Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

diminished options of socially acceptable personnel adjustments and new vacancies. Both
parties agreed in their assessment that the adjustment to reforms is costly and often not
feasible, and blamed the government for placing burdens onto firms. However, they also
perceived the necessity to restore public finances to sustainability.
The qualitative panel was of great use in order to analyse the adaptation to reforms.
This dynamic perspective allowed, firstly, for cross-checking the declarations of
management or employee representatives at the first interview with actual deeds
accomplished or renounced by the time of the second interview. Secondly, it was possible
to study adaptation patterns at a time when respective pension reforms were still far away,
and at a time when their passing was near or phasing-in periods were almost over.
However, even at the time of the second interview, some reforms have not engendered full
effects. I assume that firms will react differently in medium term, e.g. after a first wave of
legal suits for ageism.
4.2.9. Cooperation between the Management and the Employee
Representation
This chapter will delineate the cooperation between the works council and the personnel
management as central actors which are responsible for translating institutional regulations
at firm level and for setting the course in the direction of age management or, on the
contrary, pursuing the current externalising course of action. The chapter will observe the
decision-making process at firm level which was included as part of the national analytical
model in Figure 3 (see section 3.1.).
In German companies, decision-making takes place between the works council and the
management. After the amendment of the Works Constitution Act in 1972, the personnel
manager became the main sparring partner of employee representatives (Weitbrecht 2003:
72). The result of the negotiations are works council agreements and personnel policies in
such fields as recruitment, dismissals, training, health management, remuneration, and
personnel deployment.
There is little evidence whether works councils influence employers´ dismissal (and
employees´ quit) decisions and the allocation of funds for further training (Backes-Gellner
et al. 1997: 332-4). Quantitative results report a lower dismissal and lower quit rate in firms
with a works council. The works councils also play an active role in protecting training
investments. They enforce further training measures in order to reduce the risks of
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