Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

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Problematic is the orientation of collective rulings on the shortening of working life instead of shorter and more flexible working hours, which would enable older workers to adapt working hours according to changing capacity during lifetime. An example of that orientation is the wide-spread utilisation of the blocked model of the early retirement scheme (Bispinck 2005: XVII). Large deficits have to be acknowledged with regard to the number of agreements and the range of covered issues on occupational safety and health and further vocational training. Moreover, at establishment level, many firms do not even fulfil basic legal requirements as integration management or occupational risks assessments (Kerschbaumer/Räder 2008: 39), which points to the low power of works councils to enforce such measures. 3.3. Poland – Institutional Profile I will deal in the next sub-sections (3.3.1. and 3.3.2.) with changes in the old-age pension and disability pension system in Poland on the one side, and with changes in the system of passive and active labour market policies and with legal rules which have an impact on the employment relationship on the other side. Only such developments will be discussed which have a bearing on the pull factors of early exit in Poland; consequently, the social security system for farmers (KRUS) will not be dealt with. In the chapter after that (section 3.3.3.), I will depict structural changes in the economy which still have an impact on the current personnel policy of Polish companies – namely, the restructuring of whole branches, privatisation and acquisition by foreign corporations, and rising unemployment figures related to those developments. Sub-section 3.3.4. will present the outcome of those institutional and structural changes – the aggregate figures on labour market participation and take-up of pensions. Also individual retirement preferences of Poles will be dealt with in that sub-section. The last section (3.3.5.) will present the policy of social partners with regard to the way it determines firm-level policy towards older workers. 3.3.1. Overview of Changes in Polish Pension Laws 24 Poland can be, alike Germany, grouped among countries with a Bismarckian pension scheme (Hinrichs/Aleksandrowicz 2005: 15-16). Pension systems in those countries are 24 This section draws on Aleksandrowicz (2007). The historic information (up to 1991) is based on Pławucka (1991) and Żukowski (1994), unless otherwise indicated. 69

ased on social insurance and their main function is to protect living standards (Hinrichs 2000). The first pension reform which is relevant in the context of my study is the reform of 1954 whereby the Bismarckian administrative differentiation between blue- and white-collar workers was replaced with the division between two categories of workers. The preferential treatment of ´first category workers´ was a socialist element and was to encourage people to take up work regarded as important for the socialist economy and entailing dangerous or health-impairing working conditions – miners, workers on ships and aircraft, and teachers; with ´second category workers´ encompassing all others. Those categories were replaced with the act of 1982 with workers working ´under special conditions´ (e.g. pilots, dockers, steel- and ironworkers, miners, sea fishermen; Latoszek 1996) or performing work ´of special character´ (e.g. artists, musicians, teachers, journalists, soldiers, fire workers, customs officers; Tymorek 1999). What is important in the context of my study, is the lower retirement age (usually 55 y. for women, 60 y. for men) granted to those workers as a political privilege and in order to ensure loyalty (Golinowska/Pietka 2003: 337-8). The range of persons entitled to branch privileges amounted to 25 per cent of the workforce (Księżopolski 1997: 342). As will be shown in section 3.3.4., many Poles make use of those privileges, which contributes to the low average retirement age and to difficulties for adapting to the new system in terms of postponing retirement. That also has a bearing on the opportunity structure of Polish firms, as the preference of Poles for early exit enables them to cut staff levels with little social unrest (chapter 4.3.). Table 6 presents reforms of the old-age and disability pension system which are of relevance for my study. 70

ased on social insurance and their main function is to protect living standards (Hinrichs<br />

2000).<br />

The first pension reform which is relevant in the context of my study is the reform of<br />

1954 whereby the Bismarckian administrative differentiation between blue- and white-collar<br />

workers was replaced with the division between two categories of workers. The preferential<br />

treatment of ´first category workers´ was a socialist element and was to encourage people to<br />

take up work regarded as important for the socialist economy and entailing dangerous or<br />

health-impairing working conditions – miners, workers on ships and aircraft, and teachers;<br />

with ´second category workers´ encompassing all others. Those categories were replaced<br />

with the act of 1982 with workers working ´under special conditions´ (e.g. pilots, dockers,<br />

steel- and ironworkers, miners, sea fishermen; Latoszek 1996) or performing work ´of<br />

special character´ (e.g. artists, musicians, teachers, journalists, soldiers, fire workers,<br />

customs officers; Tymorek 1999). What is important in the context of my study, is the lower<br />

retirement age (usually 55 y. for women, 60 y. for men) granted to those workers as a<br />

political privilege and in order to ensure loyalty (Golinowska/Pietka 2003: 337-8). The<br />

range of persons entitled to branch privileges amounted to 25 per cent of the workforce<br />

(Księżopolski 1997: 342). As will be shown in section 3.3.4., many Poles make use of those<br />

privileges, which contributes to the low average retirement age and to difficulties for<br />

adapting to the new system in terms of postponing retirement. That also has a bearing on the<br />

opportunity structure of Polish firms, as the preference of Poles for early exit enables them<br />

to cut staff levels with little social unrest (chapter 4.3.).<br />

Table 6 presents reforms of the old-age and disability pension system which are of<br />

relevance for my study.<br />

70

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