Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

and lacks a long-term strategic orientation, let alone elements of an age management
strategy.
Hypothesis 1 (see section 2.1.) is not supported here – institutional regulations have
only limited effect upon the practice of Polish enterprises. At present, Polish firms react to
institutional coercion but do not invent integrative measures (´positive reaction´) as a result.
However, the institutional coercion is not felt at the moment firstly, the Constitutional
Court has deemed some forms of ageist practice still lawful (Maniewska 2006); secondly,
there is a time lag before certain reforms take full effect (termination of early retirement);
and thirdly, firms can shift the responsibility for certain reforms to workers (more strict
rules with regard to disability pensions). On overall, the demands to prolong working life
were voiced by the legislator in Poland much more weakly than in Germany. Incentives to
hire older workers have not yet been introduced by state actors, and qualification subsidies
were announced only in 2008 (MPiPS 2008). My impression is that Polish employers, who
react strongly to financial incentives, would be more prone to utilise such incentives than do
German employers.
Therefore, the ´no reaction´ pattern dominates in Polish firms. Polish firms rely to a
greater extent on the legislator to develop pathways of early exit, and await the legislator´s
decisions on the continuation of that trend. Due to the limited financial viability of Polish
firms in times of restructuring, they cannot yet afford to open up their own early exit
pathways like is the case in Germany. The ´negative reaction´ pattern is so far limited to
cushioning early exit by financial compensation maximally amounting to 12 monthly
wages. However, in future, voluntary exit programmes introduced by several companies as
a means of speeding up personnel reductions in times of employment guarantees could
achieve the status of an “instrument substitution” (Casey 1989) given an adequately high
compensation.
Another argument against hypothesis 1 rests on my model of decisions at firm level,
(Fig. 1 in chapter 2.). A modified and simplified version of that model in view of results
from Polish case studies is presented in Figure 13. That figure portrays the process of
translating institutional innovations at establishment level. 56
56 The actor-centred institutionalism (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995) recognises that also actors at firm level
(management and employee representatives) and social partners set agendas for action to be followed by the
legislator. E.g., the legislator can make allowances to firms which are shedding labour due to economic
reasons. This situation occurred in Poland during mass lay-offs of the 1990s when the legislator introduced
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