Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
made use of this provision. By 2003, this share had risen to 70 per cent (Büttner et al. 2005: 7). Workers endangered by unemployment in companies undertaking personnel adjustment processes (e.g. due to partial closure) are entitled to ´structural short-time working allowance´ (Strukturkurzarbeitergeld; §216b SGB III) and are obliged to undertake requalification measures in order to find a new job. From 2005, the allowance can be received for one year (instead of two years as before). In combination, those three provisions had brought onto way the ´59 rule´ utilised on a great scale by German companies to release workers (see section 3.2.1.). Since the middle of the 1990s, attempts were undertaken to stop this procedure. Firstly, the eligible age for the maximum period of receipt of unemployment benefit was raised to 57 in 1997. Secondly, from 1993 on, companies have to pay back the unemployment benefit for dismissed older workers for a period of up to 32 months (§147a SGB III). 19 Thirdly, § 428 SGB III was to expire by February 2006 (but has, in fact, been prolonged to the end of 2007). Fourthly, the pensionable age for the old-age pension after unemployment was raised to 63 years. And fifthly, the worker incurs a loss of unemployment benefit for several weeks if he/she consented to the dismissal and, since 1998, sees his unemployment benefit reduced by the amount of the severance payment. 20 The break with the unemployment pathway and with the ´59/57 rule´ was complete after the Law on Labour Market Reforms of 2004 which shortened the maximum period of receipt of AL-Geld I for workers ´55+´ to 18 months by February 2006, and the introduction of a lump-sum AL-Geld II in place of the previously earnings-related benefit. However, due to the ongoing impasse on the German labour market, the grand CDU/SPD coalition prolonged again the period of receipt of AL-Geld I to 24 months for persons aged 58+ with retrospective effect from 1 st January 2008. Since the middle of the nineties, labour market policy in Germany has been characterised by a trend towards ´activating´ the unemployed (Buchegger-Traxler et al. 2003: 38). That trend has exposed job-seekers to more strict control and to more severe 19 The § 147a SGB III was first introduced in 1982 and tightened up in 1985 in order to make the preretirement scheme more attractive as alternative to the ´59 rule´ (Kühlewind 1988: 55-56). The law had little impact on firms´ behaviour, as only about one in every 100 firms dismissing workers aged 56+ were affected (Teipen 2003: 88-89; OECD 2005: 118). The provision expired by the end of 2007. 20 Firms could prevent this by dismissing older workers due to operational reasons in cooperation with the works council (Oswald 1999: 203). 53
criteria of what jobs are they are supposed to accept. Job placement in the regular and not in the subsidised labour market has acquired a higher priority. An expression of the activation trend is the programme „Initiative 50 plus“ launched in 2002 with the Job-AQTIV Act and subsequent acts and revived in 2006. It introduced ´integration grants´ (wage costs subsidies for employers when hiring unemployed ´50pluses´), qualification vouchers for persons in SME, facilitated opportunity to conclude temporary contracts with persons aged 52 and over 21 , and earnings subsidies granted to ´50pluses´ who take up a lower-paid job (BmAS 2006c). Factually, only the integration grants generated positive effects on the recruitment chances of older unemployed, predominantly in Eastern Germany (Zwick 2006: 161-2). Other measures were largely unknown by the firms, and even by job placement officers (BmAS 2006b: xviii-xix; Eichhorst 2006a: 108). Another form of intervention of the German state in the regulation of the work contract is its legislation on Flexible Working Time Regulations from 1998. With this law, the legislator created incentives to install life-time work accounts. They may be inter al. used for training purposes, for gradual or early exit. In contrast to long-time work accounts, lifetime work accounts are protected against insolvency. Compared to other OECD countries, Germany has a strong legal and collectively agreed protection against dismissals (OECD 2005a: 116-8). Since 1969, it covers workers with an unlimited work contract and with a work history of at least six months in firms with more than ten (till 2004, more than five) employees; the period of notice rises with tenure. Those workers can only be dismissed for indiscipline or due to operational reasons in connection with a looming insolvency or mass redundancies. In a redundancy payments scheme drawn for this reason, the employer has to consider the criteria of age, seniority, dependants, severe disability and efficiency. The last criterion, introduced in 2004, has opened the way to shield younger workers from dismissals and exposed older workers to that risk, as the criterion of ´job prospects´ closely connected to age was simultaneously dismantled (Thora 2004: 11). 21 After an appeal by the European Court of Justice on grounds of ageism, the legislator included the rule that the worker had had to be unemployed for at least four months and the temporary contract may not be extended beyond five years. 54
- Page 13 and 14: older workers, and to preserve thei
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- Page 47 and 48: I had originally intended to focus
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criteria of what jobs are they are supposed to accept. Job placement in the regular and not in<br />
the subsidised labour market has acquired a higher priority.<br />
An expression of the activation trend is the programme „Initiative 50 plus“ launched in<br />
2002 with the Job-AQTIV Act and subsequent acts and revived in 2006. It introduced<br />
´integration grants´ (wage costs subsidies for employers when hiring unemployed<br />
´50pluses´), qualification vouchers for persons in SME, facilitated opportunity to conclude<br />
temporary contracts with persons aged 52 and over 21 , and earnings subsidies granted to<br />
´50pluses´ who take up a lower-paid job (BmAS 2006c). Factually, only the integration<br />
grants generated positive effects on the recruitment chances of older unemployed,<br />
predominantly in Eastern Germany (Zwick 2006: 161-2). Other measures were largely<br />
unknown by the firms, and even by job placement officers (BmAS 2006b: xviii-xix;<br />
Eichhorst 2006a: 108).<br />
Another form of intervention of the German state in the regulation of the work contract<br />
is its legislation on Flexible Working Time Regulations from 1998. With this law, the<br />
legislator created incentives to install life-time work accounts. They may be inter al. used<br />
for training purposes, for gradual or early exit. In contrast to long-time work accounts, lifetime<br />
work accounts are protected against insolvency.<br />
Compared to other OECD countries, Germany has a strong legal and collectively agreed<br />
protection against dismissals (OECD 2005a: 116-8). Since 1969, it covers workers with an<br />
unlimited work contract and with a work history of at least six months in firms with more<br />
than ten (till 2004, more than five) employees; the period of notice rises with tenure. Those<br />
workers can only be dismissed for indiscipline or due to operational reasons in connection<br />
with a looming insolvency or mass redundancies. In a redundancy payments scheme drawn<br />
for this reason, the employer has to consider the criteria of age, seniority, dependants, severe<br />
disability and efficiency. The last criterion, introduced in 2004, has opened the way to shield<br />
younger workers from dismissals and exposed older workers to that risk, as the criterion of<br />
´job prospects´ closely connected to age was simultaneously dismantled (Thora 2004: 11).<br />
21 After an appeal by the European Court of Justice on grounds of ageism, the legislator included the rule that<br />
the worker had had to be unemployed for at least four months and the temporary contract may not be extended<br />
beyond five years.<br />
54