Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
etire, because we have very large severance payments, and we also have jubilee awards paid out every five years.” In total, those sums can reach the amount of yearly wages. Another form of push factors is the agitation by the employer or by trade unions. Workers in a dairy company, in a chemicals company, and in two energy suppliers are actively informed about the available options and even convinced to make use of early exit. In times of downsizing, some firms choose less subtle methods and older workers are actively pushed out. That occurred in eight firms. In some cases, that was sparked by the concern for the material security of workers: “We have (…) been convincing them to leave. Because we knew that there can be a situation when we do not have work for them, and they will leave on worse conditions.” (Firm PL-7_HRM) In other cases, older workers were convinced to go in order to secure workplaces for persons without entitlements to social security benefits: Older workers in many cases decided to leave on their own out of sympathy for younger colleagues or their own children, whose workplaces could that way either be secured or created. In some firms, workers selected for dismissals were personally informed about the situation and given a choice between signing a cancellation agreement and receiving a higher severance payment as reward, or being dismissed with a lower compensation. There is also a crowding-out of incumbent workers by their younger successors. E.g., the construction company wanted to clear vacancies for graduates of vocational schools at the time of the first interview, and in a privatised utility, younger persons selected for managerial positions had crowded out older workers who were then degraded and encouraged to leave the firm. In general, those factors reflect retirement motives recorded at aggregate level (Zgierska 2007: 5; MPiPS 2008: 50) and resemble the early exit motives presented in the section on German case studies (4.2.7.) which demonstrates that structural factors – high unemployment level and the process of downsizing in firms – play a role for making (or enforcing) retirement decisions. A large difference to Germany is however the genderspecific 5- till 10-year gap in exit ages of women and men, and alternative income sources for Polish pensioners in the form of shadow economy and opening up one´s own business or working at one´s farm. Also the low life expectancy of Poles and the wish to enjoy last years of life is seen by some interviewees as a motive of early withdrawal from work. A specifically Polish push factor is being worn out by “revolutionary” changes in the country and in the firm which contributes to low job satisfaction, a feeling of lagging behind, and a general tiredness of work (named by 5 interviewees). 195
A polarisation in exit preferences became visible depending on working conditions (persons working in ´special´, burdening and health-harming conditions prefer early exit and more often suffer from health impairments which renders them incapable of work) and on the level of earnings. According to the experts´ opinion, persons with higher wages, often occupying managerial positions and showing a higher job satisfaction, prefer to continue work as long as possible, while low-earners want to exit early. The low difference between (low) wages after exemption of commuting costs to the (equally low) preretirement benefits moves workers to exit early, even more as the old-age pension in the old system rises only insignificantly with each additional year of work. Interestingly enough, and in stark contrast to the German case, the decisions of Poles in pre-retirement age point rather to the life cycle theory (opting for early retirement in the absence of actuarially neutral deductions) and to the observation of the principle that benefits must be lower than wages rather than to the hypothesis of securing the standard of living (which assesses that retirees-to-be decide about the timing of retirement on grounds of minimising income losses and keeping their income position; Dinkel 1988). The results also demonstrate that older workers who want to escape work – be it for family, health or job-related reasons – are willing to reduce their financial claims. That corresponds with a low-developed interest of Poles in making precautions for their future pension level (Szumlicz 2007: 185). Some interviewees observed that workers have lost the interest in exiting via preretirement benefits after worsened conditions in 2004. In a dairy company, that has complicated the process of personnel reductions, as workers do not any more take the initiative to exit early. That shows that workers factually adjust their exit choices to changed conditions, but their preferences are still orientated towards old privileges. Moreover, in times of downsizing, even those workers who do not want to exit on lower pre-retirement benefits are often forced to do so. Therefore, one should speak of negotiated or enforced retirement decisions rather than of preferences. In the light of those findings, hypothesis 4 (see section 2.3.) is supported, but supplemented with the addition that structural variables (the position of the firm on the market, restructuring or downsizing needs) have determining power. Only the intermingling of structural and institutional factors brings about the specific pattern of early exit in Poland. Other factors which interact with institutional factors (and which had been one of the reasons for the introduction of early retirement in the 1980s) are located at the 196
- Page 155 and 156: and the agitation by the works coun
