Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

urdens of the workforce and suggests the creation of age-mixed teams, job rotation and
qualification. However, it also stipulates the use of long-term work accounts as a vehicle for
early exit (AGVerband Stahl/IG Metall 2006). The collective agreement for the chemical
industry stipulates the use of ATZ in the part-time model and of long-term work accounts for
early exit (IG BCE/BAVC 2008). German Railways employees, in turn, are covered by the
Collective Agreement on Employment Security which stipulates integration management
and the instalment of age-adequate workplaces (Kerschbaumer/Räder 2008: 37).
Besides of regulations at collective bargaining level, co-determination powers of
employee representatives at firm level play a role for the opportunity structure of firms. In
cases of mass lay-offs, the employer must negotiate a social plan at the request of the works
council in companies with more than 20 workers (Backes-Gellner et al. 1997: 332). § 99, 2
of the Works Constitutions Act grants the employee representatives the right to oppose the
recruitment of new employees (e.g. in cases when incumbent workers have to be laid off).
The Works Constitution Act obliges the works council and the employer to include older
workers in external or internal vocational qualification measures. The employer can not
deny the employee the opportunity to participate in a qualification measure, but does not
have to cover the costs or grant him/her a paid leave from work. If the employer carries out
internal qualification measures, the works council has to provide for a participation of older
workers in it (Gussone 1999: 231-2). However, an individual entitlement of an older worker
to be included in such measures can not be derived from this provision but can be codified
in a collective agreement or in a work council agreement (ibid: 247-8).
It can be concluded from those findings that collective and firm-level agreements
pertaining to older workers may have mixed impact on their chances for finding and
continuing employment. Trade unions justify protective measures with the greater risk of
dismissal faced by older workers (Bispinck 2005: XVII; BmFSFJ 2005: 102-3). The
employers, on the other hand, opt for a loosening of age-protective laws as they actually
increase the non-wage labour costs and pose barriers for the employment of older people
(BDA 2000, 2003b). OECD (2005a: 116ff) argues in the same vein with regard to the legal
and collective protection against dismissals. This is in line with the neo-classical labour
market theory which states that fixed costs for hiring and firing reduce the demand for
labour, to the detriment of marginal groups of workers like the older ones (Soltwedel 1980).
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