17,2 81,7
Luxembourg (n=1552) 28,6 70,4 20,7 78,8 Luxembourg (n=1635)
300

Netherlands (n=2364) 22,3 77,2 23,4 76,2 Netherlands (n=1881)
Poland (n=2110) 6,8 92,6 9,3 90,3 Poland (n=1716)
Portugal (n=1511) 7,3 92,0 4,5 95,0 Portugal (n=2052)
Sweden (n=1999) 40,4 58,7 48,4 51,1 Sweden (n=1948)
Slovenia (n=1519) 11,7 87,2 5,7 93,6 Slovenia (n=1442)
4,1 95,5 Estonia (n=1989)
47,5 49,9 Iceland (n=579)
24,9 72,9 Slovakia (n=1512)
9,3 89,1 Ukraine (n=2031)
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values,
Question wording: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent
things from going wrong, During the last 12 months, have you done any of following? (,,,) Signed a
petition,”
Taken part in a lawful demonstration
2002 (Round 1) 2004 (Round 2)
Yes No Yes No
France (n=1503) 17,9 82,0 12,8 87,1 France (n=1806)
Norway (n=2036) 9,0 91,0 10,6 89,4 Norway (n=1760)
Austria (n=2257) 9,5 89,5 6,5 92,1 Austria (n=2256)
Belgium (n=1899) 8,4 91,0 6,5 93,5 Belgium (n=1778)
Switzerland (n=2039) 7,9 92,1 8,8 91,2 Switzerland (n=2141)
Czech Republic (n=1360) 4,5 93,5 3,3 94,7 Czech Republic (n=3026)
Germany (n=2919) 10,6 89,4 8,5 91,5 Germany (n=2870)
Denmark (n=1506) 8,3 91,4 5,4 94,4 Denmark (n=1487)
Spain (n=1729) 17,3 81,5 33,9 65,7 Spain (n=1663)
Finland (n=2000) 2,0 98,0 2,0 98,0 Finland (n=2022)
UK (n=2052) 4,4 95,6 3,7 96,1 UK (n=1897)
Greece (n=2566) 4,5 95,1 5,0 95,0 Greece (n=2406)
301

Hungary (n=1685) 3,7 96,1 1,6 98,0 Hungary (n=1498)
Ireland (n=2046) 6,9 90,4 5,7 92,0 Ireland (n=2286)
Israel (n=2499) 9,8 89,2
Italy (n=1207) 10,9 88,5
Luxembourg (n=1552) 20,7 78,6 14,8 85,1 Luxembourg (n=1635)
Netherlands (n=2364) 2,9 96,8 4,4 95,4 Netherlands (n=1881)
Poland (n=2110) 1,3 98,2 1,6 98,2 Poland (n=1716)
Portugal (n=1511) 4,3 95,0 3,5 96,3 Portugal (n=2052)
Sweden (n=1999) 6,4 93,5 7,5 92,5 Sweden (n=1948)
Slovenia (n=1519) 2,7 96,1 1,6 97,7 Slovenia (n=1442)
2,0 97,6 Estonia (n=1989)
15,2 83,2 Iceland (n=579)
3,7 95,5 Slovakia (n=1512)
21,6 77,8 Ukraine (n=2031)
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values,
Question wording: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent
things from going wrong, During the last 12 months, have you done any of following? (,,,) Taken part in
a lawful demonstration,”
Boycotted certain products
2002 (Round 1) 2004 (Round 2)
Yes No Yes No
France (n=1503) 26,6 73,2 29,9 69,8 France (n=1806)
Norway (n=2036) 36,6 63,3 23,5 76,4 Norway (n=1760)
Austria (n=2257) 21,2 77,1 19,1 78,4 Austria (n=2256)
Belgium (n=1899) 12,7 86,6 9,8 89,9 Belgium (n=1778)
Switzerland (n=2039) 31,3 68,3 24,9 74,9 Switzerland (n=2141)
Czech Republic (n=1360) 10,5 86,7 6,7 90,3 Czech Republic (n=3026)
Germany (n=2919) 26,0 73,8 21,9 77,9 Germany (n=2870)
302

