Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
of January 2005. I therefore argue that the conditions for an activation of older workers are more favourable in Germany than in Poland. In both countries, opportunities for early retirement were installed in 1970s and 1980s and were soon after accepted and utilised on a great scale, bringing about the early exit trend which is typical of European countries. The motives behind the introduction of early exit options were different. While Germany pursued the issue of humanisation of work (early 1970s), the Polish legislator endeavoured to reduce the labour supply and to ensure the loyalty of workers of special interest for the national economy. The motive behind the extension of early retirement rights in early 1980s was to pacify Poles during times of martial law. The activity rates of older Poles have fallen markedly since the 1970s due to targeted policy of de-activation pursued by the state and due to the downturn of industry and agriculture where a large share of them was employed. The policy of de-activation of older workers was in Germany jointly pursued by the state, the employers and trade unions. In Poland, the state was the main policy-maker, as employers are rarely organised and trade unions were established only during martial law. In the preparations for the grand pension reform of 1998-99 in Poland and in subsequent negotiations on bridging pensions, trade unions emerged as proponents of an early de-activation, just as is the case with their German counterparts. With regard to the model of industrial relations, Germany and Poland take distinct values. Schroeder (2000: 36) locates the „political power centre of country-specific multilevel systems“ in Germany at the meso level. He argues that employers´ and employees´ associations are powerful but becoming less important, companies have medium but increasing importance, the state defines the framework of action and collective agreements have high but diminishing impact. In contrast, in Eastern European countries, the state is the main player in industrial relations (Schroeder 2004). The state is responsible for the process of privatisation and for the compliance with EU norms, and sets rules guiding the performance of market actors, e.g. defines the minimum wage. Companies are gaining in power in the process of privatisation. They are the main sparring partner for trade unions, as employers´ associations mostly exert lobby functions and are seldom engaged in collective bargaining. However, trade unions have lost ground in industrial relations (in distinction to socio-political issues) after the transformation (EC 2004c: 18). Schroeder (2004) therefore asserts the tendency towards barring collective agreements and pushing working conditions 5
under the factual minimum standards. I would assume this occurs especially in private, greenfield investments with foreign capital. For the subject of my work, that entails that in Poland the state has the power to develop early exit options or to close them. In distinction to Germany, trade unions do not have impact on those regulations, and companies do not have leeway in legal and financial terms to develop firm-based early exit options. 6 In Germany, trade unions are proponents of a shorter working life (von Winter 1997: 177ff; Keller 1997: 207ff). Given the importance of branch-level agreements, this poses worse chances to reverse the early exit trend than in Poland. However, on the other hand, trade unions in Germany are proponents of ´humanisation of work´ and the improvement of working conditions, therefore the assessment of their impact on the prolongation of working life can at best be equivocal. The same applies to the impact of workplace representation, which is higher in Germany due to the institution of co-determination. Both countries attempted to stop the trend to early retirement with the help of curtailing early retirement options, lowering the replacement ratio, and raising of retirement ages. However, not always did the attempts take the form of laws. In Poland, the plan to abolish early retirement privileges and to equalise retirement ages for both genders was stopped by trade unions and conservative parties. It can be observed that also in Germany, state actors back off from plans to cut early retirement options under unfavourable economic conditions. Half-hearted attempts at cutting back early exit incentives were undertaken in Germany in 1996, but failed due to the break of the inter-party consensus on welfare retrenchment. In the same year, the early retirement scheme in the blocked model was introduced which created a further pull factor. In Poland, the large unemployment in the post-transition period gave rise to early old-age pensions in cases of dismissal. The financial strain on social security measures was noticed in 1997 and the old-age pension was replaced with cheaper pre-retirement benefits and allowances. Thus, as in the case of Germany, first attempts at curtailing the trend towards early exit were undertaken in mid-1990s, but has had a limited effect on retirement transitions. Active labour market policies for older workers were instituted in both countries only in early years of the current decade. With regard to passive labour market policies, both countries grant older unemployed more favourable treatment, both in terms of benefit level, activation demands and entitlement conditions. 6 Although trade unions in Poland are indeed supporter of a lower retirement age and preservation of branch privileges (Orenstein 2000). 6
- Page 1 and 2: Chances and Barriers for the Prolon
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under the factual minimum standards. I would assume this occurs especially in private,<br />
greenfield investments with foreign capital.<br />
For the subject of my work, that entails that in Poland the state has the power to develop<br />
early exit options or to close them. In distinction to Germany, trade unions do not have<br />
impact on those regulations, and companies do not have leeway in legal and financial terms<br />
to develop firm-based early exit options. 6 In Germany, trade unions are proponents of a<br />
shorter working life (von Winter 1997: 177ff; Keller 1997: 207ff). Given the importance of<br />
branch-level agreements, this poses worse chances to reverse the early exit trend than in<br />
Poland. However, on the other hand, trade unions in Germany are proponents of<br />
´humanisation of work´ and the improvement of working conditions, therefore the<br />
assessment of their impact on the prolongation of working life can at best be equivocal. The<br />
same applies to the impact of workplace representation, which is higher in Germany due to<br />
the institution of co-determination.<br />
Both countries attempted to stop the trend to early retirement with the help of curtailing<br />
early retirement options, lowering the replacement ratio, and raising of retirement ages.<br />
However, not always did the attempts take the form of laws. In Poland, the plan to abolish<br />
early retirement privileges and to equalise retirement ages for both genders was stopped by<br />
trade unions and conservative parties. It can be observed that also in Germany, state actors<br />
back off from plans to cut early retirement options under unfavourable economic conditions.<br />
Half-hearted attempts at cutting back early exit incentives were undertaken in Germany in<br />
1996, but failed due to the break of the inter-party consensus on welfare retrenchment. In<br />
the same year, the early retirement scheme in the blocked model was introduced which<br />
created a further pull factor. In Poland, the large unemployment in the post-transition period<br />
gave rise to early old-age pensions in cases of dismissal. The financial strain on social<br />
security measures was noticed in 1997 and the old-age pension was replaced with cheaper<br />
pre-retirement benefits and allowances. Thus, as in the case of Germany, first attempts at<br />
curtailing the trend towards early exit were undertaken in mid-1990s, but has had a limited<br />
effect on retirement transitions.<br />
Active labour market policies for older workers were instituted in both countries only in<br />
early years of the current decade. With regard to passive labour market policies, both<br />
countries grant older unemployed more favourable treatment, both in terms of benefit level,<br />
activation demands and entitlement conditions.<br />
6 Although trade unions in Poland are indeed supporter of a lower retirement age and preservation of branch<br />
privileges (Orenstein 2000).<br />
6
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