Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
unions. This will allow the management to play one trade union off against another but it will be more difficult to reach a collusion of interests. Ebbinghaus observed a “collusion” of interests between employer representatives and the management with regard to early exit in Western European countries and that both parties pursued the goal of externalising the costs of early exit onto the public (ibid: 48). Both in Germany in Poland, the early exit trend has been built up and sustained through cooperation between the state and the collective bargaining parties. But while the works councils in Germany often assume the role of “co-managers” (Schmidt/Trinczek 1999: 117), the model of workers´ interest representation at shop level in Poland resembles the French system of plural unionism. This model, “making for interunion conflict, dissipates labour´s strength vis-á-vis employers” and enables employers to “manipulate the system and deal with whatever body appears most amenable to negotiation” (Lane 1989: 212-3). In contrast, in Germany, the principle of one union per branch is in place which reduces conflicts within works councils which are composed mostly of union members. Nienhüser (1998) states that an unrivalled works council (or shop-level trade union committee, in the case of Poland) will be more cooperative and prone to compromise than a works council which has to compete for its position. In the latter case, the employee representatives will strive to demand benefits to the workers from the employer, and the relations will be more conflict-prone. That entails that in Poland, where several trade unions rival for re-elections and for recognition by the employer as a bargaining party, it will be more difficult for the management to reach an agreement on age management and early retirement. But the management will be able to push through its interest, e.g. by not responding to trade unions´ demands for a higher compensation in case of redundancies. The power of the employer will be lower in the stronger ´juridificated´ Germany in areas which are regulated in collective agreements. Operationalisation: I will analyse the politics and policy of employee representatives at firm-level in realms of early exit and process of bargaining with the management on these matters. I will base my analysis on oral accounts of the personnel managers and the employee representatives as well as on collective bargaining material (collective and works council agreements, social plans and personnel communication on those matters, wherever available). 29
2.5. Conclusions The depicted theoretical approaches describe different aspects of the policy domain of early exit as depicted in my analytical models (Fig. 1 and 2 in chapter 2. and Fig. 3 in section 3.1.). Some are contradictory – e.g. the neo-classical approach and the firmstructural approach in the section on company-level theories – but the contradiction nevertheless reflects firm behaviour, in which diverging actions and motives are present. Although the early exit issue can be studied at three levels (the macro level of institutions and structures, the meso level of branches, and the micro level of establishments and individual workers), I will concentrate on the institutional and on the company level. For this purpose, several of the depicted theories, frameworks and theses will be helpful. The institutional framework, and above all the actor-centred institutionalism, will serve as a basis for defining hypotheses at the establishment and the national level. The pathdependence thesis offers insight into the phenomenon that some institutional conditions prevail and are hard to revert despite not being the optimum conditions. The push, pull and jump thesis describe the competing forces that shape cohort-specific retirement trajectories at the aggregate level. The life course approach may help explain how institutions influence individual life courses and shape expectations regarding the ´standard´ or ´right´ retirement age, and expectations regarding other ways of exit. The firm structural approach and the theory of incentives and contributions, on the one side, and the neo-classical labour market theory and the thesis of alternative roles, on the other side, are competing approaches which help analyse the decisions taken and policies developed in the ´black box´ of the firm arena. The approach applied by Mares (2001) – a combination of the varieties of capitalism approach and the varieties of welfare state regimes approach – describe the conditions under which firms favour certain social policy arrangements, inter al. with regard to early exit. With regard to industrial relations, the model of Ebbinghaus (2002) which positions social partners as an entity mediating between push and pull factors, as well as the power theory adapted by Nienhüser (1998) to the arena of industrial relations can be applied. On that basis, I will aim to explain the role social partners play in the process of early retirement and age management at firm level. 30
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2.5. Conclusions<br />
The depicted theoretical approaches describe different aspects of the policy domain of<br />
early exit as depicted in my analytical models (Fig. 1 and 2 in chapter 2. and Fig. 3 in<br />
section 3.1.). Some are contradictory – e.g. the neo-classical approach and the firmstructural<br />
approach in the section on company-level theories – but the contradiction<br />
nevertheless reflects firm behaviour, in which diverging actions and motives are present.<br />
Although the early exit issue can be studied at three levels (the macro level of<br />
institutions and structures, the meso level of branches, and the micro level of establishments<br />
and individual workers), I will concentrate on the institutional and on the company level.<br />
For this purpose, several of the depicted theories, frameworks and theses will be helpful.<br />
The institutional framework, and above all the actor-centred institutionalism, will serve as a<br />
basis for defining hypotheses at the establishment and the national level. The pathdependence<br />
thesis offers insight into the phenomenon that some institutional conditions<br />
prevail and are hard to revert despite not being the optimum conditions. The push, pull and<br />
jump thesis describe the competing forces that shape cohort-specific retirement trajectories<br />
at the aggregate level.<br />
The life course approach may help explain how institutions influence individual life<br />
courses and shape expectations regarding the ´standard´ or ´right´ retirement age, and<br />
expectations regarding other ways of exit.<br />
The firm structural approach and the theory of incentives and contributions, on the one<br />
side, and the neo-classical labour market theory and the thesis of alternative roles, on the<br />
other side, are competing approaches which help analyse the decisions taken and policies<br />
developed in the ´black box´ of the firm arena. The approach applied by Mares (2001) – a<br />
combination of the varieties of capitalism approach and the varieties of welfare state<br />
regimes approach – describe the conditions under which firms favour certain social policy<br />
arrangements, inter al. with regard to early exit.<br />
With regard to industrial relations, the model of Ebbinghaus (2002) which positions<br />
social partners as an entity mediating between push and pull factors, as well as the power<br />
theory adapted by Nienhüser (1998) to the arena of industrial relations can be applied. On<br />
that basis, I will aim to explain the role social partners play in the process of early retirement<br />
and age management at firm level.<br />
30