Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
age security and the changes therein as a result of pension reforms) not as determining variable but as factors which influence and are themselves influenced by firm behaviour. On the one hand, institutional regulations set the frame within which firms can take action on issues pertaining to older workforce and early retirement. E.g., German firms can use the expiry of the early retirement scheme (Altersteilzeit) as an opportunity to introduce age(ing)- friendly working conditions. Firms can also thwart the plans of the legislator and develop firm-based early exit options. On the other hand, the legislator can make allowances to firms which are shedding labour due to economic reasons. Such a situation occurred in Poland in the 1990s. As result of adjustment to market economy and in preparation for privatisation, firms conducted mass layoffs and were supported by the legislator which introduced early retirement ´due to economic reasons´. This way, firms as actors exerted influence on the institution of old-age security. Windhoff-Héritier based her approach on Elster´s (1979: 112-117) ‘two-filter model’. The model views human behaviour as the result of two filtering processes. The first filtering process is determined by structural constraints; it “cuts down the set of abstractly possible courses of action and reduces it to the vastly smaller subsets of feasible actions” (ibid: 113). The second filtering process is a rational choice between those subsets. In distinction to Elster´s model, Windhoff-Héritier (1991: 39) stresses that “political actors themselves create the institutions which in turn constitute political constraints”. Moreover, institutions “set restrictions, but at the same time they offer opportunities” and restrictions are not deterministic but create a space within which strategic action can happen (ibid: 40, 41). The focus of Windhoff-Héritier´s (1991) observation is the development of political institutions. I will use the actor-centred institutionalism of Mayntz and Scharpf (1995) as a broader approach, on which my model of interrelations between actors at national level is based (Fig. 3 in section 3.1.), and the approach of Windhoff-Héritier (1991) as an embedded model and as basis for my model of firm agency (Fig. 1) and individual agency (Fig. 2). In difference to Windhoff-Héritier (1991: 39), I do not observe the two-way relations between political institutions which constitute restrictions and which themselves “originate in the individual choices of man”, and extend my analysis to corporate actors. Based on the combined institutional and rational choice approaches and the firmstructural approach (presented in section 2.2.), which recognise the role of the firm in the utilisation and externalisation of the workforce and in the setting of framing conditions for preserving work capacity, I derive hypothesis 1: If the institutional context changes and, 13
concomitantly, the related opportunities and restrictions for firm behaviour change, the firms adapt their personnel policy strategies accordingly. Operationalisation: Because I do not have representative data on that subject, I will analyse at macro level whether the changed incentives in the retirement system have brought about a rise of employment rates of older workers and in the exit age from the labour force. At micro level, I will analyse whether the firm has translated the legislative regulations into works council agreements at firm level and into actual policy, and how this has influenced the exit patterns of the firms´ workers (as far as statements and data provided by interview partners will allow). However, my study is not about showing which factors have the greatest explanatory power for early exit, but how institutions and corporate actors interrelate, how institutions influence corporate strategies and how the deliberation procedure is structured at firm level. I will furthermore show how corporate actors reacted to the changed institutional framework of early exit, recruitment and retention of older workers (e.g. changed rules for the selection of workers for dismissal in Germany, worsened conditions for the receipt of the pre-retirement benefit in Poland). A historical institutionalist concept which is useful for the study of pension systems is the path dependence approach (Pierson 2000; Myles/Pierson 2001), which draws on the theory of institutional change developed by North (1990) and adopts it to the study of political institutions. In the light of the path dependence concept, history matters. Institutional change is pre-determined because of positive feedback and increasing returns enjoyed when following the chosen path – “each step along a path produces consequences which make that path more attractive in the next round and raises the costs of shifting to an alternative path” (Myles/Pierson 2001: 312). With regard to pension reforms, this means that the path along which a certain institution has developed defines the tracks along which it may evolve in the future and accounts for its stability. Thus, the costs of shifting to a prefunded scheme are especially high for mature PAYG pension schemes due to the double payment problem. The path dependence thesis (Myles/Pierson 2001) substantiates hypothesis 6: In both analysed countries, the institutional context and the personnel policy of firms will rather hinder a reversal of the early exit trend and the increase of activity rates of older workforce than facilitate such a development. In Germany, which has partly 14
- Page 1 and 2: Chances and Barriers for the Prolon
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concomitantly, the related opportunities and restrictions for firm behaviour change,<br />
the firms adapt their personnel policy strategies accordingly.<br />
Operationalisation: Because I do not have representative data on that subject, I will<br />
analyse at macro level whether the changed incentives in the retirement system have<br />
brought about a rise of employment rates of older workers and in the exit age from the<br />
labour force. At micro level, I will analyse whether the firm has translated the legislative<br />
regulations into works council agreements at firm level and into actual policy, and how this<br />
has influenced the exit patterns of the firms´ workers (as far as statements and data provided<br />
by interview partners will allow). However, my study is not about showing which factors<br />
have the greatest explanatory power for early exit, but how institutions and corporate actors<br />
interrelate, how institutions influence corporate strategies and how the deliberation<br />
procedure is structured at firm level. I will furthermore show how corporate actors reacted<br />
to the changed institutional framework of early exit, recruitment and retention of older<br />
workers (e.g. changed rules for the selection of workers for dismissal in Germany, worsened<br />
conditions for the receipt of the pre-retirement benefit in Poland).<br />
A historical institutionalist concept which is useful for the study of pension systems is<br />
the path dependence approach (Pierson 2000; Myles/Pierson 2001), which draws on the<br />
theory of institutional change developed by North (1990) and adopts it to the study of<br />
political institutions. In the light of the path dependence concept, history matters.<br />
Institutional change is pre-determined because of positive feedback and increasing returns<br />
enjoyed when following the chosen path – “each step along a path produces consequences<br />
which make that path more attractive in the next round and raises the costs of shifting to an<br />
alternative path” (Myles/Pierson 2001: 3<strong>12</strong>). With regard to pension reforms, this means<br />
that the path along which a certain institution has developed defines the tracks along which<br />
it may evolve in the future and accounts for its stability. Thus, the costs of shifting to a prefunded<br />
scheme are especially high for mature PAYG pension schemes due to the double<br />
payment problem.<br />
The path dependence thesis (Myles/Pierson 2001) substantiates hypothesis 6: In both<br />
analysed countries, the institutional context and the personnel policy of firms will<br />
rather hinder a reversal of the early exit trend and the increase of activity rates of<br />
older workforce than facilitate such a development. In Germany, which has partly<br />
14
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