Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
following the structure of past sections. I will close this section with an assessment of hypothesis 7. Trade unions have lost ground in Polish enterprises in the course of transformation of the Polish economy and privatisation of state enterprises (see section 3.3.5.; Jarosz 1997: 65). Also the unionisation ratios have fallen, a.o. due to the connotation of the Solidarity trade union with unfavourable changes in the economy in the opinion of many Poles (Tuszyńska 2003: 147-8). In my firm case studies, several shop stewards and also one personnel manager reported a decreased impact of trade unions after privatisation. New regulations in the Labour Code since 2005 have deprived shop-level trade unions of co-decision power in the case of mass lay-offs – they may still give an opinion on the workers selected for dismissal, but the employer does not have to respect it, as was reported by two interviewees. Trade unions have also lost in power due to falling membership numbers. Reasons were downsizing, outsourcing or a general decrease of interest in union policy (e.g. in a transportation equipment company, membership decreased within 3 years from 400 to 100 persons). However, in some firms the power of trade unions has been preserved, owing to the importance of the sector for the national economy (energy sector), or to internal traditions of cooperative relations. The latter situation was most likely to happen in firms with a long history and many long-standing workers and thus with a “small distance” between employer and employee (Bartscher-Finzer/Martin 1998: 131-2). Trade unions in the surveyed Polish companies have only limited co-decision power on recruitment issues. They exert it during personnel reductions by enforcing a hiring freeze in order to protect incumbent workers, and by encouraging preferential recruitment of internal candidates. In two firms, shop-level trade unions had a somewhat larger impact upon recruitment matters resulting from the public ownership structure, resp. from internal traditions of cooperative relations. The impact of shop-level trade unions on further training was even lower and was reported only by shop stewards from a utility (with a traditionally higher impact of employee representatives upon company policy) and another firm with internal traditions of cooperative relations. There, trade unions serve as internal auditors and consultants. E.g., the trade unions in the utility play the role of a referee and consultant on issues of training 203
policy, as they have experience on the old, communist system of further training which was regarded in some respects as better by both the employee representatives and management. Trade unions have little impact on issues of health management, and are not very committed to that issue. At national level, Brown et al. (2001: 254) even reached the conclusion that trade unions in Poland „oppose investments into occupational health as competing with their primary concerns such as employment security, compensation, and social benefits“. A special role had fallen to trade unions in the process of privatisation of state-owned enterprises (Towalski 2003; Gąciarz/Pańków 1996; Siewierski 1993). I will remark on it to the degree that it concerned personnel reductions and early exit. An exemplary case of the influence of trade unions on the privatisation process forms Firm PL-9. In 1992, the firm was commercialised, which is a preliminary stage of privatisation. Due to ensuing restructuring, the trade unions in the firm put pressure on the Ministry to release the CEO, and consented to privatisation by a Western European investor. In exchange for the agreement, the workers received 15 per cent of shares and a privatisation premium and seven-year employment guarantees starting from mid-1998. During that time, only voluntary exit of workers were possible, and a hiring freeze was instituted. Employment guarantees were also introduced in three other firms, ranging from two till five years. Such guarantees were however only possible if the firm had gone through the state of commercialisation, i.e. was owned by the state. A Social Plan in case of mass layoffs – which were possible in the absence of employment guarantees – could be negotiated only in firms with a majority shareholder. In firms where that had not been the case (e.g. in Firm PL-12 before acquisition by the US American owner, or in Firm PL-13), personnel reductions were especially severe, and the power of trade unions to steer the process was lowest. In some firms, trade unions suggested to release workers with an entitlement to social security benefits in the first place, even against the resistance of older workers. The motivation was to secure workplaces for remaining workers, to create vacancies for younger applicants, and to lower the average age of the workforce. Such examples of co-management are sign of the change in labour relations at firm level from confrontation to negotiation (Siewierski 1993: 144). Trade unions have reached the 204
- Page 163 and 164: ationalisation, and foster adaptive
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policy, as they have experience on the old, communist system of further training which was<br />
regarded in some respects as better by both the employee representatives and management.<br />
Trade unions have little impact on issues of health management, and are not very<br />
committed to that issue. At national level, Brown et al. (2001: 254) even reached the<br />
conclusion that trade unions in Poland „oppose investments into occupational health as<br />
competing with their primary concerns such as employment security, compensation, and<br />
social benefits“.<br />
A special role had fallen to trade unions in the process of privatisation of state-owned<br />
enterprises (Towalski 2003; Gąciarz/Pańków 1996; Siewierski 1993). I will remark on it to<br />
the degree that it concerned personnel reductions and early exit.<br />
An exemplary case of the influence of trade unions on the privatisation process forms<br />
Firm PL-9. In 1992, the firm was commercialised, which is a preliminary stage of<br />
privatisation. Due to ensuing restructuring, the trade unions in the firm put pressure on the<br />
Ministry to release the CEO, and consented to privatisation by a Western European<br />
investor. In exchange for the agreement, the workers received 15 per cent of shares and a<br />
privatisation premium and seven-year employment guarantees starting from mid-1998.<br />
During that time, only voluntary exit of workers were possible, and a hiring freeze was<br />
instituted.<br />
Employment guarantees were also introduced in three other firms, ranging from two till<br />
five years. Such guarantees were however only possible if the firm had gone through the<br />
state of commercialisation, i.e. was owned by the state. A Social Plan in case of mass layoffs<br />
– which were possible in the absence of employment guarantees – could be negotiated<br />
only in firms with a majority shareholder. In firms where that had not been the case (e.g. in<br />
Firm PL-<strong>12</strong> before acquisition by the US American owner, or in Firm PL-13), personnel<br />
reductions were especially severe, and the power of trade unions to steer the process was<br />
lowest.<br />
In some firms, trade unions suggested to release workers with an entitlement to social<br />
security benefits in the first place, even against the resistance of older workers. The<br />
motivation was to secure workplaces for remaining workers, to create vacancies for<br />
younger applicants, and to lower the average age of the workforce.<br />
Such examples of co-management are sign of the change in labour relations at firm level<br />
from confrontation to negotiation (Siewierski 1993: 144). Trade unions have reached the<br />
204