Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

At firm level, the neo-classical labour market theory and the concept of alternative roles
for older workers are confirmed with regard to recruitment and exit policy. Older workers
are treated by both Polish and German firms as a ´problem group´ and a flexibility resource
in those two personnel policy domains (hypothesis 2A). A reason is that their lower
productivity is universally assumed regardless of possible individual capacities. Older
workers are disadvantaged either because of their factual negative traits
(Soltwedel/Spinanger 1976: 276), e.g. ´bad habits from old system´ in the Polish case, or, as
the concept of alternative roles states (Offe/Hinrichs 1984: 46), they are discriminated
against not because of their personal characteristics, but because certain negative values are
ascribed to them on grounds of age. In contrast, further training policy in German firms and
health management and integration policy in German and Polish firms seems to follow the
firm-structural approach and the theory of incentives and contributions. Firms view both
older and younger workers as valuable resources which should be retained rather than
exhausted. (However, that does not imply that they automatically invest more in the
prevention of work incapacity and continuous further training; rather, most firms adopt a
reactive stance, as was shown in chapters 4.2. and 4.3.) Apparently, it is easier for firms to
be ´good practice´ in terms of qualitative personnel policy (in such areas as further training
and health management) than in terms of quantitative personnel policy (recruitment and
termination of the employment contract).
Structural theories have also explanatory power for the assessment of long-term chances
for a better labour market integration of older workers, which are rather unfavourable in
Poland, and only slightly better in Germany (hypothesis 6).
In sum, it can be concluded that my study has confirmed the explanatory power and the
interrelations between institutional and structural theoretical approaches. The results also
confirm the combined explanatory power of the push and pull thesis of early exit that has
already been heralded by Kohli and Rein (1991). The authors perceived the agency of the
legislator in the field of pension and labour market policy to large extents as a response to
changing economic pressures and “muddling through”. Adopted to my topic, that would
mean that the state was not a pace-setter and initiator of pro-active policies. I would not go
so far as to diminish the scope of state´s action merely to reaction, as institutional changes
have clearly had effects on early exit preferences and the actual labour/leisure choice of
individuals, as well as on some aspects of company agency. Nevertheless, the extent to
which those institutional determinants take effect is bounded by the economic condition of
firms and the situation on the labour markets.
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