- Page 157 and 158: and on the other side, externalisat
- Page 159 and 160: severance payment in case of the 58
- Page 161 and 162: older workers, without further adju
- Page 163 and 164: ationalisation, and foster adaptive
- Page 165 and 166: with a health management professor
- Page 167 and 168: only limited impact (and interest)
- Page 169 and 170: those who cannot was reported by fi
- Page 171 and 172: I made out some forms of irrational
- Page 173 and 174: Another result of my studies, which
- Page 175 and 176: sections of this work. At aggregate
- Page 177 and 178: Table 20: Establishments studied in
- Page 179 and 180: 4.3.2. Overall human resource manag
- Page 181 and 182: wages, jubilee awards, or a longer
- Page 183 and 184: dominate over measures which treat
- Page 185 and 186: education, computer literacy, knowl
- Page 187 and 188: the recruitment practice. In the ab
- Page 189 and 190: To sum up, applicants over 50 are t
- Page 191 and 192: training is provided for persons
- Page 193 and 194: Neither hypothesis 2A nor hypothesi
- Page 195 and 196: an occupational safety inspector. B
- Page 197 and 198: The internalisation strategy - job
- Page 199 and 200: supported with regard to the age of
- Page 201 and 202: firms have an even longer protectio
- Page 203 and 204: standard retirement age, the option
- Page 205: A striking feature in most firms is
- Page 209 and 210: espective improvements in several H
- Page 211 and 212: That analysis evidently demonstrate
- Page 213 and 214: Figure 13: Procedure of translating
- Page 215 and 216: policy, as they have experience on
- Page 217 and 218: each firm would be needed. From the
- Page 219 and 220: working conditions). Also instituti
- Page 221 and 222: of home country nationals in manage
- Page 223 and 224: European corporation which is very
- Page 225 and 226: Figure 14: Firm typology Firm label
- Page 227 and 228: The qualitative support for the hyp
- Page 229 and 230: eacted to pension reforms which sou
- Page 231 and 232: Germany are more successful in prot
- Page 233 and 234: older workers, but I nevertheless u
- Page 235 and 236: 5. Barriers and Opportunities for P
- Page 237 and 238: At firm level, the neo-classical la
- Page 239 and 240: go policies´ (Schömann 2006: 135)
- Page 241 and 242: differences in EU impact are visibl
- Page 243 and 244: prevention does not play a role yet
- Page 245 and 246: from coal heating to gas and oil, r
- Page 247 and 248: innovative ideas of work-life balan
- Page 249 and 250: term orientated, personnel policy r
- Page 251 and 252: Badura, Bernhard; Schellschmidt, He
- Page 253 and 254: Brown, Halina Szejnwald; Angel, Dav
- Page 255 and 256: Dunn, Suzanne, 2005: “Effective S
A polarisation in exit preferences became visible depending on working conditions<br />
(persons working in ´special´, burdening and health-harming conditions prefer early exit<br />
and more often suffer from health impairments which renders them incapable of work) and<br />
on the level of earnings. According to the experts´ opinion, persons with higher wages,<br />
often occupying managerial positions and showing a higher job satisfaction, prefer to<br />
continue work as long as possible, while low-earners want to exit early. The low difference<br />
between (low) wages after exemption of commuting costs to the (equally low) preretirement<br />
benefits moves workers to exit early, even more as the old-age pension in the old<br />
system rises only insignificantly with each additional year of work.<br />
Interestingly enough, and in stark contrast to the German case, the decisions of Poles in<br />
pre-retirement age point rather to the life cycle theory (opting for early retirement in the<br />
absence of actuarially neutral deductions) and to the observation of the principle that<br />
benefits must be lower than wages rather than to the hypothesis of securing the standard of<br />
living (which assesses that retirees-to-be decide about the timing of retirement on grounds<br />
of minimising income losses and keeping their income position; Dinkel 1988). The results<br />
also demonstrate that older workers who want to escape work – be it for family, health or<br />
job-related reasons – are willing to reduce their financial claims. That corresponds with a<br />
low-developed interest of Poles in making precautions for their future pension level<br />
(Szumlicz 2007: 185).<br />
Some interviewees observed that workers have lost the interest in exiting via preretirement<br />
benefits after worsened conditions in 2004. In a dairy company, that has<br />
complicated the process of personnel reductions, as workers do not any more take the<br />
initiative to exit early. That shows that workers factually adjust their exit choices to<br />
changed conditions, but their preferences are still orientated towards old privileges.<br />
Moreover, in times of downsizing, even those workers who do not want to exit on lower<br />
pre-retirement benefits are often forced to do so. Therefore, one should speak of negotiated<br />
or enforced retirement decisions rather than of preferences.<br />
In the light of those findings, hypothesis 4 (see section 2.3.) is supported, but<br />
supplemented with the addition that structural variables (the position of the firm on the<br />
market, restructuring or downsizing needs) have determining power. Only the intermingling<br />
of structural and institutional factors brings about the specific pattern of early exit in<br />
Poland. Other factors which interact with institutional factors (and which had been one of<br />
the reasons for the introduction of early retirement in the 1980s) are located at the<br />
196