Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
conclusion that “no one will save the firm, if not them” (ibid). That resembles the situation in Germany (Schmidt/Trinczek 1999: 117-8) and in my German case studies (section 4.2.9.) There were also trade unions which supported the interest of older workers. That happened by rejecting their selection for individual dismissals, by convincing them not to exit early, or openly criticising the externalisation strategy towards older workers.. An interesting mechanism of collusion of interests of trade unions and workers occurred in three firms, where trade unions enforced dismissals for operational reasons or mass layoffs in order to let workers exit via pre-retirement benefits before the change of law. Other issues pertaining to early exit are dealt with by nation-wide trade unions. The head offices of the post-communist OPZZ trade unions and of the Solidarity trade union are constantly lobbying for the prolongation of early old-age pensions. However, age management, especially the creation of opportunities for the prolongation of working life, is neither on the agenda of firm-level nor nation-wide trade unions. Hypothesis 7 (see section 2.4.) can be answered in a founded way only at the example of Firm PL-9. There, the employer signed voluntary exits programmes with several trade unions (inter al. the largest one), while the Solidarity trade union chose not to participate. However, my impression is that it was the power of the employer alone, and not the situation of rivalling trade unions, which brought about such a result. That (largest) trade union decided to cooperate only after the first wave of reductions had taken place, in order to improve the conditions of exit for affected (older and younger) workers. Also in talks with trade unionists in other firms, I learnt that the decision to cooperate with the management on issues of personnel reductions had not been sparked by the wish to distinguish themselves from rival trade unions and to attract more members, but to limit the power of the employer and to improve the position of workers: “[I]f there was not this puffer in the form of trade unions, then the lot of workers would be much worse” (Firm PL-6_TU). That knowledge speaks against hypothesis 7. I regard the contrary position of the two studied trade unions as sparked by their institutional legacy (Solidarity trade unions were always antagonistic towards employers as representatives of the ruling party; Tuszyńska 2003: 146) and by the past developments at organisational level (in the course of past reductions, the Solidarity trade union has lost most of its members). However, in order to test the hypothesis in a comprehensive way, and not solely restricted to Firm PL-9, interviews with representatives of at least one other trade union in 205
each firm would be needed. From the interviews with managers and with chairpersons of usually the largest trade union in the firm, I did not gain knowledge on the relations with other trade unions. This section has shown that the power of trade unions to co-decide on employment matters in Polish enterprises is reduced to issues of employment protection in case of personnel reductions. If trade unions have an impact on other matters, it is due to sectoral affiliation (in the energy sector, trade unions have a traditionally high standing), the public ownership character of the given establishment (in which trade unions have not yet been deprived of power), or the established mode of good cooperation between the management and trade unions in the given firm. The interests of the actors at firm level could also be best studied on the example of personnel reductions and early exit. The relations between shop-level trade unions, the management and the workers took three forms – a general collusion of interests, a collusion of interests between the employer and trade unions (co-management), and between workers and their trade unions (enforcing redundancies on the employer in order to let older workers utilise still available exit pathways). 4.3.10. Conclusions In this chapter, I will repeat the results of hypothesis testing given in the previous subsections with the exception of hypothesis 5 which will be repeated and compared between the two country cases at the end of the comparative chapter 4.4. Afterwards, I will conduct a typological analysis of the 14 firms in my sample based on presented evidence. Hypothesis 1 (see section 2.1.) is not supported in the Polish case. Polish firms in my sample in most cases present a ´no reaction´ pattern. However, one reason for this is the fact that incentives for trend reversal at establishment level have not been sufficiently communicated by state actors (back-and-forth policy, contradictory messages) and that sufficient coercion mechanisms (e.g. the enforcement of the anti-discrimination legislation) have not set in. Moreover, there are no financial incentives to hire long-term unemployed or insufficiently educated older workers similar to those in Germany. I would assume that respective subsidies would be embraced by Polish firms which react sensitively to financial incentives. 206
- Page 165 and 166: with a health management professor
