Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

conditions, with concomitant receipt of a favourable wage compensation. The works
councils are therefore proponents of developing a replacement model for ATZ.
Employee representatives in the studied firms always strive for avoiding dismissals due
to operational reasons. In some firms or sectors, Agreements on Protection against
Rationalisation are being concluded for such purposes (e.g. in the banking sector, in the
public sector, in Firm DE-5, in Firm DE-13 at times, in Firm DE-10, planned by the works
council in Firm DE-9), and social plans define the priority of „socially acceptable“
measures of personnel reductions over dismissals. Works councils have co-determination
powers in case of dismissals, and their intervention on behalf of workers selected for
dismissal is usually successful.
The prevention of dismissals due to operational reasons was in most cases only possible
due to the use of other alternatives. Here, employee representatives played a role in
focusing the personnel reductions on older workers. That is sign of a change in the position
of works councils within German firms, and the risen importance of firm-level compared to
branch-level bargaining (Weitbrecht 2003: 69-70). The works council plays here the role of
a co-manager (Schmidt/Trinczek 1999: 117) by preventing dismissals and, at the same
time, supporting the personnel management in using early retirement as a downsizing
measure (e.g. in Firm DE-3).
There were singular contradictory examples to that line of action, of WCM who
favoured the termination of younger workers´ contracts instead of releasing older ones, or
who opted for the extension for the protection against dismissals of older workers (Firm
DE-4, Firm DE-13, Firm DE-14).
In the light of those findings, the part of hypothesis 7 related to Germany (see section
2.4.) is herewith supported. The institution of co-determination necessitates the
management to consult matters related to the termination of the work contract with
employee representatives. Moreover, due to the model of homogeneous trade union
representation in one company, they do not have to compete for power and are more prone
to compromise. In fact, recent history of labour relations shows a far-reaching collusion of
interests between the two parties over early retirement (Ebbinghaus 2002: 48).
This section has shown that the degree of cooperation or conflict between the works
council and the management differs with regard to HRM fields. While works councils have
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