Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
levied on persons who take up the pension between their 60 th and 63 rd year of age. Recipients of the pension who are younger than 60 have to bear a permanent lump-sum malus of 10.8 per cent. Table 3: Retirement pathways and pensionable ages in Germany as of Jan. 2008 Pensionable age 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 Retirement pathway old- Standard age pension Full pension (for persons born before 1947) Full pension (for persons born 1947- 1958 16 ) Full pension (for persons born 1959 and later 17 ) Seniority pension Old-age pension for women Expiry: 2012 (for women born 1952 or later) Deductions of up to 18% Deductions of up to 14.4% Deductions of up to 10.8% Deductions of between 7.2% and 14.4% Deductions of up to 7.2% (full pension for women born before 1943) Deductions of between 3.6% and 10.8% Deductions of up to 3.6% (full pension for women born before 1944) Deductions of up to 7.2% (full pension for persons born before 1949) Full pension for women born before 1952 Deductions of up to 3.6% (full pension for persons born before 1959) Old-age pension for the severely handicapped Old-age pension after unemployment and partial retirement Expiry: 2010 (with the exception of protected acquired rights) Deductions of 10.8% (available only to persons born before 1952) Deductions of up to 18% Deductions of 10.8% (available only to persons born before 1959) Deductions of up to 14.4% Deductions of between 3.6% and and 10.8% (full pension if born before 1943) Deductions of up to 10.8% The pension is still available at age 60-62 only to persons who have signed an ATZ contract by the end of 2003 and to those who have been dismissed before January 1 st , 2004 (even if the dismissal took effect later) Deductions of up to 7.2% (full pension if born before 1952) Deductions of up to 7.2% Deductions of up to 3.6% (full pension if born before 1959) Deductions of up to 3.6% (full pension available to persons born before 1941) Full pension Full pension available to persons born before 1952 Super-seniority Full pension pension (from 2012) Source: Own depiction based on Social Code VI: Statutory Pension Insurance and www.bmas.de/portal/440/property=pdf/tabelle_anhebung_der_altersgrenzen_ab_2010.pdf. As a form of a “public-private mix” (Ebbinghaus 2002: 137), on company level another form of early exit was used, in agreement with the older workers themselves. It combined the receipt of the unemployment benefit (used as a ´bridging pension´) and of the old-age pension after unemployment with generous payments by the firm. The so-called ´59 rule´ 16 For persons in this age bracket, the pensionable age will be raised by one month, i.e. persons born in 1947 can retire at the age of 65 years and one month and so on (Reimann 2007: 184). 17 For those birth cohorts, the pensionable age will be raised in two-month steps, i.e. persons born in 1959 can retire at the age of 66 years and two months and so on (ibid). 49
was utilised already since the late seventies in times of high unemployment. Due to the prolonged period of receipt of the earnings-related unemployment benefit and the release of unemployed aged 58 and more from the obligation to seek work, this exit pathway could start as early as at the age of 57 years and 4 months. The employer dismissed the older worker or signed a cancellation agreement and granted him/her a severance payment bridging the period until the receipt of the unemployment benefit and a smooth transfer to an early retirement pension at the age of 60. Several provisions instituted since 1997, and completed in 2004 (see section 3.2.2.) have made the ´59 rule´ less attractive to employers and employees. The dividing line between the ´59 rule´ and the statutory pre-retirement scheme (Vorruhestand; see section on pension reforms) was blurred in many branch regulations (Kühlewind 1988: 56) 18 , especially when the instrument was extended to a ´company-based pre-retirement scheme´ (betrieblicher Vorruhestand) and freed of the obligation to hire a successor (Voges 1988: 67-68). It was thus a classic example of ´instrument substitution´ in the meaning of Casey (1989). Statutory pre-retirement and the ´59 rule´ also differed in the locus of control – while the latter was often more attractive to workers in financial terms, only the first gave them control over the exit process. This accounted for the dislike of employers for pre-retirement (Jacobs et al. 1991: 209-211). Companies incurred lower costs when utilising the ´59 rule´ (Oswald 1999: 215). The locus of control is related to the question of voluntary vs. enforced exit. Statutory early retirement pensions, the preretirement and the early retirement scheme entail a (larger) freedom of choice on part of the employee. With regard to the 59 rule, the unemployment and the health pathway, the delimitation between employee´s choice and firms´ enforcement is fuzzy (Jacobs et al. 1991: 202-204; Wurm et al. 2007: 81). The early retirement scheme may be utilised past 2010, although the reimbursement of increased salary by the employment office expires by that date. The companies may, however, still profit from the exemption of the increased part of the salary from tax and social contributions (Hanau/Rolfs 2008: 19). Occupational pensions in Germany have not yet constituted a pathway into early exit as is the case in residual welfare states (U.K., USA, Japan and Ireland; Ebbinghaus 2002: 193ff). As of June 2004, 42 per cent of gainfully employed women and 47 per cent of 18 Legal differences were that the pre-retirement scheme was subject to contribution payment and that it was tax-free. 50
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was utilised already since the late seventies in times of high unemployment. Due to the<br />
prolonged period of receipt of the earnings-related unemployment benefit and the release of<br />
unemployed aged 58 and more from the obligation to seek work, this exit pathway could<br />
start as early as at the age of 57 years and 4 months. The employer dismissed the older<br />
worker or signed a cancellation agreement and granted him/her a severance payment<br />
bridging the period until the receipt of the unemployment benefit and a smooth transfer to<br />
an early retirement pension at the age of 60. Several provisions instituted since 1997, and<br />
completed in 2004 (see section 3.2.2.) have made the ´59 rule´ less attractive to employers<br />
and employees.<br />
The dividing line between the ´59 rule´ and the statutory pre-retirement scheme<br />
(Vorruhestand; see section on pension reforms) was blurred in many branch regulations<br />
(Kühlewind 1988: 56) 18 , especially when the instrument was extended to a ´company-based<br />
pre-retirement scheme´ (betrieblicher Vorruhestand) and freed of the obligation to hire a<br />
successor (Voges 1988: 67-68). It was thus a classic example of ´instrument substitution´ in<br />
the meaning of Casey (1989). Statutory pre-retirement and the ´59 rule´ also differed in the<br />
locus of control – while the latter was often more attractive to workers in financial terms,<br />
only the first gave them control over the exit process. This accounted for the dislike of<br />
employers for pre-retirement (<strong>Jacobs</strong> et al. 1991: 209-211). Companies incurred lower costs<br />
when utilising the ´59 rule´ (Oswald 1999: 215). The locus of control is related to the<br />
question of voluntary vs. enforced exit. Statutory early retirement pensions, the preretirement<br />
and the early retirement scheme entail a (larger) freedom of choice on part of the<br />
employee. With regard to the 59 rule, the unemployment and the health pathway, the<br />
delimitation between employee´s choice and firms´ enforcement is fuzzy (<strong>Jacobs</strong> et al.<br />
1991: 202-204; Wurm et al. 2007: 81).<br />
The early retirement scheme may be utilised past 2010, although the reimbursement of<br />
increased salary by the employment office expires by that date. The companies may,<br />
however, still profit from the exemption of the increased part of the salary from tax and<br />
social contributions (Hanau/Rolfs 2008: 19).<br />
Occupational pensions in Germany have not yet constituted a pathway into early exit as<br />
is the case in residual welfare states (U.K., USA, Japan and Ireland; Ebbinghaus 2002:<br />
193ff). As of June 2004, 42 per cent of gainfully employed women and 47 per cent of<br />
18 Legal differences were that the pre-retirement scheme was subject to contribution payment and that it was<br />
tax-free.<br />
50