- Page 167 and 168: only limited impact (and interest)
- Page 169 and 170: those who cannot was reported by fi
- Page 171 and 172: I made out some forms of irrational
- Page 173 and 174: Another result of my studies, which
- Page 175 and 176: sections of this work. At aggregate
- Page 177 and 178: Table 20: Establishments studied in
- Page 179 and 180: 4.3.2. Overall human resource manag
- Page 181 and 182: wages, jubilee awards, or a longer
- Page 183 and 184: dominate over measures which treat
- Page 185 and 186: education, computer literacy, knowl
- Page 187 and 188: the recruitment practice. In the ab
- Page 189 and 190: To sum up, applicants over 50 are t
- Page 191 and 192: training is provided for persons
- Page 193 and 194: Neither hypothesis 2A nor hypothesi
- Page 195 and 196: an occupational safety inspector. B
- Page 197 and 198: The internalisation strategy - job
- Page 199 and 200: supported with regard to the age of
- Page 201 and 202: firms have an even longer protectio
- Page 203 and 204: standard retirement age, the option
- Page 205 and 206: A striking feature in most firms is
- Page 207 and 208: A polarisation in exit preferences
- Page 209 and 210: espective improvements in several H
- Page 211 and 212: That analysis evidently demonstrate
- Page 213 and 214: Figure 13: Procedure of translating
- Page 215: policy, as they have experience on
- Page 219 and 220: working conditions). Also instituti
- Page 221 and 222: of home country nationals in manage
- Page 223 and 224: European corporation which is very
- Page 225 and 226: Figure 14: Firm typology Firm label
- Page 227 and 228: The qualitative support for the hyp
- Page 229 and 230: eacted to pension reforms which sou
- Page 231 and 232: Germany are more successful in prot
- Page 233 and 234: older workers, but I nevertheless u
- Page 235 and 236: 5. Barriers and Opportunities for P
- Page 237 and 238: At firm level, the neo-classical la
- Page 239 and 240: go policies´ (Schömann 2006: 135)
- Page 241 and 242: differences in EU impact are visibl
- Page 243 and 244: prevention does not play a role yet
- Page 245 and 246: from coal heating to gas and oil, r
- Page 247 and 248: innovative ideas of work-life balan
- Page 249 and 250: term orientated, personnel policy r
- Page 251 and 252: Badura, Bernhard; Schellschmidt, He
- Page 253 and 254: Brown, Halina Szejnwald; Angel, Dav
- Page 255 and 256: Dunn, Suzanne, 2005: “Effective S
- Page 257 and 258: Frerichs, Frerich; Bögel, Jan (eds
- Page 259 and 260: Heidenreich, Martin, 1991: "Verallg
- Page 261 and 262: Kistler, E.; Ebert, A.; Guggemos, P
- Page 263 and 264: Marstedt, Gerd et al., 2003: Alt we
- Page 265 and 266: etrieblicher Personalpolitik und st
each firm would be needed. From the interviews with managers and with chairpersons of<br />
usually the largest trade union in the firm, I did not gain knowledge on the relations with<br />
other trade unions.<br />
This section has shown that the power of trade unions to co-decide on employment<br />
matters in Polish enterprises is reduced to issues of employment protection in case of<br />
personnel reductions. If trade unions have an impact on other matters, it is due to sectoral<br />
affiliation (in the energy sector, trade unions have a traditionally high standing), the public<br />
ownership character of the given establishment (in which trade unions have not yet been<br />
deprived of power), or the established mode of good cooperation between the management<br />
and trade unions in the given firm.<br />
The interests of the actors at firm level could also be best studied on the example of<br />
personnel reductions and early exit. The relations between shop-level trade unions, the<br />
management and the workers took three forms – a general collusion of interests, a collusion<br />
of interests between the employer and trade unions (co-management), and between workers<br />
and their trade unions (enforcing redundancies on the employer in order to let older workers<br />
utilise still available exit pathways).<br />
4.3.10. Conclusions<br />
In this chapter, I will repeat the results of hypothesis testing given in the previous subsections<br />
with the exception of hypothesis 5 which will be repeated and compared between<br />
the two country cases at the end of the comparative chapter 4.4. Afterwards, I will conduct<br />
a typological analysis of the 14 firms in my sample based on presented evidence.<br />
Hypothesis 1 (see section 2.1.) is not supported in the Polish case. Polish firms in my<br />
sample in most cases present a ´no reaction´ pattern. However, one reason for this is the fact<br />
that incentives for trend reversal at establishment level have not been sufficiently<br />
communicated by state actors (back-and-forth policy, contradictory messages) and that<br />
sufficient coercion mechanisms (e.g. the enforcement of the anti-discrimination legislation)<br />
have not set in. Moreover, there are no financial incentives to hire long-term unemployed or<br />
insufficiently educated older workers similar to those in Germany. I would assume that<br />
respective subsidies would be embraced by Polish firms which react sensitively to financial<br />
incentives.<br />
206