Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
The higher employers´ organisation density and collective bargaining coverage in Germany is, on the one hand, a chance for concerted policy at branch level, which quite recently has brought about collective agreements on demographic change in the German steel industry and chemical industry. The lower degree of bargaining centralisation in Poland (20% as comp. to 47% in Germany; EIRO data), and the low frequency of bargaining within the Tripartite Commission (Socha/Sztanderska 2000: 184) leaves the establishment level as the main arena for bargaining on personnel policy issues (and, potentially, also on age management issues). That may, on the one hand, stabilise employment as it protects employers from overt demands of trade unions (ibid: 39). On the other hand, it diminishes the innovative potential of collective agreements in the field of age management (see section 3.2.4.), as with a smaller degree of bargaining centralisation, it is easier to push through regulations for whole branches instead of bargaining separately with each employer. And as the experience of other EU countries has shown, strong social partners have supported or initiated innovative legislative projects e.g. in the field of work ability and further training (Hartlapp/Schmid 2006: 170-4). By standard-setting, social partners in a coordinated market economy like Germany also encourage the transferability of skills within an industry (Hall/Soskice 2001: 25ff). Therefore, the results on that variable are equivocal. The same conclusion applies to industrial relations at company level. Here, the higher workplace representation coverage in Germany (53% of workers when comp. to 22% in Poland; EIRO data) and the institution of co-determination account for the greater ability of employee representatives in German firms to protect workers and to voice integrative demands regarding e.g. further training. Works councils in German firms increase employment stability, foster retraining and are organisationally efficient in a way that they balance out employer´s and employees´ interests (Backes-Gellner et al. 1997: 328, 338; Hall/Soskice 2001: 25). But, on the other hand, employee representatives may voice greater demands for preserving the status quo e.g. on early exit (Orenstein 2000). The insideroutsider theory brings forward their negative effect on increasing the employment of marginal groups of the labour market (Lindbeck/Snower 1988: 243ff). Another positive impact factor is EU influence on legislation in Poland and Germany. Both Poland and Germany are EU members, but due to different length of membership and more advanced convergence in Germany, the influence of EU regulations on legislation (and, via that channel, on company policy) is higher in the latter case. The country 229
differences in EU impact are visible in the fact that Germany has equalised retirement ages of men and women, while in Poland, that issue has been debated since 1997 but no legislative attempts have been made in the last years, and there is no obligation to do so (with the exception of third pillar pensions according to Directive 2006/54/EC). According to neo-classical labour market theory, seniority wages diminish the recruitment and retention chances of older workforce (Soltwedel/Spinanger 1976). The seniority principle is strongly developed in wage formation in Poland, in Germany only (till 2005) in the public sector, which locates a bigger barrier to the prolongation of working life in the Polish case. While there is a strong legislative and collectively agreed protection of long-standing workers in Germany, workers in Poland are protected from dismissal only four years prior to the earliest retirement age. The government sees it as impediment to higher employment rates and proposes to shorten the period to the previously valid two-year span (MPiPS 2008: 19-20). However, 87 per cent of 650 private and civil service establishments surveyed in Poland did not perceive any negative employment effects of the longer protection period (Ipsos 2007: 40). Also with regard to the dismissal protection in Germany, the assessment is equivocal (contra: OECD 2005: 116, Eichhorst 2006a: 107-8; pro: Aust/Kremer 2007: 119- 120, Naegele 1992: 379, Bosch/Knuth 2003: 137; Behrens 1999: 91), therefore it can neither be assessed as a barrier nor an opportunity for prolonged employment. An ambiguous assessment also prevails with regard to the anti-discrimination legislation in Germany and Poland, as its impact is reduced by several exceptions which still make an ageist policy possible (Kocher 2005; Ruppert 2006; Sadlik 2007; Maniewska 2006). Nevertheless, the anti-discrimination legislation may raise the awareness of employers for latent discrimination and, by omitting age bars in job advertisements, encourage older jobseekers to apply. Moreover, a non-discriminatory working climate raises productivity and work morale (Dunn 2005: 70-72; Roßnagel 2008: 69-70). A chance for the prolongation of working life is the declared political will in both countries to end the early exit trend (see the “National Strategy Reports” in FMoHSS 2005 and MSP 2005). Moreover, the disability pathway has been closed by applying medical criteria to the entitlement check. Early retirement in Germany is connected to malus payments. In Poland, a law abolishing early retirement for women and for workers in 230
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- Page 257 and 258: Frerichs, Frerich; Bögel, Jan (eds
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differences in EU impact are visible in the fact that Germany has equalised retirement ages<br />
of men and women, while in Poland, that issue has been debated since 1997 but no<br />
legislative attempts have been made in the last years, and there is no obligation to do so<br />
(with the exception of third pillar pensions according to Directive 2006/54/EC).<br />
According to neo-classical labour market theory, seniority wages diminish the<br />
recruitment and retention chances of older workforce (Soltwedel/Spinanger 1976). The<br />
seniority principle is strongly developed in wage formation in Poland, in Germany only (till<br />
2005) in the public sector, which locates a bigger barrier to the prolongation of working life<br />
in the Polish case.<br />
While there is a strong legislative and collectively agreed protection of long-standing<br />
workers in Germany, workers in Poland are protected from dismissal only four years prior<br />
to the earliest retirement age. The government sees it as impediment to higher employment<br />
rates and proposes to shorten the period to the previously valid two-year span (MPiPS 2008:<br />
19-20). However, 87 per cent of 650 private and civil service establishments surveyed in<br />
Poland did not perceive any negative employment effects of the longer protection period<br />
(Ipsos 2007: 40). Also with regard to the dismissal protection in Germany, the assessment is<br />
equivocal (contra: OECD 2005: 116, Eichhorst 2006a: 107-8; pro: Aust/Kremer 2007: 119-<br />
<strong>12</strong>0, Naegele 1992: 379, Bosch/Knuth 2003: 137; Behrens 1999: 91), therefore it can<br />
neither be assessed as a barrier nor an opportunity for prolonged employment.<br />
An ambiguous assessment also prevails with regard to the anti-discrimination legislation<br />
in Germany and Poland, as its impact is reduced by several exceptions which still make an<br />
ageist policy possible (Kocher 2005; Ruppert 2006; Sadlik 2007; Maniewska 2006).<br />
Nevertheless, the anti-discrimination legislation may raise the awareness of employers for<br />
latent discrimination and, by omitting age bars in job advertisements, encourage older jobseekers<br />
to apply. Moreover, a non-discriminatory working climate raises productivity and<br />
work morale (Dunn 2005: 70-72; Roßnagel 2008: 69-70).<br />
A chance for the prolongation of working life is the declared political will in both<br />
countries to end the early exit trend (see the “National Strategy Reports” in FMoHSS 2005<br />
and MSP 2005). Moreover, the disability pathway has been closed by applying medical<br />
criteria to the entitlement check. Early retirement in Germany is connected to malus<br />
payments. In Poland, a law abolishing early retirement for women and for workers in<br />
230