Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
The EU anti-discrimination directive (Directive 2000/78/EC) was transformed into German law only at the end of 2006. In apprehension, the German public sector has already changed its pay scale from an age-based to a tenure-based one. Additional holidays, preservation of the reached income level in cases of downgrading, and shorter working hours will be challenged by the new law (Kocher 2005: 316). However, the German legal practice justifies several exemptions from the Directive: - the ruling that employment ends at completion of the eligible age for the standard retirement pension present in many collective agreements, works council agreements and individual work contracts can be still justified on grounds of public security and the preservation of a balanced age structure of the workforce (Kocher 2005: 307, 314; Ruppert 2006: 22). Nevertheless, the anti-discrimination legislation may strengthen opposing arguments stressing the freedom of choice with regard to the workplace and to the profession (Waltermann 2006: 142-3); - well-founded age limits in job ads and recruitment practice are still possible, e.g. for trainee and apprentice programmes. Some lawyers even claim that the mismatch with the age profile of customers can justify the exclusion of older/younger applicants (Kocher 2005: 316); - during mass lay-offs connected with redundancy payment schemes, a different treatment of younger and older workers is still justified due to worse job prospects of the latter (Kocher 2005: 312, 317). To sum up: A positive trend in German labour market policy is the reversal from deactivating measures like the facilitated receipt of the unemployment benefit (§248 Social Code Book III) and the turn to activating measures. However, older unemployed and older workers are still insufficiently included in active labour market policies and overly cumulated in passive labour market policies. Only 12.5 per cent of registered unemployed aged 50+ receive active labour market services, compared to 22.5 per cent of those younger than 50 (Bach 2006: 75). Only 12.3 per cent of older unemployed profit from further vocational training and only 7.5 per cent from qualification vouchers (Frerichs 2006: 37). This impedes their chances for continued employment and for finding a new job (Eichhorst 2006b: 78-79). Especially problematic is the low investment in further vocational training, both that provided by the employment office and by companies (OECD 2005a: 127-9; Eichhorst 2006b: 75-76). The anti-discrimination legislation has so far not altered the age limits in work contracts and the practice in redundancy payments schemes. The legislation might therefore stay a mere paper tiger in many ways. Job advertisements are however formulated in an ageneutral way and this might encourage more applicants past the age of 49. 55
With regard to the legal and collectively agreed protection against dismissals, the assessment is equivocal: The OECD (2005a: 116) sees it as impediment to a more flexible recruitment policy (see also Eichhorst 2006a: 107-8 in the same vein). Some scholars argue that job protection increases costs related to laying-off older workers and without this protection, older workers already on the job would run a higher risk to lose it, while the job promotion effects would be negligible (Aust/Kremer 2007: 119-120; Naegele 1992: 379). The dismissal protection also fosters human capital investment (Bosch/Knuth 2003: 137; Eichhorst 2006a: 107), as it raises the probability that the workers will utilise the new qualifications in the same firm. 3.2.3. Impact of Institutional and Structural Changes on Retirement Transitions and Employment The analytical model depicted in Figure 3 asserts an impact of institutional regulations which bring about a specific pension and labour market policy on the one hand, and a specific system of industrial relations on the other hand, on firm behaviour. The agency of firms – the way they translate institutional regulations into company practice – is a ´black box´ so far, and will be elucidated on concrete firm examples in chapters 4.2.-4.4. In this section, I will present and discuss the final result of that ´translation´ mechanism – aggregate statistical indicators on the timing of exit and labour force participation. At the end of this section, hypothesis 4 will be tested. Pension reforms (as depicted in section 3.2.1.) have shaped exit preferences of workers which, in combination, set opportunities and restrictions for firms to regulate the exit of older workers. The introduction of the flexible retirement age in 1972 with the purpose of ´humanisation of working life´ initiated the trend towards early retirement. The acceptance of a lower age of exit by workers gave rise to firms´ interest in that option for solving labour market problems, as they could rely on a collusion of interests. Table 4 below depicts how the average age of pension take-up has developed in the last decades. The table shows that the average retirement age declined by 1.7 years between 1970 and 2000 and has risen afterwards. The downward trend in the disability pension scheme was steepest, and still continues. 56
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With regard to the legal and collectively agreed protection against dismissals, the<br />
assessment is equivocal: The OECD (2005a: 116) sees it as impediment to a more flexible<br />
recruitment policy (see also Eichhorst 2006a: 107-8 in the same vein). Some scholars argue<br />
that job protection increases costs related to laying-off older workers and without this<br />
protection, older workers already on the job would run a higher risk to lose it, while the job<br />
promotion effects would be negligible (Aust/Kremer 2007: 119-<strong>12</strong>0; Naegele 1992: 379).<br />
The dismissal protection also fosters human capital investment (Bosch/Knuth 2003: 137;<br />
Eichhorst 2006a: 107), as it raises the probability that the workers will utilise the new<br />
qualifications in the same firm.<br />
3.2.3. Impact of Institutional and Structural Changes on Retirement<br />
Transitions and Employment<br />
The analytical model depicted in Figure 3 asserts an impact of institutional regulations<br />
which bring about a specific pension and labour market policy on the one hand, and a<br />
specific system of industrial relations on the other hand, on firm behaviour. The agency of<br />
firms – the way they translate institutional regulations into company practice – is a ´black<br />
box´ so far, and will be elucidated on concrete firm examples in chapters 4.2.-4.4. In this<br />
section, I will present and discuss the final result of that ´translation´ mechanism –<br />
aggregate statistical indicators on the timing of exit and labour force participation. At the<br />
end of this section, hypothesis 4 will be tested.<br />
Pension reforms (as depicted in section 3.2.1.) have shaped exit preferences of workers<br />
which, in combination, set opportunities and restrictions for firms to regulate the exit of<br />
older workers. The introduction of the flexible retirement age in 1972 with the purpose of<br />
´humanisation of working life´ initiated the trend towards early retirement. The acceptance<br />
of a lower age of exit by workers gave rise to firms´ interest in that option for solving labour<br />
market problems, as they could rely on a collusion of interests.<br />
Table 4 below depicts how the average age of pension take-up has developed in the last<br />
decades. The table shows that the average retirement age declined by 1.7 years between<br />
1970 and 2000 and has risen afterwards. The downward trend in the disability pension<br />
scheme was steepest, and still continues.<br />
56