Denmark (n=1506) 22,8 76,8 28,2 71,2 Denmark (n=1487)
Spain (n=1729) 7,8 90,3 13,9 85,6 Spain (n=1663)
Finland (n=2000) 26,8 73,0 29,3 70,7 Finland (n=2022)
UK (n=2052) 26,0 73,6 20,5 79,1 UK (n=1897)
Greece (n=2566) 8,4 90,3 5,1 94,8 Greece (n=2406)
Hungary (n=1685) 4,8 94,9 5,1 94,3 Hungary (n=1498)
Ireland (n=2046) 13,3 84,3 10,6 86,8 Ireland (n=2286)
Israel (n=2499) 14,8 84,1
Italy (n=1207) 7,5 91,9
Luxembourg (n=1552) 15,7 78,6 14,0 85,1 Luxembourg (n=1635)
Netherlands (n=2364) 10,4 89,4 8,3 91,1 Netherlands (n=1881)
Poland (n=2110) 3,6 95,8 5,0 94,5 Poland (n=1716)
Portugal (n=1511) 3,4 95,9 2,0 97,5 Portugal (n=2052)
Sweden (n=1999) 32,3 67,2 34,8 65,2 Sweden (n=1948)
Slovenia (n=1519) 5,1 93,6 2,1 97,2 Slovenia (n=1442)
4,1 95,2 Estonia (n=1989)
27,6 70,5 Iceland (n=579)
11,2 86,2 Slovakia (n=1512)
1,8 97,4 Ukraine (n=2031)
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values,
Question wording: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent
things from going wrong, During the last 12 months, have you done any of following? (,,,) Boycotted
certain products,”
303

Bought product for political/ethical/environmental reason
2002 (Round 1)
Yes
No
France (n=1503) 28,0 71,7
Norway (n=2036) 11,5 88,4
Austria (n=2257) 29,2 69,1
Belgium (n=1899) 26,8 72,6
Switzerland (n=2039) 44,3 55,2
Czech Republic (n=1360) 21,9 74,9
Germany (n=2919) 39,1 60,6
Denmark (n=1506) 43,6 56,0
Spain (n=1729) 11,4 86,9
Finland (n=2000) 41,8 58,1
UK (n=2052) 32,3 67,6
Greece (n=2566) 6,5 92,7
Hungary (n=1685) 10,4 89,2
Ireland (n=2046) 24,0 73,3
Israel (n=2499) 17,6 81,5
Italy (n=1207) 6,5 92,8
Luxembourg (n=1552) 29,6 69,2
Netherlands (n=2364) 25,7 74,2
Poland (n=2110) 9,8 89,6
Portugal (n=1511) 6,8 92,3
Sweden (n=1999) 54,9 44,7
Slovenia (n=1519) 9,5 88,9
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values,
Question wording: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent
things from going wrong, During the last 12 months, have you done any of following? (,,,) Deliberately
bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons,”
304

Participated in illegal protest activities
2002 (Round 1)
Yes
No
France (n=1503) 2,6 97,1
Norway (n=2036) 0,8 99,2
Austria (n=2257) 1,3 97,7
Belgium (n=1899) 2,4 97,1
Switzerland (n=2039) 1,9 98,0
Czech Republic (n=1360) 1,3 96,9
Germany (n=2919) 1,1 98,8
Denmark (n=1506) 1,1 98,6
Spain (n=1729) 1,7 96,2
Finland (n=2000) 0,3 99,6
UK (n=2052) 0,8 99,2
Greece (n=2566) 1,5 98,0
Hungary (n=1685) 0,8 99,1
Ireland (n=2046) 0,8 97,0
Israel (n=2499) 1,3 97,6
Italy (n=1207) 1,8 97,6
Luxembourg (n=1552) 3,5 95,5
Netherlands (n=2364) 0,4 99,4
Poland (n=2110) 0,2 99,3
Portugal (n=1511) 0,3 98,9
Sweden (n=1999) 0,8 99,2
Slovenia (n=1519) 0,8 97,8
Where values do not add up to 100 percent, it is due to missing values,
Question wording: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent
things from going wrong, During the last 12 months, have you done any of following? (,,,) Participated
in illegal protest activities,”
305